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Abstract 
It has been established that children and adolescents can develop post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PITSD) in response to traumatic events, such as technological 
disasters and wars. However, this research has focused principally on the 
prevalence of PTSD in this age group. A number of key issues surrounding 
children and adolescents' responses to trauma, including the nature of post- 
traumatic stress symptomatology and the factors related to the onset and 
maintenance of the disorder, have yet to be examined. 
Two studies were designed to test the applicability of recent cognitive models of 
PTSD in adults to children and adolescents. Study 1 involved investigating PTSD 
symptornatology in a non-clinical sample drawn from secondary schools. Children 
and adolescents aged 11-18 years (n=254) completed self-report questionnaires 
regarding a recent frightening event. These questionnaires examined the quality 
and frequency of intrusive memories of the event, strategies for coping with these 
memories, and appraisals of the event and its sequelae. Study 2 was a prospective- 
longitudinal study of children and adolescents aged 10-16 years (n=106) who had 
attended an Accident and Emergency department in South London following an 
assault or road traffic accident. Participants in this study were assessed by way of 
a semi-structured interview schedule and completed self-report questionnaires 
regarding psychopathology, cognitive styles, trauma appraisals, and coping 
strategies. 
Regression analyses of both Study I and Study 2 responses revealed the 
importance of cognitive styles and trauma memory quality (as opposed to 
demographic and trauma-related variables) in the aetiology of PTSD. Regression 
analyses of Study 2 responses distinguished between onset and maintenance 
processes in the aetiology of PTSD, and revealed the relative effect of these 
processes in causing PTSD and depression. These results are discussed with 
regards to the theoretical understanding of PTSD in children and adolescents, the 
treatment offered to this population, and suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and rationale 
1.1 General Introduction 
It has only been acknowledged during the past 15 years or so that children and 
adolescents may suffer from PTSD. In a major review in the early 1980s of 
children's responses to trauma, Garmezy and Rutter (1985) concluded that 
children's reactions to trauma were not as serious as those developed by adults, 
and that children's reactions did not warrant inclusion within the newly 
formulated diagnostic category of PTSD. This was due particularly to there being 
no reports that children exposed to disasters displayed PTSD-specific symptoms 
such as amnesia, psychic numbing, or intrusive flashbacks. 
Particular barriers to the understanding of children's reactions to traumatic events 
were quickly highlighted. Yule and Williams (1990) pointed out that studies of 
children exposed to trauma are difficult to conduct due to the tendency of adults to 
be highly protective towards such children and deny that children can suffer 
psychiatric disturbance following trauma. In addition, these authors noted that one 
of the earliest studies (Galante & Foa, 1986) had not used scales appropriate for 
detection of traumatic stress reactions in children. 
A more detailed understanding of PTSD in children and adolescents was derived 
from the use of assessment measures designed specifically for PTSD. The Impact 
of Event Scale (IES; Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979) was utilized in a study 
of children involved in the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry disaster (Yule & 
Williams, 1990). Children assessed using this self-report measure were found to 
score in a similar fashion to adults. The PTSD Reaction Index (PTSD-RI), a 
structured interview based on the DSM-III diagnostic criteria for PTSD (APA, 
1980), was used by Pynoos et al. (1987) to assess children who had witnessed a 
fatal sniper attack on their school playground. Children in the playground at the 
time of the shooting were very likely to develop FITSD, with 77% developing 
moderate to severe levels of PTSD. 
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These key articles that helped to bring about an acceptance of the validity of the 
PTSD diagnosis in children utilized scales and interviews based on diagnostic 
criteria initially designed for adults. The study of reactions to traumatic events has 
been conducted formally for several more years within the adult population, and a 
number of theories concerning the aetiology of PTSD have been suggested. 
Before theoretical insights can be gleaned from research on adult populations 
subjected to trauma however, the issue remains of whether it is appropriate to 
continue to assume that child PITSD is essentially the same disorder as that found 
in adults. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to advance the understanding of children and 
adolescents' reactions to traumatic events and examine how such an 
understanding may benefit from models of PTSD in adults. This introductory 
chapter will comprise several sections. First, a brief critical review of theoretical 
accounts of PTSD in children and adolescents will be provided. Secondly, two 
recent cognitive models of PTSD in adults that have been shown to account for 
many of the key features of PTSD and have generated testable hypotheses. will be 
outlined. Third, evidence concerning the pattern of re-experiencing observed in 
children will be considered. Fourth, the time course of PTSD in children and 
adolescents, and the relevance of the Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) diagnosis, will 
be discussed. Fifth, psychosocial factors implicated as having a role in the 
aetiology of child and adolescent PTSD will be outlined. Sixth, the applicability of 
cognitive processes proposed in adult models of PTSD to PTSD in children and 
adolescents will be discussed. Finally, a summary of this introduction and a 
rationale of the studies undertaken for this thesis will be provided. 
1.2 Current understanding of PTSD in children and adolescents 
PTSD is categorised within DSM-IV (APA, 1994) as an anxiety disorder. The 
diagnostic criteria of PTSD are displayed in Table 1.1. Only two notes are entered 
into the diagnosis (both regarding the re-experiencing symptoms of criterion B) in 
order to account for ways in which PTSD in young children differs from PTSD in 
adults. Thus, even in the diagnostic formulations of the disorder, PTSD in children 
16 
and adolescents is not considered to be significantly different from FTSD in 
adults. In this section, a brief overview will be provided of the most significant 
conceptualizations of PTSD in children and adolescents that have been offered 
over the past 15 years. The models were selected so as to provide an idea of the 
breadth of theoretical perspectives adopted so far in trying to understand 
children's responses to trauma, and the selection is by no means comprehensive. 
Pynoos and colleagues (Pynoos, Steinberg, & Wraith, 1995; Pynoos, 1994; 
Pynoos, Steinberg, & Goenjian, 1996; Pynoos, Steinberg, & Piacentini, 1999) 
have considered children and adolescents' reactions to trauma within a 
developmental life-trajectory model. A child's short-term reaction to a trauma is 
considered to be moderated by four groups of factors: i) proximal trauma 
reminders (e. g., external and internal cues, physiological reactivity), ii) proximal 
secondary stresses (e. g., changes to family and community circumstances), iii) the 
"ecology" of the child (e. g., parental, school and peer factors), and iv) factors 
intrinsic to the child (e. g., genetic predisposition, developmental competencies). In 
particular, it is argued that "the etiology of posttraumatic distress, [is derived 
from] the nature of the traumatic experience(s) and from the subsequent traumatic 
reminders and secondary stressors [Pynoos, Steinberg, & Wraith, 1995, p. 72; the 
italics are the original author's]". A child's long-term reaction and adjustment is 
likely to be related to ongoing reminders of the trauma and persistent secondary 
stressors (e. g., physical disability, legal proceedings, etc. ). 
17 
Table 1.1 DSM-IV Criteria for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder 
A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following have 
been present: 
1. The person has experienced, witnessed, or been confronted with an event or 
events, that involve actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the 
physical integrity of oneself or others. 
2. The person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. Note: In 
children, it may be expressed by disorganized or agitated behavior. 
B. The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in at least one of the following 
ways: 
1. Recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, 
thoughts, or perceptions. Note: In young children, repetitive play may occur in 
which themes or aspects of the trauma are expressed. 
2. Recurrent distressing dreams of the event. 
Note: In children, there may be frightening dreams without recognizable content. 
3. Acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of 
reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback 
episodes, including those that occur upon awakening or when intoxicated). 
Note: In young children, trauma specific reenactment may occur. 
4. Intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that 
symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event. 
5. Physiological reactivity upon exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize 
or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event. 
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general 
responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by at least three of the 
following: 
L Efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma. 
2. Efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the 
trauma. 
3. Inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma. 
4. Markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities. 
5. Feelings of detachment or estrangement from others. 
6. Restricted range of affect (e. g., unable to have loving feelings). 
7. Sense of a foreshortened future (e. g., does not expect to have a career, marriage, 
children, or a normal life span). 
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as indicated 
by at least two of the following: 
1. Difficulty falling or staying asleep. 
2. Irritability or outbursts of anger. 
3. Difficulty concentrating. 
4. Hypervigilance. 
5. Exaggerated startle response. 
E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in B, C, and D) is more than I month. 
F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning. 
Specify if- 
Acute: If duration of symptoms is less than 3 months. 
Chronic: If duration of symptoms is 3 months or more. 
Specify if-. 
With delayed onset: Onset of symptoms at least 6 months after the stressor. 
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This conceptualisation is important as it integrates existing psychodynamic, 
familial, cognitive-behavioural and psychopharmacological approaches to 
children and adolescents' reactions to trauma, and leaves little doubt as to the 
dramatic impact of "the legacy of trauma". With regards to future research, 
Pynoos and colleagues advocate the investigation of a number of areas, including 
the development of brain mechanisms and how PTSD intersects with other 
anxiety disorders over the life span. 
In a review of the literature concerning PTSD in children and adolescents, 
Fletcher (1996) adopted a multi-factorial model similar to that of Pynoos and 
colleagues. Fletcher concluded that children react to trauma in a way very similar 
to that of adults, and called for further research to examine why it is that some 
children develop PTSD while others do not. He also stressed that factors other 
than those relating to exposure to trauma must be investigated. 
Schwarz and Perry (1994) emphasized the neurobiological impact of a traumatic 
event, noting that acute stress results in the increased activation of the 
noradrenergic system which plays an important role in a number of behaviours 
that are readily identified as being related to PTSD; arousal regulation, vigilance, 
irritability, locomotion, attention, sleep, and the startle response. The 
neurobiological changes thought to result from traumatic stress also "create an 
adaptive record of survival-related information [Schwarz & Perry, 1994, p. 312]". 
Such records, termed "malignant memories" by Schwarz and colleagues (Schwarz 
& Kowalski, 1991; Schwarz, Kowalski, & Hanus, 1993), are hypothesized to 
possess a neural network architecture and incorporate information derived from 
the traumatic event that that has a potential bearing on the individual's survival. 
The activation of these memories by trauma-related cues results in the individual 
experiencing high levels of noxious arousal, and potentially, cognitive distortions, 
memory changes, dissociative states, and altered behavioural and affective 
activity. It is further noted from animal studies that the developing brain is 
particularly sensitive to stress, especially when such stress is unpredictable and 
uncontrollable. The authors proposed therefore that children exposed to trauma 
may develop brains with dysregulated neurophysiological systems and 
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neuroanatomical structures that may leave them more vulnerable to suffering from 
exposure to psychosocial stressors when they reach maturity. The authors 
described how younger children exposed to trauma may experience a more 
pervasive and persistent increase in basal autonomic tone and develop a post- 
traumatic reaction where symptoms are elicited by more general stimuli that are 
unrelated to the trauma. 
An integrative conceptual model that incorporated exposure to trauma, child 
characteristics (such as gender and age), access to social support and coping styles 
was tested in a sample of elementary school-aged children exposed to a hurricane 
(Vernberg, La Greca, Silverman, & Prinstein, 1996). Vernberg et al. found that the 
four factors identified in the model were together able to predict a considerable 
amount of the variance in PTSD symptornatology. This study is of importance as 
it compares the relative importance of exposure variables to non-exposure 
variables such as social support and coping, and identifies specific targets for 
treatment (e. g., the use of blame and anger). Follow-up investigations of the same 
sample of children (La Greca, Silverman, Vemberg, & Prinatein, 1996) found that 
at seven and 10 months after the disaster the model accounted for less variance in 
PTSD symptornatology. Although a considerable number of children thought they 
might die during the hurricane (60%), far fewer were hurt or actually witnessed 
other people being hurt during the event. The success of the model in predicting 
children's reactions may result partly from investigating a sample exposed to a 
comparatively moderate trauma where the protective effects of social support and 
coping may be more pronounced. Nevertheless, this study presents a significant 
advance in the methodology and theory used in the investigation of children's 
responses to trauma. 
A number of reviews, while not proposing a specific model of PTSD in children 
and adolescents, have outlined etiological factors that have been shown to predict 
the occurrence of the disorder (Amaya-Jackson & March, 1995; Vogel & 
Vernberg, 1993; Pfefferbaum, 1997; American Association of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry, 1998; Foy, Madvig, Pynoos, & Camilleri, 1996; Gurwitch, 
Sullivan, & Long, 1998; Yule, Perrin, & Smith, 1999). The most widely accepted 
predictor of PTSD is exposure severity, while sex, prior exposure to trauma, prior 
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psychiatric disorder, and family functioning also seem to be emerging as having 
predictive value. A less clear picture exists of the relationship between variables 
such as age and ethnicity and post-traumatic stress reactions. 
A recent review has examined how a cognitive theory of childhood PTSD needs 
to accommodate developmental factors (Salmon & Bryant, 2002). The authors of 
this review highlight the need to consider developmental issues that have a 
bearing on how a child may encode and then resolve a traumatic experience. The 
development of language is thought to be of particular importance, both when a 
trauma is experienced, and when a child attempts to deal with the traumatic event. 
The social world of the child is examined, and the role of the family in assisting a 
child to form complete memories of a trauma is stressed. The authors conclude by 
providing a relatively clear description of how developmental issues might be 
considered in both the assessment and treatment of children suffering from PTSD. 
The role of the family in both assessment and treatment is stressed, in particular 
the potential negative effect that parents may have in reinforcing a child's 
avoidant coping. Methods for supporting young children to communicate their 
experiences and the empirical support for providing such assistance are described. 
The reviews described above have demonstrated how the understanding of 
children and adolescents' reactions to traumatic experiences has been advanced by 
incorporating theory from a variety of domains. Many studies have been directed 
at examining core assumptions regarding the nature of PTSD in children, such as 
the pattern of symptornatology observed in children following trauma. The need 
for further research into a number of aspects of children's reactions is widely 
acknowledged. Yet, it remains the case that such research is rarely driven by a 
coherent model that explains the processes that are involved in the formation of 
specific PTSD symptoms such as intrusive memories, flashbacks, and 
hyperarousal. The adoption of such a theoretical account may offer clearer 
guidelines as to how research may be directed beyond examining demographic 
and psychosocial variables. 
Clearly, a theoretical account of IPTSD in children and adolescents will need to be 
able to encompass the full range of aberrations of behaviour, cognition, 
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physiology, and consciousness that are associated with PTSD within a 
developmental context. Existing models have demonstrated a degree of success in 
accounting for these aberrations, yet inadequacies are also present. For example, 
Schwarz and Perry (1994) considered the role of developmental neurobiology 
with regards to specific PTSD symptoms. Similarly, Salmon and Bryant (2002) 
placed their discussion of childhood PTSD in the context of "fear networks" (Foa, 
Steketee, & Rothbaum, 1989). However, the kinds of single-level representations 
of emotion proposed within these accounts are limited in their explanatory power 
(Power & Dalgleish, 1997), especially with regards to some of the more disturbing 
symptoms of PTSD, such as flashbacks and emotional numbing; such accounts 
cannot explain the discontinuity between the re-experiencing of traumatic events, 
where adults and children may experience overwhelming sensations as 
experienced at the time of the trauma, and the normal, voluntary activation of 
autobiographical memories. Many models of child PTSD, particularly those of 
Pynoos and colleagues, Fletcher (1996), and Vernberg et al. (1996), are often 
vague, fail to make testable predictions, and try to relate PTSD to a number of 
processes, such as social support, that equally might be involved in a number of 
other psychiatric disorders, e. g. depression and generalised anxiety. Outlined in 
the next section are two cognitive models of PTSD in adults, that assume multi- 
level representations of traumatic events, make specific predictions regarding the 
aetiology of the disorder, and which may inform the development of a model of 
PTSD in children and adolescents. 
1.3 Cognitive Models of PTSD in Adults 
1.3.1 Brewin et al. 's (1996) Dual Representation Model of PTSD 
Brewin, Dalgleish, and Joseph (1996) suggest that the complex pattern of 
symptornatology observed in individuals with PTSD could be explained by a dual 
representation model, where the memories of the traumatic event are stored in a 
different manner to normal memories. These memories remain in a sensory format 
and are hypothesized to be represented within different neural structures than 
normal memories. 
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Brewin (2001) has presented evidence from a cognitive neuroscience perspective 
that suggests "traumatic memories" are laid down in a way that bypasses the 
hippocampus, the neural structure considered to be responsible for the encoding of 
memories within a temporal and spatial context. As a result of this difference in 
information processing, "the sensory (visual, auditory, olfactory, etc. ), 
physiological, and motor aspects of the traumatic experience are represented in 
situationally accessible knowledge in the form of analogical codes that enable the 
original experience to be recreated" [Brewin et al., 1996, p. 676-677]. Such 
representations, termed "situationally accessible memories" (SAMs) by Brewin et 
al. (1996), are re-experienced as the result of elicitation through associative 
leaming; trauma-related cues will be likely to trigger such re-experiencing. This 
qualitative difference in representation also means that traumatic memories are not 
easily accessible by conscious means. 
Such an account gives a powerful explanation of the cardinal cluster of symptoms 
observed in individuals with PTSD: the re-experiencing phenomena. The 
difference in representation may account for how flashbacks are experienced 
frequently as dissociative states. The conscious activation of SAMs is thought to 
allow changes in such representations of a traumatic event, whereby conditioned 
emotional responses are extinguished through a process of "spontaneous or 
programmed habituation" [p. 678]. Such habituation, and the associated 
normalization of attentional and memory biases, is responsible for decreasing the 
likelihood of intrusively re-experiencing the traumatic event. 
However, the full resolution of a traumatic event also may be contingent on an 
individual's verbally accessible memory (VAM) of the event. VAMs are theorized 
to consist of representations of a person's conscious experience of a traumatic 
event, such as sensory features, emotional and physiological reactions, and the 
perceived meaning of the event. Significantly such a representation is likely to be 
subject to deliberate retrieval from an individual's store of autobiographical 
memories. Brewin et al. (1996) stressed that "secondary emotional reactions 
arising from subsequent conscious appraisal" [p. 682] may interfere with the 
emotional processing of a traumatic experience. Attributions of responsibility 
made after a traumatic event, leading to emotions such as guilt or anger, in 
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addition to being themselves distressing, may prevent the habituation of fear when 
SAMs are activated. Therefore, the authors suggest that prior to the use of 
exposure treatment, such secondary emotions be addressed using cognitive 
techniques. 
Brewin et al. (1996) go on to describe three endpoints of emotional processing 
that arise from the dual representation theory proposed. The first endpoint, 
completion or integration, results when memories of the traumatic event have 
been fully "worked through", and are integrated with the individual's other 
memories and sense of self in the world. In particular, the individual will have 
habituated to their SAMs of the event. The second endpoint, termed "chronic 
emotional processing", concerns the presence of unremitting PTSD, and is thought 
to be associated with inability to integrate memories of the trauma. This may be 
the result of aversive secondary emotions, as described above, the lack of social 
support to assist processing of SAMs or VAMs, and ongoing trauma, among other 
causes. In addition to the symptoms of PTSD, an individual caught in this stage 
will continue to have attentional and memory biases towards trauma-related 
information, and develop more generalized secondary reactions. The third 
possible endpoint of processing, "premature inhibition of processing", results 
when the individual succeeds in avoiding the activation of unpleasant SAMs and 
VAMs. While the triggering of negative affect may be automatically avoided by 
the development of "avoidance schemas", the individual will continue to have 
attentional biases, impaired memory for the trauma, avoidance for trauma-related 
stimuli, and possibly somatization. 
1.3.2 Ehlers & Clark's (2000) Cognitive Model of PTSD 
The second of this new generation of models of PTSD in adults is that of Ehlers 
and Clark (2000). Ehlers and Clark (2000), in a similar fashion to Brewin et al. 
(1996), place particular emphasis on the pathological role of "trauma memory", 
highlighting processes that are involved in laying down of such memories, and the 
cognitions, meta-cognitions and thought control strategies considered responsible 
for the maintenance of IPTSD. Ehlers and Clark argued that the combination of 
trauma memory and the negative appraisal of trauma and its sequelae result in a 
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perception of "current threat" that is accompanied by intrusive phenomena, 
hyperarousal, anxiety and other emotional responses. 
Ehlers and colleagues have demonstrated the maintaining effect of a sense of 
"current threat" in victims of physical and sexual assault (Dunmore, Clark, & 
Ehlers, 1999), political prisoners (Ehlers, Maercker, & Boos, 2000), and motor 
vehicle accident (MVA) survivors (Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; Steil & Ehlers 
2000). In addition to the presence of poorly elaborated trauma memories (the 
recall of which is easily triggered by associated cues), a number of cognitions and 
meta-cognitions are thought to give rise to this mental state. These include: 
Dysfunctional meaning attached to symptoms of the trauma (e. g., believing that 
having flashbacks is a sign that one is "going mad"); Perceived negative responses 
from others (e. g., "people think I am too weak to cope on my own"); A sense of 
permanent change (e. g., "my life is ruined"); And change in global beliefs (e. g., 
"the world is a dangerous place"). 
The power of meta-cognition to impede recovery from the acute phase of the 
disorder was demonstrated by Steil and Ehlers (2000) in their finding that the 
distress caused by re-experiencing symptoms of MVAs was related to the 
idiosyncratic meaning assigned to the symptoms (e. g., believing that intrusive 
thoughts are a sign that one is going "mad"). This relationship existed regardless 
of intrusion frequency, accident severity, and general anxiety-related catastrophic 
cognitions. In addition, dysfunctional meaning attached to traumatic symptoms 
was found to be associated with maladaptive coping strategies such as avoidance, 
thought suppression (an active effort to rid one's mind of a cognition), rumination 
and distraction. These strategies are considered to discourage the full processing 
of traumatic memories, and in the case of thought suppression, paradoxically 
encourage the production of distressing intrusive cognitions. A considerable body 
of work has shown that thought suppression (see Purdon, 1999, for a review) is 
responsible for an increase in the frequency of intrusive thoughts and memories. 
Thus, cognitions and meta-cognitions that are formed after a traumatic event may 
promote the maintenance of PTSD in two ways. Firstly, dysfunctional cognitions 
and meta-cognitions produce a sense that the trauma continues to have damaging 
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implications, and consequently generate a feeling of apprehension. Secondly, the 
thought control strategies that result from these appraisals can discourage 
emotional processing of memories of the traumatic event. These cognitions and 
coping strategies may explain how a substantial proportion of traumatized adults 
emotionally engage in exposure treatments and yet do not proceed to habituation 
of the memories (Jaycox, Foa, & Morral, 1998). Therefore, Steil and Ehlers 
(2000) suggest that "therapeutic strategies aimed at identifying, restructuring, and 
changing the negative idiosyncratic meaning of posttraumatic intrusions should be 
helpful in alleviating posttraurnatic symptornatology" [p. 5551. 
Ehlers and Clark (2000), like Brewin et al. (1996), consider exposure to be an 
integral part of cognitive behavioural interventions for PTSD, but argue that the 
adoption of cognitive restructuring during reliving may be useful. In this way 
problematic appraisals associated with key moments of the trauma may be 
identified and discussed, and the full benefits of exposure can be attained. While 
Ehlers and Clark expound more the potential role of cognitive techniques in the 
treatment of PTSD in adults, and do not base their account on a dual 
representation account, there exists, however, relatively few significant conceptual 
differences between their model and that of Brewin et al. (1996). Each accounts 
for the extreme nature of the re-experiencing symptoms of PTSD, and the 
variation in outcome between survivors of trauma. In particular, the onset and 
maintenance of PTSD symptornatology are distinguished. The early onset of 
intrusive phenomena is considered a normal reaction to an extreme event 
(especially after more severe trauma). The maintenance of such symptoms is 
considered to result from a variety of maladaptive responses. 
1.4 The nature of children and adolescents' memories of trauma 
While children and adolescents have been found to possess the same two-factor 
structure of re-experiencing and avoidance observed in adults (Dyregrov, 
Kuterovac, & Barath, 1996), particular consideration must be given to children's 
memories of traumatic events. Theorists positing a cognitive approach to PTSD in 
adults (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) regard the re-experiencing 
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phenomena of the disorder not only to be its primary distinguishing feature, but 
also to be indicative of the central underlying abnormality that is responsible for 
the disorder: the nature of the memories of a traumatic event. These and other 
authors (e. g., van der Kolk, 1996) argue that traumatic events may be poorly 
encoded in memory, resulting in primitive representations of events. In addition 
such representations may also play a considerable role in maintenance of the 
hyperarousal cluster of symptoms, as the physiological changes encoded during 
the traumatic event are re-experienced. 
It is essential therefore to consider whether the re-experiencing symptoms children 
experience are like those of adults; that is, whether such symptoms are the result 
of triggering involuntary recall of poorly elaborated, sensory based memories of 
the traumatic event. With regards to this, there is a growing body of research 
regarding the elicitation, form, and treatment of traumatic memories in children. 
Three avenues of research have addressed the issue of the existence and role of 
traumatic memories in children and adolescence: clinical reports of children's 
memories of traumatic events, symptornatology profiles of samples of children 
exposed to trauma, and studies that have examined specifically the nature of 
children's memories of traumatic events. 
1.4.1 Clinical reports of children's memories of traumatic events 
The landmark case studies conducted into children's reactions to traumatic events 
examined a small sample of 5-14 year-old children involved in the Chowchilla bus 
kidnapping (Terr, 1981). Terr reported the presence of some symptoms that would 
be considered to fit DSM-IV criteria for re-experiencing: Nightmares or bad 
dreams with some content pertaining to the kidnapping, "posttraumatic play", and 
behavioural re-enactment. Flashbacks, however, were not observed in the 
children. Terr described how older children reported daytime visions of the 
kidnapping, but suggested that these re-experiencing episodes were voluntary. 
In a four-year follow-up study of these children, Terr (1983) reported that their 
memories of the kidnapping were largely unchanged, and that such memories 
were still recalled with a "vivid immediacy". A significant number continued to 
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engage in posttraumatic play and behavioural. re-enactment, a variant of 
posttraumatic play which was considered to be less "fun", and very often involved 
the re-experiencing of psychophysiological responses experienced during the 
kidnapping. Behavioral re-enactment is a feature of children's reactions to trauma 
that may be readily conceptualised within the dual representation theory of 
Brewin et al. (1996) as the elicitation of motor responses recorded during the 
trauma. 
Perrin, Smith and Yule (2000) share the view that children and adolescents can 
suffer from intrusive thoughts about a traumatic event, adding that such 
phenomena can occur either when falling asleep or when triggered by external or 
internal reminders. Perrin et al. (2000) also briefly overview the debate regarding 
the reactions of very young children to trauma, noting that while evidence exists 
to suggest that this group does not suffer from visual flashbacks, they can display 
signs of re-experiencing through vivid re-enactment of the trauma (Scheeringa & 
Zeanah, 1995; Scheeringa, Zeanah, Drell, & Larrieu, 1995). In short, many 
clinical reports note that children 're-see' or 're-feel' the trauma (Terr, 1991) and 
acknowledge the different sensory modalities that such experiences may take. 
1.4.2 Symptomatology profiles of samples of children exposed to trauma 
Beyond clinical reports, a number of studies have shown that the full range of re- 
experiencing symptomatology is found in children and adolescents who have been 
exposed to traumatic events. A summary of these studies is shown in Table 1.2. 
This table illustrates that children and adolescents can experience the full-range of 
re-experiencing symptomatology. At the same time, there exists considerable 
variability across studies in the prevalence of specific forms of re-experiencing. 
This may be due in part to the nature of the traumatic event, or may highlight the 
need for considering developmental issues when assessing PTSD in children and 
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A meta-analysis conducted by Fletcher (1994, unpublished manuscript) examined 34 
studies of children exposed to trauma (with a total sample size of 2,697) and found 
similar rates of PTSD in child and adult samples. Fletcher (1996), in discussing these 
findings, concluded that the DSM-IV diagnosis of PTSD could be applied to all child 
age groups. While the pattern of symptomatology in Fletcher's meta-analysis for 
preschool children appears to be different to that of school- and teen-aged children 
(with pre-school children found to be more frequently distressed by reminders of the 
trauma, have bad dreams regarding the trauma, and engaging in post-traumatic play), 
this meta-analysis does underscore the general acceptance that children re-experience 
traumatic events. 
1.4.3 Quantitative studies of children's memories of traumatic events 
The finding that children and adolescents experience unwanted thoughts of traumatic 
events, have "flashbacks" (albeit not young children), and experience physiological 
arousal on exposure to trauma-related cues, supports the suggestion that children and 
adolescents can form SAMs of traumatic events. Further evidence suggesting that 
some children's memories of traumatic events are comparable to the concept of 
SAMs comes from the few studies that have sought to assess the nature of these 
memories in children quantitatively. 
Burgess, Hartman, and Baker (1995) adopted a conceptual framework that 
incorporated neurobiological, information processing and psychodynamic approaches 
in their study of the memories of 34 physically and sexually abused children. The 
somatic, behavioural, verbal, and visual qualities of the children's memories were 
examined. Somatic and behavioural memories of trauma were very common and 
clearly related to the sexual nature of much of the abuse that was endured by the 
children in this sample. Most children's memories had a visual quality, though this 
finding was based on noting whether children were able to draw elements of the 
trauma they were exposed to. Such an indicator is likely to be highly insensitive due 
to children's lack of artistic ability or unwillingness to draw their experiences. Verbal 
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memories were of a varying quality, though only three children expressed no memory 
at all of what happened to them. 
Further data concerning the quality of children's memories of trauma have been 
obtained from one study of pre-school aged children exposed to an extreme natural 
disaster. Azarian, Lipsitt, Miller, and Skriptchenko-Gregorian (1999) assessed 90 
children, aged 10-44 months, after the 1988 Armenian earthquake. More than half of 
the sample had verbal memories of the earthquake, and nearly all displayed what the 
authors termed "non-verbal" memories: repetitive earthquake-related play, 
nightmares, and physiological and somatic reactions that were produced in reaction to 
specific reminders of the earthquake. An important finding of this study was that 
memory quality varied across the age range. The youngest age group, that of children 
aged 10-24 months, contained significantly fewer children with verbal memories than 
the two older groups, while the rates of non-verbal memory presentation remained 
approximately equal across the age span. 
The two studies discussed above lend weight to the possibility that children exposed 
to trauma can have non-verbal memories similar to the SAMs described by Brewin et 
al. (1996). It is noteworthy that Azarian et al. (1999) found that very young children 
had no verbal memories of the earthquake that they were exposed to, yet possessed 
non-verbal memories at the same rate as older children. That such young children 
lack verbal memories is entirely in keeping with their linguistic development (see 
Salmon & Bryant, 2002, for further discussion of this). However, if the ability to form 
verbal memories is protective, this group would have been expected to demonstrate 
more non-verbal memories than older children, who with their more developed 
linguistic and cognitive abilities may have been more able to process the traumatic 
event. Brewin and colleagues note that adults with PTSD following a trauma may 
have some verbal account of the event, but that such accounts are likely to be 
fragmentary and more biased to describing sensory rather than semantic aspects of 
what occurred. 
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In conclusion, it is suggested from the existing evidence that Brewin et al. 's (1996) 
concept of SAMs may be of explanatory relevance to children's reactions to trauma. 
Like adults' re-experiencing of traumatic events, children are likely to possess 
emotion-laden memories composed of sensory fragments, that are easily elicited by 
reminders of the event, and can be experienced in the present as intrusive memories 
and "flashbacks". Further studies of the memories of a greater age range of children 
are necessary to investigate this proposal. These should include prospective studies 
that examine the relationshipbetween memory quality and PTSD symptornatology. 
The finding of Azarian et al. (1999) that the presence of verbal memories in young 
children may not be protective against the development of non-verbal memories is in 
particular need of replication. If this is the case, then other barriers to the formation of 
coherent and non-intrusive memories other than linguistic ability will need to be 
investigated, such as emotional regulation and willingness to confront fear-eliciting 
internal or external stimuli. Indeed, one of the advances of the recent adult cognitive 
models of PTSD is the realization that while verbalizing a traumatic event is a 
necessary step in the processing of the event, other aspects of the traumatic memory 
also may need to be modified. Commentators on PTSD in children have drawn 
attention to young children's limited ability to encode an event in a verbal form 
(Fivush, 1998; Salmon & Bryant, 2002). Future studies may be beneficially directed 
towards other aspects of children's memories of trauma. Similarly, dissociation, 
which, is considered to play a significant role in the onset of PTSD in adults by 
interfering with the process of forming a coherent memory of a traumatic event, has 
received little attention in studies of children and adolescents exposed to trauma. 
1.5 The time course of PTSD symptomatology in children and adolescents 
A significant component of both Brewin et al. 's (1996) and Ehlers and Clark's (2000) 
models of PTSD is that the time course of PTSD is considered critical. That is, the 
occurrence of PTSD symptoms soon after a traumatic event is not considered 
abnormal, and may even be relatively common. Chronic PTSD, however, is thought 
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to occur in only a minority of individuals whose psychological recovery following a 
trauma has been impeded in a number of ways as outlined above. 
Before considering evidence that suggests that the same processes that prevent 
recovery following a trauma operate in children and adolescents as operate in adults, 
an examination of the findings regarding the time course of children's and 
adolescents' reactions to trauma is warranted. In addition, a discussion surrounding 
Acute Stress Disorder (ASD), a diagnosis introduced-only in the most recent version 
of DSM in 1994, will be presented. 
1.5.1 Prospective studies of children's and adolescents' responses to trauma 
In this sub-section a number of studies of the time course of children and adolescents' 
responses to a variety of traumatic events will be outlined. Space does not allow for a 
comprehensive review of studies that examined prospectively young people's PTSD 
reactions, but the studies selected illustrate the broad range of traumatic events 
investigated. 
1.5.1.1 Road traffic accidents 
Child and adolescents victims of road traffic accidents (RTAs) have been one of the 
most commonly studied populations with regards to PTSD. This has been due to the 
relative frequency of these events, their generally occurring as discrete, one-off 
events, and the ease with which survivors of RTAs can be approached via Accident 
and Emergency departments. In the last few years alone several prospective studies of 
children and adolescents exposed to RTAs have been performed. 
Di Gallo, Barton and Parry-Jones (1997) assessed 57 children and adolescents (aged 
5-18 years) who had attended accident and emergency departments in Glasgow 
following RTAs. While a small sample, the participation rate was high (77%), and 
participants were assessed shortly after their accident (mean 7.7 days). Follow-up 
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assessments were performed 12-15 weeks after the accident. The retention rate was 
also high (93.0%). 'Scores on the Revised Impact of Event Scale (R-IES; Horowitz et 
al. 1979) indicated a large drop-off in symptornatology between the two assessments, 
from a mean of 27.2 to a mean of 16.7 (effect size of d=0.69 1; Cohen, 1988). Of the 
variables assessed, the child's or adolescent's distress immediately after the RTA was 
the greatest correlate of PTSD symptoms at the initial assessment and at follow up. 
Stallard, Velleman, and Baldwin (1998) assessed 119 children and adolescents (aged 
5-18 years) who had attended an accident and emergency department in Bath 
following an RTA. This sample was less representative than that of Di Gallo et al. 
(1997), with a participation rate of 43%. Initial assessments were conducted 
approximately 6 weeks after the accident. Semi-structured interviews conducted with 
both children and parents revealed that 34% of the children and adolescents suffered 
from PTSD. At 8 month follow-up, all children who had initially been diagnosed with 
PTSD were contacted and invited to be re-assessed, as well as a sample of children 
who had been initially found not to have PTSD (Stallard, Velleman, & Baldwin, 
2001). Approximately half of the children who had initially been diagnosed with 
PTSD completed the follow-up assessment; of these children, 47.6% were diagnosed 
with PTSD. None of the children who were initially not diagnosed with PTSD went 
onto develop PTSD at the 8 month follow up. 
Mirza, Bhadrinath, Goodyer, and Gilmour (1998) assessed 8-16 year old victims of 
RTAs 6 weeks and 6 months after their accident. The study sample was large (n=1 19) 
and a high participation rate (76%). The self-report questionnaire version of the 
PTSD Reaction Index (PTSD-RI; Frederick & Pynoos, 1988) was administered to 
children and adolescents and their parents at both time points. According to scores on 
this instrument, 45% of children and adolescents had mild to severe PTSD at initial 
assessment, while only 17% had mild to severe PTSD at six month follow-up. 
Winje and Ulvik (1998) assessed the survivors of a severe bus accident involving 
Swedish school children who were travelling through Norway as part of an end-of- 
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year outing. Of 34 children and adults in the bus, 12 children and 4 adults died. In 
addition to actual survivors of the crash, the investigators assessed siblings of those 
children who either survived or died in the crash, at I year and 3 years post-trauma. 
Children completed the R-IES at each time point. Scores on both the intrusion and 
avoidance sub-scales of this instrument significantly decreased over time (effect sizes 
of d=1.178 and 0.948 respectively; Cohen, 1988). While again demonstrating a 
significant reduction of PTSD symptornatology, these findings cannot be directly 
compared to other populations, due to the children and adolescents being recruited 
from a single trauma, and as the children and adolescents received an (undisclosed) 
intervention in the months following the accident. 
1.5.1.2 Natural disasters 
The study of children's and adolescents responses to natural disasters has often 
greatly enhanced the understanding of young people's reactions to trauma. The large 
numbers of children affected by such disasters has allowed for large and diverse 
cohorts to be investigated. 
McFarlane (1987a) assessed children exposed to a bush fire in Australia. The parents 
of these 5-12 year old children, and their teachers, completed the appropriate Rutter 
scales (Rutter, Tizard, & Whitmore, 1970; Rutter & Graham, 1967) at 2,8 and 26 
months after the fire. Psychiatric morbidity (not PTSD) as assessed by these scores 
increased between the 2 month and 8 month assessment points, but showed no 
significant change from the 8 month assessments at 26 months. This increase in 
morbidity over time may be related to be a number of methodological shortfalls in the 
study. Not only do the Rutter scales fail to include child self-report, they also do not 
include items that relate specifically to PTSD. The increase in general psychiatric 
morbidity uncovered by these scales may be related less to a psychological reaction to 
the disaster itself (during which relatively few children may actually have been in 
danger), but to the ongoing impact of the disaster on the community. This study is 
important therefore in highlighting that PTSD is not the only form of psychiatric 
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disorder that can occur following a trauma, though what it tells us about PTSD 
reactions in children and adolescents is limited. 
La Greca, Silverman, Vernberg, and Prinstein (1996) conducted a prospective study 
of 442 elementary school aged children who were exposed to Hurricane Andrew, a 
disaster that devastated much of Florida. The children were assessed at three time 
points after the hurricane hit, at 3,7 and 10 months. Between the first and third 
assessments, the cohort's mean score on the PTSD-RI had decreased from 29.5 to 
20.8 (an effect size of d=0.518; Cohen, 1988), and the proportion of children with 
moderate to very severe PTSD, as assessed using the same measure, had decreased 
from 55.8% to 33.5%. 
1.5.1.3 Large-scale transport disasters 
Yule, Bolton, Udwin, Boyle, O'Ryan, and Nurrish (2000) conducted a long-term 
follow-up investigation of a large group of adolescents who had been involved in the 
Jupiter ferry disaster. At the time of the disaster, the 217 participants Oust over half 
of all the adolescents involved in the disaster) were aged 11-17 (mean age 14.7). The 
adolescents were first assessed 5 months after the disaster, and were assessed again 
between 5.7 and 7.9 years later. A large proportion of these adolescents (51.5%) 
developed PTSD, in most cases within 6 months of the disaster. At follow-up only 
34.2% of the adolescents who had developed PTSD (17.5% of the whole sample) 
continued to suffer from PTSD. 
1.5.1.4 Sniper attacks and hostage takings 
Nader, Pynoos, Fairbanks and Frederick (1990) completed a 14 month follow-up 
investigation of a group of children who had been exposed to varying degrees to a 
sniper attack at their school. At the initial assessment, approximately one month after 
the trauma, the 159 children, aged 5-3 years, were assessed using the semi-structured 
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interview format of the PTSD-RI. Post-traumatic stress symptoms were found to have 
significantly decreased at the follow-up assessment. 
Vila, Porche, and Mouren-Simeoni (1999) conducted an extensive follow-up study of 
21 children who were taken hostage in their classroom by a gunman. The children, 
aged 6-9 years, were not injured but subjected to a number of threats and insults by 
the gunman, who himself was eventually arrested without violence or resistance. The 
children were assessed using a semi-structured interview and the R-IES at 2 months, 
4 months, 7 months, and 18 months after the incident. R-IES scores decreased a large 
amount between the 2 month and 7 month assessment points (effect size of d=1.283; 
Cohen, 1988), and remained fairly constant at the 18 month follow-up. The study, 
however, was not naturalistic as the children received some debriefing after the 
trauma, and several received individual psychological interventions. 
1.5.1.5 War 
A number of studies have examined prospectively children's. and adolescents' 
responses to war. As has been acknowledged in the above sub-section regarding 
natural disasters, the wide-ranging implications of war can exact a variety of 
hardships on young people besides the conflict itself. Nevertheless, children's and 
adolescents' gradual recovery following trauma has been documented. 
Ahmad, Mohamed and Ameen (1998) conducted a follow-up investigation of Kurdish 
children's responses to the attack by the Iraqi army of Kurdish cities in Northern Iraq, 
and their families' resultant flight to safe areas. The cohort studied comprised 20 
youths, aged 6-16 years at the time of the tragedy, who were selected at random from 
temporary camps on the Iraqi-Turkish border and assessed using a structured 
interview based on DSM-III-R criteria for PTSD. The cohort were assessed initially 
at 2 months after the tragedy, then again 4 months, 14 months, and 26 months. At the 
initial interview, a high level of PTSD symptornatology was detected, which had 
significantly fallen by the time of the 4 month follow-up. However, post-traumatic 
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stress increased between the second and third assessment points, remaining at this 
elevated level at the fourth and final assessment, 26 months after the tragedy. The 
authors were not sure whether to attribute this increased symptornatology to the 
natural history of PTSD or to the increasingly precarious political situation and 
wavering international support for the Kurds. 
Stein, Comer, Gardner, and Kelleher (1999) assessed 147 Bosnian refugee children, 
aged 5-12 years, regarding their reactions to the conflict in Bosnia Hercegovina. The 
children had been living in refugee camps for anything up to a year. A follow-up 
assessment was conducted 8 months later. At follow-up PTSD symptomatology was 
not found to have improved or worsened in the cohort as a whole, but gender by time 
analysis revealed that boys, who initially had worse reactions, were improving more 
than girls over time. 
Becker, Weine, Vojvoda, and McGlashan (1999) assessed 10 Bosnian adolescent 
refugees who had been resettled in the USA. At the time of the baseline assessment, 
conducted within a year of the adolescents' arrival in the USA, the group were aged 
13-19 years (mean 16.1). The group were assessed 1 year after their baseline 
assessment. At each time point the adolescents completed the PTSD Symptoms Scale 
(Foa, Riggs, Dancu, & Rothbaum, 1993). While the small size of the sample 
prevented the proper use of statistical tests, inspection of self-report responses to this 
instrument indicated a considerable reduction in symptornatology by the time of the 
follow-up assessment. However, while none of the adolescents received an 
intervention directly addressing their PTSD symptoms, at least one received a 
behavioural intervention for non-trauma specific problems. 
The responses to the conflict in the Gaza strip of a cohort of 234 children aged 6-11 
years from Gaza were investigated by Thabet and Vostanis (2000). The children's 
PTSD reactions were initially assessed using the self-report form of the PTSD-RI 
within 6 months of cessation of hostilities in the region and again one year later. The 
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number of children reporting moderate to severe PTSD significantly decreased from 
40.6% at initial assessment to 10.0% at one year follow-up. 
In summary, a number of studies have charted the course of children and adolescents' 
PTSD reactions following a range of different traumas. The majority of these studies 
have found that PTSD levels recede in the months following a trauma, and that this 
improvement in mental health will persist. The two exceptions to this pattern, the 
studies by Ahmad, Mohamed, and Ameen (1998) and McFarlane (1987a), are likely 
to be attributable to ongoing stressors, such as dislocation and damage to property. 
However, all the studies outlined above have demonstrated that a significant minority 
of children and adolescents can continue to suffer from PTSD many months, even 
years, after a trauma. This finding highlights the need to differentiate between factors 
responsible for the onset and maintenance of PTSD symptornatology, as has been 
demonstrated in several recent studies of adults (see section 1.7 below regarding 
cognitive processes involved in the onset and maintenance of PTSD). 
1.5.2 Acute Stress Disorder in children and adolescents 
Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) was introduced in DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). This diagnosis was designed to describe stress disorders 
occurring in the period two days to four weeks after a trauma, before PTSD may be 
diagnosed (DSM-IV states that PTSD may not be diagnosed until four weeks post- 
trauma). This diagnosis also was designed to be used to identify individuals at high 
risk of going on to develop chronic PTSD. However, in trying to accomplish the latter 
function, it has been argued that this diagnosis was compromised by the inclusion of a 
dissociation symptoms criterion, the presence of which is essential for an individual 
to be diagnosed with ASD. 
Like PTSD, the diagnosis of ASD requires the presence of one re-experiencing 
symptom, but only one avoidance symptom and one hyperarousal symptom, and three 
out of a possible five dissociation symptoms. The particular stress laid upon having 
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dissociation symptoms was the result of work implicating a role for dissociative 
processes in the aetiology of PTSD (Spiegel, Koopman, Cardefia, & Classen, 1996). 
The five dissociation symptoms listed in DSM-IV are "a subjective sense of numbing, 
detachment, or absence of emotional responsiveness", reduction in awareness of 
surroundings, de-realization, de-personalisation, and dissociative amnesia. These 
symptoms can contribute to an individual meeting the dissociation criterion if they 
occur either during a trauma or afterwards. 
A number of studies have now examined adults' ASD responses to trauma, and how 
such responses relate to the development of chronic PTSD. Harvey and Bryant (1998) 
assessed adult RTA survivors who had been admitted to hospital within one month of 
their admission, and then again at 6 months post-trauma. While 78% of those adults 
diagnosed with ASD at the first assessment went on to be diagnosed with PTSD at 6 
months, suggesting that the diagnosis of ASD is useful as an indicator of risk for 
PTSD, 60% of the adults diagnosed as having "sub-clinical" ASD (i. e., failing to 
meet one of the ASD diagnostic criteria, usually dissociation) went on to develop 
PTSD. Dissociative symptoms were identified as having high positive predictive 
power (i. e. if the symptom was present, PTSD was likely to be diagnosed at follow 
up) but only moderate to high negative predictive power (i. e. if the symptom was 
absent, there was still a possibility that PTSD would be diagnosed at follow up). The 
authors propose that the need to display 3 dissociative symptoms to meet the 
dissociation criterion for ASD is excessively stringent, and that greater emphasis be 
placed on arousal symptoms. A2 year follow up study of the sample cohort (Harvey 
& Bryant, 2000) revealed that the relative value of ASD and sub-clinical ASD in 
predicting PTSD remained constant with time. 
In a large population of adults survivors of violent assaults Brewin, Andrews, Rose 
and Kirk (1999) observed a similar pattern of results. ASD was found to be strongly 
predictive of PTSD at a6 month follow up assessment, though a more efficient 
method of predicting later PTSD was to be found by simply counting the number of 
re-experiencing and arousal symptoms present in the acute phase. Indeed, the authors 
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conducted regression analyses that revealed that using this alternative method for 
assessing acute responses to traumatic stress made an equal and independent 
contribution to the prediction of PTSD. Thus both of these important studies suggest 
that there are multiple pathways involved in the development of chronic PTSD, and 
that not all of these pathways are reliant on dissociative experiences during or shortly 
after a traumatic event. 
While acknowledging that dissociation during a traumatic event has been associated 
with the development of PTSD, both Bryant and Harvey (1997) and Marshall, Spitzer 
and Liebowitz (1999) are critical of using this association to "elevate [dissociation] to 
the status of a core symptom of a new disorder [Marshall et al. 1999]". Such is the 
doubt over the usefulness of this diagnosis, that there is considerable debate 
concerning whether to include ASD in DSM-V (Bryant, 2000). Any research 
regarding children's and adolescents' acute responses to trauma, and the applicability 
of ASD to children and adolescents, must therefore be aware that this construct is not 
a fixed entity whose status as a diagnosis is guaranteed. 
With regards to the distinguishing feature of ASD, the dissociative symptoms, a body 
of research on child and adolescent dissociative states has been established. Several 
screening instruments have been developed to study and assess dissociation in 
children and adolescents (Evers-Szostak & Sanders, 1992; Reagor et al., 1992; Tyson, 
1992, Putnam et al., 1993). Putnam and colleague's Child Dissociative Checklist 
(CDC) has proved to be especially valuable, possessing high internal reliability and 
test-retest reliability (Putnam, 1997). Dissociative states and processes examined by 
the CDC include amnesia and blackouts, forgetfulness for basic information, trance- 
like absence states, fluctuating personality states, fluctuating skills and abilities, poor 
sense of time, rapidly changing physical complaints, age-inappropriate sexual 
behaviour, auditory hallucinations, imaginary companions, and fugue episodes. The 
CDC and has been shown to discriminate between sexually abused and non-abused 
children, (Malinosky-Rummell & Hoier, 1991; Putnam et al., 1993, Wherry, Jolly, 
Feldman, Adam, & Manjanatha, 1994), and significantly correlate with item- 
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equivalent dissociation scales completed by children's therapists (Putnam & Peterson, 
1994). Several of the items contained within the CDC are comparable to the 
dissociation symptoms of ASD, in particular the amnesia, de-personalisation and de- 
realisation symptoms. Similarly, the Adolescent Dissociative Experiences Scale (A- 
DES; Armstrong, Putnam, Carlson, Libero & Smith, 1997) has found high internal 
and test-retest reliability, and has been found to discriminate between psychiatric 
inpatients positively or negatively diagnosed as having dissociative disorders. 
The finding that at least some children and adolescents dissociate would suggest that 
examining dissociation, and the ASD diagnosis, within the context of children's and 
adolescents' responses to trauma may offer insights into the aetiology of paediatric 
PTSD, as has been the case with adults. At present, very few studies have examined 
ASD in children and adolescents and the value of ASD, and its constituent symptoms 
and symptom clusters, in predicting persistent PTSD. 
Winston, Kassam-Adarns, Vivarelli-O'Nell, Ford, Newman, Baxt Stafford and Cnaan 
(2002) conducted telephone interviews assessing ASD with a large (n=97) cohort of 
5-17 year old RTA survivors. While no follow up assessments of the cohort have yet 
been reported, the data presented thus far suggest that dissociative symptoms are 
quite common (with 78% of the cohort reporting at least 1 dissociative symptom), 
more common than the occurrence of re-experiencing, avoidance, and arousal 
symptoms. 
Daviss, Racusin, Felischer, Mooney, Ford and McHugo (2000), and Daviss, Mooney, 
Racusin, Ford, Fleischer, and McHugo (2000) examined ASD and PTSD in a 
relatively small sample (n=52) of 7-17 year old children and adolescents who were 
injured and admitted overnight to hospital. The sample comprised mainly RTA 
survivors (about half), falls, winter sports accidents, accidental gunshots, and bums or 
explosions. Initial (ASD) assessments were derived from parent report of their child's 
symptornatology while they were still in hospital. Follow-up assessments were 
performed approximately one month after the child's or adolescent's admission, and 
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involved a structured interview (the Clinician Administered FITSD Scale, Child and 
Adolescent version; Nader, Kriegler, Blake, Pynoos, Newman, & Weathers, 1996) 
with the young person, and a parent report of their child's symptomatology as at the 
initial assessment. At the initial assessment 30.8% of the sample met criteria for ASD, 
while at I month follow-up 12.5% of the sample met criteria for PTSD. ASD, as 
assessed by the child's or adolescent's parent, was mildly correlated with PTSD 
symptomatology at follow up, but closer inspection of this finding revealed that it was 
only hyperarousal symptoms, and not dissociative, re-experiencing, or avoidance 
symptoms, at initial assessment that significantly predicted subsequent PTSD. 
However, this study has several significant flaws, including the short period between 
initial and follow-up assessments, and the lack of child self-report during the acute 
phase, which mean that a role for dissociation may not be excluded. 
Similarly, Fein, Kassam-Adams, Gavin, Huang, Blanchard and Datner (2002) found 
that within a sample of adolescents and young adults ASD symptoms were 
significantly predictive of PTSD symptoms at a5 month follow up. However, these 
authors failed to provide details of the relationships between the individual symptom 
clusters of ASD and PTSD at follow up. 
ASD in children and adolescents has received little discussion (March, 2003), a 
consequence of the limited data available to guide commentators. Salmon and Bryant 
(2002) call for prospective studies conducted with children across developmental 
stages and various trauma populations to guide such a discussion. To a large extent 
the validity of the ASD diagnosis is not fully accepted; as the previous sub-section 
demonstrated, early post-traumatic stress symptoms are common, and are a good 
predictor of chronic PTSD. Dissociation, the distinctive feature of ASD, may or may 
not prove to be a significant component of a useful diagnosis. Nevertheless, the 
model of Ehlers and Clark (2000) would suggest that studying this complicated 
phenomenon is warranted in its own right, since "dissociation may impede the 
elaboration of [a] trauma memory and its integration into the autobiographical 
memory knowledge base [p. 330, Ehlers & Clark, 2000]". Hence, dissociation in 
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young people may prove to be an important factor in the onset of PTSD 
symptomatology. 
1.6 Psychosocial factors identified as correlates of PTSD in children and adolescents 
Several psychosocial factors have been identified as correlates or predictors of PTSD 
in children and adolescents. In this section key psychosocial factors found to pertain 
to PTSD will be outlined, and discussed in relation to the adult cognitive models of 
PTSD described above. 
1.6.1 Appraisal of threat 
The exposure-response relationship in children and adolescents exposed to trauma is 
widely accepted (Yule, Perrin, & Smith, 1999), most notably as a result of Pynoos et 
al. 's (1987) study that revealed a clear relationship between distance from a sniper 
who attacked a Californian school and later psychopathology. In addition to the 
objective threat of a trauma, more and more evidence suggests that the onset of PTSD 
in children and adolescents has been associated with subjective appraisal of the 
trauma as it occurs. 
Among adolescents involved in the Jupiter sinking, Udwin, Boyle, Yule, Bolton, and 
O'Ryan (2000) found that subjective factors, including thinking they would not 
escape, thinking they might die, and having feelings of extreme fear, panic, anger and 
confusion, discriminated moderately well between children who developed PTSD and 
those who did not. In a study comprising a very large sample of children exposed to 
the genocide in Rwanda, Dyregrov, Gupta, Gjestad, and Mukanoheli (2000) found 
that the feeling of one's life being in danger was the most important predictor of the 
intrusive and avoidant symptoms that make up PTSD. More significantly, Ehlers, 
Mayou & Bryant (2003) found that subjective indices of accident severity were 
significantly associated with PTSD severity at 3 months and 6 months after an RTA, 
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while objective indices (type of injury, extent of injuries, and whether or not children 
were admitted to hospital) were not. 
These findings emphasise the importance of speaking to children and adolescents 
directly about the thoughts and feelings they experienced during a trauma when later 
assessing the risk of post-traumatic psychopathology. In addition, these results 
suggest that the role of other appraisals in the aetiology of PTSD in children and 
adolescents exposed to trauma may warrant investigation. 
1.6.2 Vie role of the family in mediating children's and adolescents' responses to 
trauma 
One of the earliest studies into children's reactions to traumatic stress concluded that 
the family play a key role in the development of PTSD. McFarlane (1987b) looked at 
183 families two, eight, and 26 months after they were exposed to a bush fire in 
Australia. A simple 11-item questionnaire was distributed at eight months post- 
trauma to investigate the effect of family functioning on child psychopathology. This 
measure was found to consist of three factors, which McFarlane termed irritable 
distress, involvement, and social anhedonia. In addition two questions assessed 
maternal over-protectiveness of her children. The parent and teacher questionnaires of 
Rutter and colleagues (Rutter et al., 1970; Rutter & Graham, 1967) were used to 
assess child psychopathology, and were modified slightly at the eight and 26 month 
stages to include items specific to PTSD. 
Approximately one third of the children in the families assessed were found to 'have 
a continuing preoccupation with the disaster [McFarlane, 1987a; P. 7681', a figure that 
is likely to be an underestimate due the large rate of false negatives associated with 
the Rutter scales. Separation from parents in the days immediately after the fire, 
continuing maternal preoccupation with the disaster, and changed family functioning 
were found to be more powerful determinants of posttraumatic symptornatology in 
the children than exposure to the fire, or the material losses sustained afterwards. 
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McFarlane offers several mechanisms to explain this finding. Firstly, a mother with 
PTSD may struggle to cope with her child's reactions. Secondly, children may be 
aware of their parents' reactions, independent of their own experience of the fire. 
Thirdly, a mother with PTSD may be more prone to being overprotective of her 
children, which has the effect of further sensitising her children to their trauma- 
related fears. 
Green et al. (1991), in their study of children exposed to a dam collapse in the USA, 
similarly found that family functioning variables (irritable or depressed atmosphere) 
were predictive of PTSD symptomatology. It also was noted in this study that 
adolescents were more affected by the reactions of their parents, relative to younger 
siblings. The reason suggested for this finding was that older children were more 
likely to have to care for their younger siblings, and take on more parent-like, and 
hence more stressful, roles. Very young children were the most affected by parental 
symptomatology. 
In a study of children's responses to living close to a nuclear waste reactor, Korol et 
al. (1999) found that. children reported twice as many PTSD symptoms as their 
parents, though the frequency of symptoms of these groups were correlated. Exposure 
and parent functioning were found to be significant predictors of PTSD 
symptornatology, where exposure was reported as being the estimated distance from 
the plant, and parent functioning was assessed by the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised 
(SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1983). It has to be noted however that the stressor was 
abstract, chronic in nature, and a critical point was never reached. 
The largest study to date that has examined empirically the role of maternal 
psychopathology and functioning on child reactions to trauma, and vice-versa, was 
conducted on 339 nine- to 14-year-olds in Bosnia. Smith, Perrin, Yule, and Rabe- 
Hesketh (2001) distributed to children the War Trauma Questionnaire (WTQ; 
Macksoud, 1992), the Revised Impact of Event Scale (R-IES; Dyregrov & Yule; 
1995), the Birleson Depression Self Rating Scale (DSRS; Birleson, 1981), the 
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Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1978), 
the Brief Grief Questionnaire (Nader, Pynoos, Fairbanks, Al-Ajeel, & Al-Asfour, 
1993). The mothers of these children were given the RIES, the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorusch, Luschene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), and the 
General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-28; Goldberg & Hillier, 1979). Mothers also 
were asked to rate their children on the General Health and Behaviour Questionnaire 
(Goodman, 1994), while teachers' assessments of their pupils' psychopathology was 
measured using the Strengths and Needs Questionnaire (Goodman, 1994). 
Using a cut-off score of 17 of the RIES as an indication of PTSD caseness, 58% of 
the children assessed were considered to have PTSD. Such high levels of PTSD were 
not accompanied by high levels of anxiety and depression, which were actually quite 
similar to those of a normal, non-traumatised, non-psychiatric group. Among the 
mothers of the assessed children, PTSD was very common, a number had depression 
(13%), anxiety was only slightly above normal levels, and caseness as assessed by the 
GHQ was also marginally higher than community studies. 
The important findings of this study were that exposure to traumatic events (as 
assessed by the WTQ) was significantly associated with all children's outcome 
measures, and that maternal and child PTSD were associated. While exposure was the 
best predictor of the intrusion and avoidance symptoms of child PTSD, maternal 
mental health was the better predictor for children's self reported depression. The 
probable bidirectional association between child and maternal distress is considered 
by the authors of this study to be attributable to a vicious cycle process, where both 
mother and child avoid talking about the event for fear of upsetting each other. In this 
way each individual is being further encouraged to engage in avoidant coping, which 
maintains the disorder, a process that is supported by the finding of a large correlation 
between mothers' and children's avoidance scores. In addition, Smith et al. also 
found that maternal distress had a considerable distorting effect on their report of 
their children's distress, with mothers self-report scores highly correlated with their 
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reports of their children's symptoms. This is in contrast to the findings of Korol et al. 
(1999) who found that parents underreport their children's psychopathology; this 
difference is probably due to the far great intensity of traumatic stress in the families 
affected by the conflict in Bosnia. Nevertheless, this supports the usefulness, and 
indeed the necessity, of obtaining children's self-reports in the assessment of 
psychopathology. 
Thirty months after a SCUD missile attack in Israel during the Gulf War, mother- 
child dyads were assessed for PTSD symptoms by Wolmer et al. (2000). The 
children, aged three- to five-years at the time of the attack, were six- to eight-year- 
olds at the time of assessment, and a large proportion of the 50 children were found to 
have post-traumatic symptoms at a similar level across age and gender. These clusters 
of symptoms were found to correlate more with matemal general pathological 
reaction than with specific maternal post-traumatic symptoms. In the six-year-olds (at 
time of follow-up) post-traumatic symptoms were related more to the mother's 
general symptoms (depression, anxiety, aggression etc. ), than to her post-traumatic 
symptoms. However, the correlation between psychopathology of mothers and their 
seven-year-olds was non-significant, as was the correlation between matemal 
psychopathology and eight-year-olds post-traumatic symptomatology. 
The failure to find any correlation for the older children is in contrast to the findings 
of Smith and his colleagues, and may be attributable to the different nature of the 
trauma experienced by each group, the small size of Wolmer et al. 's group, and the 
finding that the scales used to assess avoidance/numbing and arousal had only 
moderate internal reliability. Aside from methodological issues, the authors of the 
study suggest that development in personal autonomy accounts for the loss of 
correlation in reactions, a view that is also supported by the work of Green et al. 
(1991) following a dam collapse, where pre-school children were most affected by 
parental reaction. 
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The youngest children in this sample were found to form a close correlation with their 
mothers in terms of the level of their avoidance scores, a finding taken to be 
indicative of the close dyad that mother and child form, and the 'traumatic reminder' 
effect that such a dyad may have. The authors also highlight the ignorance regarding 
the direction of the effect observed in the correlations reported in such studies; do 
mothers enhance child symptornatology, or vice versa, or both? 
Gurwitch et al. (1998), in a brief review of family functioning and its effects on 
children's reaction to traumatic stress, conclude that 'a family's reaction may buffer 
the negative effects of a trauma, providing a source of healing, or it can accentuate 
potential problems in a child's adjustment and coping [p. 281'. Certainly parental 
functioning, distress and psychopathology have an accentuating effect, and parental 
lack of stress reaction may act as a buffer, but a greater clarification of the 
relationship between child and parental reactions is needed. Research is needed to 
outline more accurately the role of both mother and child at each stage of the 
development of disorder. A number of issues warrant investigation. 
Firstly, what is the role of parental reactions at the time of the trauma? In young 
children especially it has been hypothesised that maternal distress is responsible in 
part for signalling to the child that something is wrong, enhancing their sense of 
distress. Subjective distress at the time of the trauma is a factor associated with the 
onset of PTSD. In addition, children may look to their parents in an attempt to select 
the most appropriate response. The behaviours that the child chooses to engage in at 
the time of the event may have repercussions for later; a child who later perceives his 
or her peritraumatic reactions to be 'cowardly' or conversely, 'brave', may be at 
greater or less risk of developing PTSD; Dunmore, Clark, and Ehlers (1997; 1999) 
found that in adults exposed to sexual or physical violence, the appraisal of one's 
reactions was associated with both the onset and maintenance of PTSD. As discussed 
earlier, having a parent present at the time of a traumatic event may help to verbalise 
an event as it occurs, which in turn helps the child to understand the event, reduce 
their fear, and discourage the formation of traumatic memories. 
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LOHDM. 
Secondly, the strategies that the parents opt to use to cope with any re-experiencing 
symptoms may also be mimicked by their children. If a parent decides not to talk 
about the traumatic event, and avoids situations where they may come into contact 
with reminders of the trauma, a child may see avoidance as an appropriate strategy. 
The vicious cycle effect warned of by Smith et el. (2001) may then develop as a 
result, as trauma-related affect is avoided at all costs. Such strategies may have 
effects on both the onset and maintenance of PTSD. A parent's attempts to address 
the trauma, develop a great understanding of what happened, and experience 
unprocessed emotions, may signal to the child that such behaviours are acceptable 
and beneficial. At present there is very little evidence on this issue. Of great 
importance is the effect of more overt parental coping strategies (avoidance, 
confrontation, etc. ) on children's covert and yet important coping strategies, such as 
the methods they adopt to deal with intrusive cognitions, and the child's attitudes 
towards emotional expression. 
Thirdly, the higher order schemata that parents form (or maintain) after a traumatic 
event may well extend to children. Parental views of themselves, the world, and the 
likelihood of their future suffering may all be affected, with consequences for their 
children. Negative views of one's self and the world have been found in adults to be 
factors responsible for the maintenance of PTSD. Even if children do not assimilate 
such views into their own knowledge of the world, then parental depression and 
anxiety may lead to children enduring greater psychological stress in an indirect 
manner, e. g., as Green et al. (1991) suggest, through taking on greater roles within the 
family situation. 
Many treatment packages for children with PTSD already include a degree of family- 
directed intervention (American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 1998; 
Pfefferbaum, 1997). The above evidence supports such an approach to treatment. 
Future research may be useful in directing how family interventions may be 
developed, and fit into a more holistic cognitive-behavioural treatment for children. 
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1.6.3 Pre-trauma psychopathology 
Following an earthquake in the Los Angeles area, Asarnow et al. (1999) identified 
several variables that were associated with the number of PTSD symptoms reported 
in children one year after the disaster. Perceived stress and resource loss (e. g. the 
destruction caused to the child's home) and a pre-earthquake anxiety disorder were 
predictive of PTSD symptoms, as was the use of avoidant coping strategies (such as 
believing the event hasn't happened, not being around other people) and active 
cognitive coping (trying to see the positive side of the situation, preparing for the 
worst). The authors found that environmental attributes, specifically the family 
situation, were not effective in identifying which children would develop PTSD, as 
'children within the same home experiencing similar objective events appear to 
perceive these events differently and show different reactions [p. 10211'. In addition, 
depression prior to the trauma was not found to be predictive of PTSD, but was 
predictive of the development of depression post-trauma. 
Participants for Asarnow et al. 's study were drawn from a relatively small sample of 
clinic-referred families who had been involved in other studies performed prior to the 
earthquake. This resulted in an accurate assessment of pre-disaster psychopathology, 
but limited the numbers of children and adolescents (n=49) who had been assessed 
prior to the earthquake and were available after the earthquake. La Greca, Silverman 
and Wasserstein (1998) were able to follow up a slightly larger sample of children 
(n=74), drawn from an elementary school and not from a clinic, who had taken part in 
a study of children's anxiety 15 months prior to a hurricane disaster. Pre-disaster 
levels of anxiety, inattention, conduct problems, and school performance predicted 
post-traumatic stress 3 months after the earthquake, but at 7 months after the 
hurricane only pre-disaster anxiety predicted PTSD symptornatology. 
1.6.4 Other psychopathology in children and adolescents following trauma 
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Several studies have observed that children and adolescents exposed to trauma are at 
risk of suffering psychopathology other than PTSD, and that such disorders are 
especially even more likely if the young person suffers from PTSD. In populations of 
children and adolescents exposed to trauma Pfefferbaurn (1997) notes that a number 
of studies have reported comorbidity between PTSD and depression (Goenjian, et al., 
1995; Green, 1985; Hubbard, Realmuto, Northwood, & Masten, 1995; Kinzie, Sack, 
Angell, Manson, & Rath, 1986; Kiser, Heston, Milsap, & Pruitt, 1991; Looff, 
Grimley, Kuiler, Martin, & Shunfield, 1995; Singer, Anglin, Song, & Lunghofer, 
1995; Stoddard, Norman, & Murphy, 1989; Weine, Becker, McGlashan, Vojvoda, 
Hartman, & Robbins, 1995; Yehuda & McFarlane, 1995; Yule & Udwin, 1991), 
PTSD and substance abuse (Arroyo & Eth, 1985; Brent et al., 1995; Clark, Bukstein, 
Smith, Kaczynski, Mezzich, & Donovan, 1995; Looff et al., 1995; Sullivan & Evans, 
1994), PTSD and other anxiety disorders (Brent et al., 1995; Clark et al., 1995; 
Goenjian et al., 1995; Kiser et al., 1991; Lonigan, Shannon, Taylor, Finch, & Sallec, 
1994; Singer et al., 1995; Yule & Udwin, 1991), and PTSD and Attention- 
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (Cuffe, McCullough, & Pumariega, 1994; Glod & 
Teicher, 1996). 
Very little research has been aimed at investigating why this increase in 
psychopathology is observed in children and adolescents following trauma, especially 
those suffering from PTSD. Tiet et al. (1998) reported that an accumulation of 
adverse life events can lead to an increase in the risk of psychiatric disorder. This 
finding has spurred Pynoos, Steinberg, & Piacentini (1999) to suggest that the 
secondary stressors that often accompany trauma lead to an increase in PTSD and 
other adverse psychiatric reactions directly, and by limiting the effectiveness of 
support (e. g. from parents or school) that otherwise may have been available to 
children and adolescents. Further research is required to uncover the processes that 
give rise to other psychopathology, and how PTSD can aggravate such difficulties. 
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1.7 Cognitive and meta-cognitive processes involved in the maintenance of PTSD in 
children and adolescents 
Among the most significant advances brought about in the adult cognitive models of 
PTSD outlined above is their account of the time course of the disorder. Accounting 
for the time course of PTSD is considered a necessary component for any model 
(Dalgleish, 1999). Such necessity seems to stem from the finding that, at least for 
severe trauma such as rape, post-traumatic symptomatology in the immediate 
aftermath of such an event may be common (Rothbaum, Foa, Riggs, Murdoch, & 
Walsh, 1992). 
Dunmore, Ehlers, and Clark (1999,2001) argued that factors responsible for the onset 
and maintenance of PTSD in adults are rarely distinguished in the literature, and that 
cognitive factors may play as significant a role in these aspects of the time course of 
PTSD as pre-traumatic and peri-traumatic experiences. Both Brewin et al. (1996) and 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) acknowledge that the onset of post-traumatic 
symptornatology may be strongly related to the quality of the memory laid down 
during the traumatic event, and argue that those individuals who suffer from more 
chronic PTSD are prevented in some way from processing such memories. This 
suggestion accounts for the finding that for many individuals the symptoms of PTSD 
are fleeting, whereas for others the disorder can last for many years. 
In the rest of this section an examination, is offered of the kinds of cognitive 
processes that may be involved in the maintenance of PTSD in children and 
adolescents. 
Appraisal, meta-cognitive, and information-processing aspects of cognition will be 
considered. First however, a caveat must be highlighted regarding the adoption of an 
onset-maintenance approach to PTSD in children and adolescents. While a growing 
body of research suggests that, as in adults, stress reactions in the immediate 
aftermath of a traumatic event may be quite common but diminish rapidly for most 
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individuals (American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 1998; Mirza, 
Bhadrinath, Goodyer, & Gilmour, 1998; Yule, Bolton, Udwin, Boyle, O'Ryan, & 
Nurrish, 2000), such findings should still be considered as tentative, especially in the 
case of young children who have been the subject of relatively few prospective 
studies. 
1.7.1 Secondary Emotions 
In the aftermath of a traumatic event, adults may develop what Brewin et al. (1996) 
term secondary emotions. According to these theorists, strong secondary emotions 
such as guilt and anger may interfere with the processing of traumatic memories by 
preventing a reduction in affect when traumatic memories are activated. Both anger 
and guilt (Goenjian, 1993; Gurwitch et al., 1998; Pynoos & Nader, 1988; Schwarz & 
Kowalski, 1991) are common reactions to trauma observed in children. To date both 
guilt (Pynoos et al., 1987) and anger (Vemberg, La Greca, Silverman, & Prinstein, 
1996) have been shown to be associated with PTSD. 
1.7.2 Thought control strategies 
As discussed in detail above, the cardinal symptoms of PTSD are distressing intrusive 
thoughts, feelings, and images, through which the individual 're-experiences' the 
traumatic event. The way in which an individual responds to these reexperiencing 
phenomena can have significant repercussions; an important feature of Ehlers and 
Clark's (2000) model of PTSD is that maladaptive thought control strategies, such as 
rumination and thought suppression, paradoxically increase the frequency of the 
intrusions. Unlike other forms of avoidance that would appear to hinder the 
processing of traumatic memories, such as distraction, thought suppression would 
appear actually to exacerbate the reexperiencing symptoms. 
Only two articles have evaluated the role of thought suppression in children with 
PTSD. In a study of 40 children exposed to MVAs, aged between eight and 17 years 
54 
old (mean age 13.6), Aaron, Zaglul, and Emery (1999) found that nearly one quarter 
of the exposed children developed PTSD (according to DSM-IV criteria). In a 
regression analysis of the assessed variables, only fear at the time of the traumatic 
event and thought suppression were found to be significant predictors of PTSD one 
month post-trauma, where greater fear and the greater endorsement of thought 
suppression were associated with worse symptoms. 
Certain flaws are apparent in this study, most notably the use of a scale that includes 
intrusion items in addition to thought suppression items (the White Bear Suppression 
Inventory; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), a small sample size, and that the children were 
assessed only at one month post-trauma. Nevertheless the study used both the key 
post-traumatic stress self-report measures available for use with children (the IES and 
the PTSD-RI), and included a suitable control group (non-MVA attendees at an 
accident and emergency department). Ehlers, Mayou, and Bryant (2003) also offer 
support for the role of thought suppression in their study of children involved in 
MVAs, where a single item assessing this strategy was found to be a significant 
predictor of PTSD at both three and six months post-trauma. 
Dissuading a child from the use of thought suppression is a simple target for 
treatment. However further research is necessary to discover if thought suppression 
leads to an increase in the frequency of intrusive cognitions, as has been demonstrated 
in adults. Gaskell, Wells, and Calam (2001) demonstrated that the standard 
experimental thought suppression paradigm is workable with children aged seven to 
11 years, while also finding that this thought control strategy was not responsible for 
an increase in intrusive thoughts. 
Other thought control strategies, such as distraction, which may not exacerbate the 
occurrence of intrusive thoughts and memories but may still delay the processing of 
traumatic memories, are worthy of investigation. Stallard, Velleman, Langsford, and 
Baldwin (2001) found that in their sample of 97 children aged seven to 18 years who 
had been involved in MVAs, the use of distraction was associated with a diagnosis of 
55 
PTSD at six weeks after the accident, though was not predictive of PTSD at eight 
months post-trauma. Very little is known about the developmental course of thought 
control strategies with regards to PTSD or any other anxiety or depressive disorder. 
Unfortunately, the avoidance cluster of symptoms within the DSM-IV classification 
of PTSD includes one symptom for the avoidance of thoughts, feelings and 
conversations associated with a traumatic event; this crude grouping may mask 
important differences between adults and children in the use of what are quite 
distinguishable avoidant strategies. The findings of Aaron et al. (1999) and Ehlers et 
al. (2003) suggest that more detailed research regarding the varieties of cognitive 
avoidance is warranted. 
1.7.3 The negative interpretation of intrusive symptoms 
One factor only recently identified within the domain of adult PTSD is the 
interpretation of post-traumatic symptoms, in particular the intrusive symptoms (see 
Steil & Ehlers, 2000). For example, the occurrence of flashbacks may be seen by the 
individual as a sign that he or she is suffering from brain damage or "going mad". 
Emotional numbness may be interpreted as indicating future unhappiness, as a result 
of being unable to form a close relationship with anyone (for further examples, see 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
In addition to further enhancing a sense of current threat, such cognitions also 
promote use of maladaptive thought control strategies, such as thought suppression 
(see earlier). At present few studies in children have formally acknowledged the 
potential role of such interpretations. Terr (1983) noted that one of the Chowchilla 
bus kidnapping children had developed a fear of being afraid, a process that is related 
to the interpretation of symptoms. The only specific test of the role of these kinds of 
appraisals is that of Ehlers et al. (in press) where the appraisal of the self as going 
mad was associated with PTSD symptornatology at both three and six months post- 
trauma. 
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A concept that has been more readily applied to child psychopathology is that of 
anxiety sensitivity. Anxiety sensitivity is the tendency to catastrophise or over- 
interpret signals of anxiety. In adults, this construct has been closely associated with 
certain anxiety disorders (Taylor, Koch, & McNally, 1992). In children, the 
Childhood Anxiety Sensitivity Index (CASI; Silverman, Fleisig, Rabian, & Peterson 
1991) has been used to account for a significant proportion of variance on measures 
of children's fears and trait anxiety, which could not be explained by anxiety 
frequency. Increasingly evidence has suggested that this construct accounts for a 
unique proportion of variance in trait anxiety, and has potential implications for the 
assessment and treatment of anxiety (Silverman & Weems, 1999). 
With regards to the psychopathology of PTSD in children, no study has examined 
specifically the role of anxiety sensitivity, though two studies have examined the role 
of anxiety sensitivity in a group of children with a number of anxiety disorders 
(Chorpita, Albano, & Barlow, 1996; Weems, Hammond-Laurence, Silverman, & 
Ginsburg, 1998). While there is some disagreement over the age at which anxiety 
sensitivity might influence general anxiety and fearfulness (where Silverman & 
Weems, 1999, argue persuasively in support of their finding that younger children are 
affected by their anxiety sensitivity), the emerging consensus is that by 11 to 12 years 
children possess the cognitive capacity to be concerned with abstract objects of fear, 
such as going crazy, losing control, or death. In each of these studies however, the 
number of children with PTSD was very small. This preliminary evidence that the 
construct of anxiety sensitivity is important in the development of anxiety disorders in 
children suggests that there is a pressing need to investigate meta-cognitive processes 
in paediatric PTSD. 
1.7.4 Rumination 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) describe how individuals involved in a traumatic event may 
ruminate over issues such as how the event could have been prevented, and how 
justice or revenge might be achieved. They also propose four ways in which 
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rumination may maintain PTSD: through strengthening maladaptive appraisals of the 
trauma, interfering with the processing of traumatic memories, increasing feelings of 
anxiety and hopelessness, and providing more internal cues to intrusive traumatic 
memories. 
Within child and adolescent populations, very few studies have examined children 
and adolescents' use of rumination. Broderick (1998) assessed children aged between 
nine and 12 years for their responses to academic, family, and peer problem 
situations, and found that girls used rumination as a means of coping with stressors 
more than boys. Studies examining the role of rumination in child psychopathology 
are even scarcer, in particular with regard to child's reactions to trauma. Some studies 
have demonstrated that the attributions children and adolescents form concerning the 
causes of a traumatic event can influence the development of post-traumatic 
symptomatology (Joseph, Brewin, Yule, & Williams, 1993), though 'Very little 
research has examined the repetitive kind of preoccupation identified by Ehlers and 
Clark (2000). One study has examined rumination and PTSD in children, that of 
Ehlers et al. (2003), who found that two items pertaining to ruminative styles 
(thinking about the trauma over and over, and wondering why the trauma happened to 
them) predicted the maintenance of PTSD symptoms. 
Broderick's (1998) study makes apparent individual differences in the use of 
rumination among prepubescent children, and given the importance attached to 
rumination by recent studies of PTSD in adults (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Dunmore 
et al., 1999; Ehlers et al., 1998), further research in children exposed to traumatic 
events is warranted. In particular such research may need to examine whether specific 
cognitions such as those identified by Ehlers et al. (2003) result from an individual's 
more global "behavioral-attentional style" (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
1.7.5 "Current threat" and children's and adolescents' beliefs about self and the 
world 
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Following a traumatic event children suffering from PTSD are likely to have elevated 
levels of anxiety (Ellis, Stores, & Mayou, 1998; Lonigan, Shannon, Taylor, Finch, & 
Sallee, 1994; Vogel & Vernberg, 1993). Such anxiety is likely to be the result of a 
number of factors, but whatever the cause, ongoing anxiety is considered by most 
theorists to impair the successful processing of traumatic memories; accessing 
emotion-laden memories of a traumatic event is unlikely to produce clinical 
improvement if no extinction of fear can occur (Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum, 1989). 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) describe how adults with PTSD often possess a particular 
form of anxiety that they term "current threat" (see above). These authors consider 
this state to be strongly related to various beliefs that an individual holds regarding 
their present condition and their more global worldview. A discussion of the possible 
role of children and adolescents' views of their own symptornatology has been given 
above. With regards to their more global assumptions, a recent study by Bishop 
(2001) found that a traumatic event has little bearing on a child's "assumptive world" 
(Janoff-Bulman, 1989); indeed the absence of a relationship between the child's 
beliefs about the world and their levels of anxiety and depression is taken to suggest 
the fascinating possibility that "children may deal with traumatic events by 
subsequently rejecting assumptions about the world that threaten their sense of 
security [p. 404]". 
Other evidence has demonstrated that appraisals relating more directly to a trauma are 
related to PTSD symptornatology. Joseph et al'. (1993) found that adolescents giving 
more internal causal attributions for negative and uncontrollable events during the 
Jupiter disaster, as measured by analysing accounts of the trauma five months 
afterwards, scored higher on the self-report measures of depression and PTSD at both 
five months and one year after the disaster. No attributions of personal control were 
given by the adolescents assessed in this study, i. e. they did not think that they could 
have actually done anything to prevent or alter what was happening. The authors 
conclude therefore, that such internal, causal, and yet uncontrollable attributions 
generated a feeling of shame in the sample tested. However, the sample was limited 
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by the number of survivors that produced accounts that could be rated, and was 
potentially a biased sample, since participants were selected by solicitors on the 
grounds that they were considered 'at risk'. It is difficult therefore to generalise these 
findings to other traumatised groups of young people. 
The role of emotions that result from internal and causal attributions, such as shame, 
in preventing recovery following a trauma is a key feature of the dual representation 
theory of PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996). A second, and yet not mutually exclusive view 
offered by Ehlers and Clark, is that considering oneself responsible for the trauma, 
helps to maintains a pervasive and persistent anxiety. The individual fears that it is 
something intrinsic about their personality or brain that means they were involved in 
the trauma or couldn't prevent certain aspects of it occurring, a belief which suggests 
that they continue to be at risk of suffering or being responsible for similar danger. 
Terr (1981; 1983) notes that the young children involved in the Chowchilla bus 
kidnapping attributed the trauma to some event that preceded it, such as being angry 
with their mother, or stepping in a 'bad luck square'. Terr calls this phenomenon 
omen formation. The links between the omen and the trauma were based on a variety 
of pathways, such as the preceding event being causal or a warning of the impending 
tragedy, or a sign that the trauma could have been handled more easily if a different 
course of action had been taken. Terr (1981) asserts that such omens can become 
closely intermingled with posttraurnatic psychopathology; indeed such thinking 
clearly reflects a child's attempts to explain an anomalous event, and be prepared for 
future trauma. The processes may often enhance a child's feeling of guilt, and anxiety 
upon future exposure to trauma-related stimuli. Terr offers an insightful explanation 
as to why children engage in such attributional. strategies, if these strategies bring 
about such negative affect; it is more comforting to '[choose] personal responsibility 
and even guilt for the event over utter helplessness and randomness [p. 1547]. 
In addition to inflating a sense of guilt and anxiety, attempting to explain an event and 
make the future more predictable can lead to great pessimism about what will become 
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of one's life. A sense of foreshortened future is one of the symptoms listed in the 
DSM-IV avoidance cluster of symptoms. How this reflects an avoidant response to 
trauma is debatable. Perrin et al. (2000) also suggest that the adoption of such 
cognitions reflects a change in the young person's 'assumptive world'. If one is to. 
view the formation of such cognitions as primarily an avoidant response, it is possible 
that not thinking about the future may be conceptualised as an avoidance of the 
distressing possibility that the traumatic event may recur. In this manner the traumatic 
event itself is avoided. Alternatively, by avoiding lifestyles such as marriage and 
childbearing, as some children who have been traumatised suggest that they will do 
(Schwarz & Kowalski, 1991), they are avoiding the emotional situations that they 
may find so provocative and painful. A further suggestion is provided by Schwarz, 
McNally, and Yeh (1998), who propose that an overgeneral memory, i. e. the inability 
to retrieve specific memories, which is observed in adults exposed to trauma, may be 
in part a cause of this distortion concerning the future. The inability to recall the past 
in detail may have consequences for how one envisions the future. Recently it has 
been reported that the overgeneral memory phenomena may occur in depressed 
adolescents as well as depressed adults (Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale, 2002), adding to 
the credence of this theory with regards to younger populations. 
While certain efforts to understand a trauma may have adverse effects on mental 
health, it is also possible that in attempting to understand and accommodate a 
traumatic event into one's worldview children and adolescents may demonstrate 
enhanced maturity and depth of understanding of the world. Goenjian et al. (1999) 
compared adolescents living in a city in Armenia devastated by an earthquake, who 
had been 7-10 years old at the time of the earthquake, to adolescents in a city much 
less affected by the earthquake. The earthquake seems to have affected the 
adolescents in the devastated city in terms of their sense of personal morality and 
their worldview in both positive and negative ways. The children and adolescents in 
the devastated city possessed a more mature moral development. Typically, the 
adolescents of the more affected city reported being more nagged by their 
consciences, and being more understanding of the fact that things are not always 
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'black and white' when it comes to right and wrong. The children and adolescents 
advocated more community values and loyalty. The following months and years of 
rebuilding and recovery must have allowed for a great deal more hardship and 
reflection. The children and adolescents seem to have made some sense of their 
experiences, and the authors of the study attribute this to the tremendous guilt among 
the children and adolescents in the first few 6-18 months after the disaster (Goenjian, 
1993), and the requirement of the children and adolescents to take on greater 
responsibilities in the aftermath of the disaster. 
More negative consequences, however, were also observed, with children and 
adolescents scoring more highly on measures of psychopathological interference with 
conscience functioning. They were more likely to see themselves as bad people, and 
see the world as basically an evil place. The authors suggest that this was possibly as 
a result of the constant negative mood associated with suffering from PTSD and 
depression; the authors fail to suggest the alternate hypothesis, that such views may in 
part be responsible for the persistent nature of the adolescents' chronic 
psychopathology following the earthquake. A methodological flaw of this study was 
that assessments were carried out six years after the earthquake, and so the difference 
between the young people of each city cannot be attributed solely to the trauma of the 
earthquake itself. It is nevertheless clear from this study that a traumatic event and its 
aftermath can have a tremendous impact on a young person's view of their self and 
the world, and that such views are associated with chronic psychopathology. 
In their practitioner review, Perrin and colleagues (2000) advocate the use of 
discussion and cognitive restructuring for self-blame, beliefs in the permanency of the 
traumatisation, and the overemphasis on the effects of the trauma on other aspects of 
life. In this sub-section evidence has been presented to support the view that children 
and adolescents do modify their schemata concerning the world following trau ma, 
can generate powerful secondary emotions such as guilt and anger, and may blame 
themselves in part for what happened. Pynoos et al. (1999) point out that such 
changes in schemata may quickly become embedded in the individual, and operate 
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outside of conscious awareness. No studies have examined prospectively what kinds 
of cognitions predict the onset of PTSD or its persistence, or indeed cognitions that 
predict the depression and anxiety that are so often co-morbid with PTSD. 
1.7.6 Worry 
An early study into children's fears following a traumatic event (a lightning strike at a 
boy's football match) demonstrated that, not unsurprisingly, the children exposed to 
the tragedy were more likely than control groups to have fears and worries regarding 
a number of phenomena (Dollinger, O'Donnell, & Staley, 1984). These phenomena 
included lightning and thunderstorms, disasters, death and dying, as well as other 
events and situations that were not related to the event they were exposed to, such as 
animals and the supernatural. A similar increase in the fears was observed in child 
survivors of the Jupiter disaster (Yule, Udwin, & Murdoch, 1991). While such fears 
may result from amendments to a child's self-schema and external threat schemata 
(Kendall & Ingrain, 1987; Kendall & Ronan, 1990), the intensity of such fears also 
may be aggravated by worrying. 
Vasey (1993), following the work of Borkovec, Shadick, and Hopkins (1991), 
defined worry as "an anticipatory cognitive process involving repetitive thoughts and 
images that contain fear-producing content related to possible traumatic events and 
their potentially catastrophic implications [p. 7]". Such a process is likely to play a 
significant role in enhancing specific fears following a traumatic event, in addition to 
maintaining a generally anxious mood. Vasey's consideration of childhood worry 
centres largely around the role of children's cognitive development, acknowledging 
that worry requires the ability both to anticipate future events as well as the related 
ability "to go beyond what is observable and consider what is merely possible [Vasey, 
1993, p. 9]". Before a child is seven to eight years of age, he or she is unlikely to be 
able to consider the future (Piaget & Inhelder, 1966), though at the slightly earlier age 
of five to six years children have been found to produce anticipatory thoughts of 
threat (Vasey, 1991). 
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For the child who already has experienced an extremely frightening event, it may be 
considerably easier to conceive of future threats, as demonstrated in the studies of 
Dollinger et al. (1984) and Yule et al. (1991). For children exposed to trauma, worry 
may be directed towards the prevention of the reoccurrence of an experienced event. 
In adult populations, it has been proposed that beliefs regarding the importance of 
worry, especially as a way of coping with future anticipated threats, play a key role in 
the maintenance of high levels of anxiety (Wells, 1995). The role of the meta- 
cognitive beliefs outlined by Wells (1995) have not yet received attention with 
regards to childhood anxiety disorders, yet Vasey (1993) has acknowledged that the 
role of children's beliefs concerning their own problem solving skills and c. ognitive 
states are related to uncontrollable worry. Future research directed at examining 
children's beliefs regarding worry could highlight how children think about the future 
following trauma and whether an endorsement of worry may maintain elevated levels 
of anxiety and contribute to the maintenance of PTSD. 
1. Z7 Infortnation processing approaches 
Several experimental paradigms have been used to examine information-processing 
aspects of children's and adolescents' responses to trauma. In this section three 
paradigms (attentional biases, memory biases, and probability judgments) that have 
been used to examine information processing biases observed in children and 
adolescents suffering from PTSD will be considered. 
1.7.7.1 Attentional biases 
For some time it has been known that following a traumatic event adults suffering 
from PTSD demonstrate an attentional bias, as measured using the modified Stroop 
task, towards trauma-related cues than adults not suffering from PTSD (Cassiday, 
McNally, & Zeitlin, 1992; Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, & McCarthy, 1991; Kaspi & 
McNally, 1991; McNally, Kaspi, Riemann & Zeitlin, 1990; Thrasher, Dalgleish & 
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Yule, 1994). In this task participants are required to name the colour of a word 
presented on a computer screen or on a board with a list of words. An attentional bias 
is thought to be present when the participant takes a longer period of time to name the 
colour of a word that relates to an individual's concerns relative to a neutral or non- 
word. In a review of the previous decade's work into the emotional Stroop task and 
psychopathology, Williams, Mathews and Macleod (1996) consider interference on 
the colour-naming task to be due to the presented word stimulus having a semantic 
value that relates to the individual's current concerns, danger schema or expertise. 
Thrasher and Dalgleish (1999) note that a variety of explanations have been proposed 
for why such a bias occurs, but no clear account exists as to why different 
methodologies for examining attentional biases (e. g. the dichotic listening task; 
Trandel & McNally, 1987) do not demonstrate the same bias so conclusively. 
Three studies involving samples of children exposed to traumatic events have 
investigated the role of attentional biases in this age group. Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat- 
Doost, Yule, and Dalgleish (1999), in a study using the modified Stroop task, found 
that children aged 9-17 years who had been exposed to traumatic events such as 
MVAs or assaults, demonstrated an attentional bias towards trauma-related words 
(e. g., "injureX% "blood"), relative to neutral words, and to children who had not been 
exposed to trauma. Unfortunately a sample of children who had been exposed to 
trauma but did not develop PTSD was not included in this study, and as the authors 
conclude, the children included in the study were old enough to have met all the 
significant cognitive developmental milestones. The same samples of children also 
performed the dot probe task (Dalgleish, Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, & Yule, 
2001). Children with PTSD selectively allocated attention towards socially 
threatening stimuli, and away from depression-related stimuli. No trauma-related 
stimuli were used in this study, however. 
Ribchester (2001) has overcome some of the weaknesses of these studies of selective 
attention in children following trauma. Ribchester found that children suffering from 
PTSD who had been exposed to a MVA demonstrated greater response latencies 
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towards trauma-related words on a modified Stroop task, relative to other word 
categories and a sample of children also exposed to MVAs but not suffering from 
PTSD. In addition to using an appropriate control group, this study also found that the 
threat-specific attentional bias was eliminated following treatment with eye 
movement desensitisation and reprocessing (EMDR). 
Although the findings from these studies are broadly consistent with others that have 
examined attentional biases in anxious children (Vasey et al., 1995,1996), it has not 
been demonstrated that such biases play a role in the maintenance of PTSD in either 
children or adults. It remains to be established whether attentional bias is a discrete 
cognitive process involved in the aetiology and maintenance of PTSD, or an 
experimental index of PTSD symptoms (e. g., hypervigilance). 
1.7.7.2 Probability judgements 
Butler & Mathews (1983) found that adults with depression and anxiety estimated 
that negative events were more likely to happen, and were also were more likely to 
happen to themselves than other people, relative to normal controls. These findings 
were interpreted in terms of the "availability heuristic" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), 
which suggests "that estimates of the likelihood of a given event are not generated by 
a process of logical calculation but rather are a function of the ease with which 
instances or scenarios of similar events in memory can be brought to mind [Dalgleish, 
Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Canterbury, 2000, p. 9821'. Given that 
people with depression and anxiety are preoccupied with thoughts about negative 
situations, in the past or possibly in the future, according to this heuristic they are 
likely to give elevated probability estimates for such negative events. 
In extending the same probability judgement paradigm to children with anxiety and 
depression, Dalgleish, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Yule, and Canterbury (1997) 
found that, unlike with adults, children with these disorders did not estimate that 
negative events were any more likely to occur than control children who were not 
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suffering any emotional disorders. In addition, they did not estimate that negative 
events were more likely to happen to themselves than others, relative to controls. 
From this finding, Dalgleish and his colleagues hypothesised that the availability of 
negative event-related cognitions 'is elevated as a function of increased rumination 
about hypothetical negative incidents [Dalgleish et al., 2000, p. 982]'. It is possible 
that children do not engage in rumination about future hypothetical events, and so are 
considerably less likely to give elevated probability estimates for such events. 
Dalgleish et al. (2000) conducted a study of children who actually had experienced a 
very negative event, and then proceeded to develop PTSD, in order to test this 
hypothesis. As Dalgleish and colleagues found a similar pattern of results to the 
anxious and depressed children of their earlier study, it can be concluded that the lack 
of hypothetical rumination explanation for the failure to observe an elevated 
probability judgement is false. The alternative explanation offered is that children are 
capable of inhibiting information related to a negative event, thereby decreasing the 
availability of negative event information when estimating a probability judgement. 
There are two reasons to reject this inhibition theory. Firstly, as the authors 
themselves suggest, if the children were inhibiting information related to the trauma, 
then they would have given lower estimates of negative events occurring, relative to 
controls, which was not the case. Secondly, it is not plausible that children would use 
a sophisticated thought control strategy, which presumably assists in reducing their 
subjective distress, while adults do not. Dalgleish and colleagues recognise this 
explanation, and suggest that in the case of adults, availability effects must outstrip 
inhibition effects. This may be likely given that adults, with their greater cognitive 
capacity, are more able to devise more detailed negative future outcomes and 
ruminate about them. 
Clearly the presence of inhibitory mechanisms in children has important implications 
for an understanding of the aetiology and possible treatment routes for PTSD in this 
population. Rumination in adults has been found to be associated with more negative 
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outcome following trauma (Ehlers et al., 1998). If children have sufficient inhibitory 
mechanisms available to prevent rumination about the impact of the traumatic event 
to which they have been exposed, then inhibition may be protective. A more negative 
effect of inhibition may be that emotional processing of traumatic memories is 
prevented. There is a tremendous need for further studies of cognitive inhibitory 
processes in children, with and without anxiety disorders, before this potentially 
highly important aspect of child psychopathology enters into the mainstream 
aetiological models. 
1.7.7.3 Memory biases 
In addition to biases of probability estimation, individuals with emotional disorders 
have been found to have explicit memory biases in favour of recalling negative 
information, in particular if that information relates to the individual's concerns (see 
Williams, Watts, McLeod, & Mathews, 1997, for review). Such biases may function 
as a maintaining factor in the emotional disorders by selecting information that 
reinforces the cognitions that are distressing. 
Following studies that supported the existence of memory biases in children with 
depression (Neshat-Doost, Taghavi, Moradi, Yule, & Dalgleish, 1998) and anxiety 
(Daleiden, 1998), Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, and Dalgleish (2000) 
repeated a basic free recall and recognition procedure for testing memory bias in a 
group of children and adolescents with PTSD. In addition to showing poorer overall 
performance on the tasks, the PTSD participants showed a bias in recalling negative 
words, relative to neutral and positive words. However, the participants with PTSD 
did not have a bias specifically towards negative words associated with trauma, 
relative to depression-related negative words and general threat-related words. These 
data were taken to indicate that cognitive models of emotion developed in adults 
might be applied, in part, to children. Unlike children with depression, the memory 
bias in this group did not increase with age, suggesting that the 'information 
processing biases associated with anxiety may be a function of the basic emotional 
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state and therefore be present at full strength from the developmental onset of the 
emotion [p. 53 1, Moradi et al., 2000]'. 
The cognitive processes of attentional bias, probability estimation, and memory bias 
and their role in child psychopathology still require a great deal of research, but some 
points can be made from the work already conducted in relation to PTSD in children 
and adolescents. Children and adolescents with PTSD do show worse overall 
cognitive functioning, both in the information processing tasks described above, and 
more general mnemonic functioning (Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Taghavi, Yule, & 
Dalgleish, 1999). This finding validates the considerable clinical evidence suggesting 
that children with PTSD may, like adults, present with the DSM-IV symptom of 
difficulty concentrating. The existence of mnemonic and attentional biases also 
suggest a continuity between child PTSD and adult PTSD in terms of underlying 
processes associated with the disorder. At present no studies in adults have examined 
empirically how such processes may maintain the disorder, though several theories 
have been suggested. 
1.8 Conclusions and rationalefor the current investigation 
1.8.1 Summary and conclusions 
It has not been the aim of this introduction to outline the effects that trauma has on a 
child's development and distal psychopathology (see Pynoos et al., 1999, for such an 
account). This is not to say that trauma and PTSD do not have long-term 
developmental consequences for children, in terms of both psychopathology, and 
more general functioning such as school performance. The work of Bolton, O'Ryan, 
Udwin, Boyle, and Yule (2000) in the follow-up of children involved in the Jupiter 
disaster demonstrated that children are at a greater risk in the aftermath of a traumatic 
event of developing a range of anxiety and affective disorders, especially if they have 
PTSD. Rather, it has been the purpose of this introduction to stress the need for a 
more detailed understanding of the precise mechanisms that govern the incidence and 
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course of post-traumatic stress reactions, as well as how other psychopathology can 
result following a traumatic event. 
In particular, evidence has been presented that suggests that adopting three distinct 
components of the cognitive models of adult PTSD devised by Brewin et al. (1996) 
and Ehlers and Clark (2000) would offer insights into the understanding of children's 
and adolescents' responses to trauma. These components are i) distinguishing 
between onset and maintenance factors in the aetiology of PTSD, ii) the critical role 
of the nature of trauma memories in the onset and maintenance of the disorder, and 
iii) the role of negative appraisals and maladaptive coping in maintaining the 
disorder. It is proposed that other factors found to be associated with child and 
adolescent PTSD may be investigated within such a framework, e. g. the role of the 
family (Smith, et al. 2001), the role of pre-traumatic psychological disorders 
(Asamow et al., 1999; La Greca, et al., 1998), and the increased prevalence of 
emotional disorders in children and adolescents exposed to trauma. 
An examination of the developmental context to these critical theoretical issues has 
been initiated here, yet, as has been shown, considerably more research is required. 
The case for applying elements of adult approaches to psychopathology to the 
understanding of childhood emotional disorder has already been made, e. g., the 
information processing perspective on anxiety (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997). However, 
there exists in this application of adult theory the danger that "the more the research is 
about psychopathology, the less it is about development [Steinberg, 2002, p. 127]". 
Adopting the framework outlined here does not preclude developmental 
considerations when understanding children's reactions to traumatic events. Indeed, 
such a framework allows investigation into developmental influences on the specific 
processes that contribute to the onset and maintenance of PTSD. 
Understanding the aetiology of child and adolescent PTSD in greater detail will have 
tremendous implications for psychological interventions for youth following trauma. 
While considered the "first-line" approach to treatment, the "active ingredients" of 
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cognitive behaviour treatment for PTSD in children and adolescents have yet to be 
established (Cohen, Berliner, & March, 2000). Exposure treatments have been shown 
to be effective in child as well as adult populations (Saigh, Yule, & Inamdar, 1996), 
but the success of this treatment could be attributable to different therapeutic 
processes. Exposure treatment may allow a reduction in the negative affect and 
arousal incorporated in traumatic memories, modify the structure and form of the 
traumatic memory such that the memories are less likely to be triggered by external 
sensory stimuli, or both of these processes. The role of cognitive elements of 
cognitive behaviour therapy similarly needs clarification, and it is suggested that 
cognitive interventions will benefit from incorporating an understanding of children's 
cognitive avoidant and meta-cognitive processes in the aftermath of trauma. The 
framework presented here for understanding elements of children's and adolescents' 
reactions to trauma may inform how cognitive behavioural treatments might be 
improved and tailored to a child's development. 
1.8.2 Rationalefor the current investigation 
The central aim of this investigation is to understand the role of cognitive processes, 
described above, in the onset and maintenance of PTSD in children and adolescents. 
In particular, the framework outlined in the previous sub-section advocated 
examining several critical issues regarding child and adolescent PTSD. 
First, an examination of the role of the nature of trauma memory is strongly 
war-ranted. To this end it is considered that a measure of the nature of memories of a 
trauma should be examined soon after the event, and the role of this factor in causing 
post-traumatic stress in both the acute and chronic periods should be quantified. 
Second, the role of cognitive appraisals in determining PTSD should be examined. 
Specifically, the appraisals investigated should be those a child or adolescent had 
during a trauma, those relating to the world and the self following a trauma, and those 
relating their own PTSD symptornatology after a trauma. 
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Third, pathways to avoidance (in both cognitive and behavioural forms) should be 
elucidated. That is, since avoidance has been regularly demonstrated to be associated 
with chronic PTSD, there is a pressing need to understand the attitudes and responses 
that are likely to result in children and adolescents adopting this activity in the 
aftermath of a trauma. The importance attached to forms of cognitive avoidance by 
both Brewin et al. (1996) and Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggests that research may be 
usefully directed towards understanding to what extent children use these maladaptive 
thought control strategies. 
Fourth, the role of ruminative and worrying coping styles, identified as being 
correlates of both post-traumatic stress and other psychopathology in adults, in 
maintaining PTSD needs to be assessed. In particular, the role of worry in persistent 
hyperarousal and anxiety, and the role of rumination in precipitating maladaptive 
appraisal and maintaining post-traumatic depression, need evaluation. 
Fifth, the ability of ASD to predict chronic PTSD in children and adolescents requires 
investigation. In examining this diagnosis the relationship between dissociative 
symptoms (both during and after a trauma) and PTSD, in particular the effect of 
dissociation during a trauma on laying down fragmented, sensory-laden memories, 
may be examined. 
Sixth, the role of parents and the family, already demonstrated to be important in the 
development of PTSD in children and adolescents (Smith, Perrin, Yule, & Rabe- 
Hesketh, 2001), deserves further investigation. In the context of the framework for 
considering child and adolescent PTSD outlined above, a child's family may be 
playing a role in moderating PTSD at a number of points: by enabling a child to 
verbalize a traumatic event as it occurs, enabling the verbalization and emotional 
processing of a traumatic event in its aftermath, and influencing a child's appraisals 
and coping styles after a traumatic event. Examining parental influence on these 
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stages may offer insights into psychopathological responses to trauma in children and 
adolescents. 
Seventh, pathways to other post-traumatic psychopathology need to be delineated. As 
has been demonstrated in adults exposed to trauma (Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & 
Orsillo, 1999), a child's appraisals following a trauma may be associated with 
depression and anxiety, as well as PTSD symptornatology. 
Eighth, the role of pre-traumatic psychological disorders in increasing the risk of 
PTSD (Asamow et al., 1999; La Greca, et al., 1998) may be better understood. Pre- 
existing elevated arousal may lead to a child laying down more emotion-laden 
memories and be related to the onset of PTSD, while the presence of maladaptive 
cognitive and meta-cognitive styles may play a role in the maintenance of 
posttraumatic symptomatology. For example, rumination in the aftermath of a trauma 
may be related to a pre-existing belief concerning the merits of ruminating as a 
method of problem-solving or avoiding negative affect. The suppression of thoughts 
relating to the trauma may relate to the pre-existing use of this strategy to control 
unpleasant thoughts or memories. The negative appraisal of post-traumatic 
symptomatology may be related to a pre-existing and more general negative appraisal 
of bodily sensations and anxiety symptoms. The view that worry is a positive way of 
coping may lead to the generation of more post-traumatic arousal and maladaptive 
beliefs (e. g. "the world is an unfair place", I am a weak person"). 
In order to address these key questions, two studies were designed. Given the limited 
amount of research conducted in this area, and the methodological and ethical 
problems associated with recruiting younger children, it was decided to conduct each 
study using older child and adolescent participants, aged 10 to 17. The first study 
designed for, this investigation involved surveying the prevalence of intrusive 
memories and other post-traumatic symptornatology in non-clinic referred samples of 
children and adolescents. This study required that children and adolescents, recruited 
from secondary schools, completed questionnaires concerning a recent frightening 
73 
experience. These questionnaires assessed what kind of event they had experienced, 
the emotions they felt during the event, the quality of their memories of the 
frightening event, the strategies they used to cope with intrusive memories of the 
event, post-traumatic and depressive symptornatology, and how they appraised the 
effect of the trauma and any post-traumatic stress symptoms. 
While lacking the ability of a prospective study to delineate the role of onset and 
maintenance processes, the use of a cross-sectional study design would allow for an 
exploratory investigation of the relationships between memory quality, the frequency 
and quality of intrusive memories, other PTSD symptoms, post-traumatic appraisals, 
and the coping strategies adopted to cope with such symptoms. It was thought that 
conducting this study in a non-clinical population would be useful as it would 
determine whether the processes hypothesised to be involved in the onset and 
maintenance of PTSD in children and adolescents exposed to traumatic events, would 
be qualitatively different from the processes observed in youth exposed to less severe 
events. In addition, distributing the questionnaires used in Study 2, a prospective 
study, to large samples of non-clinical children will be useful in validating (in terms 
of their component structure and internal reliability) the novel measures designed for 
this investigation. 
The second and more important study comprised a prospective investigation of 
children's and adolescents' psychological responses to either an assault or an RTA. 
These traumatic events were chosen as i) it was considered likely that a child or 
adolescent undergoing such events would meet criterion A (exposure to a traumatic 
event) of the DSM-IV PTSD criteria, ii) such events are commonly experienced by 
children and adolescents, especially in urban areas, and have been found to be a 
common cause of PTSD, and iii) a representative sample of children and adolescents 
exposed to such events could be identified and recruited at hospital accident and 
emergency departments. 
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A prospective study affords the opportunity to understand the role of a number of 
cognitive processes in the aetiology of child and adolescent PTSD. The cognitive 
processes chosen to be investigated included: 
9 The formation of sensory-based and fragmented memories of the trauma, 
* negative beliefs about self and the world, 
self-blame, 
thought control strategies, 
rumination as a response to any (not necessarily trauma-related) mental 
distress, 
endorsement of worry as a positive strategy, 
" the negative appraisal of anxious and post-traumatic symptomatology, 
" negative attitudes towards emotional expression, 
" thought suppression of intrusive traumatic memories, 
" distraction from intrusive traumatic memories, and 
" rumination about the traumatic event and its consequences. 
It was also considered that the mediating effect of age and parental influence on these 
variables could be assessed, in order to understand the developmental limitations on 
the application of cognitive models of PTSD to children and adolescents, and the 
extent to which parents shape their child's ability to cope with a traumatic event. 
Given the exploratory nature of this investigation, it was considered appropriate to 
focus on examining these processes in older children and adolescents (10-16 year 
olds), who would be more likely to have reached the level of cognitive development 
necessary to undertake the processes and appraisals outlined above. A prospective 
study would also allow for investigation of the power of the ASD to predict later 
PTSD. 
The two studies designed for this investigation would be novel in a number of ways. 
To the investigator's knowledge, no studies have yet examined post-traumatic stress 
symptoms in a non-clinical child and adolescent population, or in a sample of 
children and adolescents exposed to an assault. The prospective study designed for 
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this investigation would be only the third study to investigate the kinds of cognitive 
processes postulated by Brewin et al. (1996) and Ehlers and Clark (2000), and the 
first to examine the ability of the ASD diagnosis to predict chronic PTSD in this age 
group. This prospective study would use more thoroughly devised measures than 
previous studies (Ehlers et al., 2003, Stallard, 2003), and would attempt to relate 
cognitive processes involved in pre-trauma psychopathology to processes directly 
involved the aetiology of PTSD. 
1.8.3 Hypothesesfor the investigation 
As stated above, the central aim of this investigation was to understand the role of 
cognitive processes, described in the introduction, in the onset and maintenance of 
PTSD in children and adolescents. Having conducted a review of the literature 
concerning the aetiology of PTSD in children and adolescents, and then highlighted 
several key issues that require investigation, a number of specific hypotheses were 
made concerning this investigation, listed here. 
Hypothesis 1: In Study 2, PTSD symptornatology across the sample assessed will 
decrease as a function of time; 
Hypothesis 2: Subjective indices of trauma or frightening event severity will account 
for unique variance in PTSD scores over and above objective indices of trauma 
severity and other demographic variables, and in Study 2 will be particularly 
associated with the onset of PTSD (i. e. PTSD as assessed soon after the assault or 
RTA); 
Hypothesis 3: Sensory-based and fragmented memories will be correlated with post- 
traumatic stress symptoms following a trauma or frightening event. In both Study I 
and Study 2 memory quality will account for a proportion of unique variance in 
PTSD scores, over and above demographic variables and peri-traumatic distress. 
Within Study 2, memory quality will be strongly correlated with the onset of PTSD, 
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but to a lesser degree with the maintenance of PTSD (i. e. PTSD as assessed several 
months post-trauma); 
Hypothesis 4: In Study 2, peri-traumatic dissociation will be correlated with the onset 
of PTSD symptoms, but to a much lesser extent be predictive of chronic PTSD. With 
regards to the ASD diagnosis, the dissociation criterion will not significantly enhance 
the ability of the diagnosis to predict chronic PTSD; 
Hypothesis 5: The various cognitive processes outlined in the previous sub-section 
will be correlated with PTSD symptornatology in Study 1, a cross-sectional study. In 
Study 2, a prospective study, such processes will predict chronic PTSD (i. e. they 
would be involved in the maintenance of PTSD), over and above the effects of the 
variables hypothesised to be involved in the onset of PTSD (i. e. peri-traumatic 
distress and memory quality); 
Hypothesis 6: Maladaptive appraisals concerning the trauma or frightening event will 
be related to the use of maladaptive coping strategies, in both Study I and Study 2; 
Hypothesis T Family psychopathology and cognitive processes, assessed in Study 2, 
will be related to child PTSD, particularly in the maintenance of the disorder; 
Hypothesis 8: Where prior psychopathology was related to the onset and maintenance 
of PTSD in participants of Study 2, this relationship will be attributable at least in part 
to the role of maladaptive cognitive styles and coping strategies that pre-existed the 
trauma; 
Hypothesis 9: The cognitive processes involved in causing PTSD symptoms in 
participants of Study I and Study 2, in particular negative appraisals, will also play a 
large role in causing depressive responses to the trauma or frightening event. 
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Note. A version of this introduction was published in a peer-reviewed journal. Please 
see Appendix C for a copy of this article. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology for Study 1: A naturalistic study of intrusive cognitions, 
post-traumatic psychopathology, and coping in a non-clinical sample of children and 
adolescents following self-reported upsetting events. 
In chapters 2 and 3 an account will be given ofthe methodologies used in Studies I 
and 2, respectively. In this chapter an account of the methodology used for Study 1, 
the cross-sectional study, will be given. 
2.1 Design 
This study involved gathering cross-sectional data from a non-clinical sample of 
children and adolescents, with the aim of estimating the prevalence of intrusive 
memories (the cardinal symptom of PTSD) within non-clinical populations, and 
exploring the relationships between memory quality, the frequency and quality of 
intrusive memories, other PTSD symptoms, post-traumatic appraisals, and the coping 
strategies adopted to cope with such symptoms. In addition, data were gathered on 
measures of cognitive and coping styles, in order to derive fully the psychometric 
properties of the measures used in Study 2. 
2.2 Ethical permission 
Ethical pennission for the study was successfully sought from the Institute of 
Psychiatry Research Ethics Committee (Study No. 133/0 1). 
2.3 Participant population 
The participant population was drawn from two secondary schools in England. The 
first, School A, is a mixed-sex comprehensive school in a small town in the West of 
England, where 3.7% (in 2000) of pupils qualify for free school meals. The second, 
School B, is a mixed-sex comprehensive school in an outlying district of Nottingham, 
where 11.2% (in 1996) of pupils qualify for free school meals. The proportion of 
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pupils that qualify free school meals is the standard indicator of the social 
backgrounds of pupils at a school; the average within the UK is 16%, suggesting that 
both schools, in particular School A, are of above-average social background. 
Children and adolescents from years 7 (11-12 year olds), 9 (13-14 year olds), 11 (15- 
16 year olds) and the sixth form (16-18 year olds) were invited to participate in the 
study. 
2.4 Procedure 
The consent procedures stipulated by the Research Ethics Committee of the Institute 
of Psychiatry required that the opt-in informed consent of parents and the informed 
consent of their children be required for the pupils to participate in the study (except 
for pupils aged 16 and over, for whom only the pupil's consent was required). 
Initially therefore, children at School A took letters home to their parents informing 
them about the study, and asking for their permission for their child to participate in 
the study (see Appendix A for copies of all letters, information sheets and 
questionnaire batteries used in Study 1). Parents would have to return a reply slip if 
they consented to their child participating. The pupils themselves were given a 
forewarning of what the study would involve, and on the day of the study received 
information sheets detailing why the study was being conducted and what 
participating in the study would involve. Letters to parents and information sheets for 
children stressed that participating in the study was voluntary and any information 
received would be treated as confidential, except in instances where it was thought 
that the child was at risk of further harm. 
A very low participation rate at School A using this opt-in consent procedure 
necessitated an amendment to the recruitment procedures. This amendment, ratified 
by the Research Ethics Committee of the Institute of Psychiatry, allowed the use of an 
opt-out consent procedure. This involved writing directly to parents' homes (as 
opposed to sending letters home via pupils) and informing them about the study. 
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Parents were informed that unless they returned the reply slip, it would be assumed 
that they consented to their child participating in the study, as long as their child also 
consented to participating. Using this procedure at School A and at School B in the 
following academic year there was a far higher rate of participation (see following 
sub-section). 
Teachers presented a consent form and 12-page questionnaire battery to children 
within their class and went over the details presented within the infon-nation sheet and 
any concerns that they might have. The teacher then gave instructions as to how to 
complete the questionnaire battery. Again it was stressed that participation in the 
study was voluntary and that any information received would be treated 
confidentially, unless any child was thought to be in any danger. Children were 
assured that they could drop out at anytime they choose, without any consequences at 
school or at any hospital. It was also stressed that each child's own personal 
responses were needed, and that there were no right or wrong answers to the 
questionnaire items. 
Children completed the battery with both the teacher present and the investigator 
available should any child become upset and need help. Children took between 15 
and 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire battery. No child became upset while 
completing the questionnaire. A number of children stated that they were unable to 
think of a frightening event that had happened to them in the previous two months 
(the opening question of the questionnaire battery). Children were encouraged by the 
investigator to take more time to think about events that they had experienced 
recently and to report any frightening event, however trivial, e. g. watching a scary 
film or nearly being in an accident. If children were still unable to recall a frightening 
event they were asked to complete the sections of the questionnaire battery that 
weren't related to a specific event. 
2.5 The questionnaire battery 
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The questionnaire battery completed by children participating in Study 2 centred on 
the disclosure of a frightening event that the child had experienced in the previous 
two months. The remaining sections of the battery were aimed at investigating the 
emotions elicited by the frightening event, the frequency and quality of memories and 
intrusive memories of the event, psychopathology following the event, general 
strategies for coping with intrusive cognitions, and appraisals of the event and its 
sequelae. 
Each component of the questionnaire battery is described in the following sub- 
sections. 
2.5.1 Section 1: A brief description of a recentfrightening event 
Children were asked to briefly describe a frightening event they had experienced in 
the two months prior to participating in the study. A brief description was requested 
so as to limit the degree of distress elicited by participating in the study. A period of 
two months was chosen as it thought that the frightening event had to be sufficiently 
recent to be memorable, but not too recent so as to limit the number of frightening 
events that they children might recall. 
2.5.2 Section 2: Affect during thefrightening event 
Children were asked to rate their affect during the frightening event on Likert scales 
(with possible responses of 1-10, where a greater number indicated a stronger 
emotion). The five emotions assessed were "scared", "angry", 64 sad7, "ashamed", and 
"helpless". 
2.5.3 Section 3: Frequency of intrusive memories of thefrightening event 
Children were asked to rate how frequently they experienced intrusive memories of 
the frightening event. These memories were described as "popping" into mind and as 
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being unwanted. Possible responses to this question were "not at all or only one 
time", "once a week or less/once in a while", "2 to 4 times a week/half the time", or 
"5 or more times a week/almost always". 
2.5.4 Section 4: Affect during intrusive memories 
Children rated their affect when they experienced intrusive memories of the 
frightening event. Seven different emotions ("scared", "angry", 66 sad", "crazy, ", 
"confused", "ashamed", and "helpless") were rated by each on a 1-10 Likert scale 
(i. e. the greater the number, the greater the emotion). 
2.5.5 Section 5: Memory Modality Questionnaire (MMQ) 
The MMQ was devised for this investigation as a measure of the quality of the 
memories that participants have of the event to which they were exposed. This 14 
item self-report questionnaire was developed with the purpose of testing the theory of 
Brewin et al. (1996). These authors propose that 'the sensory (visual, auditory, 
olfactory, etc. ), physiological, and motor aspects of the traumatic experience are 
represented in situationally accessible knowledge in the form of analogical codes that 
enable the original experience to be recreated [p. 676-677]'. Thus, the characteristic 
re-experiencing and hyperarousal symptoms of PTSD result from the nature of the 
memories of the traumatic event. 
The MMQ contains items pertaining to the visual quality, verbal encoding, temporal 
context (the extent to which the event feels like an event in the past or as if it is 
occurring now), and non-visual sensory (e. g. olfactory, auditory etc) quality of the 
memories children have of the traumatic event. Children completing the questionnaire 
were asked to respond in one of four different ways: "don't agree at all", "don't agree 
very much", "agree a bit", or "completely agree". 
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2.5.6 Section 6. - Difficulty in inhibiting intrusive memories 
Children rated the difficulty with which they inhibited intrusive memories from their 
mind. Children indicated their responses using a Likert scale of 1-10 (where a greater 
score indicated greater difficulty in inhibiting the intrusive memory). 
2.5.7 Section T Strategies for coping with frightening event-related intrusive 
memories 
Children rated the extent to which they used the strategies of thought suppression 
("pushing the memory out of mind") and distraction (I try hard to think about 
something else") to cope with their intrusive memories of the frightening event. 
Children were able to respond I don't agree at all", "I don't agree a bit", I agree a 
bit", and I agree completely" to these two items. 
2.5.8 Section 8: Strategiesfor coping with intrusive memories and thoughts 
The original Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ) was a 30-itern instrument for 
measuring strategies for coping with unpleasant and unwanted thoughts in adults 
(Wells & Davies, 1994). When validating the instrument it was found to have a five- 
factor structure. The factors were labelled distraction, social control, worry, 
punishment and reappraisal. The factors were found to possess acceptable internal 
reliability (with Cronbach's alpha coefficients of . 72, . 79, . 71, . 64, and . 67 
respectively). The TCQ also has been found to be useful in identifying the strategies 
used to control the re-experiencing symptoms of PTSD (Reynolds & Wells, 1999). 
A child version of the TCQ (hereafter referred to as the cTCQ) was created for the 
purposes of this study. Participants could respond in one of four ways to each item 
("never", "sometimes", "often", or "almost always"). 
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2.5.9 Section 9: Revised Impact of Event Scale; child version 
The RIES-C is a 13 item child's version of the Revised Impact of Event Scale (RIES; 
Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979), a self-report measure of post-traumatic 
symptornatology used with adults. The RIES-C was adapted from the RIES following 
concerns that certain items belonging to the latter were incomprehensible to children 
(Dyregrov & Yule, 1995). 
The REES-C contains items pertaining to the three core symptom clusters that form 
PTSD, re-experiencing, avoidance and arousal. Children are asked to respond to the 
presented items by indicating how true these were for them over the past week. 
Children may tick one of four responses ("not at all", "rarely", "sometimes", or 
"often", scored 0,1,3, and 5 respectively). This scale has been widely used in other 
studies of children's responses to traumatic events (e. g. Papageorgiou, Frangou- 
Garunovic, Iordanidou, Yule, Smith, & Vostanis, 1999; Smith, Perrin, Yule, & Rabe- 
Hesketh, 2001; Vila, Porche, & Mouren-Simeoni, 1999) and has been considered to 
be a useful continuous measure of children's post-traumatic symptomatology. 
2.5.10 Section 10: Birleson Depression Self-Rating Scale 
The Birleson Depression Self-Rating Scale (BDSRS; Birleson, 1981) is a measure of 
childhood depression, developed primarily in an attempt to assess whether this 
diagnosis is appropriate within this age group. Basing his self report scale on various 
sets of criteria devised for depression in adults, Birleson initially distributed a 37 item 
questionnaire to 17 children thought to be suffering from depression, 17 control 
children from the same clinic but not suffering from depression, 20 children from a 
residential school for maladjusted children, and 19 children from a primary school. 
The children could respond to each item by indicating whether or not the statement 
referred to them using one of three categories ("no/never", "sometimes", or "most of 
the time"). 
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Eighteen of the original 37 items were found to significantly discriminate between the 
depressed and non-depressed groups, and these items were therefore taken to 
comprise the DSRS. The test-retest reliability of this measure, as assessed on the 
group from the residential school for maladjusted children, was . 80, indicating 
acceptable stability. Internal consistency was estimated using the split-half reliability 
coefficient to be . 86, which is also satisfactorily high. 
2.5.11 Section 11: Post-Traumatic Cognitions Inventory - child version 
The Post-Traumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa, et al., 1999) is a 36 item self- 
report questionnaire devised for the purpose of measuring trauma-related thoughts 
and beliefs in adults exposed to trauma. The questionnaire was created with recent 
theoretical advances in mind, in particular cognitive models of PTSD. The 
development of the PTCI involved distributing a clinically derived set of 114 items to 
both large clinic referred and non-clinic referred participants (a total of 601 
participants). The items were chosen to represent the concepts of general negative 
view of self, perceived permanent change, alienation from self and others, 
hopelessness, negative interpretation of symptoms, self-trust, self-blame, trust in 
other people, and unsafe world. 
A factor analysis of the scores on these items of those participants who had been 
exposed to a traumatic event revealed a three-factor structure, where each factor upon 
inspection were labelled as negative cognitions about self, negative cognitions about 
the world, and self-blame for the trauma. A number of items were excluded at this 
point through their failure to load highly on any of these factors, on the basis of their 
content (so that the final questionnaire would contain items pertaining to different 
types of trauma) and so that the items remaining in the questionnaire would correlate 
with the measures of post-traumatic symptornatology. Thus, a 33-itern questionnaire 
was produced. Each of the three factors present in this questionnaire had a high 
internal reliability, with Cronbach's alphas of . 97 for negative cognitions about self, 
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. 88 for negative cognitions about world, and . 86 for self-blame. The total 
questionnaire had a Cronbach's alpha of . 97. 
The importance of the scale within samples of adults who have been exposed to 
trauma suggested that it would be worthwhile adapting this questionnaire for use with 
children. The scale was adapted therefore by the investigator and the investigator's 
supervisors, based on their experiences treating clients within the Maudsley Hospital 
Child Traumatic Stress Clinic. A 47 item questionnaire was produced (hereafter 
referred to as the cPTCI), which accommodated the items in the PTCI and items used 
by Steil and Ehlers (2000) to ensure that the concept of negative interpretation of 
symptoms was assessed. Additional items were included to assess persistent anger 
directed at those responsible for the trauma, and "omen formation", a phenomenon 
observed in case studies of child survivors of trauma (Terr, 1981; 1983) where 
children claim they had a sense that the trauma was going to happen. Children were 
able to respond by stating how much they agreed with each statement in one of four 
ways (either "don't agree at all", "don't agree very much", "agree a bit", or "agree a 
lot"). 
2.6 Study cohort 
While using an "opt-in" consent procedure, 151 pupils at School A were invited to 
participate in Study 2. Of these pupils, 92 (60.9%) participated in the study. However, 
the bulk of this group were sixth fonners, for whom, parental consent was not 
necessary; a far lower rate of participation was obtained with lower years. Given the 
large numbers of sixth formers who agreed to participate, no further sixth formers 
were invited to participate in the study. 
Following the introduction of "opt-out" consent procedures, 60 pupils from School A 
were invited to participate in the study. Of these, 30 (50%) participated in the study. 
The remaining 30 pupils did not participate in the study because their parents denied 
their consent for them to participate, or the pupils themselves did not give their 
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consent to participation in the study. At School 2, where only an "opt-out" consent 
procedure was used, 222 pupils were invited to take part in the study. Of these, 132 
(59.5%) participated in the study. In total, therefore, 433 pupils were invited to 
participate in Study 2, of whom 254 (58.7%) participated. 
The demographic characteristics (age and sex) of participants in each school (and in 
the case of School A, participants recruited using "opt-in" and "opt-out" consent 
procedures) are presented in Table 2.1. It was not possible to obtain the demographic 
details of those pupils invited to participate in the study but who did wish to take part. 
Table 2.1. Age and sex ofparticipants at School A and School B 
School A 
4,0pt- "Opt- 
in" out" Total Total Statistical 
sample sample sample School B" population teStSb 
Age 
Mean 16.48 12.59 15.57 13.41 14.45 
N 92 28 120 128 248 
P<000 
Std. Deviation 1.62 . 91 2.22 1.58 2.20 (Independent 
Range 11.75- 11.15- 11.15- 11.34- 11-15- sample t-test, 
18.98 13.96 18.98 16.22 18.98 t=8.798, 
Missing cases 0 2 2 4 6 df=214.143ý 
Sex 
Female 61 19 80 66 146 ns 6.29, 
Male 31 11 42 66 108 p<012, df=1) 
"Participants were only recruited from School B using "opt-out" consent procedures. 
'Comparison were between the total sample drawn from School A and the sample drawn 
from School B. 
'Homogeneity of variance for these samples was not demonstrated. The given statistic was 
calculated therefore without the assumption that the two samples possessed similar variance. 
The group of pupils from School A participating in the study were significantly older 
than the pupils from School B. A chi square analysis revealed that there were 
significantly more girls than boys participating in the study, though inspection of 
Table 2.1 reveals that this difference was restricted to participants recruited from 
School A. This may have been due to the preponderance of females in the sixth form 
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of that school. These age and sex biases need to be considered when evaluating this 
study. 
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Chapter 3: Methodologyfor Study 2: A prospective study of children's psychological 
responses to assaults or RTAs following attendance at an A &E department in South 
London 
3.1 Design 
This study utilised a prospective longitudinal design involving assessment at three 
time points (two to four weeks, three months, and six months after a traumatic event). 
3.2 Ethical permission 
Ethical permission for the study was successfully sought from the Institute of 
Psychiatry Research Ethics Committee (Study No. 058/01) and King's College 
Hospital Research Ethics Committee (Study No. 01-186). 
3.3 Participant population 
Children attending King's College Hospital in South London following traumatic 
events were invited to participate in the study. 
Inclusion criteria for participation in the study were: 
* Attendance at A&E following a road traffic accident (RTA) or assault, and 
9 Aged 10- 16 years. 
Exclusion criteria for participation in the study were: 
Existing organic brain disease or learning disability, 
Sexual assault, 
0 Investigation by social services into the child's family circumstances, either 
initiated prior to their attendance at A&E, or as a result of their attendance, 
* Inability to speak English, 
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0 Potential threat to investigator (e. g. if the child's caregivers had been 
aggressive at A&E), and 
0 The child had been assaulted by a parent or step-parent living in his or her 
home 
Children and adolescents attending the A&E department following a sexual assault 
were excluded from participating in this study as the investigator and all of the staff at 
the Maudsley Child Traumatic Stress Clinic were male. It would not have been 
possible, therefore, to offer female victims of sexual assault the offer of a female 
therapist if treatment and further assessment were required. 
Children who were unable to read for themselves were still invited to participate in 
the study. If there was enough time the investigator assisted the children in 
completing the questionnaire batteries. 
In order for children to participate in the study, both their and their principal 
caregiver's consent was required. 
3.4 Procedure 
Children attending the Accident and Emergency department of King's College 
Hospital (KCH) in South London following exposure to either an RTA or non-sexual 
assault were invited to participate in the study. The contact and attendance details of 
children meeting the inclusion criteria for the study were highlighted using the 
Footman-Walker reports software. The principal caregiver (typically the mother) of 
children attending KCH A&E between 22 nd October 2001 and 29 th September 2002 
was contacted by letter and informed as to the nature of the study. Contained within 
this initial contact letter were information sheets for the child and caregiver, detailing 
why the study was being conducted, what participating in the study involved, and that 
the study was voluntary and that all information received through the study would be 
kept confidential (see Appendix B for copies of these information sheets and a sample 
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invitation letter). Three to four days after the initial contact letter was sent, the 
caregiver was contacted by telephone and asked if they would like to participate in 
the study. If they agreed to their child participating in the study, their child also was 
told about what the study involved, and asked for their consent to participate in the 
study. Written consent was obtained when the child and caregiver were met by the 
investigator for the first interview (for copy of consent form, see Appendix B). It was 
stressed to both caregiver and child that their involvement in the study was entirely 
voluntary, and that they could withdraw at any time. 
Children and their principal caregiver were interviewed on two occasions, and asked 
to complete self-report questionnaires on three occasions in the six-months following 
the traumatic event. 
The first assessment was conducted between two and four weeks after the RTA or 
assault. This involved explaining the nature of the study, gaining consent from both 
the child and the child's principal caregiver, conducting a semi-structured diagnostic 
interview schedule with child and caregiver, and both child and caregiver completing 
a battery of self-report questionnaires. The second assessment, conducted at three 
months after the RTA or assault, consisted of self-report questionnaires to be 
completed by child and caregiver. These questionnaire batteries were sent and 
returned by post. The third and final assessment was conducted at six months after the 
RTA or assault, and comprised a semi-structured diagnostic interview schedule with 
child and caregiver, and a questionnaire battery completed by child and caregiver. 
Children found to have developed PTSD at the time of the final six-month assessment 
were offered treatment within the Maudsley Hospital Child Traumatic Stress Clinic. 
3.5 Assessment interviews and seýflreport questionnaires 
The primary assessment measure used in the study was a semi-structured diagnostic 
interview schedule. In addition to this, self-report questionnaires assessing 
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psychopathology (post-traumatic stress, depression and anxiety) and cognitive 
processes were distributed to children and their caregivers. In this sub-section the 
contents and development of these measures will be detailed. 
3.5.1 Semi-structured diagnostic interview schedule 
The Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV: Child and Parent Versions 
(ADIS-C/P) is a semi-structured interview schedule devised by Silverman and Albano 
(1996) for the assessment of anxiety disorders in children and adolescents, based on 
the diagnostic criteria laid out in DSM-IV. Interviews are conducted with both parent 
and child. Diagnoses are derived using both child and parent responses. 
Silverman, Saavedra, and Pina (2001) note that the ADIS-C/P has been used in a 
number of childhood anxiety clinical trials (e. g. Barrett, Dadds, & Rapee, 1996; 
Beidel, Turner, & Morris, 2000; Kendall, 1994; Kendall, Flannery-Schroder, 
Panichelli-Mindel, Southam-Gerow, Henin, & Warman, 1997; Hayward, Varady, 
Albano, Thienemann, Henderson, & Schatzberg, 2000; Silverman, Kurtines, 
Ginsburg, Weems, Lumpkin, & Carmichael, 1999; Silverman, Kurtines, Ginsburg, 
Weems, Rabian, & Serafini, 1999; Spence, Donovan, & Brechman-Toussaint, 2000). 
In assessing the test-retest reliability of the ADIS-C/P, Silverman et al. (2001) 
conducted the interview with 62 children aged seven- to 16 years of age referred to a 
specialist childhood anxiety disorders clinic. Separation anxiety disorder, social 
phobia, specific phobia, generalized anxiety disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder and oppositional defiant disorder were found to have good to excellent test- 
retest reliability (using kappa coefficients; Cohen, 1960). Disorders such as panic 
disorder, agoraphobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, and obsessive-compulsive 
disorder were not examined as the numbers of children and adolescents presenting 
with these disorders were too low. 
Despite the lack of data regarding the reliability of the ADIS-C/P for the assessment 
of PTSD, it was considered to be the most appropriate interview measure of PTSD 
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available. This was due to its prominence in childhood anxiety disorders research, the 
ability of the schedule to be used effectively to assess a variety of disorders, the use 
of both parental and child assessment, the inclusion of an appropriate measure to 
assess the interference associated with each possible disorder, the use of DSM-IV in 
devising the schedule, and the availability of training in the use of the schedule. 
The ADIS-C/P examines the vast majority of anxiety, affective, and behavioural 
disorders observed in children. Due to the constraints of time (and the limited 
usefulness which would be derived from examining highly improbable 
psychopathology) many disorders were not examined. PTSD/ASD, separation anxiety 
disorder, social phobia, specific phobia, panic disorder, agoraphobia, generalised 
anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and major depressive disorder were 
investigated in both children and parents, while conduct disorder, oppositional defiant 
disorder, enuresis, and sleep terror disorder were examined by parent schedules only. 
The ADIS-C/P is designed such that each diagnosis can be discounted after one or 
two key questions. In the case of the PTSD/ASD diagnoses, however, all questions 
were asked of each child or parent, regardless of their answers. 
Prior to using this assessment tool in the study it was considered necessary to include 
several additional items in the interview schedule. These additional items are detailed 
in the following sub-sections. 
3.5.1.1 Items added to the ADIS-CIP 
3.5.1.1.1 The addition of items for assessing the dissociation criterion of Acute Stress 
Disorder 
A key aim of Study 2 was to examine the usefulness of the Acute Stress Disorder 
(ASD) diagnosis in predicting chronic reactions to trauma in children and 
adolescents. As far as the present investigator is aware, there are no studies published 
that have examined the prevalence of ASD in children and adolescents as it is defined 
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by DSM-IV and using a standardised interview with the child. Questionnaire items 
assessing the dissociation items of ASD, to be included in the interview schedules for 
both parent and child at the initial (2-4 week) interview, were developed. This 
development was guided by the DSM-IV criteria for ASD, ASD interview schedules 
developed for use with adults (Bryant, Harvey, DAng, & Sackville, 1998; Bryant & 
Harvey, 2000), existing work on child dissociation (Putnam, Helmers, & Trickett, 
1993), and the experience of staff at the Maudsley Hospital Child Traumatic Stress 
Clinic. 
DSM-IV lists five dissociative symptoms, of which three are required for an 
individual to meet the dissociation criterion for ASD. As this was the first attempt to 
investigate ASD in children and adolescents, a thorough examination of each 
symptom was considered necessary, in particular to compensate for the linguistic 
subtlety associated with these symptoms, and to assess what was the best possible 
method for examining these difficult to define phenomena. Each dissociation 
symptom was assessed using two or three items, and each item was asked twice; once 
relating to the child or adolescent's experience during the trauma, and a second time 
relating to their experience since the trauma. Thus four or six items were included in 
the interview schedule to assess each dissociation symptom. 
These items were included in the ADIS-C/P immediately after the items assessing 
whether the trauma met Criterion A for ASD/PTSD. The items included to assess the 
dissociation criterion of ASD are displayed in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1. Questions used to assess Acute Stress Disorder Criterion B (dissociation) 
symptoms in children and adolescents 
Criterion B 
symptom Question 
Detachment When the [trauma] was happening did you feel numb or empty inside? 
When the [trauma] was happening, did you feel so shocked that you 
didn't feel anything? 
Since the [trauma] happened, have you ever felt numb or empty inside? 
Since the [trauma] happened, have you ever felt so shocked that you 
haven't felt anything? 
Reduced When the [trauma] was happening, did you feel as if you were in a daze? 
awareness 
When the [trauma] was happening, did you feel as if you weren't noticing 
what was going on around you? 
Since the [trauma] happened, have you ever felt as if you were in a daze? 
Since the [trauma] happened, have you felt as if you weren't noticing 
what was going on around you? 
Derealization When the [trauma] was happening, did you feel as if things around you 
weren't real? 
When the [trauma] was happening, did you feel as if you were in a dream 
or a movie? 
Since the [trauma] happened, have you felt as if things around you 
weren't real? 
Since the [trauma] happened, have you felt as if you were in a dream or a 
movie? 
Depersonalization When the [trauma] was happening, did you feel as if your body didn't 
really belong to you? 
When the [trauma] was happening, did you feel that you were outside 
your body? 
When the [trauma] was happening, did you feel that you weren't really 
there? 
Since the [trauma] happened, have you felt as if your body doesn't really 
belong to you? 
Since the [trauma] happened, have you felt as if you were outside your 
body? 
Since the [trauma] happened, have you felt as if you're not really where 
you actually are? 
Amnesia Is there a gap in your memory of what happened during the [trauma]? 
NB All responses were rated either yes or no. 
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3.5.1.1.2 The addition of items assessing re-experiencing (Criterion B) symptoms 
A significant flaw regarding the ADIS-C/P scope for assessing re-experiencing 
symptoms was noted. The presence of the re-experiencing symptom "acting or feeling 
as if the traumatic event were recurring" is assessed using the items "Do you 
sometimes feel that [frightening event] is about to happen again? " (child interview) or 
"Do you think that [he or she] sometimes feels that [frightening event] is about to 
happen again? " (parent interview). It was considered that these items did not fully 
capture the sense of reliving the traumatic experience, and instead focused on a sense 
of apprehension. The items "When you remember the (frightening event), do you feel 
that you are back there again, or that it is happening all over again? " (child interview) 
and "When your child remembers the (frightening event) does (he or she) feel as if 
she is back when it actually happened, or that it is happening again? " (parent 
interview) were therefore added to this section of the interview schedules. 
Given the importance attached to the quality of the memories and intrusive 
recollections of a traumatic experience by many of the more recent cognitive models 
of PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000), children and parents were given 
additional prompts following the items in the reexperiencing symptoms section that 
examine the DSM-IV symptom "recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of 
the event, including images, thoughts, or perceptions". In ADIS-C/P this item is 
investigated using the items "Do you have a lot of thoughts that you don't want to 
have about [trauma]? " (child version) and "Does you child complain of thoughts 
about [trauma] that [he or she] doesn't want to have? " (parent version). The prompts 
were aimed at examining whether the intrusive memory was in the forrn of pictures or 
thoughts/words. 
3.5.1.1.3 Other information gathered during the interview 
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Questions concerning the child's background were put to each child's parent, prior to 
commencing the diagnostic interview schedule. At the initial (2-4 week) interview 
these questions pertained to: 
0 the child's school, 
the parent's marital status and employment, 
" the child's family composition (including the number of siblings, who else 
lives at home, and was anyone else from the family involved in the trauma), 
"a brief description of what happened during the traumatic event, 
" how long the child was at A&E/hospital for, 
" what were the child's injuries, 
" the extent of the child's remaining injuries, 
" time spent off school, 
" the extent of physical and psychological injury in other people involved in the 
trauma, 
" whether the child had been involved in any trauma previously, and the child's 
psychological reaction to such an event, 
" and whether the child had ever received any medical help for a emotional, 
behavioural or psychiatric problem. 
Prior to the diagnostic interview schedule with the parent at 6 months post-trauma, 
the following information was also sought: 
has the child been involved in any other traumatic events since the event that 
initially caused the child to attend King's College Hospital A&E department, 
has there been any legal action associated with the trauma (e. g. a Police 
investigation, criminal or civil proceedings, etc. ), and if so, are the parent and 
child satisfied with the outcome of these actions, 
0 has the child received any professional support for his or her psychological 
reaction to the trauma, 
0 and does the child experience ongoing health problems as a result of the 
trauma. 
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3.5.1.2 Investigator training and supervision in the use ofADIS-CIP 
The investigator was trained in the use of the ADIS-C/P by clinicians at the Maudsley 
Hospital Child Traumatic Stress Clinic. This training involved detailed instruction as 
to how to conduct the ADIS-C/P, and supervised interviews conducted with client 
families referred to the Maudsley Hospital Child Traumatic Stress Clinic. 
The ongoing quality of the interviews was maintained by 1) regular supervision 
meetings with the investigator's supervisors where queries arising from the interviews 
might be discussed, 2) one of the investigator's supervisors (Dr Patrick Smith) 
attending actual interviews conducted with participating families and providing 
feedback concerning the investigator's interview technique, and 3) the tape recording 
of a sample of the interviews conducted, so that the inter-rater reliability estimates 
might be made. Children and parents whose interviews were recorded completed a 
consent form agreeing to this procedure (se Appendix B for a copy of this form). 
Tape recordings of the randomly selected interviews, 11 from the initial assessment 
and 10 from six month follow up assessment, were rated by one of the investigator's 
supervisors. The clinician/researcher who conducted these ratings, Dr Patrick Smith, 
had seven years' experience of assessing and treating traumatic stress reactions in 
children and adolescents, and was blind as to the principal investigator's diagnosis in 
each case. There was unanimous agreement between raters for both the ASD 
diagnosis at initial interview (Kappa = 1.00) and the PTSD diagnosis at 6 month 
follow up (Kappa = 1.00). 
3.5.1.3 Interview environment and procedure 
Families who consented to participate in the interview were given the choice as to 
where the assessment interview took place. Families were interviewed either at rooms 
within the Department of Psychology at the Institute of Psychiatry, or at the 
participant family's home. Offering families this choice was necessary for increasing 
the participation rate of families invited to take part in the study, and for overcoming 
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simple impracticalities (e. g. travel, looking after other children, finding a quiet place 
at home, etc. ) that prevented families from participating. 
When conducting the interviews, parent and child were generally interviewed 
separately, except for a few cases where the child was too distressed to be 
interviewed on their own. At the first (two to four week) assessments both parent and 
child were reminded as to why the study was being conducted, what participating in 
the study involved, and that the study was voluntary and any information given would 
be confidential. A brief check was made at the beginning of the final (six month) 
interview to ensure that both parent and child were still happy to participate in the 
study and to see if they had any questions. At each assessment the child was then 
asked to complete the questionnaire battery while the parent was interviewed. Once 
both the parent interview had finished and the child had completed the questionnaire 
booklet, the child was then interviewed and the parent was asked to complete a 
questionnaire booklet (see following sections). 
Two to three days following the initial assessment, parents were contacted by 
telephone to check that the child had not experienced any distress during the 
assessment that the investigator was not aware of. The participant family was sent a 
thank you letter following both the initial and final interview. 
3.5.1.4 Duty of care 
Prior to commencing the study the investigator was briefed by the investigator's 
supervisors as to what to do in the event that a participant child was discovered to be 
at a high risk of seriously injuring themselves or others. It was agreed that in these 
instances the investigator's supervisors should be contacted as soon as possible, and 
that potential interventions be discussed. In the case of three children it was necessary 
for the investigator to contact the investigator's supervisors following the child's 
responses in the interview indicating that they were depressed and were 
contemplating suicide, or had recently made a suicide attempt. 
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In one instance it was felt, on discussion, that the child was not very likely to act on 
her suicidal ideation, and the child and her mother were advised what to do should the 
child's mood worsen or the child think more seriously about committing suicide. In 
two other instances, it was decided that the child should be seen as soon as possible 
by a member of the child's nearest Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service 
(CAHMS). Each child was assessed by a psychiatrist, and treated accordingly. In 
each of the three cases the family remained in the study and completed the final (6 
month) assessment. At this time no child required further emergency support. 
3.5.2 Self-report questionnaires 
A number of self-report questionnaires were used in this study, in addition to the 
diagnostic interview schedule detailed above. These questionnaires were used to 
obtain a quantitative assessment of child and parent psychopathology in the months 
following the trauma, and to assess the cognitive styles, appraisals, and coping 
processes adopted by child and parent adopted following the trauma. 
The following sub-sections detail the self-report questionnaires completed by children 
and their parents at each time point. 
3.5.2.1 Child self-report questionnaires 
An overview of the questionnaires completed by children at each assessment point is 
presented in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2. Self-report questionnaires completed by children in Study 1 by assessment 
Assessment Psychopathology 
point measures 
2-4 weeks 0 Birleson Depression - 
Self-Rating Scale 
(BDSRS) 0 
9 Revised Impact of - 
Event Scale (child - 
version; RIES-C) 
point 
3 months 0 BDSRS, 









Attitudes towards Emotional Expression 
questionnaire (child version; AEE) 
Childhood Anxiety Sensitivity Scale (CASI) 
Memory Modality Questionnaire (MMQ) 
Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (positive 
beliefs about worry sub-scale, child version; 
MCQ-C) 
Peritraumatic cognitions (mental confusion, 
detachment/dissociation, initial anger, life 
threat and distress, anger, appraisal of adults' 
distress) 
Response styles questionnaire (child version; 
RSQ-C) 








6 months 0 As at three months - As at three months 
Four concerns provided the rationale for the contents of the three child questionnaire 
batteries. Firstly, sufficient assessment of child psychopathology at each time point' 
was considered important. Due to the importance of the initial assessment point, only 
two psychopathology measures were used at this assessment (the Birleson Depression 
Self-Rating Scale and the child version of the Revised Impact of Event Scale), though 
the three and six month follow-up assessment batteries comprised four 
psychopathology measures (the Birleson Depression Self-Rating Scale, the child 
version of the Revised Impact of Event Scale, the Child Post-Traumatic Symptom 
Scale, and the Revised Child Manifest Anxiety Scale). 
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Secondly, a key aim of the study was to examine how a range of non-trauma-specific 
cognitive styles that the child possessed prior to the trauma were related to the child's 
short- and long-term appraisals of the trauma and its sequelae, the child's strategies 
for coping with the trauma, and through these pathways, the child's post-traumatic 
stress symptoms. Since it was not possible to conduct a fully prospective study 
(where assessments were conducted prior to the trauma) the measures examining 
these cognitive styles were distributed in the initial questionnaire battery; since these 
questionnaires were not trauma-specific, it was assumed that children's responses on 
these measures would reflect higher-order beliefs and would not be altered radically 
in the 2-4 weeks since the trauma. The measures assessing cognitive styles were 
Attitudes towards Emotional Expression questionnaire (child version), the Childhood 
Anxiety Sensitivity Inventory, the positive beliefs about worry sub-scale of the Meta- 
Cognitions Questionnaire (child version), the Response Styles Questionnaire (child 
version), and the Thought Control Questionnaire (child version). 
Thirdly, another key aim of the study was to examine the role of the nature of the 
child's memory of the trauma in the onset of PTSD. To this end a questionnaire 
examining the quality of the child's memories (the Memory Modality Questionnaire) 
was included in the initial questionnaire battery. 
Fourthly, the capacity of negative appraisals about self, the world, and the impact of 
the trauma, and maladaptive coping strategies to maintain post-traumatic stress 
symptornatology was assessed by including measures of these appraisals and 
strategies (the child version of the Post-Traumatic Cognitions Inventory and thought 
suppression, distraction, and rumination items) at the second (postal) and third 
assessment points. 
A description of each questionnaire completed by children in Study 2 is given below. 
Copies of each of the questionnaires are included in Appendix B. As the six month 
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questionnaire battery was identical to the three month questionnaire battery, no copy 
of this battery has been included. 
3.5.2.1.1 Attitudes towards Emotional Expression (AEE) 
Following evidence that the failure to confide traumatic events is stressful and 
associated with increased health problems (Pennebaker, Hughes, & O'Heeron, 1987), 
Joseph, Yule, Williams and Hodgkinson (1994) investigated the role of attitudes 
towards emotional expression in the development of PTSD in a sample of adults 
involved in the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry disaster. 
A four-item questionnaire devised for the purpose of examining attitudes towards 
emotional expression was distributed to 73 survivors of the disaster, two years after it 
occurred. Participants were invited to respond to the items presented by indicating 
how much they agreed with each one by way of a five-point scale ranging from 
46agree very much" to "disagree very much". The measure was found to have good 
internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha = . 74). The questionnaire was slightly adapted 
for this study such that children would be able to comprehend each item more easily. 
Children respond by stating how much they agreed with each of the four items (either 
"don't agree at all", "don't agree very much", "agree a bif ', or "agree a lof '). 
3.5.2.1.2 Birleson Depression Self-Rating Scale (BDSRS) 
The Birleson Depression Self-Rating Scale (BDSRS; Birleson, 1981) was included as 
a measure of depressive symptomatology. The BDSRS comprises 18 items, to which 
children can respond "most", "some-times", or "never" (for further information on 
this measure see sub-section 2.5.10 of the previous chapter). 
3.5.2.1.3 Child Post-traumatic Symptom Scale (CPSS) 
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The CPSS (Foa, Johnson, Feeny, & Treadwell, 2001) was developed to assess the 
severity of DSM-IV PTSD symptoms in children exposed to trauma. Foa et al. (2001) 
administered the instrument to 75 children two years after they had been exposed to 
an earthquake. The CPSS was found to possess good internal consistency (alpha 
coefficient = . 89) and moderate test-retest reliability (kappa = . 
55). Unlike earlier 
measures for assessing child PTSD symptomatology, the CPSS entirely maps on to 
each of the 17 DSM-IV symptoms for PTSD, and includes six items assessing the 
interference with the child's life resulting from PTSD symptoms. It is therefore 
possible to derive a diagnosis from responses to the instrument. 
Children are able to respond to each symptom item in one of four ways ("not at all or 
only one time", "once a week or less/once in a while", "2 to 4 times a week/half the 
time", or "5 or more times a week/almost always", scored 0,1,2, and 3, respectively), 
and to each interference item "yes" or "no". 
3.5.2.1.4 Childhood Anxiety Sensitivity Index (CASI) 
The CASI (Silverman, Fleisig, Rabian, & Peterson, 1991) is an adaptation of the 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986). The ASI 
was devised as a measure of the "individual difference variable consisting of beliefs 
that the experience of anxiety/fear causes illness, embarrassment or additional anxiety 
[p. 1-2]". Anxiety sensitivity has been identified as being closely associated with 
several anxiety disorders (Taylor, et al. 1992). 
A growing body of evidence has suggested that this construct is also a unique 
predictor of trait anxiety in children, and has potential implications for the assessment 
and treatment of anxiety (Silverman & Weems, 1999). While there is some 
disagreement over the age at which anxiety sensitivity might influence general 
anxiety and fearfulness (where Silverman & Weems, 1999, argue persuasively in 
support of their finding that younger children are affected by their anxiety 
sensitivity), children aged eight to ten years would be expected to possess the 
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cognitive capacity to be concerned with abstract objects of fear, such as going crazy, 
losing control, or death. 
The CASI is an 18-item measure where one of three responses can be made ("none 9" 
"some", or "a lot") to each item. In Silverman et al. 's (1991) initial evaluation study, 
both a non-clinical and a clinical sample demonstrated that the measure had an 
internal consistency of . 87 (Cronbach's alpha). 
3.5.2.1.5 Memory Modality Questionnaire (MMQ) 
The same form of the MMQ as used in Study I was used in Study 2 to examine the 
nature of the children's memories of the traumatic event they reported. For further 
information on the MMQ see sub-section 2.5.5. Parents who were also involved in the 
trauma completed the same version of the measure (see sub-section 3.5.2.2.5 below). 
3.5.2.1.6 Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire - Positive beliefs sub-scale WCQ) 
The MCQ was devised by Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997) in order to measure 
beliefs about worry and intrusive thoughts. Wells' (1995) meta-cognitive model of 
worry proposes that positive and negative beliefs about worrying are a key feature of 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder. 
A version of the 'positive beliefs about worry' sub-scale was adapted for use with 
children in this study. This sub-scale was selected as Cartwright-Hatton and Wells' 
(1997) data suggested that some individuals might be more likely to worry due to 
positive beliefs they held about worrying. Such pre-existing views concerning the 
merits of worry may encourage individuals who have experienced a traumatic event 
to elaborate on further possible danger, contributing to the maintenance of a sense of 
current threat (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
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The adapted MCQ consists of the 19 items of the 'positive beliefs about worry' sub- 
scale, and was slightly amended at points to make the items more comprehensible for 
children. Children were able to respond by indicating how much they agree with each 
item presented (either "do not agree", "agree slightly", "agree moderately", or "agree 
very much"). The original adult version of the measure possessed good internal 
reliability (Cronbach's alpha = . 87). 
3.5.2.1.7 Peritraumatic cognitions 
A questionnaire was devised, based on a number of studies conducted in children and 
adults, which assessed a variety of appraisals, emotions, and dissociative states that 
can occur in people during, or immediately after, a traumatic event. These 
questionnaire items pertained to feelings of confusion/disbelief, the dissociative states 
of depersonalisation and derealisation, general fear and fear of being seriously hurt or 
killed, and anger directed towards self or other people held to be responsible for the 
trauma. An additional item was included for the child to rate the fear of any adults 
who were present during the trauma. 
In total 13 items were included in this questionnaire. Children could respond 
"disagree a lot", "disagree a bit", "agree a bit, or "agree a lof' to the presented items, 
except for the final item that assessed adult fear, which allowed for the responses "not 
at all frightened", "a bit frightened", "quite frightened", or "very frightened". 
3.5.2.1.8 Post-traumatic Cognitions Inventory, child version (cPTC1) 
The child version of the post-traumatic cognitions inventory (cPTCI; Foa et al., 1999) 
assesses children's appraisals of themselves, the world, the psychological sequelae of 
a traumatic event, persistent anger, and omen formation (see sub-section 2.5.11 of the 
previous chapter for further details of this measure and the development of the child 
version). This measure comprises 47 items, to which children can respond "don't 
agree at all", "don't agree a bit", "agree a bit", or "agree a lot". 
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3.5.2.1.9 Response Styles Questionnaire (rumination sub-scale; child version; RSQ) 
The Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ) was devised by Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) 
as a measure of those 'ruminative responses [that] involve repetitively focusing on the 
fact that one is depressed; on one's symptoms of depression; and on the causes, 
meanings, and consequences of depressive symptoms [p. 5691'. Nolen-Hoeksema, 
who has pioneered the study of this phenomenon, viewed the ruminative response 
style as 'a pattern of behaviors and thoughts that focus the individual's attention on 
his or her emotional state and inhibit any actions that might distract the individual 
from his or her mood [1991; p. 569]'. Rather than highlighting specific cognitions, 
Nolen-Hoeksema places emphasis on the function of a behavioural-attentional style 
that has the effect of maintaining or worsening their mood, increasing the likelihood 
that their thinking will be negatively biased by their mood, and decreasing 
accessibility to solutions to their problems. 
The RSQ (rumination sub-scale), when first distributed to 137 students participating 
in a study of depression and coping after an earthquake (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991) was found to have good internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha = . 89). The 22 
items included in this instrument were adapted for use with children, and one item ("I 
listen to sad music") was excluded because of its inappropriateness for younger 
children. Further adaptations were made to make the items relevant to feelings of 
fearfulness as well as sadness. This was done so that the focus of the questionnaire 
would be on the respondent's responses to negative emotions, not the strength or 
direction of the emotions themselves. In addition, children's responses to trauma are 
characterised by fear as much as (if not more than) sadness. 
As in the adult version of the measure, four responses to each item could be made; in 
the child version these were "never", "sometimes", "often", and "always". 
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3.5.2.1.10 Revised Child Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS) 
The RCMAS was devised by Reynolds and Richmond (1978) as an improved version 
of an earlier child manifest anxiety scale (Castaneda, McCandless, & Palermo, 1956). 
Their final version, following evaluation, consisted of 28 items including nine lie 
scale items. The measure was found to have good internal reliability (KR20 of . 85). 
The RCMAS is widely used in research and clinical practice for assessing anxiety in 
children (Muris, Merckelbach, Ollendick, King, & Bogie, 2002; Schniering, Hudson, 
& Rapee, 2000). Children can respond either "yes" or "no" to each questionnaire 
item. 
3.5.2.1.11 Revised Impact of Event Scale (child version; RIES-C). 
The child version of the Revised Impact of Event Scale (RIES-C; see sub-section 
2.5.9 of the previous chapter for further details) was included as a measure of 
participants' post-traumatic stress symptoms in response to the traumatic event they 
had experienced. The RIES-C comprises 13 items, to which children can respond "not 
at all", "rarely", "sometimes", or "often". 
3.5.2.1.12 Thought Control Questionnaire (child version; cTCQ) 
The Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells & Davies, 1994) was adapted for 
use with children (see sub-section 2.5.8 in the previous chapter for further details on 
this questionnaire), and included in Study 2 as a means of measuring in greater detail 
the kinds of strategies used by children in coping with any distressing and unwanted 
memories or thoughts. The child version of the TCQ comprises 30 items, to which 
children can respond "never", "some-times", "often", or "almost always". 
3.5.2.1.13 Thought suppression, distraction and rumination items 
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A brief five item questionnaire was developed to examine how often children use 
thought suppression (one item) and distraction (one item) to cope with intrusive 
memories of the traumatic event, and the extent to which they ruminate over what 
happened to them (three items). Unlike the other measures relating to these strategies 
(the RSQ and the TCQ) these items measured the extent to which the strategy is used 
to cope specifically with symptoms relating to the traumatic event. Children can 
respond "disagree a lot", "disagree a bit", "agree a bit", or "agree a lot" to the thought 
suppression and distraction items, and "never", "sometimes", "often", or "almost 
always" to the rumination items. 
3.5.2.2 Parent self-report questionnaires 
An overview of the questionnaires completed by parent at each assessment point is 
presented in Table 3.3. 




24 weeks - Posttraumatic Stress - 
Diagnostic Scale 0 
(PDS) 0 
" Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI) 
" State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI) 
Trait/attitude/cognition measures 
Anxiety Sensitivity Inventory (ASI) 
Attitudes towards Emotional Expression (AEE) 
Memory Modality Questionnaire (MMQ) 
Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (positive 
beliefs about worry sub-scale; MCQ) 
Peritraumatic cognitions (mental confusion, 
detachment/dissociation, initial anger, life 
threat and distress, anger, appraisal of child's 
distress)" 
Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ) 
Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ) 
3 months PDS Family functioning questionnaire (FFQ) 
BDI Thought suppression, distraction, and 
STAI rumination items 
6 months 0 As at three months 0 As at three months 
a If present at the time of the traumatic event 
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The self-report questionnaires completed by parents were chosen to reflect three 
concerns. Firstly, an examination of parental psychopathology in the months 
following the trauma was considered highly necessary, both to evaluate the degree of 
distress suffered by parents following trauma, but also to allow for an examination of 
the analysis of the relationship between child and parent PTSD symptoms. Four 
measures were included in the questionnaire battery at each assessment point for this 
purpose (the Posttraumatic stress Diagnostic Scale, the Beck Depression Inventory, 
and the State Trait Anxiety Inventory). 
Secondly, examining parental scoring on adult versions of the scales completed by 
their children (assessing their cognitive styles and coping strategies) will assist in 
identifying the strength of relationship between child and parental post-traumatic 
cognitive styles and coping. These data will be relevant to cognitive-behavioural 
interventions for children with PTSD as clinicians will be able to work with both 
children and parents to modify maladaptive appraisals and ways of coping, rather 
than working solely with children and giving them advice that conflicts with advice 
given, implicitly or explicitly, by their parents. As with children participating in the 
study, cognitive style, appraisal, and coping strategy questionnaires (the Anxiety 
Sensitivity Inventory, the Attitudes towards Emotional Expression questionnaire, the 
Memory Modality Questionnaire, the positive beliefs about worry sub-scale of the 
Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire, Response Styles Questionnaire, the Thought Control 
Questionnaire, and thought suppression, distraction, and rumination items) were 
included in the initial questionnaire battery for parents. 
Thirdly, some index of the disruption brought to the child's family by the trauma and 
its sequelae was thought necessary. Therefore, a single questionnaire (the Family 
Functioning Questionnaire) was included to obtain a parental report concerning 
family functioning following the trauma. This questionnaire was included in the 
second and third assessments. 
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A description of each self-report measure completed by parents is given in the 
following sub-sections. 
3.5.2.2.1 Anxiety Sensitivity Inventory (ASI) 
The Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Reiss, et al., 1986) is a measure of an 
individual's negative beliefs about the experience of anxiety and anxious symptoms 
(please see sub-section above for fuller description and background). The ASI 
comprises 16 items, to which the participant can respond by indicating "very little", 
66a little", "some", "much", or "very much". When distributed to a sample of students, 
Reiss and colleagues found that the measure possessed a high test-retest reliability 
(Pearson product-moment correlation = . 75). 
3.5.2.2.2 Attitudes towards Emotional Expression (AEE) 
The AEE was used to assess attitudes towards emotional expression in adult survivors 
of a ferry disaster (Joseph, et al., 1994; please see sub-section 3.5.2.1.1 above for full 
description). The AEE comprises four items, to which participants can respond "don't 
agree at all", "don't agree very much", "agree a bif', or "agree a lot". 
3.5.2.2.3 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
The BDI (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979) is a 21-itern inventory that measures 
depression in adults. The inventory has good internal reliability, with a Cronbach's 
alpha of . 81 (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988). Participants indicate their responses by 
selecting one or more of the four sentences that comprise each questionnaire item. 
3.5.2.2.4 Familyfunctioning questionnaire (FFQ) 
The FFQ is a 12-item questionnaire developed by McFarlane (1987b) to assess the 
role of family functioning on the maintenance of post-traumatic sYmptornatology in 
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children following a bush-fire. The FFQ was distributed to both a sample of families 
exposed to the bush fire (n=183) and to a large non-traumatised sample (n=497). The 
questionnaire was completed by parents. The questionnaire was found to comprise 
two factors, titled "irritable distress" and "involvement". These factors had internal 
reliability Alpha coefficients of . 76 and . 78 respectively. A further two 
items were 
included within the measure to assess maternal overprotection. Parents respond to 
each item by indicating "does not apply", "applies somewhat", or "certainly applies" 
(scored 0,1, and 2 respectively). 
3.5.2.2.5 Memory Modality Questionnaire (MMQ) 
The MMQ was distributed to parents who had witnessed the same trauma as their 
child. The MMQ completed by parent participants was the same as that completed by 
child participants (please sub-section 2.5.5 in previous chapter for fuller description 
of instrument). The MMQ comprises 14 items to which participants can respond 
"don't agree at all", "don't agree a bit", "agree a bit", or "completely agree". 
3.5.2.2.6 Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (positive beliefs about worry sub-scale; 
MCQ) 
The positive beliefs sub-scale of the MCQ was used to assess parents' positive views 
about the usefulness of worrying (please see sub-section 3.5.2.1.6 above for further 
information about this instrument). This sub-scale of the MCQ comprises 19 items, to 
which participants can respond "do not agree", "agree slightly", "agree moderately", 
and "agree very much". 
3.5.2.2.7 Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS) 
The PDS is a self-report measure of adult PTSD that, in addition to giving a 
continuous measure of post-traumatic symptomatology, is capable of producing a 
diagnosis (Foa, 1995; Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997). Participants are asked 
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to rate how much they are bothered by each of the PTSD symptoms included in the 
DSM-IV on a four-point scale. The PDS has good internal consistency (r=. 92) and 
good test-retest reliability (r=. 74 for PTSD diagnosis, and . 83 for symptom severity). 
Respondents are asked to indicate how frequent and distressing each of the 17 PTSD 
items are, then indicate how much (on a 0-10 scale) how the PTSD symptoms have 
interfered with the person's work, social life and family life, and how much they have 
to come to terms with what happened and how upset they are when they think of the 
trauma (on a 0-100 scale). 
3.5.2.2.8 Response Styles Questionnaire (Rumination sub-scale; RSQ) 
The rumination sub-scale of the RSQ (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) examines a cognitive 
style where attention on focused on the individual's emotional state (please see sub- 
section 3.5.2.1.9 above for fuller discussion of this scale). This measure was 
completed by parents participating in the study, and, as with the child version scale, 
was slightly adapted to include references to fear as well as sadness. The RSQ 
rumination sub-scale comprises 22 items, to which participants can respond "never", 
66some-times", "often", or "always". 
3.5.2.2.9 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) 
The STAI (Spielberger, et al. 1983) is a widely used measure of adult anxiety. The 
state anxiety section of the STAI was used so as to avoid duplication of the measures, 
and since the main objective in using the scale was to obtain an assessment of the 
parent's recent anxious symptornatology. The STAI has good internal consistency, 
with Cronbach's alpha coefficients of between . 86 and . 95 (Spielberger, et al., 1983). 
The state anxiety section of the STAI contains 20 items, to which participants can 
respond by indicating one of four responses ("not at all", "somewhaf', "moderately 
so", or "very much so"). 
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3.5.2.2.10 Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ) 
The TCQ (Wells & Davies, 1994) was devised to measure strategies for coping with 
unpleasant and unwanted thoughts (please see sub-section 2.5.8 in previous chapter 
for more detailed description of this measure). The full 30-item measure was 
distributed to parents of children participating in the study. Participants can respond 
to each item in the TCQ in one of four ways: "never", "sometimes", "often", or 
"almost always". 
3.5.2.2.11 Thought suppression, distraction and rumination items 
As with children in the study, a brief five item questionnaire was developed to 
examine how often parents used thought suppression (one item) and distraction (one 
item) to cope with intrusive memories of the traumatic event, and the extent to which 
they ruminate over what happened to them and their child (three items). Unlike the 
other measures relating to these strategies (the RSQ and the TCQ) these items 
measured the extent to which the strategy is used to cope specifically with symptoms 
relating to the traumatic event. Parents can respond "don't agree at all", "disagree 
slightly", "agree slightly", "completely agree" to the thought suppression and 
distraction items, and "never", "sometimes", "often", or "almost always" to the 
rumination items. 
3.6 Other information relating to the trauma 
The following additional information regarding the child's attendance at King's 
College Hospital A&E department was also recorded: 
0 Ethnicity, 
* Diagnosis and sub-diagnosis given by A&E staff, 
0 Attendance outcome (e. g. discharged, discharged to see General Practitioner 
for follow-up, etc. ), 
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* If trauma was an RTA, the type of accident (e. g. pedestrian, on a bike, in a 
car, etc. ), 
Triage category (i. e. A&E nurse's assessment of how urgently treatment is 
required)', 
0 Heart rate, blood pressure, respiratory rate, and Glasgow 
Coma Scale score at 
first assessment made by A&E staff or paramedics, and 
If admitted to hospital, how long child remained in hospital. 
3.7 Study cohort 
In this section details of the study cohort will be provided, including the participation 
rate, and trauma and demographic characteristics of participants and non-participants. 
3. Zl Participation rate 
Children were recruited from King's College Hospital A&E department between 22 nd 
October 2001 and 29h September 2002. During this period, 409 children attending 
the A&E department were registered by the Footman-walker reports software as 
meeting the inclusion criteria of the study. Of these cases, 21 had been erroneously 
categorised as assaults or RTAs, 20 were instances of parental abuse or situations 
where social services were involved, 15 were attending for the second time following 
the same incident, three were unable to speak English, two were attending following a 
sexual assault, one involved a child referred to the A&E department from another 
hospital, one involved a child whose date of birth had been recorded incorrectly and 
was not eligible to participate, one had received a severe traumatic brain injury, one 
involved a family where the investigator was thought to be at possible risk of injury, 
1A triage category of "I" is given if a patient needs to be treated immediately, 'T' if the need for 
treatment is "very urgent" (i. e. within 10 minutes), "Y if the need for treatment is "urgent" (i. e. within 
an hour), and "4" if the need for treatment is "standard" (i. e. within two hours). A higher triage number 
therefore indicates less severe injury. When children arrived by ambulance it was common for them 
not to receive a triage category. 
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and one case involved a child with severe learning disabilities. Therefore, a total of 66 
cases had to be discarded as they met exclusion criteria for the study. 
Of the 343 cases that met inclusion criteria and failed to meet exclusion criteria for 
the study, 119 (34.7%) were not contactable due to inaccurate or incomplete records 
within the A&E department, 116 (33.8%) did not wish to participate in the study, two 
(. 6%) were immediately referred for treatment for the effects of prior trauma, and 106 
(30.9%) agreed to participate in the study. 
Of the 106 cases that agreed to participate in the study, 50 (47.2%) returned the three 
month questionnaire battery, and 67 (63.2%) completed the six month assessment. No 
significant differences in initial PTSD symptomatology were observed between 
participants who completed all assessments and those failed to complete either the 
three or six month assessments (in terms of either self-reported PTSD 
symptomatology on the REES-C or by ASD diagnoses). Thus, despite the marked 
cohort attrition (especially at the three month assessment), the participants who 
completed the follow-up assessments were representative of the initial sample. 
3. Z2 Demographic information 
Demographic and trauma-related data obtained from King's College Hospital A&E 
department about both participants and non-participants are presented in Table 3.4. 
While no difference between the participants and non-participants was found with 
regards to their sex, trauma type, triage category, or ethnicity, non-participants were 
demonstrated to be significantly older than participants. This feature of the population 
of children who participated in the study, as well as the relatively low proportion of 
children who agreed to participate in the study, are important findings that have to be 
considered when interpreting the results of this study. 
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(n=343) Statistical tests 
Age: 
Mean 13.99 14.76 14.52 
Std. Deviation 1.93 1.86 1.91 p<001 (Independent 
sample t-test, t=3.54, N 106 236 342 df=340)' 
Missing cases 0 1 1 
Range 10.13-16.99 10.04-16.97 10.04-16.99 
Sex: 
ns (Xý = 1.02, p=. 31 1, Female 39 74 113 df=l) 
Male 67 163 230 
Trauma type: 
ns ()? = 2.93, p=. 087, Assault 60 157 217 df=1) 
RTA 46 80 126 
Triage Category: 
1 7 21 28 
2 0 3 3 
3 16 33 49 ns 2.64, p=. 620, 
4 76 155 231 df=4) 
Ambulance 6 18 24 
Missing 1 7 8 
Ethnicity: 
Black African 17 28 45 
Black Caribbean 18 48 66 
Black Other 22 65 87 
ns ()? = 8.27, p=. 219, Indian 1 0 1 df=6) 
Other 1 17 28 
Pakistani 1 0 1 
White 36 71 107 
Missing 0 8 8 
'Homogeneity of variance for these samples was demonstrated (Levene's test, F=1.02, 
p=. 312). 
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Chapter 4: Psychometric properties of novel measures invented or adapted for this 
investigation 
4.1 Novel measures used in both Study I and Study 2 
Three novel instruments were designed for this investigation and completed by 
participants in both Study 1 and Study 2. As two of these measures (the child version 
of the Post-Traumatic Cognitions Inventory and the child version of the Thought 
Control Questionnaire) were adapted from adult measures identified as having 
significant factor structures, and one new measure was designed specifically for this 
investigation (the Memory Modality Questionnaire), it was considered necessary to 
submit these measures to principal components analysis. This would have the effect 
of identifying meaningful component structures, and removing redundant items 
(thereby aiding future use of the measures in clinical settings). 
The following analysis strategy was devised. In order to meet the numbers of cases 
needed for the principal components analysis, initial analyses were to be conducted 
on the large data set obtained from children participating in Study 1. Then, 
components structures derived from these analyses were to be tested in the data set 
derived from Study 2. 
The number of components to be extracted from each analysis would be based on 
inspection of scree plots of the eigenvalues produced (where the number of valid 
components to be extracted corresponds to the number at the which the gradient of 
the plot changes drastically), and the number of eigenvalues greater than one. Judging 
how items load onto the extracted components would be aided by the use of varimax 
rotation. Items would be allocated to a component if they had a high loading on that 
particular component (e. g. a loading of at least A), and a low loading on the other 
components (e. g. a loading less than A). Items that loaded highly on more than one 
component would be discarded. Components would be discarded if they were found 
to comprise only one or two items. Components would be re-examined if they were 
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found not to possess satisfactory internal reliability in both the Study I and Study 2 
samples, or if the component loadings were not replicated in the Study 2 sample. An 
internal reliability greater than . 70 is considered to be necessary when devising a 
measure (Kline, 1993). 
4.1.1 Memory modality questionnaire (MMQ) 
The MMQ was designed to assess the quality of children's and adolescents' 
memories of, in Study 1, the most frightening recent memory they could recall, or in 
Study 2, the assault or RTA that caused them to attend King's College Hospital A&E. 
The items of the MMQ examined several different aspects of memories of trauma, as 
proposed in the models of Brewin et al. (1996) and Ehlers and Clark (2000): the 
extent to which memories consisted of sensory information (i. e. consisted of visual, 
auditory, olfactory, and proprioreceptive data), and the extent to which the memories 
comprised verbal information. 
4.1.1.1 Assumptions of Principal Components Analysis 
Inspection of the correlation matrix for the items of the MMQ as completed by 
children participating in Study 2 indicated that there was no multicollinearity or 
singularity between the items. Several items were found to demonstrate skewness and 
kurtosis. While this failure to achieve the assumption of normality for some of the 
items may lead to some degradation of any principal components analysis solution, it 
does not result in the solution ceasing to be worthwhile (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
1996). Logarithmic and inverse transformations of the item score did not alter any 
subsequent solutions. 
4.1.1.2 Component extraction 
The first principal components analysis, conducted on the Study I data set, revealed 
that the items of the MMQ had four components with eigenvalues larger than one. 
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When subjected to a varimax rotation, it was clear that the third and fourth 
components had only one or two items loading highly on them. The analysis was 
therefore repeated, but with these items (2,12, and 14) deleted (see Table 4.1 for 
contents of these items). This analysis resulted in a solution with three components 
with eigenvalues greater than one. However, inspection of the scree plot for this 
solution indicated that a two component solution may be more appropriate. The 
analysis was therefore repeated again, but this time the remaining items were forced 
into a two component solution. 
The first component accounted for 30.1% of variance in the solution, while the 
second component account for an additional 12.3% of variance. The items included in 
this solution and their respective component loadings are shown in Table 4.1. 
Each component appeared to posses face validity. The first component corresponded 
to the visual clarity of trauma memories. The second component corresponded to 
memories that were more fragmented and comprised non-visual sensory modalities. 
The internal reliability of the first component, as assessed within the Study I sample, 
was acceptable (Cronbach's alpha = . 73) according to the commonly accepted limits 
for internal reliability estimates (Kline, 1993), while the internal reliability of the 
second component was less satisfactory (Cronbach's alpha = . 63). 
An attempt to replicate this component structure in the data for participants in Study 2 
was unsuccessful. However, each component, as defined using the principal 
components solution derived from the Study 1 data, did have good internal reliability; 
for component one Cronbach's alpha was equal to . 74, and for component two 
Cronbach's alpha was equal to . 74. Given the lack of internal reliability of component 
2, the difficulty of replicating the component structure observed in Study 1 data in 
Study 2 data, and the results of exploratory analyses where single component 
solutions were successfully forced into principal component analyses, it was decided 
to collapse the two proposed components into a single measure. This 11 -item measure 
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had high internal reliability in both the Study I (Cronbach's alpha = . 76) and Study 2 
(Cronbach's alpha = . 82) data. 
Table 4.1 Component loadings of MMQfor Study 1 participants 
Item Component I Component 2 
Component 1 (visual clarity): 
1. My memories of the frightening event are mostly pictures . 71 
or images. 
8.1 remember the frightening event as a few moments, and . 57 
each moment is a picture in my mind. 
9. My memories of the frightening event are like a film that . 62 
plays over and over. 
10. My memories of the frightening event are very clear and . 69 detailed. 
11. Remembering what happened during the frightening event . 73 is just Eke looking at photographs of it in my mind. 
Component 2 (Non-verbal and non-visual quality) 
3.1 can't seem to put the frightening event into words. . 50 
4. When I have memories of what happened I sometimes hear . 58 things in my head that I heard during the frightening event. 
5. When I remember the frightening event I feel like it is . 71 happening right now. 
6. When I think about the frightening event I can sometimes . 42 
smell things that I smelt when the frightening event happened. 
7.1 can talk about what happened very easily. -. 46 
13. When memories come to mind of what happened, I feel . 72 
my body is in the same position as when the frightening event 
occurred. 
Excluded items: 
2. When I think about the frightening event it is just like 
thinking about anything else that has happened to me. 
12.1 can remember the order in which things happened during 
the frightening event. 
14. My memories of the frightening event feel like memories 
of other things that have happened to me that aren't very 
scary. 
Note. MMQ = Memory Modality Questionnaire. 
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4.1.2 Thought Control Questionnaire - child version (cTCQ) 
A child version of the Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Davies & Wells, 1994) 
was devised. The original questionnaire devised for adults was designed to assess 
strategies for controlling unpleasant and unwanted thoughts that are a prominent 
feature of several anxiety disorders, and has been used to identify maladaptive 
thought control styles in adults with depression and PTSD (Reynolds & Wells, 1999). 
All 30 items of the TCQ were included in the child version devised for this 
investigation, and were amended so as to be understood by this younger population. 
In addition, the introduction to the measure and each item was amended so that 
explicit reference was made to unpleasant and unwanted memories, as well as 
unpleasant and unwanted thoughts. 
4.1.2.1 Assumptions of Principal Components Analysis 
Inspection of the correlation matrix for the items of the cTCQ as completed by 
children participating in Study I indicated that there was no multicollinearity or 
singularity between the items. The items were not found to possess normality 
however, as a large proportion of items were found to demonstrate skewness and 
kurtosis. While this may lead to some degradation of principal components analysis 
solution, it does not result in the solution ceasing to be worthwhile (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 1996). Logarithmic and inverse transformations of the item score did not alter 
any subsequent solutions. 
4.1.2.2 Component extraction 
The items of the cTCQ were submitted to principal components analysis. Eight 
components were found to have eigenvalues greater than 1. Examination of the scree 
plot of eigenvalues was difficult to interpret (see Figure 4.1), so it was decided to 
progress using an eight component solution. 
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The loadings of this eight component solution were subjected to a variniax rotation. 
Tile eighth component was found to have only a single item (item 17). Tile analysis 
was therefore repeated, but with this item removed and with a seven component 
solution forced. The rotated solution comprised components that each had face 
validity, however not all of the seven components were found to have satisfactory 
internal reliability, i. e. Cronbach's alpha coefficients greater than . 70 (Kinie, 1993). A 
further principal components analysis was therefore conducted, but with tile items 
that loaded on the components with poor internal reliability removed. As only three 
components had satisfactory internal reliability, a three component solution was 
forced using the 15 items that had been found to load on these components. The three 
components extracted frorn this analysis accounted for 52.8'/'(, of variance in tile 
solution. Each item loaded satisfactorily highly on a single component (i. e. a loading Z71 
greater than . 50), and 
lowly on the other components. 
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The first component related to methods of pleasant or neutral distraction, and had 
high internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha = . 81). The second component related to 
reappraising a thought or memory, and had an acceptable internal reliability 
(Cronbach's alpha = . 71). The third component related to support from friends in 
coping with an unpleasant thought or memory, and also had acceptable internal 
reliability (Cronbach's alpha =. 73). 
Table 4.2 Component loadings of cTCQfbr Study 1 and Study 2 participants 
Item 
"Distraction" component: 
4.1 do something that I enjoy. 
8.1 keep myself busy. 
11.1 remember good times. 
18.1 think about nice things. 
22.1 think about something else. 
25.1 try and do something around the house. 
27.1 try to come up with a better thought or 
memory. 
"Reappraisal" component. 
1.1 try to think clearly about the thought or 
memory. 
3.1 concentrate on the thought or memory. 
24.1 try a different way of thinking about it. 
28.1 try to see if the thought or memory is really 
true. 
29.1 wonder why I am having the thought or 
memory. 
"Social support" component: 
2.1 ask my friends if they have thoughts or 
memories Eke mine. 
6.1 find out how my friends deal with these 
thoughts or memories. 
15.1 talk to a friend about the thought or 
Component I Component 2 Component 3 
SI/S2 Sl/S2 SI/S2 
. 69/. 61 
. 68/. 61 
. 69/. 63 
. 79/. 61 
. 67/. 48 
. 54/. 18 
. 66/31 
. 70/37 
. 77/. 35 
. 65/. 58 
. 68/. 67 
. 51/. 70 
. 77/. 71 
. 79/. 75 
memory. . 
80/. 61 
Note. cTCQ = child version of Thought Control Questionnaire; SI= Sample from Study 1; 
S2 = Sample from Study 2. 
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In order to verify this solution further, the retained items were also subjected to a 
principal components analysis in the data set obtained from Study 2. A three 
component solution was forced, accounting for 47.6% of variance. The items loaded 
moderately well on the components produced in the analysis on data from Study 2. 
The loadings of the 15 retained items on their respective components, in both the 
Study 1 and Study 2 data sets, are displayed in Table 4.2. 
The internal reliabilities of these components as measured using the data from Study 
2, however, were not as high as those for the data obtained from Study 1. The first 
component (relating to methods of pleasant or neutral distraction) had acceptable 
internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha = . 70), while both the second component 
(relating to reappraising a thought or memory) and the third component (relating to 
support from friends in coping with an unpleasant thought or memory) had 
unacceptable internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha = . 63 and . 58, respectively). While 
the internal reliability coefficients for the second and third components may not reach 
the commonly accepted level of . 70 (Kline, 1993), the finding that these components 
have similar loading structures across populations, and do reach an acceptable level 
for internal reliability within the considerably larger sample that participated in Study 
1, suggests that the derived component structure may be acceptable for use in this 
investigation. 
4.1.3 Post-traumatic Cognitions Inventory - child version (cPTCj) 
The initial version of the cPTCI designed for this study comprised items from the 
adult PTCI (Foa et al., 1999) amended for use with children together additional items 
deemed suitable for children that would also address the key concepts that make up 
the adult PTCL Six items included in the cPTCI to relate to very specific processes 
(i. e. omen formation and persistent anger), and an item that was considered to be 
vaguely worded (item 14, "1 feel like a robot sometimes"), were not included in the 
following analyses, which sought to distinguish between more general forms of 
appraisal. 
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4.1.3.1 Assumptions of Principal Components Analysis 
Inspection of the correlation matrix for the items of the cPTCI as completed by 
children participating in Study 1 indicated that there was no multicollinearity or 
singularity between the items. The items were not found to possess normality 
however; a large proportion of items were found to demonstrate skewness and 
kurtosis. While this may lead to some degradation of principal components analysis 
solution, it does not result in the solution ceasing to be worthwhile (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 1996). Logarithmic and inverse transformations of the item score did not alter 
any subsequent solutions. 
4.1.3.2 Component extraction 
The 41 items of the cPTCI were submitted to a principal components analysis. 
Initially, a nine component model was suggested, though examination of the scree 
plot implied a two component solution (see fig 4.2). 
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The model was run again with two components and subjected to vaninax rotation. 
The first component accounted for 32.9%, of variance, while the second component 
accounted for an additional 6.2% of variance. Items that were found to load more than 
. 
50 on a given component, and less than . 
40 on the other component were retained 
within the questionnaire and subjected to further interpretation. Inspection of tile two 
proposed components, revealed meaningful groupings; the first component, 
comprising 13 items, corresponded to a sense of disturbing and permanent change 
since the traurna, while the second component, comprising 12 items, corresponded to 
a sense of being a feeble person in a scary world. A third principal components 
analysis was run with the 25 retained items, and again subjected to varimax rotation. Z71 
In thi's solution, the first component accounted for 37.3% of variance, while the 
second component accounted for an additional 9.2% of variance. 
In order to further verify this solution, the analysis was performed ag'ain using tile 
data from Study 2 participants' scores on the cPTCI at the 6 month follow-up 
assessment. The 6 nionth follow-up cPTCI scores were selected as a greater number 
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of children and adolescents completed the questionnaire at this time point than at the 
3 month follow-up. The loadings for each item on their respective components for 
both the Study I and Study 2 samples are shown in Table 4.3. It was not possible to 
conduct split-half confirmatory analyses as the sample size in the Study 2 population 
was not sufficiently large. Only a few of Study 2 participants' items showed 
substantial loadings for the component other than that to which they had been 
allocated based on the data from Study 1. 
The internal reliability of these components was then assessed. Using the data 
obtained from Study I (the much larger sample) the Cronbach's alpha coefficients for 
the "disturbing and permanent change" component and for the "feeble person in a 
scary world" component were . 91 and . 86 respectively. Using the data obtained from 
Study 2 at 6 month follow-up, the Cronbach's alpha coefficients for the "disturbing 
and permanent change" component and for the "feeble person in a scary world" 
component were . 88 and . 88 respectively. 
Within the sample taken from Study 1, total scores for each component were found to 
be significantly correlated (r=. 64, n=223, p<001). Both the "disturbing and 
permanent change" component and the "feeble person in a scary world" component 
were significantly correlated with the total score for the revised, 25 item 
questionnaire (r=. 88, n=223, p<001, and r=. 93, n=223, p<001, respectively). 
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Table 4.3 Component loadings of cPTCIfor Study 1 and Study 2 participants 
Item 
Component 1 Component 2 
Sl/S2 SI/S2 
"Disturbing and permanent change" component 
15.1 feel like I am a different person since the frightening . 56/. 61 
event. 
23.1 used to be a happy person but now I am always sad. . 57/. 49 
25.1 will never be able to have normal feelings again. . 70/. 82 
26. I'm scared that I'll get so angry that I'll break something . 62/. 55 
or hurt someone. 
33. MY life has been destroyed by the frightening event. 79/. 57 
34. My reactions since the frightening event mean I have . 76/34 
changed for the worse. 
35. My reactions since the frightening event mean I will never . 77/. 63 
get over it. 
36. My reactions since the frightening event mean something . 70/39 is seriously wrong with me. 
37. My reactions since the frightening event show that I must . 63/34 
be going crazy. 
39. Not being able to get over all my fears means that I am a . 57/. 61 
failure. 
40. Nothing good can happen to me anymore. . 59/. 49 
43. Something terrible will happen if I do not try to control . 59/. 64 
my thoughts about the frightening event. 
45. The frightening event has changed me forever. . 67/. 54 
"Feeble person in a scary world" component 
2. Anyone could hurt me. . 66/. 67 
3. Bad things always happen. . 68/. 58 
4. Everyone lets me down. . 65/. 61 
5.1 am a coward. . 57/. 68 
8.1 am no good. . 52/. 60 
9.1 can't cope when things get tough. . 58/. 80 
10.1 can't stop bad things from happening to me. . 67/. 53 
13.1 don't trust people. . 69/. 67 
18.1 have to be really careful because something bad could . 67/. 50 happen. 
19.1 have to watch out for danger all the time. . 53/. 54 
3 1. Life is not fair. . 51/. 44 
41. Small things upset me. . 55/. 69 
Note. cPTCI = child version of Post-Traumatic Cognitions inventory; S1 = Sample from 
Study 1; S2 = Sample from Study 2. 
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4.2 Novel measures used only in Study 2 
Several measures adapted for use with the children and adolescents participating were 
taken directly from adult measures and were only completed by participants in Study 
2. Rather than conducting principal components analyses so as to ascertain their 
usefulness as instruments, it was considered sufficient to conduct internal reliability 
analyses of these measures. The results of these analyses are given in the following 
sub-sections. 
4.2.1 Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ) 
The child version of the 21-item rumination sub-scale of the RSQ (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991), adapted for use in Study 2, was completed by 79 children and adolescents at 
the initial (2-4 week) assessment of that study. This adapted measure was found to 
possess excellent internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha = . 93). The mean total score 
for this measure was 36.68 (standard deviation = 11.67). 
4.2.2 Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ; positive beliefs about worry sub-scale) 
The child version of the 19-itern positive beliefs about worry sub-scale of the MCQ 
(Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997), adapted for this study, was completed by 81 
children and adolescents at the initial (2-4 week) assessment of Study 1. This adapted 
measure was found to possess excellent internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha = . 90). 
The mean total score for this measure was 34.45 (standard deviation = 10.46) 
4.2.3 Attitudes towards Emotional Expression questionnaire (AEE) 
The child version of the AEE (Joseph et al., 1994) was completed by 88 children and 
adolescents at the initial assessment of Study 1. However, this 4-item adapted 
measure was not found to possess acceptable internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha = 
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. 49). The removal of one item indicated by the reliability analysis as being poorly 
correlated with the questionnaire's total score did not adequately improve the 
questionnaire's internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha = . 50). It was decided to include 
the questionnaire in later analyses, while exercising caution regarding its usefulness. 
The mean total score for this measure was 10.48 (standard deviation = 2.56). 
4.3 Summary and Discussion 
The psychometric properties of several novel measures for assessing aspects of 
children's and adolescents' coping with traumatic events were evaluated in two 
samples: the first, a cross-sectional sample of secondary school pupils; and the 
second, a prospective study of children and adolescents exposed to assaults and 
RTAs. Three of these measures (the MMQ, the cTCQ, and the cPTCI) were evaluated 
in both samples, while a further three, which were more simple, single-component 
questionnaires adapted for use with children and adolescents (the RSQ, the MCQ 
positive beliefs sub-scale, and the AEE), were only evaluated within the prospective 
study sample. 
Principal components analysis initially revealed that the MMQ possessed a two 
component structure when assessed within the cross-sectional study sample (Study 1), 
the first component relating to the extent to which children's memories of a 
frightening event consisted of visual elements, and the second relating to the extent to 
which memories of the event were in a non-verbal form and consisted of non-visual 
elements (e. g. olfactory and auditory elements). Since the same component structure 
was not found in the prospective study sample (Study 2), and the second component 
was not found to have acceptable internal reliability in the cross-sectional study 
sample (Study 1), the two components were merged. That two components were 
found to exist only in the cross-sectional sample may have been related to the range 
of experiences reported by participants in this study; events that were more saddening 
than fearful may have led to the onset of intrusive memories laden with visual 
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elements, but without the features associated with more severe, PTSD-inducing 
events, such as the incorporation of other sensory elements and less verbal encoding. 
The cTCQ was found to possess a three component structure (consisting of 
"distraction", "reappraisal" and "social support" components), that was reliable 
across the two samples tested. The "worry" and "punishment" sub-scales found in the 
adult version of this measure, the TCQ, were not found to be coherent concepts 
within the present studies. 
The cPTCI was reduced from comprising 41 items to a 25 item version which 
possessed two components, that conveyed a sense of disturbing and permanent 
change, and a sense of being a feeble person in a scary world. Each component was 
found to have high internal reliability in both the Study 1 and Study 2 samples. 
The child versions of the RSQ and the positive beliefs sub-scale of the MCQ, which 
were simplified from the adult versions for use with this younger age group, were 
found to possess high internal reliability. The child version of the AEE, however, had 
low internal reliability, suggesting that any results derived from the use of this 
measure are to be interpreted cautiously. 
In conclusion, all the measures devised for use in this investigation, except for the 
child version of the AEE, were found to be satisfactory instruments, and their use in 
analyses investigating the role of the various processes examined by these measures is 
supported. 
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Chapter 5: Intrusive memories, post-traumatic stress symptoms, and coping 
processes in a non-clinical child and adolescent population (Study 1) 
In this chapter the data derived from Study 1, a study of intrusive memories, post- 
traumatic stress symptoms, and coping processes in a non-clinical child and 
adolescent population, will be presented. Children and adolescents at two secondary 
schools completed a number of self-report questionnaires regarding the most 
frightening event they had experienced in the two months prior to participating in the 
study, the emotions the child or adolescent experienced during the event, the quantity 
and quality of any intrusive memories of the event, their post-traumatic stress and 
depressive symptornatology, their strategies for coping with intrusive memories of the 
event, and their appraisals of the event and its sequelae (see chapter 2 for the 
demographic details of the sample obtained, details of the procedures used in 
recruiting this sample, and details of the measures used). Participants' scores on the 
novel measures designed for the present investigation were derived using the 
components suggested by a psychometric analysis of the measures in chapter 4. 
This study was undertaken to examine the prevalence and processes associated with 
intrusive memories of a trauma, the cardinal symptom of PTSD, in children and 
adolescents. Cognitive models of PTSD in adults stress the role of intrusive memories 
and how individuals cope with such memories in the aetiology of the disorder 
(Brewin et al. 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Intrusive memories of a traumatic event 
are thought to be quite common phenomena, but in a minority of individuals exposed 
to a trauma these may occur for an extended period. Within adults it has been 
demonstrated that laying down disorganised and sensory-based memories of a trauma 
has been shown to predict later PTSD (Halligan, Michael, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003), and 
that negative appraisals of intrusive memories (e. g. thinking that having intrusive 
memories is a sign that one is "going mad") are associated with the use of 
maladaptive thought control strategies that maintain these PTSD symptoms (Steil & 
Ehlers, 2000). These processes have not yet been fully evaluated within child and 
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adolescent populations. One way in which such processes may be investigated is 
through examining responses to fear provoking events in non-clinical populations. 
Precedents exist for investigating psychopathology in non-clinical populations. For 
example, Allsopp and Williams (1996) assessed the prevalence of the kinds of 
intrusive thoughts that are typically found in individuals with obsessive compulsive 
disorder (OCD) in a sample of secondary school pupils. Unwanted intrusive thoughts 
were reported by 85% of the sample, and maladaptive strategies for coping with such 
intrusions (e. g. avoidance or neutralising) were found to be associated with 
conscientious, superstitious or magical beliefs about intrusive thoughts. Brewin, 
Christodoulides, and Hutchinson (1996) assessed the prevalence and quality of 
intrusive memories and thoughts in a non-clinical sample of adults, observing that 
intrusive memories are not confined to individuals experiencing emotional disorders 
such as PTSD and depression. Similarly, Reynolds & Brewin (1998) compared 
intrusive thoughts and memories in PTSD, depressed, and non-clinical groups, 
finding that intrusive memories were common in each group, though it was only in 
the PTSD group and to a lesser extent the depressed group that these memories 
possessed a "flashback" quality. 
The particular aims of the present study, therefore, were to assess within a non- 
clinical child and adolescent population: 
i. the prevalence of intrusive memories and other PTSD symptomatology 
following fear-provoking events; 
ii. the relationship between emotions experienced during the event and memories 
of such events, and the frequency of intrusive memories and PTSD 
symptomatology; 
iii. what strategies are maladaptive in coping with intrusive memories; 
iv. the relationship between maladaptive coping strategies and post-traumatic 
appraisals; 
V. the relationship of the above processes with depressive symptomatology; and 
vi. the impact of age on the above processes. 
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Prior to examining these issues, some consideration of the events reported by children 
and adolescents participating in this study is necessary. 
5.1 "Frightening events" reported by children and adolescents in Study 1 
The frightening events reported by participants were classified by the investigator 
according to the type of trauma experienced. Event types which were reported by 
three or more participants are presented in Table 5.1, together with the numbers of 
participants reporting each event type. 
Several points regarding these data are to be noted. Firstly, nightmares and scary 
films were commonly reported events. However this relatively high frequency may be 
due to the investigator giving these events as examples of the kinds of minor 
frightening events with regards to which children and adolescents might wish to 
complete the questionnaire battery, if they could not think of any other more serious 
events. Secondly, nearly 10% of the sample was unable to think of a recent 
frightening event that they had experienced. The scores of these participants on 
measures not related specifically to a frightening event (i. e. the child version of the 
Thought Control Questionnaire, and the Birleson Depression Self-Rating Scale) were 
retained and used to examine age-related differences (see section 5.3 below). 
Participants not reporting a frightening event did not complete the measures 
specifically related to a frightening event, (e. g. the Revised Impact of Event Scale, 
child version), and so did not contribute to any of the other analyses. Thirdly, some of 
the events reported by participants were not events that might be described as 
primarily fear provoking events, but rather sadness or worry provoking (e. g. family 
problems, exam failure). Fourthly, witnessing or being involved in an RTA, the event 
type most commonly reported by participants, may have been reported at an 
exaggerated rate due to the numbers of sixth formers at School A who were learning 
to drive, and an incident at School B (where one pupil was knocked down by a car 
when leaving school) which was witnessed by a large number of pupils. Fifthly, the 
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small numbers of participants reporting most types of events precludes the use of chi- 
square analyses to discern if there are age-related differences in the frequency with 
which these events are reported. 
Table 5.1 Frequency ofparticipants reporting eachfrightening event type 
Frequency 
Trauma type (N=254) % 
Witnessed or involved in an RTA 51 20.1 
Illness or injury of other person (actual or threatened) 22 8.7 
Burgled, or threat of burglary 15 5.9 
Attacked or threat of attack by or exposure to animal 13 5.1 
Attacked or threat of attack 12 4.7 
Scary film 12 4.7 
Bereavement 11 4.3 
Stalked, pursued, or unwanted advances 10 3.9 
Nightmare 9 3.5 
Bullying 7 2.8 
Family problems 7 2.8 
Accidental Injury 5 2.0 
Scared about own health 4 1.6 
Lost, trouble getting home 4 1.6 
Arrested by police 4 1.6 
Witnessed violence 4 1.6 
Fall 3 1.2 
Ghost sighting/fear 3 1.2 
Surgical procedure 3 1.2 
exam failure/concern over future prospects 3 1.2 
Other (reported by less than 3 participants) 29 11.4 
No event reported 23 9.1 
5.2 ne prevalence of intrusive memories and other PTSD symptomatology following 
fear-provoking events 
The frequency with which participants reported experiencing intrusive memories of 
the frightening event they reported are displayed in Table 5.2. Across the sample as a 
whole, it was more likely that children and adolescents would experience at least one 
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intrusive memory of the frightening event they reported than experience no intrusive 
memories at all. Very frequent intrusive memories (i. e. five or more times a week) 
were only reported by 22 participants, less than 10% of the total number of the 231 
participants who reported a frightening event. Chi-square analysis revealed there to be 
no differences between the different age groups with regards to the frequency with 
which they reported experiencing intrusive memories. 
Table 5.2 Frequency of intrusive memories by age group 
Age group 
11-12 13-14 15-16 Sixth 
Frequency of intrusive Years Years Years formers Total 
memories (n=70) (n=59) (n=34) (n=68) (n=23 1) 
Not at all / only one time 16 22 8 15 61 
Once a week or less 
once in a while 26 19 16 36 97 
2 to 4 times a week / 
half the time 19 12 8 12 51 
5 or more times a week / 
almost always 9625 22 
138 
5.3 Mean scores on self-report questionnaires used in Study 1 
Before examining the relationships between the various measures used in the study, 
some consideration of the mean scores for these measures, as well as comparison 
across the age groups, schools and sexes, and between this population and other 
populations, is warranted. Mean scores and standard deviations for each measure, 
differentiated by age group, sex, and school, are displayed in Table 5.3 2. 
2 The data presented in Table 5.3 were obtained from the 231 participants who reported a frightening 
event (out of a total of 254 participants). In addition, 3 of the 23 participants who reported no 
frightening events completed the non-trauma related questionnaires (the cTCQ and the BDSRS). A 
total of 234 participants who completed at least these measures is reported, though this dropped to 231 
for the variables pertaining emotions experienced during the trauma and intrusive memories of the 
trauma, the MMQ, the difficulty in getting rid of intrusive memories item, the thought suppression and 
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Many of the variables displayed in Table 5.3 were found to be significantly skewed in 
either a positive or negative direction. Where these skewed variables were included in 
correlational analyses, non-parametric (Kendall's tau) as well as parametric 
(Pearson's r) tests were performed to examine whether skew distorted the results. 
Any differences between these two tests are reported in footnotes. 
ANOVA tests revealed significant age group differences for feeling helpless during 
the event item (F=3.92, df=3,229, p<01), MMQ scores (F=3.01, df=3,250, p<05), 
the difficulty in "getting rid of' intrusive memories item (F=4.45, df=3,222, p<01), 
scores on the cTCQ distraction sub-scale (F=3.36, df=3,241, p<05), and scores on 
the RIES-C avoidance sub-scale (F=7.54, df=3,227, p<001). Tukey post-hoc 
comparisons were conducted, and significant between group differences are indicated 
in the table. 
Eleven to 12 year old participants scored higher than all older participants on the 
avoidance sub-scale of the RIES-C. The youngest group was also more likely to 
endorse distraction as a way of coping with intrusive memories (relative to the 15-16 
year olds), have greater difficultly in getting rid of intrusive memories (relative to the 
sixth formers), and have more sensory-based, poorly verbalised and fragmented 
memories (relative to the 15-16 year olds and the sixth formers). Sixth formers were 
more likely to have experienced helplessness during the event they reported, relative 
to 11-12 year olds. When a Bonferroni correction was made to account for the use of 
multiple comparisons, only the difference on the avoidance sub-scale of the RIES-C 
remained significant. However, given that the differences that existed prior to the 
Bonferroni correction seemed to be between the younger and older groups, and in the 
case of the difference on the cTCQ measure the difference mirrors that observed on 
the avoidance sub-scale of the RIES-C, these findings are noteworthy. 
ANOVA tests revealed significant sex differences for feeling scared during the 
reported event (F=14.50, df=l, 232, p<0001), feeling scared (F=18.23, df=1,228, 
p<0001), confused (F=4.40, df=I, 228, p<04), and helpless (F=3.95, df=l, 230, 
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p<05) during intrusive memories of the reported event, MMQ scores (F=20.56, df=l, 
233, p<0001), difficulty getting rid of intrusive memories (F=4.17, df=l, 224, 
p<04), the thought suppression item (F=8.11, df=l, 228, p<0001), the distraction 
item (F=8.99, df=l, 228, p<0001), the cTCQ distraction sub-scale (F=12.84, df=l, 
243, * p<00 1), the cTCQ social support sub-scale (F= 10.47, df= 1,243, p<00 1), RIES 
intrusion (F=6.85, df=l, 229, p<009), avoidance (F=9.15, df=l, 229, p<003), and 
arousal (F=6.90, df=l, 225, p<009) sub-scales and the RIES total score (F=11.80, 
df=l, 228, p<001), BDSRS (F=6.59, df=l, 238, p<01), and the cPTCI "feeble 
person in a scary world" sub-scale (F=11.36, df=l, 221, p<001) and cPTCI total 
score (F=7.83, df=l, 221, p<006). 
Girls participating in the study were more scared during the reported event, were 
more scared, helpless, and confused during intrusive memories of the reported event, 
possessed more sensory-based and fragmented memories of the event, had greater 
difficulty "getting rid of' intrusive memories of the event, were more likely to use 
thought suppression and distraction as ways of coping with intrusive memories of the 
event, were more likely to use distraction and social support in general when coping 
with intrusive thoughts and memories, experienced greater PTSD (as assessed by all 
RIES-C sub-scales and the RIES-C total) and depressive symptomatology, and were 
more likely to endorse a view of themselves as being "a feeble person in a scary 
world", relative to boys. When Bonferroni corrections were made to account for the 
use of multiple comparisons, the differences observed for the feeling scared during 
the reported event, feeling scared intrusive memories of the event, MMQ scores, the 
distraction and social support sub-scales of the cTCQ, RIES-C total score, and the 
"feeble person in a scary world" sub-scale of the cPTCI remained significant. 
With regards to the schools to which participants were drawn from, children and 
adolescents at school A were more likely to feel ashamed (F=6.85, df=l, 230, p<009) 
and helpless (F=16.09, df=l, 231, p<0001) during the reported event, more likely to 
feel helpless during intrusive memories of the event (F=4.81, df=1,230, p<03), have 
less difficulty in getting rid of intrusive memories of the event (F=5.50, df=l, 224, 
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p<02), and be more likely to endorse the cTCQ sub-scales of distraction (F=4.39, 
df=1,243, p<04) and social support (F=7.08, df=1,243, p<008). These findings may 
have been related, in the case of the differences between schools on the feelings of 
shame and helplessness, to the age-related differences noted above and School A 
comprising an older sample. 
With regards to the level of psychopathology observed in this sample, some 
comparison with other populations is warranted. The level of post-traumatic stress in 
this sample, as assessing using the RIES-C (mean = 24.03) is only slightly lower than 
that of a large sample of children and adolescents exposed to civil war in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina (mean = 27.09; Smith, et al. 2001). Participants within Study 2 who 
completed the RIES-C two to four weeks after an assault or an RTA scored higher 
than the sample in Study 1 on this measure (mean = 30.88), whilq at six months post- 
trauma their mean score had dropped to a level lower than that observed in the 
present cross-sectional study (mean = 21.77). Levels of depression within the sample, 
as assessed using the BDSRS (mean 8.41), were slightly lower than levels in 
another non-clinical population (mean 8.53; Yule, 1998) and in the cohort of 
children and adolescents assessed by Smith and colleagues in Bosnia-Hercegovina 
(mean = 9.40). 
5.4 The relationship between emotions experienced during the frightening event, 
emotions experienced during intrusive memories of the frightening event, memory 
quality, intrusive memoryfrequency, and PTSD symptomatology 
Two aspects of the relationships between emotions experienced during the frightening 
event, emotions experienced during intrusive memories of the frightening event, 
memory quality, intrusive memory frequency, and PTSD symptomatology, were 
examined. Firstly, the relationships between emotions experienced during the 
frightening event and emotions experienced during intrusive memories of the 
frightening event were investigated using correlational analyses. Secondly, the 
relationship between these emotions (both during the event itself and during intrusive 
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memories of the event) and the quality of trauma memories, the frequency of 
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The correlations between emotions experienced during the frightening event and 
emotions experienced during intrusive memories of the frightening event are 
displayed in Table 5.4. Several points are to be noted. Firstly, while there are 
significant correlations between the various emotions experienced during the reported 
event, none of these correlations are very high. This suggests that the individual items 
were being distinguished by participants as assessing different emotions, and that 
individuals were more likely to experience fewer but more strong emotions during the 
event. Secondly, the higher correlations observed between emotions experienced 
during intrusive memories of the reported event suggest that a greater range of 
emotions may be experienced during intrusive memories. Thirdly, there were high 
correlations between ratings of emotion during the event reported and ratings of the 
same emotion experienced during intrusive memories of the event. This suggests that 
the emotions experienced during a frightening event remain consistent over time and 
are characteristics of memories of the event. 
Correlation coefficients for associations between emotions experienced during the 
event reported and during intrusive memories, and the frequency of intrusive 
memories of the event and PTSD symptornatology are displayed in Table 5.5. Each 
emotion, whether experienced during the event or during intrusive memories of the 
event, was found to be significantly correlated with intrusive memory frequency and 
PTSD symptornatology as assessed by the RIES-C. In particular, the emotions of 
being "scared", "sad", and "helpless" were highly correlated with these outcomes. In 
most cases (except for the emotion of sadness) there was a higher correlation between 
the rating of the emotion during the intrusive memory and intrusive memory 
frequency or RIES-C score than for the rating of the emotion during the actual event 
and these outcomes 3. All emotions experienced during an intrusive memory were 
' These apparent differences in size of correlation were examined statistically by transforming these 
non-normally distributed correlation coefficients (r) into normally distributed coefficients (r') using the 
Fisher Z, transformation. When the respective r' coefficients were compared using z-tests, differences 
in correlation size were only observed between trauma- and intrusion-related "anger" and the RIES-C, 
and between trauma- and intrusion-related "helplessness" and intrusive memory frequency. 
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significantly correlated with memory quality (as assessed by the MMQ)4' though only 
feeling scared, sad and helpless during the event itself were correlated with this 
variable, suggesting that feeling angry and ashamed were not associated with laying 
down sensory based and fragmented memories. 
Table 5.5. Correlations between emotions experienced during the event reported and 
during intrusive memories, and memory quality, frequency of intrusive memories of 
the event, and PTSD symptomatology 
Correlation with Correlation with 
Correlation with intrusion RIES-C total 
MMQ frequency score 
Emotion (n=229) (n=227) (n=220) 
Experienced during event: 
Scared . 41*** . 31*** . 30*** 
Sad . 29*** . 44*** . 42*** 
Angry . 06 . 27*** . 22** 
Ashamed . 09 . 24** . 16* 
Helpless . 25** . 29*** . 30*** 
Experienced during intrusive 
memory: 
Scared . 36*** . 44*** 
Sad . 26** . 43*** . 38*** 
Angry . 21 * . 37*** . 39*** 
Ashamed . 14* . 26*** . 18* 
Helpless . 31*** . 47*** . 40*** 
Crazy . 31*** . 35*** . 29*** 
Confused . 37*** . 41*** . 41*** 
Note: PTSD = Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; MMQ = Memory Modality Questionnaire; 
RIES-C = Revised Impact of Event Scale, child version. *p<05, ** p<001, *** p<0001 
4 When a non-parametric correlation coefficient (Kendall's tau) was calculated, the relationship 
between feeling ashamed during intrusive memories and the MMQ ceased to be significant. 
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5.5 The relationship between memory quality, thought control strategies, post- 
traumatic appraisals, intrusive memoryfrequency, and PTSD symptomatology 
Correlations between memory quality (as assessed by the MMQ), thought control 
strategies used to cope with intrusive memories (as assessed by the thought 
suppression and distraction items, and the sub-scales of the cTCQ), post-traumatic 
appraisals (as assessed by the sub-scales of the cPTCl), intrusive memory frequency, 
and PTSD symptornatology (as assessed by the RIES-C) are displayed in Table 5.6. 
The MMQ, the novel measure assessing the quality of children's memories of their 
trauma, was found to be significantly and positively correlated with both intrusive 
memory frequency and IIFSD symptornatology as assessed by the RIES-C, as well as 
all the thought control strategies assessed and post-traumatic appraisals as assessed by 
the sub-scales of the cPTCI. 
The two items assessing the use of thought suppression and distraction as ways of 
coping with the intrusive memories reported by participants were significantly and 
positively correlated with each other, but not so high as to suggest that they were 
addressing exactly the same process. That these items were both correlated with the 
distraction sub-scale of the cTCQ but not the reappraisal and social support sub-scales 
also supports the suggestion that they are addressing related but distinct processes. 
Thought suppression and distraction were both correlated with the sub-scales of the 
cPTCI, intrusive memory frequency, and all sub-scales of the RIES-C (in particular 
the avoidance sub-scale) as well as total RIES-C score. The use of thought 
suppression was particularly highly correlated with intrusive memory frequency, 
relative to the use of distraction. 
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The sub-scales of the cTCQ, which were directed at how participants typically cope 
with intrusive thoughts and memories and were not specific to intrusive memories of 
the reported event, had more complicated relationships with the other variables 
examined. The distraction sub-scale of the cTCQ was not correlated with intrusive 
memory frequency, but was significantly positively correlated with all sub-scales of 
and the overall total for the RIES-C, in particular the avoidance the sub-scale. The 
distraction sub-scale was mildly coffelated with the "feeble person in a scary world" 
sub-scale of the cPTCI, but not at all with the "disturbing and permanent change" 
sub-scale5. Similarly, the social support sub-scale was mildly and positively 
correlated with the "feeble person in a scary world" sub-scale of the cPTCI, but not at 
all with the "disturbing and permanent change" sub-scale, and showed no correlation 
with intrusive memory frequency. However, it was not correlated with either the 
avoidance sub-scale of the RIIES-C or the RIES-C total score 6. The reappraisal sub- 
scale of the cTCQ, however, was strongly positively correlated with intrusive 
memory frequency, RIES-C intrusion, REES-C arousal, and RIES-C total score, and 
both sub-scales of the cPTCI. 
Both sub-scales of the cPTCI were positively correlated with intrusive memory 
frequency and all sub-scales of the RIES-C as well as the RIES-C total score. 
Intrusive memory frequency was strongly and positively correlated with the intrusion 
sub-scale of the RIES-C (as would be expected given that intrusive memories are a 
key feature of the intrusion symptoms of FITSD), as well as the RIES-C avoidance 
and arousal sub-scales and the RIES-C total score. 
5 The distraction sub-scale of the cTCQ did become significantly associated with the "disturbing and 
permanent change" sub-scale of the cPTCI when a non-parametric correlation analysis (Kendall's tau) 
was performed. 
The reappraisal sub-scale of the cTCQ was significantly and positively correlated with both RIES-C 
avoidance and the RIES-C total score when a non-parametric analysis was conducted (Kendall's tau). 
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5.6 The relationship between emotions experienced during the frightening event, 
emotions experienced during intrusive memories of the frightening event, memory 
quality, thought control strategies, post-traumatic appraisals, intrusive memory 
frequency, PTSD symptomatology, and depressive symptomatology 
Some examination of the relationships between the variables investigated above in 
the case of intrusive memories and PTSD symptornatology as applied to depressive 
symptornatology is now presented. This is in order to investigate what processes are 
involved in the production of depressive symptornatology, in itself a serious and 
common response to trauma in child adolescent populations (Goenjian et al., 1995; 
Green, 1985; Hubbard et al., 1995; Kinzie et al., 1986; Kiser et al., 1991; Looff et al., 
1995; Singer et al., 1995; Stoddard et al., 1989; Weine et al., 1995; Yehuda & 
McFarlane, 1995; Yule & Udwin, 1991), as well as to consider whether the processes 
suggested to be involved in the aetiology of PTSD within this age group are specific 
to this disorder or play a role in the production of other psychopathology. 





Experienced during event: 
Scared . 23** 
Sad . 31*** 
Angry . 21 * 
Ashamed . 19* 
Helpless . 23** 
Experienced during intrusive memory: 
Scared . 29*** 
Sad . 30*** 
Angry . 31*** 
Ashamed . 23** 
Helpless . 29*** 
Crazy 




Note: BDSRS = Birleson Depression Self-Rating Scale. 
*p<05, ** p<001, *** p<0001 
The correlations between depressive symptornatology (as assessed by the BDSRS) 
and emotions experienced during the reported event and during intrusive memories of 
the reported event are displayed in Table 5.7. All emotions, whether experienced 
during the event itself or during intrusive memories of the event, were significantly 
and positively correlated with depressive affect. Sadness had the greatest correlation 
with BDSRS of all the emotions experienced during the reported event, while several 
emotions experienced during intrusive memories (i. e. feeling scared, sad, angry, 
helpless, and confused) were moderately strongly correlated with BDSRS. While 
these correlations are quite strong, they do not appear to be as strong as the 
correlations between these emotions and PTSD symptornatology, as displayed in 
7 Table 5.5 . 
Displayed in Table 5.8 are the correlations between intrusive memory quality (as 
assessed by the MMQ), thought control strategies (as assessed by the thought 
suppression and distraction items and the sub-scales of the cTCQ), post-traumatic 
appraisals (as assessed by the sub-scales of the cFTCl), intrusive memory frequency, 
PTSD symptornatology (as assessed by the RIES-C) and depressive symptornatology 
(as assessed by the BDSRS). 
7 When these apparent differences in correlation size were examined statistically, however (using the 
Fisher's 2ý transformation and z-test procedure, as in Footnote 3), no significant differences in 
correlation size were observed. 
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Table 5.8 Correlations between memory quality, thought control strategies, post- 
traumatic appraisals, intrusive memory frequency, PTSD symptomatology, and 
depressive symptomatology 
Correlation with BDSRS 
(n=208) 
MMQ . 41*** 
Thought suppression item . 27*** 
Distraction item . 22* 
CTCQ: 
Distraction . 02 
Reappraisal . 27*** 
Social support . 01 
cPTCI: 
Disturbing & permanent change . 67*** 
Feeble person in scary world . 70*** 
Intrusion Frequency . 40*** 
RIES-C: 
Intrusion . 45*** 
Avoidance . 32*** 
Arousal . 62*** 
Total 
Note: PTSD = Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; BDSRS = Birleson 
Depression Self-Rating Scale; MMQ = Memory Modality 
Questionnaire; cPTCI = child version of Post-Traumatic Cognitions 
Inventory; cTCQ = child version of Though Control Questionnaire; 
RIES-C = Revised Impact of Event Scale, child version. 
*p<05, ** P<001, *** p<0001 
Depression was found to be as strongly correlated with MMQ scores as intrusion 
frequency was (see Table 5.6 above). The thought suppression and distraction 
strategies were moderately well correlated with BDSRS, while the cTCQ distraction 
sub-scale was not. The reappraisal sub-scale of the cTCQ and in particular the cPTCI 
sub-scales were positively correlated with depressive symptornatology. Indeed, the 
cPTCI sub-scales were correlated with depression at a rate far greater than emotions 
experienced during the frightening event or during intrusive memories of the 
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frightening event8. In the case of the cPTCI, the correlation between its sub-scales 
and the BDSRS was even greater than that between the cPTCI and the RIES-C. 
BDSRS scores were also significantly correlated with intrusion frequency and RIES 
scores 9. 
5.7 Regression models of variables associated with intrusive memory frequency, 
PTSD symptomatology, and depressive symptomatology 
In order to more fully investigate the role of emotion, memory quality, thought 
control strategies and post-traumatic appraisals in the aetiology of intrusive 
memories, PTSD symptomatology, and depressive symptomatology, regression 
analyses were performed to investigate the unique variance accounted for by each of 
these processes. The strategy adopted for entering variables into these models was as 
follows. Hierarchical regression analysis was selected as the mode of entering 
variables so as to see whether the variables entered on each step would account for 
unique variance over and above previous steps. Variables would be entered in the 
following order of steps: in the first step demographic (i. e. age and sex) variables 
would be entered; in the second step subjective indices of event severity (i. e. the 
emotions experienced during the reported event) would be entered; in the third step 
the memory quality variable (i. e. the MMQ) would be entered; in the fourth step the 
thought control strategy items and measures would be entered; and in the fifth step, 
the post-traumatic appraisal measures (the sub-scales of the cPTCI) would be entered. 
In order to assess whether the assumptions of regression analysis were met, i. e. 
normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity, residuals produced by each regression 
were examined. These assumptions are met when there is no obvious relationship 
between predicted scores on the independent variable and residuals, as observed in a 
8 These differences in the size of correlations were found to be statistically significantly when the 
Fisher's Z, transformation and z-test procedure was used (see Footnote 3). 
9 These differences were also found to be statistically significant when the Fisher's 4 transformation 
and z-test procedure was used (see Footnote 3). 
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scatterplot of these scores (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). All these assumptions were 
met in the analyses conducted in this chapter. Furthermore, regression will not work 
correctly if there is multicollinearity among independent variables entered in the 
model. Where independent variables were found to be highly correlated (Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 1996, recommend no higher than . 9) variable selection is to be re- 
considered. No variables were found to be so highly correlated in the present study. 
5.7.1 Regression models of variables associated with intrusive memoryfrequency 
The variables listed in the regression modelling strategy given above were entered 
into a hierarchical regression model with intrusive memory frequency as the 
dependent variable. The significance of the model at each step and the beta 
coefficient for each variable entered, as measured in the final step of the model, is 
presented in Table 5.9. 
Entering age and sex in the first sex significantly enhanced the ability of the model to 
account for variance in intrusive memory frequency, though beta coefficients suggest 
that this finding is the principally related to the role that sex plays. The inclusion of 
the emotions experienced during the reported event, and the memory quality variable 
in the model each accounted for unique variance in intrusive memory frequency, 
though inclusion of both thought control strategies and post-traumatic appraisals did 
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5. Z2 Regression models of variables associated with PTSD symptomatology 
The variables listed in the regression modelling strategy given above were entered 
into a hierarchical regression model with RIES-C total score as the dependent 
variable. The significance of the model at each step and the beta coefficient for each 
variable entered as measured in the final step of the model is presented in Table 5.10. 
Each step (age and sex, emotions experienced during the event, memory quality, 
thought control strategies, and post-traumatic appraisals) significantly accounted for 
unique variance in the model. The total model accounted for 60% of variance in 
RIES-C scores. 
In order to examine whether the memory quality, thought control strategies and post- 
traumatic appraisals accounted for variance in RIES-C over and above intrusive 
memory frequency, a further regression analysis was performed, but with intrusive 
memory frequency entered in the initial step. As the regression model above (see 
Table 5.9) indicated that intrusive memory frequency was strongly related to 
emotions experienced during the reported event, these variables were not entered in 
the regression. Intrusive memory frequency was entered into the first step of the new 
model, and accounted for 29% of variance in RIES-C scores (F = 77.80, df = 1,190, 
p<0001). In the second step, the addition of the MMQ significantly accounted for an 
additional 17% of variance (F = 61.39, df = 1,189, P<0001). In the third step thought 
control strategies (as assessed by the thought suppression and distraction items and 
the sub-scales of the cTCQ) significantly accounted for a further 12% of variance in 
RIES-C scores (F = 10.18, df =5,184, p<0001), while in the fourth step scores on the 
cPTCI significantly accounted for an additional 5% of variance (F = 12.17, df = 2, 
182, p<0001). The overall model accounted for 63% of variance in RIES-C scores. 
In the final step of this model significant beta coefficients were observed for intrusive 
memory frequency (beta = . 25, t=4.90, p<0001), the MMQ (beta = . 25, t=4.54, 
p<0001), thought suppression (beta =. 17, t=3.02, p<003), cTCQ distraction (beta = 
. 10, t=2.05, p<04), cTCQ reappraisal 
(beta = . 16, t=2.89), and the 'feeble person in 
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5.7.3 Regression model of variables associated with depressive symptomatology 
The variables listed in the regression modelling strategy given above were entered 
into a hierarchical regression model with depressive symptornatology (as assessed by 
the BDSRS) as the dependent variable. The significance of the model at each step and 
the beta coefficient for each variable entered as measured in the final step of the 
model is presented in Table 5.11. 
The first step (age and sex) did not significantly contribute to the model, but all other 
steps, in particular the fifth and final step (post-traumatic appraisals), significantly 
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5.8 Summary and discussion 
Several key issues regarding the nature of aetiology of post-traumatic stress 
reactions in children and adolescents were addressed by a cross-sectional study of 
a non-clinical population drawn from two secondary schools. How the results of 
this study answered the questions stated at the beginning of this chapter are 
summarised here. 
5.8.1 "at is the prevalence of intrusive memories and other PTSD 
symptomatology following fear-provoking events? 
Regarding the prevalence of intrusive memories and other PTSD symptornatology 
following fear-provoking events, it was found that intrusive memories are a 
relatively common phenomenon following fear-provoking events, and that post- 
traumatic stress levels (as assessed by the REES-C) were moderately high in the 
non-clinical sample assessed. While the level of post-traumatic stress was not as a 
high as that observed in a sample of children and adolescents exposed to civil war 
(Smith et al., 2001) or the Study 2 population at two to four weeks after exposure 
to either an assault or an RTA, the observed level of post-traumatic stress was 
greater than that found in the Study 2 population at six months post-trauma. 
The moderately high scores on the REES-C do not necessarily indicate that a high 
rate of PTSD would have been diagnosed in the sample, since this self-report 
measure does neglect certain PTSD symptoms (e. g. flashbacks, nightmares, 
emotional numbing, etc. ) and may be related to distress in general rather than 
specifically PTSD symptornatology. A large number of events reported by the 
sample were undeniably distressing but would not qualify for criterion A of the 
DSM-IV PTSD diagnosis, supporting this latter point. 
Since these data support the view that non-clinic referred children and adolescents 
experience aspects of post-traumatic stress that persist for at least several weeks in 
response to frightening events, the use of non-clinical samples to investigate 
processes involved in the aetiology of child and adolescent PTSD may be 
justified. 
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5.8.2 VVhat is the relationship between emotions experienced during the event and 
memories of such events, and the frequency of intrusive memories and PTSD 
symptomatology? 
With regards to the relationship between emotions experienced during the event 
and during memories of such events, and the frequency of intrusive memories and 
PTSD symptornatology, a number of significant correlations were identified. 
Emotions experienced during the event, in particular fear, sadness, and 
helplessness, were found to be related to more sensory-based and fragmented 
memories (as assessed by the MMQ), intrusive memory frequency, and RIES-C 
scores. Strong correlations were observed between MMQ scores and intrusive 
memory frequency and RIES-C scores. 
Both emotions experienced during a frightening event and memory quality, as 
assessed by the MMQ, accounted for unique proportions of variance in intrusive 
memory frequency. Memory quality also accounted for a significant proportion of 
variance in REES-C scores, over and above intrusive memory frequency, 
suggesting that this measure is not merely an index of intrusive phenomena but is 
quantifying aspects of the memories of the reported event. 
The distinction between the role of emotions experienced during a frightening 
event and the role of the quality of memories of a frightening event, gives support 
for the application of significant element of the adult cognitive models of PTSD of 
Brewin et al. (1996) and Ehlers and Clark (2000) to the understanding of the 
disorder in children and adolescents. Both of these models state that the onset of 
PTSD is related not just to experiencing a extremely fear-provoking event (though 
clearly fear is essential), but to laying down poorly processed, sensory based, and 
fragmented memories of the event as well. 
That a role for memory quality in the aetiology of PTSD was observed in a non- 
clinical population suggests that the formation of sensory based and fragmented 
memories may only be an extreme form of normal memory processes, and not 
qualitatively different from the processes in the formation of memories of non- 
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traumatic events. There still exists a need to examine whether this distinction 
would be observed in a sample of children exposed to traumatic events (i. e. events 
that would meet criterion A of DSM-IV). 
5.8.3 Mat strategies are maladaptive in coping with intrusive memories? 
Investigation of the relationships between post-traumatic stress symptornatology 
and potentially maladaptive thought control strategies and trauma-related 
appraisals identified by adult theorists, revealed a number of significant 
correlations. Both thought suppression and distraction items were significantly 
correlated with PTSD as assessed by the REES-C. The distraction and re-appraisal 
sub-scales of the cTCQ were found to be significantly positively correlated with 
total REES-C scores, while the social support sub-scale was unrelated to total 
RIES-C scores. Both the "disturbing and permanent change" and "feeble person in 
a scary world" sub-scales of the cPTCI were significantly correlated with scores 
on the RIES-C. Importantly, no thought control strategy or post-traumatic 
appraisals were significantly negatively correlated with post-traumatic stress 
symptornatology. While no thought control strategies or appraisals significantly 
improved the amount of variance explained in a regression model of intrusive 
memory frequency, these processes did significantly improve a regression model 
of RIES-C scores. These processes also accounted for a large proportion of 
variance over and above demographic variables (i. e. age and sex), which 
themselves accounted for very little variance in these regression models. 
These findings also support the application of elements of adult cognitive models 
of PTSD to children and adolescents, as was noted in the previous sub-section 
with regards to the role of memory quality. Cognitive avoidance, a feature of both 
the models of Brewin et al. (1996) and Ehlers and Clark (2000), was assessed in a 
variety of ways (i. e. the thought suppression and distraction items, and the 
distraction sub-scale of the cTCQ) and found to be significantly related to post- 
traumatic stress in children and adolescents. The relationship between the 
reappraisal sub-scale of the cTCQ and PTSD symptornatology suggests that some 
children and adolescents attempted to amend how they view a frightening 
experience, but that this strategy was unsuccessful and was closer to being a form 
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of rumination, a process implicated strongly in the model of Ehlers and Clark 
(2000). Post-traumatic appraisals, also a key feature of this model, were found to 
play a significant role, suggesting that children and adolescents are capable of 
higher-level appraisals that interfere with the processing of memories of a 
frightening event and maintain negative affect. 
5.8.4 What is the relationship between maladaptive coping strategies and post- 
traumatic appraisals? 
With regards to the relationships between post-traumatic appraisals and thought 
control strategies, a varying pattern between each sub-scale of the cPTCI and each 
thought control strategy was observed. Both the "permanent and disturbing 
change" and "feeble person in a scary world" sub-scales of the cPTCI were 
significantly and positively correlated with scores on the individual thought 
suppression and distraction items. While the feeble person in a scary world sub- 
scale was significantly and positively correlated with each of the cTCQ sub- 
scales, the "permanent and disturbing change" sub-scale was only correlated with 
the reappraisal sub-scale of the cTCQ. These data identify a specific pathway 
between negative post-traumatic appraisals and PTSD that has also been found in 
adults (Steil & Ehlers, 2000), i. e. negatively appraising a frightening event has the 
result of encouraging the use of maladaptive thought control strategies, which in 
turn either directly worsen or maintain post-traumatic stress symptoms. 
5.8.5 Mat is the relationship of the above processes with depressive 
symptomatology? 
Depressive symptomatology was found to be significantly related to all emotions 
experienced during the report frightening event, the quality of memories of the 
reported event, several of the thought control strategies assessed, and in particular, 
post-traumatic appraisals. These variables accounted for a very large amount of 
variance in BDSRS scores in a regression model over and above demographic 
variables. 
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The data presented in this chapter suggest that the cognitive processes 
hypothesiýed to be involved in PTSD are also involved in depression. That post- 
traumatic appraisals should have a large role in producing low mood is to be 
expected. The finding that memory quality has a significant, if not large, role in 
producing depression, however, is more counter-intuitive. This suggests that the 
occurrence of fragmented, sensory based memories is experienced as very 
negative and plays a role in maintaining a low mood, or acts as a reminder of what 
the event child or adolescent was exposed to. 
5. &6 VAat is the impact of age on the above processes? 
Age did not appear to make an enormous impact on the symptornatology and 
processes examined here. While children from the youngest age group (11- 12 year 
olds) did report greater use of distraction as assessed by the cTCQ, and had more 
sensory-based and fragmented memories as assessed by the MMQ, the only 
impact on overall symptornatology was greater avoidance of event-related stimuli, 
as assessed by the REES-C; the total REES-C and BDSRS scores of this age group 
did not significantly differ from older age groups. This lack of impact of age was 
also observed in the regression models, where either the demographic variables 
added no unique variance (e. g. in the case of the BDSRS model) or beta 
coefficients revealed that any variance explained by the demographics variables 
was attributable to sex, rather than age. The failure of age to make a significant 
impact on the regression models conducted in this chapter suggests that the 
cognitive processes found in this chapter to be related to PTSD have their effect 
across the age groups participating in Study 1. 
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Chapter 6. ý The time course of post-traumatic stress and depressive 
symptomatology in children and adolescents exposed to assaults or RTAs 
In this chapter the time course of post-traumatic stress, anxious, and depressive 
symptomatology in children and adolescents in Study 2, who were exposed to 
either assaults or RTAs, will be outlined. Post-traumatic stress and depressive 
symptoms were assessed in two ways; firstly, through semi-structured interviews 
at 2-4 weeks post-trauma and 6 months post-trauma, and secondly, through self- 
report questionnaires that were completed at 2-4 weeks, 3 months, and 6 months 
post-trauma. Non-specific anxiety was assessed by a self-report questionnaire at 
the three and six month follow up assessments, while particular anxiety disorders 
were assessed by semi-structured interview at the two to four week and six month 
time points. 
Examining the time course of such psychopathology is warranted for several 
reasons. Firstly, as outlined in the introduction, the time course of post-traumatic 
stress symptoms in children and adolescents has implications for the theoretical 
understanding of PTSD in this age group. The application of elements of adult 
cognitive models of PTSD (e. g. Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) 
depends on a time course where initial post-traumatic stress is high and then 
decreases over time, suggesting a distinction between onset and maintenance 
processes. 
Secondly, the ability of post-traumatic stress symptoms shortly after a trauma to 
predict later, chronic PTSD is of significant clinical use. In adults, the ability of 
post-traumatic stress symptoms, and the Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) diagnosis to 
predict later PTSD has been clearly demonstrated (Brewin, Andrews, & Rose, 
2003; Brewin, Andrews, Rose, & Kirk, 1999). In children and adolescents there is 
less evidence regarding the ability of early PTSD symptoms to predict later PTSD, 
and no evidence at all concerning the prevalence of ASD and its ability to predict 
later PTSD. ASD was introduced in DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994) so as "to distinguish between normative and pathological acute stress 
responses by linking acute stress disorder to predictors of a relatively poor 
prognosis [p. 1679]" (Marshall, Spitzer, & Liebowitz, 1999). ASD differs from 
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PTSD in being explicitly conceived as a dissociative response to trauma (Spiegel, 
Koopman, Cardefia, & Classen, 1996), with the most significant diagnostic 
addition being the requirement that an individual experiences at least three of a 
possible five dissociation symptoms, either during or following a trauma. The role 
that these dissociation symptoms play in children's and adolescents' responses to 
trauma in particular requires examination. 
Thirdly, evidence concerning the prevalence of post-traumatic stress following 
assaults is needed. While there is a growing body of evidence concerning 
children's and adolescents' responses to RTAs (Di Gallo, Barton, & Parry-Jones, 
1997; Mirza, Bhadrinath, Goodyer, & Gilmour, 1998), very few studies regarding 
their responses to non-domestic violence have been conducted, and there exist no 
studies regarding traumatic stress responses in British youth following violent 
crime. The attendance of children and adolescents at Accident and Emergency 
departments in the UK following RTAs is not uncommon; according to the 
Department of Transport, Local Government and Regions (2000), over 40,000 
children, aged 15 or under, are injured each year in RTAs. Violent crime is also a 
common occurrence for children and adolescents; the Youth Survey of 2002 
found that 39% of children and adolescents had been physically attacked in the 
area where they lived, and 35% had been attacked while at school (MORI, 2002). 
Estimates of the prevalence of post-traumatic stress in children and adolescents 
exposed to such violence is needed to inform the provision of services for this 
vulnerable group. 
Fourthly, greater consideration of the prevalence of other psychopathology in 
children and adolescents following trauma is warranted (Pynoos, Steinberg, & 
Piacentini, 1999). The emphasis placed on PTSD as a possible response to trauma 
has detracted from consideration of other forms of psychological disorder 
following trauma. In particular, depressive symptomatology, and the relationship 
of such psychopathology to post-traumatic stress symptomatology, is in need of 
investigation. 
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6.1 Acute Stress Disorder, 'early Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder', and Post- 
Traumatic Stress Disorder at six monthfollow up 
In this sub-section the prevalence of ASD diagnosis and criteria as assessed at the 
initial, 2-4 week interview, and PTSD at the six month follow up, will be detailed. 
In addition, the prevalence of 'early PTSD' diagnosis and criteria (i. e. PTSD as 
assessed at the initial interview but without Criterion E, which requires that the 
diagnosis can only be made one month after a trauma) and 'sub-ASD' diagnosis 
and criteria (i. e. ASD without Criterion B, the dissociation symptoms) will also be 
presented. The frequency with which children and their parents report individual 
'early PTSD' and ASD symptoms will be presented, and the ability of individual 
symptoms, as well as ASD, 'early PTSD' and 'sub-ASD' diagnoses and criteria, 
to predict PTSD at follow up will be presented. Differences between children and 
adolescents exposed to assaults or RTAs will be detailed. 
6.1.1 The prevalence of ASD, 'early PTSD', 'sub-ASD', and PTSD at six month 
follow up 
Ninety-three children and adolescents completed the initial ADIS-C interview for 
ASD, 'sub-ASD' and 'early PTSD', out of 106 (87.7%) who participated in the 
study as a whole. In 90 cases (84.9%), both child and parent completed the ADIS- 
C interview. At six month follow up, 64 (68.8%) of the 93 children and 
adolescents who completed the initial interview were re-interviewed. Of the 90 
cases where both child and parent completed the initial interview, there were 51 
(56.7%) cases where both child and parent were re-interviewed at six month 
follow up. 
The internal reliability of the ASD diagnostic items was found to be high 
(Cronbach's alpha=0.85), and comparable to that of the 'Sub-ASD' diagnosis 
(Cronbach's alpha=0.86), and the 'early PTSD' diagnosis (Cronbach's 
alpha=0.87). Tape recordings of II initial interviews and 10 follow up interviews 
were assessed by another clinician so as to assess the inter-rater reliability of the 
ASD and PTSD diagnoses according to the interview schedules used. The 
clinician (PS) had seven years' experience of assessing and treating traumatic 
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stress reactions in children and adolescents, and was blind as to the principal 
investigator's diagnosis in each case. There was unanimous agreement between 
raters for both the ASD diagnosis at initial interview (Kappa = 1.00) and the 
PTSD diagnosis at 6 month follow up (Kappa = 1.00). 
According to child report as assessed using the ADIS-C, 18 (19.4%) children and Z: ) 
adolescents met critena for ASD at the initial interview. Twenty-three (24.717c) 
met criteria for 'early PTSU. Twenty-three (24.7%) met Lill criteria except the 
dissociation symptoms criterion for ASD (hence referred to 11S 'SUb-ASD'). At the 
six month follow up interview, 8 (12.51k) of the 64 children and adolescents met 
criteria for PTSD (see Fig, 6.1 for graphical representation of how rates of ASD 
and PTSD changed over time). 
Figure 6.1. ASDIPTSD diagnoses at two to, lbur weeks andsix montlis post- 







Composite diagnoses were derived from parent and child reports In the Interview 
schedules. According to these diagnoses, 24 out of 90 (26.7%) children and Cý Z: ý 
adolescents met criteria for ASD at the initial interview, 35 Out Of 90 (38.9%) met 
criteria for 'early PTSD, and 37 out of go (41.1%) met criteria for 'suh-ASD'. At 
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2-4 weeks Time point 
6 months 
the six month follow up assessment, 11 out of 51 (21.6%) children and 
adolescents were found to meet criteria for PTSD, as identified using a diagnosis 
derived from parent and child reports. 
Examination of the agreement between child and parent report on the ADIS-C, 
however, revealed there to be considerable disagreement between them as to the 
child or adolescent's post-traumatic stress reaction. Inter-rater reliability 
coefficients for each diagnosis were not high; Kappa coefficients for ASD, 'early 
PTSD' and 'sub-ASD' were . 39,. 28, and . 42, respectively. For PTSD as assessed 
at six month follow up, reliability between the two reports had improved (Kappa = 
. 71). 
Nevertheless, this disagreement, and the relative maturity of participants in 
the study, suggest that use of the composite diagnosis may not be warranted. 
Subsequent analyses therefore will use diagnoses derived from child reports alone. 
Chi-square analyses revealed there to be no significant differences in the 
prevalence of ASD, 'early PTSD', or 'sub-ASD' between children and 
adolescents exposed to assaults or RTAs (for frequencies by trauma type see 
Table 6.1 below). Similarly, no significant difference in the prevalence of PTSD 
at 6 month follow up between the assault-exposed and RTA-exposed groups was 
found. 
6.1.2 The prevalence ofASD, 'early PTSD', and 'sub-ASD' criteria 
The prevalence of ASD, 'early PTSD' and 'sub-ASD' criteria (including 
prevalence by trauma type) are displayed in Table 6.1. The specifically symptom- 
related criteria (i. e. the re-experiencing, avoidance and arousal criteria) were 
frequently endorsed, regardless of whether these criteria were defined by the 
requirements of ASD or 'early PTSD'. A large proportion of the study sample 
met criteria for Criterion A (i. e. a traumatic event). However, it was noted by the 
investigator that the open wording of the ADIS-C questions that address this 
criterion, and the reluctance of many children and adolescents to admit to feeling 
scared or horrified, may mean that the reported figure should be higher. The 
criterion which was the least met was that of impairment of functioning (Criterion 
F). 
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Table 6.1. Frequency ofASD, 'sub-ASD'and 'early PTSD' criteria and diagnoses 
by trauma type at two tofour weeks post-trauma, according to child report 









A. Traumatic stressor 36(69.2) 31(75.6) 67(72.0) 
B. Dissociation (at least 3 symptoms) 25(48.1) 25(61.0) 50(53.8) 
C. Reexperiencing (at least 1 symptom) 35(67.3) 28(68.3) 63(67.7) 
D. Avoidance (at least 1 symptom) 32(61.5) 31(75.6) 63(67.7) 
E. Arousal (at least one symptom) 40(76.9) 35(85.4) 75(80.6) 
F. Impairment 22(42.3) 14(34.1) 36(38.7) 
ASD diagnosis (A+ B+ C+D +E+F) 11(21.2) 7(17.1) 18(19.4) 
'sub-ASD' diagnosis (A +C+D+E+ F) 15(28.8) 8(19.5) 23(24.7) 
'Early PTSD' criteria 
Reexperiencing (at least 1 symptom) 36(69.2) 33(80.5) 69(74.2) 
Avoidance (at least 3 symptoms) 25(48.1) 25(61.0) 50(53.8) 
Arousal (at least 2 symptoms) 29(55.8) 31(75.6) 60(64.5) 
'Early PTSD' diagnosis 
('early PTSD' criteria +A+ F) 14(26.9) 9(22.0) 23(24.7) 
Note. ASD = Acute Stress Disorder; PTSD = Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; RTA 
Road Traffic Accident. 
Chi-square comparisons between participants exposed to assaults and RTAs 
revealed a single difference with regards to the 'early PTSD' arousal criterion, 
where children and adolescents involved in RTAs were more likely to meet this 
criterion than those exposed to assaults ( =3.94, df=l, p<05). However, when 
the alpha value of this statistic was adjusted according to a Bonferroni correction 
for multiple comparisons, this difference did not remain. 
61.3 The ability of ASD, 'early PTSD', and 'sub-ASD' criteria and diagnoses to 
predict PTSD at six monthfollow up 
Diagnoses of ASD ()? =6.92, df=l, p<009), 'sub-ASD' (xý=7.77, df=l, p<005), 
and 'early PTSD' ()? =6.05, df=l, p<01) significantly discriminated between 
children and adolescents who did or did not go on to have PTSD at follow up. The 
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sensitivity (i. e. the probability that someone diagnosed with PTSD at follow up 
had a given diagnosis etc. at initial interview), specificity (i. e. the probability that 
someone not diagnosed with PTSD at follow up did not have a given diagnosis 
etc. criterion at initial interview), positive predictive power (i. e. the probability 
that someone who has a given diagnosis etc. goes on to have a diagnosis of PTSD 
at 6 month follow up), and negative predictive power (i. e. the probability that 
someone who does not have a given diagnosis etc. does not go on to have a 
diagnosis of PTSD at 6 month follow up) of each ASD and 'early PTSD' criterion 
and diagnosis to predict PTSD at six months post-trauma are presented in Table 
6.2. In addition, the number of participants whose PTSD status at six month 
follow up are correctly classified by a given criterion or diagnosis is presented in 
this table. 
The ASD diagnosis in children and adolescents was good at predicting later PTSD 
in terms of its sensitivity, specificity, and positive and negative predictive power. 
However, a 'sub-ASD' diagnosis (i. e. ASD without dissociation) gave a better 
balance of sensitivity and specificity than the full ASD diagnosis and was able to 
correctly classify only a few less cases, despite the absence of an entire criterion. 
The 'sub-ASD' diagnosis was marginally better than a diagnosis of early 'PTSD' 
at predicting later PTSD (as evidenced by the data for specificity and number of 
cases correctly classified), suggesting that the reduced number of avoidance and 
arousal symptoms in ASD compared to IPTSD had no associated predictive cost. 
In terms of individual criteria, the dissociation criterion had comparable power to 
predict later PTSD as other individual ASD criteria, though overall impairment of 
functioning had the greatest accuracy, and alone was able to correctly classify a 
very large number of cases. The avoidance and arousal criteria for ASD were 
more sensitive but less specific than the corresponding criteria for 'early PTSD' at 
predicting later PTSD, as would be expected given their reduced symptom 
requirements. 
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Table 6.2. Sensitivity, specificity, and positive and negative predictive power of 




A. Traumatic stressor 
B. Dissociation (at least 3 
symptoms) 
C. Reexperiencing (at least 1 
symptom) 
D. Avoidance (at least 1 
symptom) 




(A +B+C+D+E+ F) 
'Sub-ASD' diagnosis 
(A+C+D+E+F) 
Positive Negative Correct PTSD 
predictive predictive Classification 
Sensitivity Specificity power power N% 
1.00 0.32 0.17 1.00 26 40.6 
0.75 0.55 0.19 0.94 37 57.8 
1.00 0.30 0.17 1.00 25 39.1 
0.88 0.34 0.16 0.95 26 40.1 
1.00 0.23 0.16 1.00 21 32.8 
0.75 0.64 0.23 0.95 42 65.6 
0.50 0.88 0.36 0.92 53 82.8 
0.63 0.82 0.33 0.94 51 79.7 
'Early PTSD' criteria: 
Reexperiencing 
(at least I symptom) 1.00 
Avoidance 
(at least 3 symptoms) 0.50 
Arousal 
(at least 2 symptoms) 0.88 
'Early PTSD' diagnosis 
('early PTSD' criteria +A+ F) 0.63 
0.25 0.16 1.00 22 34.3 
0.45 0.11 0.86 29 45.3 
0.38 0.17 0.95 28 43.8 
0.79 0.29 0.94 49 76.6 
Note. ASD = Acute Stress Disorder, PTSD = Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
6.1.4 The prevalence ofASD and 'early PTSD'Symptoms 
The prevalence of ASD and 'early PTSD' symptoms (including prevalence by 
trauma type) is displayed in Table 6.3. It is to be noted that a* number of symptoms 
were commonly reported; reduced awareness and derealization either during or 
following a trauma, recurrent intrusive images or thoughts, avoidance of talk or 
thought about the trauma, and hypervigilance were all reported by at least half of 
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the sample. The 'early PTSD' symptoms of a sense of foreshortened future and 
the loss of developmentally acquired skills (a 'symptom' included in the ADIS-C 
as being a possible avoidance symptom, despite not being specifically mentioned 
by DSM-IV) were not frequently reported. 
Table 63 Frequency of each ASD and 'early PTSD' symptom by trauma type at 









ASD: Numbing 21(40.4) 21(51.2) 42(45.2) 
Reduced awareness 28(53.8) 22(53.7) 50(53.8) 
Derealisation 27(51.9) 27(65.9) 54(58.1) 
Depersonalisation 18(34.6) 17(41.5) 35(37.6) 
Dissociative amnesia 18(34.6) 25(61.0) 43(46.2) 
Recurrent images or thoughts 26(50.0) 24(58.5) 50(53.8) 
Dreams/nightmares 16(30.8) 11(26.8) 27(29.0) 
Flashbacks 15(30.8) 18(43.9) 33(35.5) 
Distress on exposure 12(23.1) 17(41.5) 29(31.2) 
Avoidance of thoughts or talk about 
trauma 32(61.5) 28(68.3) 60(64.5) 
Avoidance of places 21(40.4) 22(53.7) 43(46.2) 
Difficulty sleeping 17(32.7) 13(31.7) 30(32.3) 
Irritability 21(40.4) 16(39.0) 37(39.8) 
Poor concentration 24(46.2) 20(48.8) 44(47.3) 
Hypervigilance 31(59.6) 32(78.1) 63(67.7) 
Exaggerated startle response 20(38.5) 25(61.0) 45(48.4) 
Motor restlessness 18(34.6) 23(56.1) 41(44.1) 
'Early 
PTSD': Loss of interest in activities 14(26.9) 6(14.6) 20(21.5) 
Detachment from others 12(23.1) 8(19.5) 20(21.5) 
Restricted range of affect 21(40.4) 19(46.3) 40(43.0) 
Sense of foreshortened future 12(23.1) 5(12.2) 17(18.3) 
Loss of developmentally acquired 
skills 3(5.8) 7(17.1) 10(10.8) 
Note. ASD = Acute Stress Disorder; PTSD = Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; RTA 
Road Traffic Accident. 
Comparisons between participants exposed to assaults and RTAs revealed that 
children and adolescents involved in RTAs were more likely to experience 
dissociative amnesia (Xý=6.41, df=l, p<05), exaggerated startle response 
()? =4.65, df--I, p<. 05), and motor restlessness ()? =4.29, df=l, p<05), than 
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children and adolescents involved in assaults. However, when Bonferroni 
corrections of alpha values for multiple comparisons were introduced these 
differences did not remain significant. 
6.1.5 The ability of ASD and 'early PTSD' symptoms to predict PTSD at six 
monthfollow up 
The sensitivity, specificity, positive and negative power, and number of cases 
correctly classified by each ASD and 'early PTSD' symptom are presented in 
Table 6.4. 
Chi-square analyses revealed that children and adolescents who were identified as 
having PTSD at 6 month follow up reported more nightmares (ý=14.64, df=l, 
p<0.0001), distress on exposure to reminders of the trauma (Xý=4.16, df=l, p<05), 
difficulty sleeping (ý=12.40, df=l, p<0.0004), hypervigilance ()? =4.79, df=1, 
p<. 05), and loss of interest in activities (Z=8.83, df=l, p<003) at the initial 
interview than children who were not later diagnosed with PTSD. However, with 
alpha levels adjusted according to a Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons, differences remained only for nightmares and difficulty sleeping. 
These results were mirrored in the sensitivity and specificity statistics for these 
items. Nightmares and difficulty sleeping were highly sensitive and specific 
predictors of PTSD at follow up. Dissociation symptoms fared as well as most 
other symptoms at predicting later PTSD, with a reasonable trade-off between 
sensitivity and specificity. All symptoms assessed at the initial interview had high 
negative power for PTSD at follow up, that is, if a participant did not have the 
symptom it was very unlikely they would develop PTSD at follow up. However, 
the positive predictive power of all symptoms was very low, that is, having a 
given symptom at initial interview was not a clear risk for later PTSD. 
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Table 6.4. Sensitivity, specificity, and positive and negative predictive power of 
each ASD and 'early PTSD' symptom to predict PTSD at six months post-trauma 
Positive Negative Correct PTSD 
predictive predictive Classification 
Item Sensitivity Specificity power power N% 
ASD 
Numbing 0.63 0.61 0.19 0.92 39 60.9 
Reduced awareness 0.75 0.45 0.16 0.93 31 48.4 
Derealisation 0.75 0.50 0.18 0.93 34 53.1 
Depersonalisation 0.50 0.66 0.17 0.90 41 64.1 
Dissociative amnesia 0.63 0.55 0.17 0.91 36 56.3 
Recurrent images or 
thoughts 0.88 0.48 0.19 0.96 34 53.1 
Dreams/nightmares 0.88 0.79 0.37 0.98 51 79.7 
Flashbacks 0.50 0.64 0.17 0.90 40 62.5 
Distress on exposure 0.63 0.73 0.25 0.93 46 71.9 
Avoidance of thoughts or 
talk about trauma 0.88 0.39 0.17 0.96 29 45.3 
Avoidance of places 0.63 0.59 0.18 0.92 38 59.4 
Difficulty sleeping 0.88 0.75 0.33 0.98 49 76.6 
Irritability 0.63 0.59 0.18 0.92 38 59.4 
Poor concentration 0.63 0.46 0.14 0.90 31 48.4 
Hypervigilance 1.00 0.39 0.19 1.00 30 46.9 
Exaggerated startle 
response 0.75 0.55 0.19 0.94 37 57.8 
Motor restlessness 0.75 0.57 0.20 0.94 38 59.4 
'Early PTSD': 
Loss of interest in 
activities 0.63 0.84 0.36 0.94 52 81.3 
Detachment from others 0.50 0.79 0.25 0.92 48 75.0 
Restricted range of affect 0.75 0.59 0.21 0.94 39 60.9 
Sense of foreshortened 
future 0.38 0.80 0.21 0.90 48 . 75.0 
Loss of developmentally 
acquired skills 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.86 48 75.0 
Note. ASD = Acute Stress Disorder; PTSD = Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
6.2 Post-traumatic stress symptomatology as assessed by self-report questionnaire 
In this sub-section participants' mean scores on the child version of the Revised 
Impact of Events Scale (RIES-C; Dyregrov & Yule, 1995; Smith, Perrin, 
Dyregrov, & Yule, 2003), a continuous self-report measure of post-traumatic 
stress symptomatology, will be presented, and differences between time points 
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and trauma types examined. In addition, the ability of early REES-C scores to 
predict later REES-C scores will be presented. 
62.1 Post-traumatic stress symptomatology as assessed by self-report 
questionnaire at two tofour weeks, three months and six months post-trauma 
Participants' scores on the RIES-C, differentiated by trauma type, are displayed in 
Figure 6.2. These scores were subjected to a repeated measures two-way (time 
point by trauma type) ANOVA. According to a Box's M statistic for this analysis, 
the included variables were found to have homogeneity of variance. A significant 
main effect of time point was found (F=20.73, df=2,68, p<0001), but there was 
no main effect of trauma type, or time point by trauma type interaction. Tukey 
post-hoc comparisons revealed that RIES-C scores at two to four weeks were 
significantly greater than scores at three month and at six months, but that three 
month scores were not greater than six month scores, or six month scores greater 
than three month scores. The apparent difference between assault and RTA 
participants, especially at the six month time point, were not validated by these 
statistics. 
Concern that these statistics may have been the result of the small numbers of 
cases (N=36) that completed the questionnaire at each time point and were eligible 
for the ANOVA, led to the use of Mests to verify the above results. No significant 
differences were found between assault and RTA participants with regards to two 
to four week RIES-C scores (N=90), three month RIES-C scores (N=50), or six 
month REES-C scores (N=67), though at three months the difference was 
approaching significance (t=1.73, df=65, p<1). 
Further Mests revealed that RIES-C scores at two to four weeks were significantly 
greater than scores at three months (t=5.70, df=42, p<0001), and scores at six 
months (t=7.37, df=57, p<0001), though there was no significant difference 
between scores at three months and six months. Additional confirmation of the 
constancy of post-traumatic stress symptornatology between the three month and 
six month assessment points was derived from examining participants' scores on 
the Child Post-traumatic Symptom Scale (CPSS; Foa, Johnson, Feeny, & 
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Treadwell, 2001), a relatively novel self-report questionnaire that was only 
completed by children at the three month and six month assessment point. A 
repeated measures t-test revealed there to be no significant difference between 
participants' scores at these two assessment points. 
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The ability of REES-C scores at two to four weeks to predict later scores was 
assessed using correlations. Two to four week RIES-C scores were significantly 
correlated with both three month scores (r--. 78, p<0001) and six month scores 
(r--. 79, p<0001). In addition, three month REES-C scores were significantly 
correlated with six month scores (r--. 81, p<0001). 
63 Non-post-traumatic stress psychopathology as assessed by semi-structured 
interview 
A range of psychopathology other than post-traumatic stress was assessed at the 
two to four week assessment and at the six month assessment using the ADIS-C. 
The ADIS-C was used to assess whether participants met criteria for the following 
emotional disorders: separation anxiety disorder, social phobia, specific phobia, 
panic disorder, agoraphobia, generalised anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive 
disorder and major depressive disorder. The frequency with which children and 
adolescents met criteria for these disorders at each interview point, differentiated 
by trauma type, are displayed in Table 6.5. Given the low concordance between 
child and parent report with regards to PTSD questions (see above) it was decided 
only to consider child reports. 
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Table 6.5. Frequency of other (non-PTSD) diagnoses by interview time point and 
trauma type 
Frequency at 24 week Frequency at 6-month 
interview (%) interview (%) 
Assault RTA Total Assault RTA Total 
Diagnosis (N=47) (N=37) (N=84) (N=33) (N=24) (N=57) 
Separation Anxiety Disorder 3(6.4) 1(2.7) 4(4.8) 0(0.0) 1 (4.2) 1 (1.8) 
Sub-clinical Separation 
Anxiety Disorder 4(8.5) 2(5.4) 6(7.1) 
Social Phobia 1(2.1) 1(2.7) 2(2.4) 1(3.0) 1 (4.2) 2 (3.5) 
Sub-clinical Social Phobia 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 
Specific Phobia 5(10.6) 6(16.2) 11(13.1) 2(6.1) 3 (12.5) 5 (8.8) 
Sub-clinical Specific Phobia 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0(0.0) 
Panic Disorder 0(0-0) 1(2.7) 1(1.2) 0(0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Sub-clinical Panic Disorder 1(2.1) 0(0.0) l(1.2) 
Agoraphobia without Panic 
Disorder 1(2.1) 1(2.7) 2(2.4) 1 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.8) 
Agoraphobia with Panic 
Disorder 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder 3(6.4) 3(8.1) 6(7.1) 3(9.1) 2 (8.3) 5 (8.8) 
Sub-clinical Generalised 
Anxiety Disorder 2(4.3) 2(5.4) 4(4.8) 
Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder 1(2.1) 0(0.0) 1(1.2) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Major Depressive Disorder 4(8.5) 3(8.1) 7(8.3) 4 (12.1) 1 (4.2) 5 (8.8) 
Note. PTSD = Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; RTA = Road Traffic Accident. 'Sub- 
clinical' signifies that the participant met all criteria for the diagnosis except for the 
duration criterion. At the six month follow up interview, 'sub-clinical' diagnoses were not 
made (indicated by a hyphen). 
The most common disorders diagnosed in the study sample were specific phobia 
and major depressive disorder, at both time points. Contrasting the prevalence of 
these diagnoses in this sample with larger community studies, it is apparent that a 
few diagnoses are more common. Schniering, Hudson, and Rapee (2000), in their 
review of research into the epidemiology of anxiety disorders in youth, suggest 
prevalence rates of 0.6-2.4% for separation anxiety disorder, up to 6.3% for social 
phobia, 5.1-9.2% for specific phobia, 0.3% for panic disorder, 2.9-4.6% for 
generalised anxiety disorder, and 3% for obsessive-compulsive disorder. In their 
review of the epidemiology of depression in children and adolescents, Kessler, 
Avenevoli, and Ries Merikangas (2001) report a prevalence rate for major 
depressive disorder of 1-6%. In the case of this study, therefore, it would appear 
that the numbers of children meeting criteria for separation anxiety disorder and 
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generalised anxiety disorder at the initial interview, and major depressive disorder 
at both interviews, were higher than might be expected. Indeed, the findings 
presented here are quite similar to those reported in a study of a large sample of 
children and adolescents exposed to a ferry disaster. Bolton, O'Ryan, Udwin, 
Boyle and Yule (2000) observed elevated levels of separation anxiety disorder 
(6.8%), specific phobia (23.6%), panic disorder (12.0%), and major depression 
(17.2%) in the five to eight years following the disaster, relative to a control group 
who were not exposed to the disaster. 
Chi-square analyses, modified to account for the presence of expected values less 
than five (Clark-Carter, 1997) were performed on the frequencies of each non- 
PTSD disorder. No significant differences in the frequency of non-PTSD 
disorders between participants exposed to assaults and RTAs were found at either 
assessment point. 
Table 6.6 shows the frequency of non-PTSD diagnoses by ASD diagnosis (at 
initial interview) and by PTSD diagnosis (at six month follow up interview). Chi- 
square analyses, again modified to account for the presence of expected values 
less than five (Clark-Carter, 1997) were performed on the frequencies of each 
non-PTSD disorder. Participants with ASD were found to be more likely than 
participants without ASD to meet criteria for separation anxiety disorder 
(Xý=10.01, df=l, p<002), panic disorder (Xý=4.93, df=l, p<05), agoraphobia 
without panic disorder ()? =9.98, df=l, p<002), 'sub-clinical' (i. e. without the 
duration criterion) generalised anxiety disorder ()? =10.01, df=l, p<002), 
obsessive compulsive disorder (Xý=4.93, df=l, p<03), and major depressive 
disorder (Z=25.53, df=l, p<0001), at the initial interview. At the six month 
follow up interview, participants with PTSD were found to be more likely than 
participants without PTSD to meet criteria for agoraphobia without panic disorder 
(Z=7.14, df=l, p<. 008), generalised anxiety disorder ()? =11.38, df=l, p<0008), 
and major depressive disorder (Z=l 1.38, df=l, p<0008). 
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Table 66. Frequency of other (non-PTSD) diagnoses by interview time point and 
ASDIPTSD diagnosis 
Frequency at 2-4 week Frequency at 6 month 
interview interview 
No 
No ASD ASD Total PTSD PTSD Total 
Diagnosis (N=69) (N=14) (N=83) (N=50) (N=7) (N=57) 
Separation Anxiety 
Disorder 1(1.4) 3(21.4) 4(4.8) 1 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.8) 
Sub-clinical Separation 
Anxiety Disorder 4(5.8) 2(14.3) 6(7.2) 
Social Phobia 1(1.4) 1(7.1) 2(2.4) 1 (2.0) 1 (14.3) 2 (3.5) 
Sub-clinical Social Phobia 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 
Specific Phobia 7(10.1) 4(28.6) 11(13.3) 4 (8.0) 1 (14.3) 5 (8.8) 
Sub-clinical Specific 
Phobia 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Panic Disorder 0(0.0) 1(7.1) 1(1.2) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Sub-clinical Panic Disorder l(l. 4) 0(0.0) l(I. 2) 
Agoraphobia without Panic 
Disorder 0(0.0) 2(14.3) 2(2.4) 0 (0.0) 1 (14.3) 1 (1.8) 
Agoraphobia with Panic 
Disorder 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0(0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder 3(4.3) 2(14.3) 5(6.0) 2 (4.0) 3 (42.9) 5 (8.8) 
Sub-clinical Generalised 
Anxiety Disorder 1(1.4) 3(21.4) 4(4.8) 
Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder 0(0.0) 1(7.1) 1(1.2) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Major Depressive Disorder I(l. 4) 6(42.9) 7(8.4) 2 (4.0) 3 (42.9) 5 (8.8) 
Note. ASD = Acute Stress Disorder; PTSD = Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. 'Sub- 
clinical' signifies that the participant met all criteria for the diagnosis except for the 
duration criterion. At the six month follow up interview, 'sub-clinical' diagnoses were not 
made (indicated by a hyphen). 
An independent samples Mest, modified to account for heterogeneity of variance, 
found that participants with ASD (mean number of other diagnoses = 1.79) were 
found to have significantly more non-trauma-specific diagnoses than participants 
without ASD (mean number of other diagnoses = . 28) at the initial interview 
(t=2.53, df=13.3, p<03). A second Mest, again. modified to account for 
heterogeneity of variance, found a trend towards participants with PTSD (mean 
number of other diagnoses = 1.38) having more other non-trauma-specific 
diagnoses than participants without PTSD (mean number of other diagnoses 
. 57) at the six month 
follow up interview (t=2.06, df=6.29, p=. 08). 
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6.4 Depressive and anxious symptoniatology as assessed bV seýf-report 
questionnaire at each assessment point 
Children and adolescents participating in Study 2 completed the Birleson 
Depression Self-Rating Scale (BDSRS-, Birleson, 1981), a self-report measure Z71 
assessing depressive symptomatology, at each time point in the study (two to fOLII' Z-71 
weeks, three months, and six months post-trauma). Participants' scores on tile 
BDSRS, differentiated by trauma and time point, are displayed in Figure 6.3. Z: ) 
Scores on this measure appeared to be elevated at each time point relative to 
British normative data (mean = 8.53; Yule, 1998), and appeared to he elevated at 
the initial assessment relative to sample of youth exposed to the civil war in 
Bosma-Hercegovina (Smith et al., 2001). 
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BDSRS scores were subjected to a repeated measures two-way (time point by 
trauma type) ANOVA. According to a Box's M statistic for this analysis, the 
included variables were found to have homogeneity of variance. No significant 
main effect of time point, trauma type, or time point by trauma type interaction, 
was found. 
Concern that these statistics may have been the result of the small numbers of 
cases (N=38) that completed the questionnaire at each time point and were eligible 
for the ANOVA, led to the use of t-tests to verify the above results. Between 
subjects Mests revealed no significant differences between assault and RTA 
participants with regards to two to four week BDSRS scores (N=90), three month 
BDSRS scores (N=52), or six month BDSRS scores (N=67). Repeated measures t- 
tests revealed that the drop in BDSRS scores between the two to four week 
assessment and the six month assessment was approaching significance (t=1.97, 
df=57, p=. 053), but there no was no significant difference between scores at two 
to four weeks and three months, and scores between three months and six months. 
Participants in Study 2 also completed the Revised Child Manifest Anxiety Scale 
(RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1978) at three months and six months post- 
trauma. This measure was not completed at the initial two to four week 
assessment because of the number of other self-report questionnaires also 
completed at this time point. Participants' scores on the RCMAS, differentiated by 
trauma and time point, are displayed in Figure 6.4. 
186 













Scores at each time point were lower than normative data for American youth 
(mean = 13.84; Reynolds & Richmond, 1978), and were lower than the level 
observed in a sample of youth exposed to civil war in Bosma-Hercegovina (mean 
= 10.93; Smith et al., 2001). RCMAS scores were subjected to a repeated 
measures two-way (time point by trauma type) ANOVA. According to a Box's M ItD 
statistic for this analysis, the included variables were found to have homogeneity 
of' variance. A significant main effect of time point was observed (F = 4.58, df = Z, 
1,39, p<. 039), but no main effect for trauma type, or time point by trauma type 
interaction. 
The main effect of time point did not seem to correspond to the data displayed in 
Figure 6.4. As with the data for the BDSRS, however, there was concern that C, 
these results were skewed by the cases that did not complete both assessments, 
and hence were not eligible for this analysis. T-tests were used therefore to Z' 
examine these data for between-groups differences regarding traurna type Z7 L, at each 
time point. Again, no differences in anxiety levels between ýIssault and RTA 
groups were observed at either the three month or six month time points. 
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65 Summary 
Post-traumatic stress reactions and non-traumatic stress psychopathology were 
assessed in a sample of children and adolescents attending A&E following 
assaults or RTAs. Participants were interviewed with their caregiver at two to four 
weeks and six months post-trauma, and completed self-report questionnaires at 
two to four weeks, three months and six months post-trauma. 
ASD was found to be a valid diagnosis, both in terms of internal reliability and 
inter-rater reliability, and its ability to predict later PTSD. The inclusion of a 
criterion assessing dissociation did not significantly improve the ability of the 
diagnosis to predict later PTSD over and above a 'sub-ASD' diagnosis that 
comprised all the ASD criteria (experiencing a traumatic event, re-experiencing, 
avoidance, arousal, and impairment of functioning), except for dissociation. There 
was poor agreement between child and caregiver reports in the interview, with the 
result that for the remainder of the investigation it was considered appropriate to 
rely on the child's report only. There were no differences between participants 
exposed to assaults and RTAs in the prevalence of ASD symptoms and either 
ASD, 'sub-ASD' or 'early PTSD' diagnoses, or PTSD at six month follow up. 
Two individual ASD symptoms, nightmares and difficultly sleeping, distinguished 
participants who went on to meet criteria for PTSD at follow up from participants 
who did not meet criteria for PTSD at follow up. 
Participants' post-traumatic stress symptomatology was assessed with the REES-C 
at each assessment point. Scores on this self-report questionnaire were found to 
decrease between the two to four week assessment point and the three month 
assessment point, but not between the three month and six month assessment 
points. Again there were no differences between children and adolescents exposed 
to different trauma types. 
Psychopathology other than ASD and PTSD were assessed at the two to four 
week and six month follow up assessments by the ADIS-C. Separation anxiety 
disorder, generalised anxiety disorder, and at the final assessment only, major 
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depressive disorder, were found to occur at a higher rate than might be expected. 
No differences between assault-exposed and RTA-exposed participants in the 
prevalence of non-traumatic stress related disorders were observed. Children and 
adolescents with ASD at the two to four week assessment were found to be more 
likely to meet criteria for separation anxiety disorder, panic disorder, agoraphobia 
without panic disorder, generalised anxiety disorder (without the duration 
criterion), obsessive compulsive disorder and major depressive disorder than 
children and adolescents without ASD. At the final assessment children and 
adolescents with PTSD were found to be more likely to meet criteria for 
agoraphobia without panic disorder, generalised anxiety disorder, and major 
depressive disorder than children and adolescents without PTSD. 
Depressive psychopathology, in addition to being assessed by the major 
depressive disorder questions of the ADIS-C, was assessed using the BDSRS self- 
report questionnaire at two to four weeks, three months and six months post- 
trauma. Both a two-way ANOVA and t-tests revealed no differences between the 
scores of assault-exposed and RTA-exposed participants, and no difference in 
scores between the three assessment points. Anxious psychopathology, as 
assessed by the RCMAS, was found to decrease between the three month and six 
month follow up assessments, but no trauma type differences were observed. 
With regards to the reasons stated at the beginning of this chapter for examining 
both post-traumatic stress and non-traumatic stress psychopathology in children 
and adolescents exposed to assaults to RTAs, it can be concluded that: 
1. Post-traumatic stress, in the sample assessed, was found to decrease 
between two to four weeks and three months following a trauma; 
supporting the distinction between onset and maintenance processes in the 
aetiology of PTSD in this population; 
2. A diagnosis of ASD has merit with regards to its ability to predict later 
PTSD, though the inclusion of the dissociation criterion within this 
diagnosis may not add to its usefulness; 
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3. Children and adolescents exposed to assaults would appear to be as likely 
to experience post-traumatic stress following a trauma as children and 
adolescents exposed to RTAs; 
4. Children and adolescents exposed to traumatic events may be at increased 
risk of experiencing psychopathology other than PTSD, though children 
and adolescents with PTSD are at an even greater risk. 
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Chapter 7. Predictors of PTSD in a sample of children and adolescents exposed 
to assaults and RTAs (Study 2) 
In this chapter the data concerning predictors of PTSD in a sample of children and 
adolescents exposed to assaults and RTAs will be presented. This sample was 
drawn from an Accident and Emergency department in South London. 
Participants completed a semi-structured interview assessing PTSD, anxious, and 
depressive psychopathology at two to four weeks and six months post-trauma, and 
self-report questionnaires assessing psychopathology, cognitive styles, appraisals, 
and psychosocial aspects of their response to the disaster at two to four weeks, 
three months, and six months post-trauma (see chapter 3 for full details of the 
assessment measures used, recruitment procedures, and demographic information 
of the recruited sample). Participants' scores on the novel self-report measures 
devised for use in this study were calculated according to the components analyses 
performed in chapter 4. 
The study was undertaken so that the role of cognitive processes in the onset and 
maintenance of PTSD in children and adolescents might be distinguished. To date, 
only two prospective studies have explicitly tested the role of cognitive processes 
postulated by adult PTSD theorists such as Brewin et al. (1996) and Ehlers and 
Clark (2000) in a child and adolescent population (for further details of these adult 
models please see chapter 1). Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant (2003) conducted a 
prospective study in child and adolescent survivors of RTAs, and found that data- 
driven processing during the accident, appraisals of the trauma and its impact, and 
cognitive strategies such as rumination, thought suppression, and persistent 
dissociation accounted for a significant proportion of variance in post-traumatic 
stress symptoms at six months post-trauma, over and above demographic and 
accident severity variables. Similarly, Stallard (2003), in a cross-sectional study of 
children and adolescents involved in RTAs, found that the negative appraisal of 
trauma sequelae and the use of distraction and rumination were more likely to 
occur in participants with PTSD than participants without PTSD. While these 
studies have contributed a considerable amount to our understanding of PTSD in 
children and adolescents, they each have focused solely on RTA survivors, and 
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have used measures comprising only a single item, the reliability of which cannot 
therefore be assessed. 
The present study was designed with these considerations in mind. In addition, 
two further theoretical and methodological concerns were noted. Firstly, a number 
of studies have demonstrated that prior emotional disorder makes a child or 
adolescent more vulnerable to experiencing PTSD (Asarnow et al., 1999; La 
Greca, et al. 1998). However, what mechanisms are responsible for this 
relationship between pre-trauma emotional disorder and post-traumatic stress has 
not been investigated. The possibility that pre-existing maladaptive cognitive 
styles would be related to the maintenance of post-traumatic stress was considered 
to be a conceivable pathway whereby prior emotional disorder might be related to 
increased PTSD. Secondly, it was thought that using single-item measures that 
relate exclusively to the traumatic event may simply be indices of PTSD or 
general distress, rather than distinct psychopathological processes. In order to 
incorporate these considerations, it was decided to use multiple item measures that 
were not trauma-specific, and might relate to pre-existing emotional disorder. 
The particular cognitive and psychosocial processes to be investigated in this 
study were: 
i. Appraisal of threat, 
ii. Quality of memories of the frightening event, 
iii. Anxiety sensitivity (i. e. negative beliefs regarding the meaning of anxiety 
symptoms), 
iv. Positive beliefs about worry, 
v. Ruminative coping. style, 
vi. Attitudes towards emotional expression, 
vii. Negative appraisals of the trauma and its sequelae (assessed at three months 
and six months post-trauma only), and 
viii. Maladaptive thought control strategies and trauma-focused rumination. 
These processes were investigated with regards to PTSD symptomatology in the 
acute phase (two to four weeks) and after an extended duration (six months), using 
both correlational and regression analyses. Specifically it was predicted that the 
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appraisal of threat and memory quality would be related to the onset of PTSD, 
while the remaining processes would be involved in the maintenance of PTSD. 
Regression analyses were used to investigate whether those cognitive processes 
hypothesised to be related to the maintenance of PTSD (i. e., ruminative style, 
endorsement of worry, a negative attitude towards to emotional expression, 
negative appraisals of the trauma and its sequelae, and maladaptive thought 
control strategies) would account for variance in PTSD scores at six months over 
and above the variance accounted for by PTSD scores at two to four weeks. 
Regression analyses were also used to examine the extent to which demographic 
and objective trauma-related variables are involved in the aetiology of PTSD. 
While it has been demonstrated that demographic and trauma-related variables are 
moderately good predictors of PTSD at one to three months (La Greca et al., 
1996), it was predicted that in the current investigation the cognitive processes 
outlined above would continue to predict PTSD at 6 months, over and above such 
variables. 
The relationship between non-trauma specific cognitive styles (in particular 
rumination) and maladaptive trauma-specific appraisals and coping strategies was 
explored using correlational techniques. The purpose of this investigation also was 
to examine whether pre-traumatic maladaptive cognitive styles had an impact on a 
child or adolescent's response to trauma, and affected their appraisals and coping 
strategies in response to it. A final set of regression analyses were conducted to 
examine whether the cognitive processes hypothesised to predict later PTSD 
would be involved also in the onset and maintenance of depressive responses to 
the trauma experienced. 
7.1 Relationships between demographic, history, and objective trauma severity 
variables and PTSD at each time point 
Pearson's Product Moment correlations between each of the demographic, history, 
and objective trauma severity variables (i. e. triage category, admission to hospital, 
and fracture) and PTSD symptornatology at each time point (as assessed by the 
RIES-C and the CPSS) are shown in Table 7.1. The only variable found to be 
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significantly correlated with PTSD symptomatology was being admitted to 
hospital following attendance at A&E. This variable was not correlated with 
REES-C scores at the two to four week assessment, but was correlated with each 
of the PTSD measures used at the three-month follow-up, and CPSS scores at six 
month follow up. 
Table Z1 Correlations between demographic and objective trauma severity 
variables and PTSD symptomatology at each time point 
PTSD symptornatology 
24 weeks 3 months 6 months 
(n=83) (n=41) (n=63) 
Variable REES-C RIES-C CPSS RIES-C CPSS 
Age -. 10 . 01 . 16 . 11 . 18 
Sex' -. 16 -. 20 -. 11 -. 16 -. 13 
Prior emotional 
disorder' -. 03 -. 04 . 05 . 12 . 12 
Prior exposure 
to trauma' -. 10 -. 09 -. 07 -. 14 -. 07 
Trauma type' -. 02 -. 05 -. 07 -. 16 -. 21 
Triage category -. 07 . 08 . 14 . 05 . 08 
Fracture' -. 14 -. 04 -. 02 . 03 -. 05 
Admitted to 
hospital' . 07 . 28* . 31* . 15 . 24* 
Note: 'These measures were dichotomously coded and examined using point-biserial 
correlations, a variant of Pearson's Product Moment Correlation. RIES-C = Revised 
Impact of Event Scale, child version; CPSS = Child Post-traumatic Stress Scale. * p<05 
7.2 Relationships between cognitive and psychosocial processes and PTSD at 
each time point 
Pearson's Product Moment correlations between the various cognitive and 
psychosocial processes assessed and PTSD symptornatology at each time point are 
displayed in Table 7.2. 
With regards to measures completed by participants at the initial, two to four week 
assessment, each of the items assessing threat and subjective index of trauma 
severity were significantly correlated with PTSD at each time point on at least one 
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measure. The items assessing confusion and dissociation were for the most part 
correlated with PTSD at the initial assessment and predictive of PTSD at the three 
and six month follow-up assessments. The item I didn't have any feelings about 
what was happening" was not significantly correlated with PTSD scores as 
assessed by either measure at any time point. 
Anger directed towards the people responsible for either the assault or RTA was 
found not to be correlated with PTSD at the initial assessment, or with PTSD as 
assessed at follow-up. Anger directed towards self, however, was found to be both 
a correlate of PTSD at the two to four week assessment and predictive of PTSD at 
three and six months, as assessed by each measure of PTSD. The child or 
adolescent's report of the fear of any adults present during the experienced assault 
or RTA was correlated with PTSD at the initial assessment but failed to predict 
PTSD at either follow-up. 
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Table 7.2 Correlations between cognitive and psychosocial variables and PTSD 
symptomatology at each time p6int 
PTSD symptornatology 
2-4 3 months 6 months 
weeks 
Variable RIES-C RIES-C CPSS RIES-C CPSS 
Measures at 2-4 weeks: (n=85) (n=4 1) (n=56) 
Subjective sense of threat items: 
I really thought that I was going to 
die . 31** . 48** . 35* . 43*** . 28* 
I thought that I was going to be very 
badly hurt . 40*** . 41** . 35* . 36** . 34** 
I was really scared . 51**** . 41** . 29 . 35** . 28* 
I was scared that someone else 
might get badly hurt . 31** . 56*** . 43** . 29* . 25 
Confusion and dissociation items: 
I couldn't believe this was 
happening to me . 41**** . 28 . 28 . 45*** . 41** 
1 didn't feel like I was really there . 43**** . 49** . 33* . 40** . 37** 
I didn't have any feelings about 
what was happening . 00 -. 11 -. 11 -. 08 -. 06 
I didn't understand what was 
happening . 44**** . 41** . 34* . 33* . 30* 
It all felt like a dream . 39*** . 37* . 26 . 48*** . 34** 
My mind went blank . 44**** . 39* . 33* . 40** . 40** 
Anger items: 
Just after the frightening event I 
was really angry with the people 
who caused the event . 13 . 25 . 14 . 13 . 08 
Just after the frightening event, I 
was really angry with myself . 27* . 32* . 34* . 39** . 39** 
Child's rating of adult's fear . 28* . 40 . 35 . 29 . 31 MMQ . 78**** . 50*** . 40** . 54**** . 52**** 
cTCQ distraction . 01 . 27 . 14 . 05 . 02 
cTCQ reappraisal . 46**** . 38** . 32* . 46*** . 35** 
cTCQ social support . 18 . 30* . 37* . 32* . 26 RSQ . 68**** . 60**** . 62**** . 62**** . 71**** CASI . 68**** . 62**** . 57**** . 65**** . 59**** AEE . 11 . 13 . 12 . 20 . 26* MCQ . 37*** . 47** . 37* . 40** . 37** 
Continued onfollowing page 
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Table 7.2 Correlations between cognitive and psychosocial variables and PTSD 
symptomatology at each time point - cont. 
Variable 
Measures at 3 months: 
cPTCI "permanent change" 
cPTCI "scary world" 
cPTCI total score 
Anger item ("I will always be angry 
with the people who caused the 
frightening event") 
Omen formation item (I had a 
feeling the frightening event was 
going to happen") 
Thought suppression item 
Distraction item 
Rumination (sum of 3 items) 
PTSD symptomatology 
2-4 
weeks 3 months 6 months 
RIES-C REES-C CPSS 
(n=45) 
. 67**** . 72**** 
. 68**** . 77**** 
. 72**** . 79**** 
RIES-C CPSS 
(n=39) 
. 59**** . 64**** 
. 59**** . 69**** 
. 62**** . 70**** 
. 56**** . 47*** . 40** . 47** 
. 34* . 32* . 26 . 27 
. 77**** . 63**** . 74**** . 71**** 
. 79**** . 60**** . 75**** . 63**** 
. 70**** . 60**** . 61**** . 60**** 
Measures at 6 months: (n=65) 
cPTCI "permanent change" . 68**** . 60**** 
cPTCI "scary world" . 67**** . 73**** 
cPTCI total score . 73**** . 73**** Anger item ("I will always be angry 
with the people who caused the 
frightening evenf') -- - . 40*** . 46**** Omen formation item ("I had a 
feeling the frightening event was 
going to happeW') -- - . 32** . 35** Thought suppression item -- - . 62**** . 53**** Distraction item -- - . 73**** . 64**** Rumination (sum of 3 items) -- - . 78**** . 76**** Note: PTSD = Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; RIES-C = Revised Impact of Event Scale, 
child version; CPSS = Child Post-traumatic Stress Scale; MMQ = Memory Modality 
Questionnaire; cTCQ = Thought Control Questionnaire, child version; RSQ = Response 
Styles Questionnaire; CASI = Childhood Anxiety Sensitivity Index; AEE = Attitudes 
towards Emotional Expression questionnaire; MCQ = Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire, 
child version of positive beliefs about worry sub-scale; cPTCI = Post-Traumatic 
Cognitions Inventory, child version. 
* p<05; ** p<01; *** p<001; **** p<0001 
Memory quality, as assessed by the MMQ, was found to be a strong correlate of 
PTSD at the initial assessment, and was also a good predictor of PTSD scores at 
three and six months. With regards to measures of children's strategies for 
typically coping with unwanted and intrusive thoughts and memories, 
relationships with PTSD at each time point differed between the sub-scales of the 
cTCQ. The distraction sub-scale was found not be associated with PTSD at any 
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time point. The re-appraisal sub-scale was significantly and positively correlated 
with PTSD scores at each time point and on each measure used at the follow-up 
assessments to measure PTSD symptomatology. The social support sub-scale was 
not correlated with PTSD symptornatology at the initial assessment, but was 
positively correlated with both PTSD measures at the three-month follow-up and 
the REES-C at six months. 
Both the RSQ and CASI were positive and strong correlates of PTSD at two to 
four weeks, and positive and strong predictors of PTSD at three months and six 
months. The AEE was not a correlate of PTSD at two to four weeks or a predictor 
of PTSD at three months, but was a significant positive predictor of scores on the 
CPSS at the six-month follow-up. The MCQ (positive beliefs sub-scale) was 
positively and moderately correlated with PTSD scores at each time point. 
With regards to measures completed by participants at the three-month follow-up, 
each sub-scale of the cPTCI and the cPTCI total score were strong correlates of 
PTSD at that time point, and strong predictors of PTSD at the six-month follow- 
up. The trauma-related thought suppression, distraction, and rumination items 
were similarly related to PTSD scores at three months and at six months. Ongoing 
anger directed at those responsible for the assault or RTA was a similarly 
significant and positive correlate of PTSD at three months and six months, while 
the omen formation item was a moderate correlate of PTSD at three months but 
failed to predict PTSD significantly at six months. With regards to measures 
completed by participants at the final six-month follow-up assessment, each 
measure, including the omen formation item, was found to be significantly and 
positively correlated with PTSD. The cPTCI sub-scale and total scores and the 
thought suppression, distraction, and rumination items were particularly strongly 
correlated with PTSD as measured by the REES-C and the CPSS. 
7.3 Regression models of PTSD 
Regression modelling was used to identify whether demographic, trauma-related, 
and cognitive process variables would have a role in the onset and maintenance of 
PTSD in participants in Study 2. In the first set of analyses conducted, the 
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dependent variable used was RIES-C scores at two to four weeks, with the aim of 
identifying processes involved in the onset of PTSD. In the second and third sets 
of analyses REES-C and CPSS scores at six months were used as the dependent 
variable, with the aim of identifying processes involved in the maintenance of 
PTSD. lEerarchical regression modelling was selected as the mode of entering 
variables so as to see whether the variables entered on each step would account for 
unique variance over and above previous steps. It was initially planned to enter 
variables in the following steps: 
i. Demographic variables (i. e. age, sex, prior history of trauma, prior history of 
emotional disorder), 
ii. Objective indices of trauma severity (i. e. triage category, fracture, admission 
to hospital), 
iii. Subjective indices of trauma severity (subjective threat items), 
iv. Memory quality (as assessed by the MMQ), 
V. Cognitive and psychosocial variables (other than memory quality) assessed 
at two to four weeks (cTCQ sub-scales, RSQ, CASI, MCQ, AEE), and for 
the analyses examining processes involved in the maintenance of PTSD at 
six months, 
vi. Cognitive and psychosocial variables assessed at three months (cPTCI, and 
thought suppression, distraction, and rumination items). 
However, since a number of variables were found not to be correlated with PTSD 
symptoms, these variables (age, sex, prior history of trauma, prior history of 
emotional disorder, fracture, triage category, cTCQ distraction, and AEE) were 
not entered into the regression models, in order to improve the power of the 
regression analyses conducted. It was therefore decided to use the following steps 
for entering variables: 
i. Objective index of trauma severity (admission), 
ii. Subjective indices of trauma severity (subjective threat items), 
iii. Memory quality (as assessed by the MMQ), 
vii. Cognitive and psychosocial variables (other than memory quality) assessed 
at two to four weeks (cTCQ reappraisal and social support, RSQ, CASI, 
MCQ), and for the analyses examining processes involved in the 
maintenance of PTSD at six months, 
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viii. Cognitive variables assessed at three months (sub-scales of the cPTCI, and 
thought suppression, distraction, and rumination items). 
In order to assess whether the assumptions of regression analysis were met (i. e. 
normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity), residuals produced by each regression 
were examined. These assumptions are met when there is no obvious relationship 
between predicted scores on the independent variable and residuals, as observed in 
a scatterplot of these scores (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). All these assumptions 
were met in the analyses conducted in this chapter. Furthermore, regression will 
not work correctly if there is multicollinearity among independent variables 
entered in the model. Where independent variables were found to be highly 
correlated (i. e. greater than . 8) one variable was omitted from the regression 
analysis, based on theoretical concerns. A strong correlation between the thought 
suppression and distraction items (r--. 84) meant that one of these items had to be 
discarded. The distraction item was not included in the regression analyses 
performed here as thought suppression was considered to be the more important 
measure, because of the experimental evidence concerning this strategy (Purdon, 
1999). A strong correlation between the sub-scales of the cPTCI led to the use of 
the total score for this measure in the regression analyses performed in this 
chapter. 
7.3.1 Regression models: The ability of cognitive processes to account for PTSD 
at two tofour weeks 
Regression models were conducted so as to examine what processes were 
involved in the onset of PTSD. Since it was not possible in a study of this nature 
to assess participants prior to the trauma they experienced, or, very soon (i. e. 
minutes or hours) afterwards, it was not feasible to investigate variables that 
predicted the onset of PTSD. Nevertheless, it was possible to use hierarchical 
regression analysis to investigate what variables accounted for a unique proportion 
of variance in initial PTSD symptornatology. As stated previously, variables found 
to be significant correlates of PTSD at two to four weeks were entered into the 
model in the following steps: 
Objective index of*trauma severity (admission), 
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2. Subjective indices of trauma severity (subjective threat items), 
3. Memory quality (as assessed by the MMQ), and 
4. Cognitive and psychosocial. variables (other than memory quality) assessed 
at two to four weeks (cTCQ reappraisal and social support, RSQ, CASI, 
and the MCQ). 
The results of this regression analysis are displayed in Table 7.3. 
The objective index of trauma severity, admission to hospital, failed to account for 
any variance in RIES-C scores at two to four weeks. The model was greatly 
enhanced by subjective indices of trauma severity in the second step and memory 
quality in the third step, and to a lesser degree, the various cognitive styles 
assessed at this time point. The overall model accounted for 76% of variance in 
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7.3.2 Regression models: The ability of cognitive processes to account for PTSD 
at six months 
Regression modelling was used to investigate the unique variance in PTSD scores 
at six-month follow-up accounted for by each of the trauma-related, demographic, 
and cognitive variables assessed. Each model was conducted twice, once with 
RIES-C scores as the outcome variable, and once with CPSS scores as the 
outcome variable, in order to further verify the appropriateness of the model 
tested. 
The results of the first analysis, conducted with REES-C scores as the outcome 
variable, are displayed in Table 7.4. Subjective indices of threat, memory quality, 
and cognitive processes assessed at the three-month follow-up each significantly 
improved the ability of the regression model to explain variance in RIES-C scores 
at six months, post-trauma. The proportion of variance accounted for by cognitive 
processes assessed at the initial assessment tended towards significance. The 
model produced accounted for 72% of variance in REES-C scores at the six-month 
follow up. However, the limited number of participants who completed the three- 
month follow-up assessment meant that the model had greatly reduced power (as 
evidenced by the small degrees of freedom and the failure of any individual 
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In order to overcome this shortcoming, the analysis was repeated but without the 
variables from the three month follow-up. In the resultant model, the objective 
index of trauma severity (admission to hospital) again failed to significantly 
enhance the model, while the amount of variance explained by the model was 
significantly improved by the subjective indices of trauma severity step (R 2 
change = . 24, F=4.25, 
df = 4,5 1, p<005), the memory quality step (R 2 change = 
. 14, F= 11.48, 
df = 1,50, p<001), and the cognitive variables assessed at the two 
to four week assessment step (R 2 change = . 18, F=3.85, df = 4,45, p<005). The 
total model accounted for 58% of variance in RIES-C scores at the six month 
follow up assessment. Only RSQ, the measure of ruminative style, had a 
significant beta coefficient in the final step of the model (beta = . 37, t=2.40, 
p<021). 
The hierarchical regression model conducted with CPSS as the outcome variable 
is displayed in Table 7.5. Entering memory quality, cognitive processes assessed 
at two to four weeks, and cognitive processes assessed at six months significantly 
improved the proportion of variance in CPSS scores explained by the model, and 
resulted in an significant overall model of CPSS scores which accounted for 77% 
of variance. Neither objective nor subjective indices of trauma severity added to 
this model. The RSQ and the thought suppression item (assessed at three months) 
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As with RIIES-C scores, however, the small number of participants who completed 
the questionnaire battery at three months reduced the power of the model, as 
indicated by the low degrees of freedom. The analysis therefore was repeated but 
only variables from the assessment at two to four weeks post-trauma were 
included. The steps where objective and subjective indices of trauma severity 
were entered into the model approached significance (R 2 change = . 06, F=3.43, 
df = 1,54, p<069, and R2 change =. 13, F=2.04, df = 4,50, p< 103, respectively) 
but did not enhance the variance explained by the model. The model was 
significantly enhanced by the memory quality step (R 2 change = . 15, F= 10.7 8, df 
= 1,49, p<002), and the cognitive processes at two to four weeks step (R 2 change 
= . 27, F=6.19, df = 
5,44, p<00 1), resulting in a model where 61% of variance in 
CPSS scores at six months was explained by the entered variables. Only the RSQ 
was found to have a significant beta coefficient in the final step of the model (beta 
= . 
64, t=4.23, p<00 1). 
Given the difficulty of including within the above analyses variables assessed at 
the three-month follow-up, further analyses were conducted to examine whether 
cognitive processes assessed at three months would on their own predict PTSD at 
six months post-trauma. In the first hierarchical regression analysis conducted, 
RIES-C scores at six months were used as the dependent variable. Both post- 
traumatic appraisals (as assessed by the cPTCI total score) in the first step (R 2 
change = . 38, F= 22.56, df = 1,37, p<001) and thought suppression and trauma- 
related rumination in the second step (R 2 change = . 26, F= 12.20, df = 2,35, 
p<001) significantly improved the model produced. Significant beta coefficients 
were observed for the cPTCI total score (beta = . 30, t=2.38, p<023) and the 
thought suppression item (beta = . 54, t=3.88, p<00 1) in the final model. 
In the second analysis conducted, CPSS scores at six months were used as the 
dependent variable. Again both post-traumatic appraisals in the first step (R 2 
change = . 49, F= 35.27, df = 1,37, p<001) and thought suppression and trauma- 
related rumination in the second step (R 2 change = . 18, F=9.19, df = 2,35, 
p<001) each significantly improved the ability of the model to predict PTSD at 
six months post-trauma. Significant beta coefficients were observed for the cIYrCI 
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total score (beta = . 45, t=3.69, p<001) and the thought suppression item (beta = 
. 46, t=3.52, p<001). 
Z 3.3 Regression models: The ability of cognitive processes to account for PTSD 
at six months over and above PTSD at two to four weeks 
Having established that cognitive variables assessed at two to four weeks were 
predictors of PTSD at six months, it was decided to investigate whether these 
variables would predict at six months over and above PTSD at two to four weeks. 
This further investigation was thought necessary, as the aim of this set of analyses 
was to investigate what processes are involved in the maintenance of PTSD, as 
opposed to the onset of PTSD. 
Given the large proportion of variance in initial RIES-C scores accounted for by 
the MMQ, and the hypothesis that memory quality is involved in the onset rather 
than the maintenance of PTSD, an initial regression analysis was conducted to see 
whether the MMQ would account for any variance in RIES-C scores at six months 
over and above REES scores at two to four weeks. This analysis revealed that the 
MMQ failed to account for any variance in REES-C scores at six months over and 
above initial REES-C scores, supporting the hypothesis. Having established that 
the MMQ is involved in the onset and not the maintenance of PTSD, this variable 
was not examined in the following analyses. 
In order to examine the role of the other cognitive processes in the maintenance of 
PTSD, initial REES-C scores and cognitive processes assessed at two to four 
weeks were entered into a hierarchical regression model with six-month REES-C 
scores as the dependent variable. The analysis was conducted only once with 
REES-C scores at six months as the dependent variable, as CPSS scores were not 
assessed at both two to four weeks and six months. The results of this analysis are 
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As would be expected, initial RIES-C made a significant contribution to the 
model, alone accounting for 62% of variance in RIES-C scores at six months. The 
various cognitive processes assessed at two to four weeks (endorsing reappraisal 
and social support as a way of coping with intrusive memories and thoughts, a 
ruminative style, a fearful attitude towards anxious symptoms, and endorsing 
worry as a positive coping strategy) failed to enhance significantly the model, 
over and above initial PTSD symptornatology. Social support was found to have a 
positive beta coefficient that approached significance. 
it was similarly questioned whether the variables assessed at three months would 
predict FITSD at six months over and above initial RIES-C scores as assessed at 
two to four weeks post-trauma. Given the limited number of participants who 
completed the questionnaire battery at three months, it was decided to investigate 
the role of these variables separately from the other cognitive processes assessed 
at two to four weeks so as to maximise the power available for regression 
analysis. 
As in the previous analysis, RIES-C scores at two to four weeks were entered in 
the first step of a hierarchical regression analysis, and accounted for a significant 
proportion of variance in RIES-C scores at six months (R 
2 change = . 
62, F= 
60.30, df = 1,37, p<001). In the second step, the cPTCI total score at three 
months failed to improve the model (R 2 change = . 01, F=1.31, 
df = 1,36, 
p=. 259). In the third step, thought suppression and trauma-related rumination were 
found to significantly enhance the regression model over and above previous steps 
(R2 change = . 08, F=4.59, 
df = 2,34, p<017). Significant beta coefficients were 
observed for RIES-C scores at two to four weeks (beta = . 44, t=3.02, p<005), 
and the thought suppression item (beta = . 37, t=2.72, p<O 10). 
Z4 Relationships between cognitive styles and trauma-specific maladaptive 
coping strategies and appraisals 
The analyses presented above suggest that a variety of cognitive processes are 
involved in the maintenance of PTSD, with the result that the disorder takes a 
chronic course. Certain cognitive processes assessed at two to four weeks and at 
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three months post-trauma were found to predict PTSD at six months over and 
above initial PTSD. As the variables assessed at the two to four week assessment 
related to more general, non-trauma specific attitudes and styles, and the variables 
at three months to more trauma-specific coping strategies, it was decided to 
investigate whether the former processes, assumed to relate to potentially 
maladaptive styles and attitudes, would predict the latter psychopathological 
behaviours. 
Correlations between the various processes identified as significant predictors of 
PTSD at six months are displayed in Table 7.7. Each cognitive style assessed at 
two to four weeks, in particular the CASI, was significantly correlated with scores 
on the thought suppression item at three months. Both the distraction item and the 
total score for the three rumination items were significantly correlated with the 
cTCQ reappraisal sub-scale, the RSQ, the CASI, and the positive beliefs sub-scale 
of the MCQ. 
Table 7.7 Correlations between cognitive processes assessed at two tofour weeks 
and at three months post-trauma 
Cognitive processes at 3 months 
Cognitive Processes Thought Rumination 
at 2-4 weeks suppression item Distraction item (sum of 3 items) 
CTCQ reappraisal . 32* . 46** . 45** 
CTCQ social support . 34* . 29 . 24 
RSQ . 39* . 39* . 53*** 
CASI . 51*** . 50*** . 57**** 
MCO . 36* . 45** . 55*** 
Note: cTCQ = Thought Control Questionnaire, child version; RSQ = Response Styles 
Questionnaire (rumination); CASI = Childhood Anxiety Sensitivity Index; MCQ = Meta- 
Cognitions Questionnaire, child version of positive beliefs about worry sub-scale. 
*= p<05, ** = p<. Ol, *** = p<001, **** = p<0001 
Three further points are to be noted from this table. Firstly, reappraisal as a 
strategy for coping with non-trauma specific intrusive thoughts and memories was 
significantly correlated with rumination, suggesting that attempts to reappraise a 
trauma do not necessarily result in satisfactory resolution. Secondly, RSQ scores, 
while being significantly correlated with each of the cognitive processes assessed 
at three months that were implicated as being predictors of later PTSD, appeared 
211 
to be more strongly correlated with the trauma-specific rumination items than with 
the thought suppression and distraction items. Thirdly, the CASI was the strongest 
predictor of each of the three cognitive processes assessed at three months post- 
trauma that were identified as being maladaptive. 
Z5 Regression models of depression 
A final set of regression analyses were conducted so as to examine whether the 
processes hypothesised to be related to the onset and maintenance of PTSD also 
would have a role in the aetiology of post-traumatic depression. Having 
established that objective indices of trauma severity were unrelated to PTSD it 
was not thought necessary to retain this variable for these analyses, while the role 
of the other variables assessed (subjective indices of trauma severity, memory 
quality, ruminative style, thought control strategies, fear of the symptoms of 
anxiety, endorsement of worry as a positive strategy, and negative trauma 
appraisals) in the onset and maintenance of depressive responses to the trauma 
was examined. 
In order to investigate which processes were involved in the onset of depression 
following the experienced trauma, a regression analysis was conducted with 
BDSRS scores at the two to four week assessment point as the dependent variable. 
Subjective indices of trauma severity ("I really thought I was going to die", etc. ) 
were entered in the first step of the model, significantly contributing to the model 
and accounting for a large proportion of variance (R 2 change = . 20, F=4.85, df = 
4,79, p<001). Memory quality, entered in the second step, significantly 
accounted for a similar proportion of variance (R 2 change = .21, F= 27.5 6, df = 1, 
78, p<001). Scores on the reappraisal and social support scales of the cTCQ, the 
RSQ, the CASI and the positive beliefs sub-scale of the MCQ were entered on the 
third step and again significantly accounted for variance in BDSRS scores at two 
to four weeks (R 2 change = . 14, F=4.47, df = 5,73, p<001). Significant beta 
coefficients revealed that the "I was really scared" item (beta = . 21, t=2.13, 
p<036), the reappraisal sub-scale of the cTCQ (beta = -. 24, t=-. 2.28, p<025), 
and the RSQ (beta = . 48, t=3.77, p<001) were significant contributors to the 
model produced. In this model, therefore, reappraisal was negatively related to 
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depression, rather than being positively related to it. In total, the variables entered 
accounted for 55% of variance in BDSRS scores at the initial, two to four week 
assessment point. 
In order to investigate whether those processes hypothesised to be involved in the 
maintenance of PTSD were also involved in the maintenance of depression 
following trauma, a regression analysis was conducted with BDSRS scores at the 
six month assessment point as the dependent variable, and BDSRS scores at two 
to four weeks entered in the first step. Not surprisingly, this first step significantly 
accounted for a very large proportion of variance in BDSRS scores at six months 
(R 2 change = . 44, F= 29-06, df = 1,37, p<001). Cognitive processes assessed at 
the two to four week assessment, entered in the second step (R 2 change = . 05, F= 
. 63, df = 5,32, p=. 677), and cPTCI total score, thought suppression, and 
rumination items, entered in the third step (R 2 change = . 09, F=2.11, df = 3,29, 
p=. 12 1), failed to account for additional variance in BDSRS scores at six months. 
With all steps entered into the model, inspection of beta coefficients for each 
variable revealed that initial BDSRS (beta . 43, t=2.21, p<034), and the 
thought suppression item (beta = . 43, t 2.46, p<020), were significant 
contributors to the model. The overall model accounted for 58% of variance in 
BDSRS scores at six months post-trauma. 
However, there was concern that this analysis may have had insufficient power 
due to the inclusion of so many variables and the small number of participants 
returning the three-month questionnaires. In view of this, a further regression was 
conducted, with only cognitive processes assessed at 3 months entered in the 
second step. The model was enhanced by initial BDSRS scores (R 2 change =. 44, 
F= 29.06, df = 1,37, p<001), but not by cognitive processes assessed at the three 
month follow up (R 2 change = . 09, F=2.07, df = 3,34, p<123). The slight 
improvement in power did not reveal any further variables that individually 
contributed to the model beyond the BDSRS (beta = . 43, t=2.30, p<027), and the 
thought suppression item (beta = . 38, t=2.3 1, p<027). 
76 Summary and discussion 
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A prospective study of children and adolescent's responses to assaults and RTAs 
was undertaken, and an investigation into the cognitive processes involved in the 
onset and maintenance of PTSD was conducted. Regression and correlational 
analyses were used to investigate whether a number of cognitive processes were 
associated with PTSD, and whether such processes were greater predictors of 
IPTSD at six months than demographic and trauma-related variables. 
Age and sex were not correlated with PTSD at any of the three time points when 
participants completed assessments. Admission to hospital following the trauma 
was a correlate of PTSD at three and six months post-trauma. While admission to 
hospital might be viewed in part as an index of objective trauma severity, there 
exists the possibility that this refers to additional exposure. Each of the subjective 
indices of trauma severity were found to be significant correlates of PTSD at each 
time point, as were most items assessing dissociation and confusion. Anger 
directed towards the individuals responsible for causing the traumatic event was 
not found to be related to PTSD, but self-directed anger was, being significantly 
correlated with PTSD at each time point. 
Of the cognitive processes assessed at two to four weeks post-trauma, memory 
quality (as assessed by the NMQ), the use of reappraisal and social support in 
coping with intrusive thoughts and memories (as assessed by the reappraisal and 
social sub-scales of the cTCQ), a ruminative style (as assessed by the RSQ), 
negative and fearful responses towards the symptoms of anxiety (as assessed by 
the CASI), and endorsing worry as a positive coping strategy (as assessed by the 
positive beliefs about worry sub-scale of the MCQ) were significant correlates of 
PTSD at each time point, while a negative attitude towards emotional expression 
(as assessed by the AEE) and using distraction to cope with intrusive thoughts and 
memories (as assessed by the distraction sub-scale of the cTCQ) were not found to 
be correlated consistently with PTSD. Of the cognitive processes assessed at three 
months, both a sense of permanent and disturbing change and of being a feeble 
person in a scary world (as assessed by the sub-scales of the cPTCI), ongoing 
anger towards those responsible for the trauma, omen formation, thought 
suppression and distraction as a way of coping with intrusive memories of the 
214 
trauma, and trauma-related rumination were significant correlates of PTSD at 
three months and at six months. 
The various processes assessed at two to four weeks and three months that 
initially were found to be correlated with PTSD were entered into regression 
models. Admission to hospital failed to improve such models significantly. 
Subjective indices of trauma severity (i. e. items assessing subjective threat) 
significantly contributed to a regression model of PTSD at the two to four week 
assessment, and a model of PTSD at six months when the RIES-C was used at the 
dependent variable, but not when the CPSS was used. 
Regression analysis was used to examine which variables assessed at two to four 
weeks would account for variance in REES-C scores at this time point. Indices of 
trauma severity, memory quality, and to a lesser degree, the cognitive processes 
assessed, accounted for variance in two to four week REES-C scores. This analysis 
suggests that appraisal of trauma severity, memory quality, and a variety of 
cognitive styles play a role in the onset of PTSD in children and adolescents. 
Further regression analyses were conducted to examine the role of the cognitive 
processes assessed in the maintenance of PTSD. Memory quality was ruled out as 
having any role in the maintenance of PTSD. Cognitive processes assessed at two 
to four weeks and at three months, however, contributed to models of PTSD at six 
months. More rigorous tests of whether cognitive processes were involved in the 
maintenance of IITSD also were conducted. In these regression analyses the 
ability of various cognitive processes to predict PTSD at six months over and 
above initial PTSD levels was examined. In each analysis initial PTSD accounted 
for a significant proportion of variance (62%) in RIES-C scores at six months. In 
the first analysis, cognitive processes assessed at two to four weeks were entered 
in the second step of the model, but failed to account for any variance over and 
above initial PTSD. In the second analysis conducted, post-traumatic appraisals, 
entered in the second step, failed to account for any variance, while thought 
suppression and trauma-related rumination, entered in the third step, significantly 
accounted for further variance over and above initial PTSD. 
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An exploratory investigation was conducted into the relationships between non- 
trauma-specific attitudes, cognitive styles, and thought control strategies assessed 
at two to four weeks and the trauma-specific items assessing thought suppression, 
distraction, and rumination assessed at three months. The CASI was found to be 
the strongest predictor of the maladaptive strategies hypothesised to be 
responsible for maintaining PTSD, and the RSQ, while significant correlated with 
each of the processes at three months, was particularly strongly correlated with the 
rumination items. 
Regression analyses were conducted to examine whether the cognitive processes 
hypothesised to be involved in the aetiology of PTSD also would play a role in 
depressive responses to trauma. Subjective indices of trauma severity, memory 
quality, and the cognitive processes assessed at the two to four week assessment 
(in particular the measures assessing ruminative or reappraisal cognitive styles) 
significantly contributed to a regression model of depression at this time point. 
This suggests that the same processes involved in the onset of PTSD were also 
involved in the onset of depression. Only thought suppression (assessed at three 
months) was found to predict depression at six months, over and above the effect 
of initial depression. 
The findings presented in this chapter suggest that the cognitive processes 
investigated do play a role in the aetiology of PTSD in children and adolescents. 
The role of these processes was found to be greater than that of subjective 
appraisal of trauma severity and admittance to hospital, and considerably greater 
than that of demographic variables and a history of trauma exposure or emotional 
disorder. In addition, it was possible to distinguish between processes involved in 
the onset and maintenance of PTSD. The critical process in this regard was 
memory quality, which was related to the onset of PTSD but did not account for 
variance in PTSD at the six month follow up over and above initial PTSD. 
The cognitive processes assessed were also found to play a role in the onset, and 
to a lesser degree, the maintenance of depressive disorder. A degree of specificity 
was observable, however; memory quality appeared to play a greater role in the 
onset of PTSD than it did in depression (36% of variance versus 20%), while the 
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cognitive processes assessed at two to four weeks appeared to account for a 
greater proportion of variance in initial depression than in initial PTSD (14% of 
variance versus 6% of variance). 
The finding that negative appraisals of anxious symptoms predicted with 
maladaptive cognitive coping strategies at three months mirrors the finding of 
Steil and Ehlers (2000) who reported a relationship between negative appraisal of 
PTSD symptoms and maladaptive coping strategies. The relationship between the 
various non-trauma related cognitive styles assessed at two to four weeks and 
maladaptive trauma-related coping strategies at three months does suggest that 
there is a mechanism by which pre-trauma emotional disorder might increase the 
risk of PTSD. However the absence of a relationship between pre-traumatic 
emotional disorder and PTSD prevents a full examination of this hypothesis. The 
failure to observe a relationship between pre-traumatic emotional disorder and 
PTSD contradicts the findings of Asamow et al. (1999) and La Greca et al. 
(1998), and suggests that the method used to assess prior emotional disorder was 
too insensitive. 
A further methodological criticism that may be made of this study is that the 
MMQ, the measure used to assess memory quality, is simply an index of PTSD, 
and that its constituent items overlap with individual PTSD symptoms. This 
possibility is discounted by the fact that the items of the MMQ refer exclusively to 
the quality of intrusive memories of the trauma, and not to the frequency of 
intrusive memories of the trauma. It is possible that the NMQ has a descriptive 
rather than explanatory role, i. e. it identifies the kinds of memories that are likely 
to be involved in PTSD, but does not address how such memories come into 
being. 
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Chapter 8: The relationship between parental and child responses to trauma in 
families participating in Study 2, a prospective study of children and adolescents' 
responses to assaults and RTAs 
A number of studies have found that parental responses to trauma have an effect 
on their children's responses to the trauma (Green et al., 1991; Korol et al., 1999; 
McFarlane, 1987a; Smith et al., 2001; Wolmer et al., 2000). As noted in chapter 1, 
how parental post-traumatic stress and other psychopathology (such as 
depression) impact on children's responses to trauma has yet to be fully explored. 
An investigation was conducted therefore into the mechanisms by which parental 
psychopathology may impact upon child post-traumatic stress, within the context 
of Study 2, a prospective study of children and adolescents exposed to assaults 
and road traffic accidents. One parent of each child (typically the child's mother) 
completed the same questionnaires as their children, but in their adult form. Those 
cognitive processes identified in the previous chapter as being related to the onset 
and maintenance of PTSD were examined to see if there would be any correlation 
between parent and child endorsement of these processes. It also was considered 
pertinent to investigate whether the relationship between parental 
psychopathology and child PTSD would be replicated within this sample, and 
whether parental endorsement of those cognitive processes identified in the 
previous chapter as being maladaptive would be related to their own 
psychopathology and their child's PTSD. 
Parents completed the PDS, a self-report measure of PTSD, and the MMQ, a 
measure of the quality of the individual's memories of a traumatic event, with 
regards to their exposure to the trauma their child experienced. The degree of 
exposure varied widely between participating families; some parents were 
involved directly in the same event (e. g. both were sat in a car that crashed), 
others witnessed the trauma happen or saw the immediate aftermath of the trauma 
(e. g. a mother who was quickly alerted to her child being struck by a car and 
seeing her child unconscious on the ground), and some were called and asked to 
attend the A&E department where their child had been taken following either an 
assault or RTA. In cases where parents did not find out about their child's assault 
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or RTA until some time afterwards, parents did not complete either the PDS or the 
MMQ. Direct parental exposure was included in several of the analyses conducted 
in this chapter, where level of exposure was dichotomously coded (i. e. direct 
exposure to the trauma or no direct exposure to the trauma). 
Given the attrition in the questionnaire completion rate with successive 
assessments and the heavy use of regression analyses in the previous chapter, and 
the corresponding loss of power for further regression analyses, it was decided to 
use correlational analyses as the principal statistical tool within this chapter. As 
the analyses conducted in this chapter are more exploratory, it was decided to 
adopt a more conservative level of significance than in previous chapters (a=. 01). 
In addition to parental post-traumatic stress, parental depression and anxiety were 
also examined. The parental cognitive processes selected for investigation in this 
chapter, based on findings from the previous chapter, were anxiety sensitivity 
(assessed by the ASI), general ruminative style (assessed by the RSQ), positive 
beliefs towards worry (assessed by the appropriate sub-scale of the MCQ), 
thought control strategies (as assessed by the sub-scales of the TCQ), and memory 
quality (assessed by the MMQ). In addition to these variables assessed at the two 
to four week time point, trauma-specific thought suppression, distraction, and 
rumination at the three month assessment point were also examined. Furthermore, 
the items of the family functioning questionnaire, used by McFarlane (1987b) to 
investigate adaptive and maladaptive intra-familial coping, were included for the 
present analyses. Where correlational analyses were used to investigate the effect 
of parental cognitive styles, coping strategies, and psychopathology on child 
PTSD, the outcome measures used were the REES-C and the CPSS. 
8.1 Parental psychopathology over time 
Before examining the relationships between parental and child variables, some 
consideration of the impact on parents of their child's trauma (and in a few cases 
their own trauma as well) is warranted. Table 8.1 shows the mean scores of 
parents on the PDS, BDI, and the state sub-scale of the STAI at each time point. 
1 
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A within-subjects ANOVA revealed there to be a significant main effect of time 
for scores on the PDS (F = 8.23, df = 2,44, p<001). T-tests revealed significant 
differences in PDS scores between the two to four week and three months time 
points (t = 2.58, df = 29, p<05), and between the two to four week and six month 
time points (t = 4.47, df = 32, p<0001), but not between the three month and six 
month assessments. With regards to depressive symptomatology, a main effect of 
time for BDI scores was observed also (F = 8.23, df = 2,44, p<001). T-tests 
showed no significant differences between the two to four week and three month 
assessments, or between the three and six month assessments, but a significant 
difference between two to four week and six months was found (t = 3.20, df = 35, 
p<01). Anxious symptomatology scores, as assessed by the state anxiety sub- 
scale of the STAI, also were subjected to ANOVA. No main effect of time point 
was observed. 
Table 8.1 Parental psychopathology by time point 
Mean Score 
(Standard Deviation) 
Time point PDS BDI STAI 
2-4 weeks (n=59) 13.12 (11.54) 7.63(9.21) 36.44 (13.10) 
3 months (n=37) 6.68(8.62) 4.32(4.67) 37.14 (11.84) 
6 months (n=42) 5.81(8.74) 3.95(6.91) 34.89 (14.11) 
Note. PDS = Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; 
STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory. 
To the investigator's knowledge no data for the PDS in non-clinical populations is 
available. The parents' mean score on the BDI at the initial two to four week 
assessment was found to be below the cut-off used for mild depression (Beck & 
Beamesderfer, 1974), and similar to the level of depression observed in a large 
population of mothers exposed to civil war in Bosnia-Hercegovina (Smith et al., 
2001). At the follow up assessments, however, parental symptornatology dropped 
below the levels exhibited in this sample of mothers. Parents' scores on the state 
anxiety sub-scale of the STAI at two to four weeks and three months was slightly 
higher than normative data for American women (mean = 35.21; Spielberger et 
al., 1983), but very slightly lower than these levels at the six month follow up. 
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8.2 Relationships between parent and child psychopathology 
Correlations between parent and child measures of post-traumatic stress and 
depressive and anxious psychopathology at each time point are displayed in Table 
8.2. 
Table 8.2 Correlations between parent and child psychopathology by time point 
Parent Psychopathology 
Child 24 weeks 3 months 6 months 
Psychopathology PDS BDI STAI PDS BDI STAI PDS BDI STAI 
2-4 weeks: (n=58) (n=34) (n=38) 
RIES-C . 27 . 40** . 32 . 21 . 17 . 16 . 36 . 
37 . 17 
BDSRS . 25 . 37* . 34* . 26 . 07 . 11 . 
29 . 38 . 27 
3 months: (n=29) (n=35) (n=26) 
RIES-C . 17 . 40 . 23 . 33 . 24 . 18 . 17 . 
29 . 09 
CPSS . 21 . 42 . 25 . 32 . 27 . 18 . 08 . 28 . 
02 
BDSRS . 28 . 34 . 22 . 16 . 00 -. 02 -. 10 . 10 -. 
16 
RCMAS . 10 . 41 . 15 . 02 . 01 -. 09 . 00 . 15 -. 
19 
6 months: (n=40) (n=29) (n=41) 
RIES-C . 31 . 40* . 25 . 23 . 19 . 05 . 48* . 49* . 39 
CPSS . 34 . 39* . 17 . 16 . 20 -. 01 . 36 . 43* . 26 
BDSRS . 29 . 32 . 09 -. 10 . 02 -. 16 . 31 . 39 . 22 
RCMAS . 38 . 39* . 14 . 05 . 01 -. 14 . 39 . 42* . 22 
PDS = Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; STAI = 
State anxiety sub-scale of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory; BDSRS = Birleson 
Depression Self-Rating Scale; RIES-C = Revised Impact of Event Scale, child version; 
CPSS = Child Post-traumatic Symptom Scale; RCMAS = Revise Child Manifest Anxiety 
Scale. 
*= <01' <001 
Parental depression at the two to four week assessment was found to correlate 
with child PTSD and depression at the same assessment point, and to predict child 
PTSD (as assessed by both the RIES-C and the CPSS) and anxiety at the six 
month assessment. Parental anxiety was correlated with initial child depression, 
but failed to predict any later psychopathology. Relationships with any of the 
three-month variables were non-significant, though this is likely to be due to the 
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poor completion rate of the three-month questionnaire battery. Parental depression 
and PTSD at the six month assessment were significantly correlated with child 
PTSD at this assessment point, while parental depression was also significantly 
associated with child anxiety. No other significant associations were observed. 
8.3 Relationships between parent and child objective and subjective indices of 
trauma severity 
Correlations between parent and child objective and subjective indices of trauma 
severity are displayed in Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3 Pearson's Product Moment Correlations between parent and child 
objective and subjective indices of trauma severity 
Parent variables 
Objective index of Subjective index of 
trauma severity: trauma severity: 
Direct exposure I was really scared" 
(n=58) (n=54) 
Child variables: 
Objective indices of trauma severity: 
Fracture -. 12 -. 17 
Admitted -. 02 . 22 
Triage -. 04 . 07 
Subjective indices of trauma 
severity: 
"I really thought that I was going to 
die" -. 11 . 21 
"I thought that I was going to be 
very badly hurt" -. 03 . 19 
I was really scared" -. 11 . 10 
I was scared that someone else 
might get badly hurt"" . 03 . 30 
Parent variables: 
Subjective index of trauma severity: 
"I was really scared" . 13 
A trend towards a relationship between a child being admitted to hospital and 
parent subjective trauma severity was noted, but this failed to reach significance. 
Children were not more distressed by the presence of a parent in the same trauma. 
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A single significant correlation was observed between parental subjective trauma 
severity and the child item assessing fear that someone else might be hurt. No 
significant relationships between parent and child objective and subjective indices 
of trauma severity. These data suggest that child appraisals of the severity of a 
trauma were not affected by either their parent's exposure to the same trauma, or 
their parent's appraisal of the severity of the trauma. 
&4 Relationships between parent and child cognitive styles and coping strategies 
Correlations between parent and child responses on those cognitive styles and 
coping strategies found in chapter 7 to be significant predictors of child PTSD are 
displayed in Table 8.4. 
The relationships between parent and child responses on the same measure (or an 
age-appropriate version in the case of children) were predominantly non- 
significant. Parental endorsement of worry as a positive strategy was significantly 
correlated with child anxiety sensitivity (as measured by the CASI). In addition, 
parent scores on the MMQ were significantly correlated with several of the child 
cognitive style measures (the social support sub-scale of the cTCQ, the RSQ, and 
the CASI), though why this should be the case is more difficult to explain, since 
the NWQ is a measure of aspects of the memory of the event experienced, and not 
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8.5 Parental cognitive styles and coping strategies as correlates and predictors of 
parental PTSD and depression 
Correlational analyses were used to examine the relationships between parental 
cognitive styles and coping strategies and parental psychopathology (see Table 
8.5). Direct exposure to the trauma was not related to depression or PTSD at any 
assessment point. The subjective index of trauma severity item was a correlate of 
PTSD at the initial assessment, but failed to predict PTSD at six month follow up, 
or depressive psychopathology. Memory quality, as assessed by the MMQ, was 
found to be a significant correlate of FITSD at the initial interview, as well as 
being a significant predictor of PTSD at the three and six month follow up 
assessments. 
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Table 8.5. Relationships between parental cognitive styles and coping strategies 
and depressive and PTSD psychopathology 
Parent cognitive styles 








2-4 week measures: (n=47) (n=28) (n=30) 
Direct exposure to 
trauma . 14 . 22 . 03 -. 11 -. 13 -. 11 
"I was really scared" 
item . 32 . 42* . 11 . 30 . 22 . 39 
MMQ . 51** . 64*** . 22 . 70*** . 33 . 46* 
TCQ distract . 12 . 10 -. 19 . 17 -. 16 -. 22 
TCQ reappraisal -. 10 . 00 -. 10 . 04 . 07 . 03 
TCQ social support . 01 . 04 -. 08 . 13, . 09 -. 11 
RSQ . 56*** . 41 * . 13 . 34 . 31 . 24 
ASI . 46** . 36* . 13 . 63** . 35 . 22 
MCQ . 37* . 31 . 25 . 60** . 11 . 18 
3 month measures: (n=36) (n=27) 
Thought suppression 
item - - . 55** . 52* . 11 . 06 
Distraction item - - . 44* . 47* . 06 . 04 
Rumination (sum of 3 
items) - - . 42 . 62*** . 24 . 10 
FFQ irritable distress - - . 65*** . 69*** . 59* . 54* 
FFQ involvement - - . 30 . 40 . 34 . 29 
Maternal overprotection - - . 38 . 53** . 06 . 15 
MMQ = Memory Modality Questionnaire; TCQ = Thought Control Questionnaire; RSQ 
= Response Styles Questionnaire (rumination); ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Index; MCQ = 
Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire, positive beliefs about worry sub-scale; FFQ = Family 
Functioning Questionnaire; PDS = Posttraurnatic Stress Diagnostic Scale; BDI = Beck 
Depression Inventory. 
*= <01' ** = <001, <0001 
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The sub-scales of the TCQ investigated in child participants (the distraction, social 
support and reappraisal sub-scales) were unrelated to either depressive or PTSD 
symptomatology at any time point. The RSQ was a correlate of depression and 
PTSD at the initial time point, but failed to predict later psychopathology. Both 
the ASI and the positive beliefs sub-scale of the MCQ were also correlates of 
initial psychopathology, and both measures predicted FITSD symptoms at three 
months. Neither measure predicted psychopathology at six month follow-up, 
however. 
A number of the coping strategies assessed at the three-month follow up were 
significantly related to both forms of psychopathology assessed at that time point 
(thought suppression and distraction, and the irritable distress sub-scale of the 
FFQ). However, only the irritable distress sub-scale of the FFQ significantly 
predicted parent psychopathology (both PTSD and depression) at the six-month 
follow up. 
8.6 Parental cognitive styles and coping strategies as correlates and predictors of 
child PTSD 
Correlational analyses were performed between parental cognitive styles and 
coping strategies and child PTSD at each time point, the results of which are 
presented in Table 8.6. 
The quality of parent's memories were found to be significant correlates of 
children's PTSD symptoms at the initial assessment, though this may be have 
been due to the strong correlation between parental FTSD and MMQ scores. 
Direct parental exposure to the trauma was not related to child PTSD at any time 
point. The positive beliefs about worry sub-scale of the MCQ was correlated with 
PTSD at the two to four week assessment, but failed to predict PTSD at'later 
assessments. 
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Table 8.6 Correlations between parental cognitive styles and coping strategies 
and child PTSD at each time point 
Child PTSD 
2-4 
weeks 3 months 6 months 
Parent cognitive styles and 
coping strategies RIES-C RIES-C CPSS RIES-C CPSS 
2-4 week measures: (n=53) 
Direct exposure to trauma . 02 
I was really scared" item . 26 
MMQ . 36* 
TCQ distract . 25 
TCQ reappraisal -. 02 
TCQ social support . 02 
RSQ . 24 
ASI . 22 
MCQ . 34* 
(n=26) (n=35) 
-. 02 -. 02 -. 02 . 01 
. 20 . 27 . 27 . 19 
. 23 . 22 . 28 . 28 
. 43 . 29 . 15 . 15 
-. ls -. 16 -. 05 -. 11 
. 21 . 20 . 20 . 17 
. 25 . 19 . 15 . 15 
. 07 . 09 -. 04 -. oi 
. 38 . 41 . 38 . 33 
3 month measures: (n=36) (n=29) 
Thought suppression item - . 30 . 34 . 01 -. 03 
Distraction item - . 32 . 34 . 02 -. 04 
Rumination (sum of 3 items) - . 46* . 50* . 23 . 17 
FFQ irritable distress - . 32 . 37 . 24 . 21 
FFQ involvement - . 45* . 42* . 26 . 18 
Matemal overprotection - . 37 . 32 . 04 . 09 
PTSD = Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; MMQ = Memory Modality Questionnaire; TCQ 
= Thought Control Questionnaire; RSQ = Response Styles Questionnaire (rumination); 
ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Index; MCQ = Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire, positive beliefs 
about worry sub-scale; FFQ = Family Functioning Questionnaire; RIES-C = Revised 
Impact of Event Scale, child version; CPSS = Child Post-traumatic Symptom Scale. 
*= <01 
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Parental rumination and the involvement sub-scale of the FFQ were significantly 
correlated with concurrent PTSD (as assessed by both the RIES-C and the CPSS), 
but no measures were predictive of PTSD at the six month assessment. 
&7 Summary 
An investigation was conducted into the effect of parent psychopathology and 
cognitive processes on children's responses following attendance at an A&E 
department after an assault or RTA. Levels of PTSD and depression in the parents 
of children exposed to such events were found to have decreased by the follow up 
assessments, while levels of anxiety were static. Initial parental depression was 
significantly related to children's PTSD at both the initial assessment and six 
month follow up. 
Of the cognitive processes assessed, no adult and child versions of the same 
measure were correlated. However, there were relationships between parental 
memory quality and child use of social support in coping with intrusive memories, 
a ruminative style, and anxiety sensitivity, as well as an association between 
parental endorsement of worry as a positive strategy and child anxiety sensitivity. 
The onset of parental PTSD following their children's exposure to trauma was 
related to their own subjective appraisal of threat, memory quality, a general 
ruminative style, and fear concerning the symptoms of anxiety. Direct exposure 
did not contribute to parental PTSD scores at any time point. The onset of parental 
depression was related to memory quality, ruminative style, anxiety sensitivity, 
and endorsing worry as a positive strategy. Only memory quality was found to 
relate consistently to parental PTSD at each time point, while family irritable 
distress was the only variable assessed'at three months to be correlated with 
parental PTSD and depression at both the three-month and six-month follow up 
assessments. These data suggest that parents can experience some IPTSD 
symptoms following a child's exposure to trauma, and that these symptoms can 
occur in the absence of direct exposure to the trauma. It is also to be noted, 
however, that such symptoms are mostly transient and not severe. 
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Parental endorsement of worry as being a positive coping strategy was a 
significant correlate of the onset of child PTSD, as was parental memory quality. 
No parental cognitive processes assessed at either the two to four week or three- 
month assessment points significantly predicted scores on self-report measures of 
PTSD at the six-month follow up point. 
In conclusion, it would be appear that child responses to trauma are related to 
responses of their parents. The study undertaken here replicated previous findings 
that parental psychopathology (in particular parental depression) correlates with 
child PTSD (Green et al., 1991; Korol et al., 1999; McFarlane, 1987a; Smith et 
al., 2001; Wolmer et al., 2000), but the mechanisms by which parental and child 
responses are related remain largely unknown. The small numbers of parents and 
children who completed the questionnaire booklets at each time point precluded 
the use of regression analyses, which would have helped to distinguish the role of 
parental psychopathology and cognitive processes from children's cognitive 
processes and other psychopathology. 
The lack of a relationship between direct parental exposure to the trauma and 
child PTSD suggests that within this age group children's responses to a trauma 
are not affected by parental presence during the event. The issue remains as to 
why depression was the only parental variable consistently to be associated with 
child PTSD. A depressed parent may simply be less able to offer encouragement 
to a child following trauma, and less able to encourage the child to adopt more 
adaptive coping strategies, e. g. resuming a normal routine. The significant 
relationship between parental endorsement of worry and child anxiety sensitivity 
does indicate that a significant child psychopathological trait may be modelled, at 
least partially, on a related maladaptive parental cognitive style. 
It is noteworthy that although several significant findings were observed regarding 
the relationship between child PTSD and parent responses to their child's trauma, 
the size of the sample investigated was not large. Furthermore, the sizes of the 
correlations were not very large, e. g. the correlation coefficients between parental 
depression and child PTSD were no greater than . 40, suggesting that no more than 
16% of the variance in child PTSD was explained by parental psychopathology. 
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These findings, especially in light of the previous chapter's findings where child 
cognitive processes were found to account for a great of variance in PTSD, 
sharply contrast with the report of McFarlane (1987a) that maternal responses to a 
bushfire better predicted child PTSD than a child's own exposure. This disparity 
may be attributable to the reliance on parental report for assessing child PTSD in 
McFarlane's study. 
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Chapter 9: General Discussion 
The present investigation was directed towards understanding cognitive aspects of 
PTSD in children and adolescents. Two studies were designed to examine whether 
cognitive models of PTSD in adults might be usefully applied to children and 
adolescents. In particular these studies were aimed at testing whether cognitive 
processes involved in the onset and maintenance of PTSD might be differentiated, 
and whether cognitive processes might be more responsible for causing PTSD 
than demographic and trauma-related factors. In this chapter the hypotheses 
presented for this investigation in section 1.8.3 will be evaluated, limitations of 
the investigation will be discussed, implications for clinical practice will be 
outlined, and suggestions for future research will be specified. 
9.1 Review of hypotheses 
In section 1.8.3 a number of hypotheses were made regarding aspects of children 
and adolescents' responses to trauma and the actiology of PTSD, in the context of 
a theoretical approach to PTSD where much emphasis is placed upon the role of 
distinct cognitive processes in the onset and maintenance of the disorder. In this 
section it will be discussed whether these hypotheses were supported by the 
evidence presented. 
9.1.1 Hypothesis 1: PTSD symptomatology will decrease as afunction of time 
Study 2 comprised a prospective study of children and adolescents' psychological 
responses to either an assault or an RTA. Details of how participants' PTSD and 
depressive symptomatology changed over time were presented in chapter 6. PTSD 
levels, as assessed by semi-structured interview, were found to decrease between 
the two to four week and six month assessment points. This finding was clarified 
by responses to self-report questionnaires, where PTSD levels were found to 
decrease between the two to four week and three month assessments, but not 
between the three month and six month assessments. This endorsement of 
hypothesis 1 lends support to an onset-maintenance approach in understanding the 
aetiology of PTSD in this age group. 
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9.1.2 Hypothesis 2: Subjective indices of trauma orfrightening event severity will 
account for unique variance in PTSD scores over and above objective indices of 
trauma severity and other demographic variables 
In both Study 1 and Study 2 subjective indices of trauma or frightening event 
severity were found to account for a significant proportion of variance in PTSD 
symptornatology over and above demographic and objective trauma-related 
variables. Indeed, only in Study 1 did age and sex significantly relate to PTSD 
symptoms, while even then the subjective indices of trauma severity (in this case, 
how scared, sad, angry, ashamed, and helpless the children described themselves 
as being during the event) accounted for considerably greater variance. This 
finding supports previous research in both children (Yule, et al. 1999) and adults 
(Ehlers, et al. 1998; Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 2001) that subjective estimates of 
the severity of a trauma are more significant factors than objective estimates of 
trauma severity (e. g. degree of injury sustained), or demographic variables such as 
age and sex. 
9.1.3 Hypothesis 3: Sensory-based and fragmented memories will be correlated 
with post-traumatic stress symptoms following a trauma orfrightening event 
A prominent feature of both Brewin et al. (1996) and Ehlers and Clark's (2000) 
cognitive models of IITSD in adults is the emphasis placed on the quality of the 
memories laid down of a trauma in the onset of PTSD. Recent evidence (Halligan 
et al, 2003) supports this proposal. Very few studies have attempted to examine 
thoroughly the role of trauma memory in children. In the present study a self- 
report measure of memory quality was designed and distributed to participants in 
both a cross-sectional study (Study 1) and a prospective study (Study 2). In each 
case, scores on this measure of memory quality, the MMQ, accounted for a 
significant proportion of variance in PTSD scores. In addition, the variance 
accounted for by the MMQ was distinct from the variance accounted for by either 
subjective indices of trauma severity, or objective indices of trauma severity and 
demographic variables. 
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The strong relationship observed in Study 2 between memory quality and the 
onset of PTSD, together with the failure of this variable to predict PTSD at six 
month follow up above and beyond initial PTSD symptomatology, supports the 
distinction between onset and maintenance processes in the aetiology of PTSD in 
children and adolescents. Furthermore, the finding that memory quality is an 
aspect of children and adolescents' responses to trauma that is separate from 
appraisals of threat and peri-traumatic distress suggests that a single-level account 
of PTSD, such as the fear conditioning model espoused by Foa, Steketee, and 
Rothbaum (1989), is inadequate in this age group. 
9.1.4 Hypothesis 4: Peri-traumatic dissociation will be correlated with the onset 
of PTSD symptoms, but to much a lesser extent be predictive of chronic PTSD, 
while the dissociation criterion ofASD will not significantly enhance the ability of 
the diagnosis to predict chronic PTSD 
In Study 2 dissociative responses to an assault or an RTA were assessed in two 
ways. ASD, which includes a diagnostic criterion relating to dissociation, was 
assessed by a semi-structured interview with the investigator, while the battery of 
self-report questionnaires that participants completed comprised several items 
pertaining to peri-traumatic dissociation and confusion. The ability of the ASD 
diagnosis to predict PTSD at six months, investigated in chapter 6, was very good, 
but the inclusion of the dissociation criterion did not play a noticeable role. While 
found to be significantly correlated with both the onset of PTSD and a predictor of 
PTSD at six months, the self-report items assessing dissociation and confusion 
were not entered in regression models in chapter 7, due to the failure of the 
dissociation criterion of ASD to predict PTSD over and above over symptoms in 
the previous chapter, and the need to enhance the power of the regression analyses 
conducted. It was not therefore possible to determine whether these items would 
significantly predict PTSD at six months over and above initial PTSD 
symptornatology, i. e. whether or not these items have a role in the maintenance of 
PTSD. 
The above hypothesis would appear broadly to be supported by the data gathered 
for this investigation. Further research is necessary, however, to determine 
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conclusively whether the significant relationship found between peri-traumatic 
dissociation and PTSD at six months is due to the role of this process in the onset 
of PTSD, or whether peri-traumatic dissociation has an additional role in the 
maintenance of PTSD. 
9.1.5 Hypothesis 5: The various cognitive processes investigated will be 
correlated with PTSD symptomatology in Study 1, and in Study 2 will predict 
chronic PTSD over and above the effects of the variables hypothesised to be 
involved in the onset of PTSD 
The cognitive processes assessed in Study 1 (general thought control strategies, 
thought control strategies for coping with intrusive memories of the reported 
frightening event, and post-traumatic appraisals) were found to account for a large 
proportion of variance in PTSD symptornatology in a sample of non-clinical 
children and adolescents. In particular the use of thought suppression in coping 
with intrusive memories of the reported frightening event, endorsing reappraisal 
as a way of coping with general intrusive thoughts and memories, and the sense of 
being a feeble person in a scary world were significant associates of PTSD. 
The discovery of the role of thought suppression in the aetiology of PTSD 
emulates the findings of experimental studies in adults that have observed a 
paradoxical increase in the frequency of to-be-suppressed information (Purdon, 
1999), and the discovery of a role for thought suppression in prospective studies 
of adults exposed to traumatic events (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Ehlers, et al. 
1998; Steil & Ehlers, 2000). Such a finding is advocated by Ehlers and Clark's 
(2000) cognitive model of PTSD in adults, where thought suppression is 
hypothesised to be not only an avoidant response but, due to the rebound effect, 
actively worsens the frequency of intrusive memories. This finding of Study 1, 
contradicts the failure to observe a rebound effect in an experimental study of 
thought suppression with 11 -year-old children (Gaskell, et al. 200 1). 
The positive correlation between endorsing reappraisal as a way of coping with 
intrusive thoughts and memories and PTSD symptornatology is at first sight 
counter-intuitive; reappraisal is often thought of as an adaptive problem-solving 
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strategy, and in the case of PTSD may serve to rectify maladaptive appraisals, or 
even assist in the emotional processing of traumatic memories. The data from the 
present study suggest that in the aftermath of a frightening event, such a coping 
style is maladaptive. It is likely, therefore, that reappraisal in such circumstances 
or in this age group is frequently unsuccessful in leading towards resolution of a 
frightening or traumatic event, and may even be an index of ruminative style; a 
positive correlation between scores on the RSQ and the reappraisal sub-scale of 
the cTCQ (r--. 50, n=87, p<0001) suggests that the latter explanation is the case. 
Appraising the self as feeble and the world as being a scary place may promote 
the occurrence of PTSD in a number of ways. Avoidance, and other maladaptive 
forms of coping, may be encouraged, and hyperarousal on exposure to trauma- 
related cues may be exaggerated, decreasing the likelihood of habituation over 
time. 
While this evidence strongly implicates a role for cognitive processes in the 
aetiology of PTSD, it does not differentiate between processes involved in the 
onset and maintenance of PTSD. Distinguishing onset and maintenance processes 
was possible in Study 2 however. In addition to the processes examined in Study 
1, measures assessing meta-cognitive beliefs and cognitive styles were completed 
by participants. Ruminative style, fear of anxiety symptoms, endorsement of 
worry as a positive coping style, and the use of reappraisal in coping with 
intrusive thoughts and memories, were correlates of PTSD at the initial 
assessment, and predictors of PTSD at six months post-trauma. 
The role of these processes soon after the trauma may have been, in the case of 
rumination, worry, fear of anxious symptoms, and reappraisal, to exaggerate the 
importance and meaning of the symptoms of PTSD, the impact of the trauma on 
their evaluation of their present life and their future prospects, and to maintain a 
high level of physiological arousal. The finding that a meta-cognitive style where 
anxious symptoms are negatively appraised was predictive of PTSD suggests that 
children and adolescents may possess the capacity for the same kind of negative 
appraisals of post-traumatic symptornatology that have been implicated in adult 
PTSD (Dunmore, et al. 2001; Ehlers, et al. 1998; Steil & Ehlers, 2000). Worry 
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may be a factor in maintaining a sense of "current threat", a feature of the model 
of Ehlers and Clark (2000). 
Post-traumatic appraisals, and trauma-specific thought control strategies, both 
crucial elements of the cognitive model of Ehlers and Clark (2000), were assessed 
at three months, and were found to be strongly correlated with PTSD at six 
months. However, only thought suppression was found to account for variance in 
PTSD scores at six months over and above initial PTSD scores. 
In conclusion, this investigation has found that a number of cognitive processes 
contribute to both the onset and maintenance of PTSD, supporting the hypothesis. 
9.1.6 Hypothesis 6: Maladaptive appraisals concerning the trauma orfrightening 
event will be related to the use of maladaptive coping strategies, in both Study 1 
and Study 2 
Significant relationships between post-traumatic appraisals and maladaptive 
thought control strategies, were observed in both Study I and Study 2. These 
relationships offer one pathway for how negative post-traumatic appraisals, such 
as seeing oneself as a weak person or the symptoms of PTSD as being a sign of 
brain damage or "madness", are associated with more severe PTSD. These data 
therefore support the hypothesis, and emulate the relationship observed between 
negative appraisals of intrusive memories and avoidance in adult survivors of 
RTAs (Steil & Ehlers, 2000). 
9.1.7 Hypothesis 7. Family psychopathology and cognitive processes will be 
found in Study 2 to be related to child PTSD, particularly in the maintenance of 
the disorder 
Parental depression was found to be correlated with child PTSD in families 
participating in Study 2. Parental endorsement of worry as a positive activity and 
ruminative style were correlated with initial (two to four week) child PTSD, but 
not later psychopathology. That parental endorsement of worry impacted on their 
children's responses to trauma suggests that such attitudes either led to overt 
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worrisome behaviour (e. g. bringing up the trauma in conversation, expressing 
concern over future harm) which in turn exaggerated their children's appraisals of 
future threat, or that such attitudes were modelled by the children prior to the 
trauma and influenced their cognitive style and responses to the trauma. The 
quality of parents' memories of the trauma also was correlated with child PTSD, 
but only at the two to four week assessment point. 
While these findings broadly support the hypothesis, many issues regarding the 
relationship between child and parent responses to trauma remain. The small size 
of the sample of children and parents who completed self-report questionnaires at 
each time point precluded the use of regression analyses, which would have been 
able to identify whether parental responses had any impact over and above child 
variables alone. This inability to use regression analyses meant that it was not 
possible to distinguish fully the role of parental variables in the onset and 
maintenance of child PTSD. 
9.1.8 Hypothesis 8: Where prior psychopathology was related to the onset and 
maintenance of PTSD in participants of Study 2, this relationship will be 
attributable at least in part to the role of maladaptive cognitive styles and coping 
strategies that pre-existed the trauma 
Psychopathology prior to the assault or RTA was not found to be a significant 
correlate of PTSD at any time point. This finding contradicts other studies of child 
and adolescent responses to trauma (Asamow et al., 1999; La Greca, et al., 1998), 
though the present study has clear methodological failings relative to these other 
studies; the assessment of prior psychopathology utilised a crude, dichotomous 
index of the extent of psychological disorder (i. e. whether or not the child had 
seen a doctor or other professional regarding an "an emotional or behavioue, 
problem), and was based solely on a retrospective report obtained from parents. 
The lack of a relationship between prior psychopathology and PTSD makes it 
impossible to evaluate this hypothesis effectively. However, the cognitive 
processes assessed at the initial time point of Study 2 that were found to have a 
strong relationship with both the onset and maintenance of PTSD were not 
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trauma-specific, and may still have been indices of psychopathological processes 
that existed prior to the trauma. Even if children and adolescents participating in 
Study 2 had not yet experienced an anxious or depressive disorder, these 
processes may have been risk factors for experiencing such disorders, which were 
eventually triggered by the occurrence of the trauma. Only a prospective study 
where both psychopathology and psychopathological processes were examined 
prior to the occurrence of a traumatic event would allow a full examination of 
theseissues. 
9.1.9 Hypothesis 9: The cognitive processes involved in causing PTSD symptoms 
in participants of Study 1 and Study 2, in particular negative appraisals, will also 
play a large role in causing depressive responses to the trauma or frightening 
event 
Memory quality, maladaptive thought control strategies, and post-traumatic 
appraisals were found to be significantly related to depressive responses in 
participants of both Study 1 and Study 2. In Study 2, processes involved in the 
onset and maintenance of depression were again distinguished, with the onset of 
depression being associated with subjective indices of trauma severity, memory 
quality, and the cognitive processes measured at the initial assessment point 
(ruminative style, fear concerning the symptoms of anxiety, endorsing worry, and 
the use of social support and reappraisal as a way of coping with intrusive 
thoughts and memories), and the maintenance of depression being associated with 
a sense of "permanent and disturbing change" and being a "feeble person in a 
scary world" and trauma-specific thought suppression and rumination. 
In both studies the cognitive variables assessed accounted for a considerable 
proportion of variance in depression scores. While these data support hypothesis 
9, the success of these cognitive predictors to account for post-traumatic 
depression raises the issue of the specificity of the cognitive models of PTSD as 
applied to children and adolescents. A degree of specificity was observed, with 
memory quality being more involved in the onset of PTSD, and cognitive styles 
playing more of a role in the onset of depression. Nevertheless, the power of 
memory quality to account significantly for both depressive as well as PTSD 
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symptomatology, despite being considered to be the critical feature underlying the 
re-experiencing symptoms of PTSD, is problematic. While these disorders may 
share certain underlying psychopathological processes, future research may be 
usefully directed towards developing more precise models that distinguish 
between these processes, as has recently been successfully attempted in adults 
(Ehring, Glucksman, & Ehlers, 2003). 
9.1.10 Summary 
The evidence presented in this investigation supports the application of significant 
elements of cognitive models of PTSD in adults to the understanding of this 
disorder in children and adolescents. In particular, it has been demonstrated that 
cognitive processes play a significant role in the aetiology of PTSD over and 
above objective indices of trauma severity and demographic variables, and that 
onset and maintenance processes can be differentiated. However, this 
investigation was not able to examine fully the role of parents in the aetiology of 
child PTSD, failed to replicate the findings of other studies where prior 
psychopathology predicts PTSD, and demonstrated that the cognitive processes 
thought to be playing a major role in the aetiology of PTSD also contributed 
largely to the aetiology of depressive responses. 
9.2 Limitations 
The present investigation has contributed to the understanding of cognitive aspects 
involved in the aetiology of PTSD in children and adolescents. However, several 
significant methodological and theoretical issues limit the application of the 
investigation's findings. 
Firstly, the age range of participants of both studies was restricted to older 
children and adolescents. This was considered necessary due to the exploratory 
nature of the investigation, which is one of the first designed with the aim of 
applying elements of adult cognitive models of PTSD to children. It is in younger 
age groups, below the age of 10, where the most significant cognitive 
development occurs. In this age group the aetiology PTSD may be related less to 
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higher-order cognitive processes such as rumination, worry, thought suppression 
and negative appraisals (for which they did not possess adequate cognitive 
development), but more to other processes such as linguistic development 
(involved in the encoding of the trauma) and social support. 
Secondly, the studies were conducted with regards either to "frightening events" 
that may not have been "traumatic" (in the case of Study 1), or only to assaults 
and RTAs (in the case of Study 2). Many of the events reported by participants of 
Study 1 would probably not be considered to reach Criterion A of DSM-IV, i. e. be 
recognised as being traumatic. The sample obtained for Study 1 did function as a 
useful analogue population, with similar cognitive processes being implicated in 
the aetiology of PTSD as were implicated in participants of Study 2, but such a 
sample may prove to be less useful for considering in greater detail aspects of the 
children's cognitive responses to the trauma, such as memory processes. Study 2 
relied on the recruitment of children and adolescents who attended an A&E 
department in South London following either an assault or RTA. These events are 
in themselves "one-off' events; this feature of the study sample was enhanced by 
excluding children and adolescents who had been assaulted by parents, where 
there existed the possibility of serial violence and abuse. There exists the 
possibility that the cognitive processes examined in this study may play differing 
roles in the aftermath of other types of trauma, in particular following chronic 
trauma (e. g. war, abuse). 
Thirdly, the numbers of participants recruited for Study 2 and the proportion of 
participants who completed the follow up assessments was low. Larger numbers 
of participants and a higher retention rate would have allowed for regression 
analyses with greater power, particularly when examining the impact of parental 
psychopathology and cognitive processes, and for examining the relative impact 
of the individual cognitive processes assessed in children, e. g. appraisal processes 
assessed at three months. Furthermore, greater numbers of participants would 
have allowed for comparison of the assault and RTA groups, so as to assess 
whether the impact of the cognitive processes investigated might be generalised 
across traumas. 
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Fourthly, as mentioned at the end of chapter 6, using the RIES-C as the principal 
self-report measure of PTSD may have not have been warranted. While this 
measure has been used widely and successfully in research studies of children and 
adolescents exposed to trauma, the omission of certain key PTSD symptoms (such 
as nightmares, flashbacks, and emotional numbing) may have made this measure 
more pertinent to moderate PTSD reactions. This may explain why participants in 
Study 1 scored relatively highly on this measure, and the ability of the cognitive 
processes to account for a great deal of variance in RIES-C scores. Had the CPSS, 
which comprises items that match to each of the DSM-IV symptoms of PTSD, 
been used in this study, the amount of variance accounted for might have been 
smaller. Similarly, when examining the role of cognitive and other processes in 
the onset of PTSD in Study 2, different results may have been obtained with the 
CPSS. 
Fifthly, the measure of memory quality designed for this investigation, the MMQ, 
is in need of further clarification. This measure was found to account for a 
substantial proportion of variance in PTSD scores over and above objective and 
subjective indices of trauma severity. However, the content of this measure (see 
chapter 4 for a list of the items that were included in this measure) bears a strong 
resemblance to aspects of the re-experiencing symptoms of the PTSD diagnosis; it 
might be argued therefore that this measure acts merely as a further index of 
PTSD, rather than measuring a critical underlying process. While the MMQ only 
comprises items that refer to the quality of trauma memories, rather than the 
frequency with which such memories are intrusively experienced, investigation of 
this measure in conjunction with other, possibly experimental, measures of trauma 
memory quality (e. g. narrative analysis, examination of trauma memories in 
comparison with other autobiographical memories) is warranted. 
Sixthly, negative post-traumatic appraisals (concerning a sense of permanent and 
disturbing change, and being a feeble person in a scary world), and maladaptive 
trauma-specific coping strategies in Study 2 were only assessed at three months 
post-trauma. Since it was not considered viable to assess these variables at the 
initial two to four week assessment due to methodological concerns (i. e. not 
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wishing to overburden participants at this time point), it was not possible to rule 
out a role for such appraisals and coping strategies in the onset of PTSD. 
9.3 Clinical implications 
The findings of this investigation have several implications for clinical practice 
with children and adolescents exposed to trauma. When considering these 
implications, however, the above limitations must be held in mind. 
Firstly, the major role of memory quality observed in both studies of this 
investigation suggest that tackling this aspect of children and adolescents' 
responses to a traumatic event is a fundamental component of any psychological 
treatment for PTSD. Simply challenging maladaptive appraisals and coping 
strategies would not be expected to modify the quality of an individual's memory 
of a traumatic event, and hence address a central process underlying PTSD. 
Secondly, while changing maladaptive appraisals and coping strategies may not 
on their own be sufficient for the treatment of PTSD in children and adolescents, 
the evidence presented here does suggest that it may aid treatment. Ruminative 
style and negative appraisals, demonstrated here to be involved in maintaining 
PTSD, may generate the kind of "secondary emotions" which Brewin et al. 
(1996) consider to be impediments to successful habituation to trauma-related 
stimuli. Tackling such processes prior to modifying the nature of trauma 
memories may greatly increase the success of the intervention. 
Thirdly, the high rate of PTSD observed in participants who had experienced an 
assault, and the similarity between participants exposed to assault and participants 
exposed to RTAs in the level and time course of PTSD symptornatology, suggest 
that assaults are a neglected cause of PTSD, to which the existing findings 
regarding children and adolescent's responses to RTAs may be appropriately 
applied. Larger-scale studies in different socio-economic contexts that examine 
children and adolescents' responses to assaults are warranted in order to verify 
these findings, particularly when it is considered that such events are commonly 
occurring events amongst youth (MORI, 2002). Nevertheless, the need for 
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medical professionals to be aware of the significant psychological injury caused 
by one-off, non-sexual assaults is clear. 
Fourthly, the ability of the ASD diagnosis and early PTSD symptornatology to 
predict PTSD at six months, together with the significant drop in PTSD 
symptornatology between the two to four week and three month time points, 
suggest that intervention for children and adolescents at three months post-trauma 
may be appropriate. As unassisted recovery seems to occur for a period of three 
months or so following a trauma, treating children and adolescents with PTSD 
before this period has elapsed may be unnecessary. Intervention at the three month 
point, however, may prevent the formation of chronic and more complicated post- 
traumatic stress reactions. Further examination of the time course of PTSD 
symptornatology over the first few weeks and months following a trauma is still 
required, but the implication of data obtained from Study 2 is that serious cases of 
enduring PTSD may be identified early on. 
Fifthly, the results of both Study I and Study 2 suggest that memory quality and 
intrusive memory frequency plays some role in depressive responses to distressing 
events (thought did not account for unique variance in depressive 
symtpomatology). This aspect of depression in children and adolescents has 
received little attention, despite findings from investigations conducted in adult 
populations suggesting that intrusive memories may be a common feature of 
depression (Reynolds & Brewin, 1998; 1999). Acknowledging the occurrence of 
intrusive memories and providing appropriate strategies for coping with such 
phenomena may be an additional tool for clinicians working with depressed youth. 
9.4 Future research 
The limitations of this investigation, outlined in sub-section 9.2, present several 
ways in which the understanding of PTSD in children and adolescents might be 
advanced, e. g. examining cognitive processes in larger samples, investigating a 
younger age range, using more appropriate measures. Future research also might 
be addressed towards other issues arising from the application of adult cognitive 
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models of PTSD to children and adolescents. Three examples of questions such 
research might address are given here. 
Firstly, what processes are involved in the formation of sensory based, 
fragmented, affect laden and poorly verbalised memories, the kinds of memories 
that are hypothesised to be responsible for the onset of PTSD, has yet to be 
investigated in children and adolescents exposed to trauma. While the dissociation 
criterion of ASD did not add significantly to the ability of this diagnosis to predict 
chronic PTSD, dissociative processes may have prevented thorough processing of 
the trauma as it occurred or in its aftermath. Low intelligence, in particular low 
verbal intelligence, may have limited the extent to which the formation of verbal 
memories of a trauma was possible. Peri-traumatic panic also may have interfered 
with the processing of a trauma as it occurred. Study 2, the prospective study, 
found that while processes involved in the maintenance of PTSD play a significant 
role, most variance in PTSD at six months was explained by initial PTSD levels. It 
is therefore imperative that processes potentially involved in the onset of PTSD 
receive further investigation. 
Secondly, in the case of cognitive processes involved in both the onset and 
maintenance of PTSD there is a need to examine whether such processes pre- 
existed the trauma. There is the possibility that individuals with PTSD 
exaggerated their responses to measures assessing cognitive processes, treating 
them as indices of general distress, with the result that a significant relationship 
between these processes and PTSD scores was found. While such processes, such 
as rumination, may have been playing some role, their impact may have been 
overstated. In order to rule out this explanation, it would be necessary to examine 
such processes prior to the trauma. This is particularly true when attempting to 
identify whether processes such as trait dissociation and intelligence are involved 
in the onset of PTSD. A study similar to Study 1, with a prospective rather than a 
cross-sectional design, might be used to examine what consider more thoroughly 
what processes were involved in the onset and maintenance of PTSD. Cognitive 
processes such as anxiety sensitivity, ruminative and worrisome styles, and trait 
dissociation, would be assessed at the first time point, and then at a second time 
point post-traumatic stress reactions to any recently occurring traumatic events 
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would be assessed. Such a study would allow for regression analyses to elucidate 
the role of the processes assessed without concern that participants' endorsements 
of such processes were influenced by their PTSD symptomatology. How prior 
psychopathology impacted on post-traumatic stress responses to trauma, if such a 
relationship existed, might also be expounded using this methodology. 
Thirdly, further work is necessary to examine if children and adolescents modify 
memories of a traumatic event without professional assistance, and if they do, 
what techniques they use to achieve this. Little research has examined in depth 
how children and adolescents exposed to trauma make use of the social support of 
family and friends, utilise media such as diaries and writing, or practice forms of 
in vivo or imaginal exposure in handling their memories of the event. Identifying 
successful ways of addressing the kinds of memories that are central to the 
aetiology of PTSD, that are also acceptable to at least some children and 
adolescents, may inform how behavioural elements of psychological treatments 
for youth with PTSD are conducted. 
9.5 Conclusion 
Cognitive aspects of PTSD in children and adolescents were examined in two 
studies, one using a cross-sectional design and the other a prospective design. In 
particular the applicability of elements of cognitive models of PTSD in adults 
(Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) to children and adolescents was 
investigated. Each study found that cognitive processes, including memory 
quality, subjective indices of trauma severity, rumination, maladaptive thought 
control strategies, and maladaptive trauma-related appraisals, were related to 
PTSD symptornatology. The second of the two studies conducted, a prospective 
study of children and adolescents exposed to assaults and RTAs, yielded data 
supporting a distinction between processes involved in the onset and maintenance 
ofPTSD. 
Therefore, the application of key features of adult cognitive models of PTSD to 
children aged over 10 years was supported. More than this, however, the data 
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presented here have wider implications for both child and adolescent and adult 
cognitive models of PTSD. 
Firstly, the evidence presented here is relevant to the assessment of the adult 
cognitive models of PTSD from which the hypotheses tested in this investigation 
were derived (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). While the present 
investigation supported the onset-maintenance distinction that is a central feature 
of each of these models, it was also observed that onset processes played the most 
significant role. An ASD diagnosis and early ASD/PTSD criteria were good 
predictors of later PTSD, while two to four week PTSD symptornatology 
accounted for a very large proportion of variance in PTSD symptornatology at six 
months. The processes proposed by Brewin et al. (1996) and Ehlers and Clark 
(2000) to be responsible for the maintenance of PTSD (e. g. shame and anger, 
negative post-traumatic appraisals, rumination) may still have a significant role, 
but their importance must be considered to be secondary to processes involved in 
the onset of PTSD. This is further supported by the failure of nearly all three 
month cognitive processes to account for variance in PTSD at six months over and 
above initial PTSD symptomatology. The ability of early post-traumatic stress to 
predict later PTSD is recognised in adults (Brewin et al., 1999; Harvey & Bryant, 
1998), yet many studies have failed to acknowledge this fact, and have focused on 
examining psychological processes that predict later PTSD. Thus, it is suggested 
that attempts to uncover why certain individual children or adults develop acute 
post-traumatic stress would shed the most light on this disturbing condition. 
Of the onset processes proposed by both Brewin et al. (1996) and Ehlers and 
Clark (2000), the variable found to be the most significant in the present 
investigation was memory quality. Both of these models suggest that the nature of 
trauma memories is central to the aetiology of PTSD, and this is supported by the 
present study. The major role for memory quality in the onset of PTSD, and the 
failure of this variable to account for any unique variance in depressive 
symptomatology, emphasises that PTSD, while categorised within DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) as an anxiety disorder, is best 
understood as being a memory disorder. While anxiety refers to a more vague 
apprehension about future harm, the strong involvement of the nature of trauma 
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memories in PTSD suggests that it is the recall of particular types of trauma 
memory that gives rise to the core symptoms of PITSD. An advantage of the 
Brewin et al. (1996) model over the Ehlers and Clark (2000) model in this regard 
is that Brewin and colleagues relate the time course of PTSD (and particularly 
why some individuals recover and others do not) specifically to the nature of 
trauma memories, and the degree of processing that such memories receive. 
Both the Brewin et al. (1996) and the Ehlers and Clark (2000) models emphasise 
the importance of the quality of trauma memory, but also build upon the fear 
conditioning component of previous models, such as Foa et al. (1989). While 
memory quality was perhaps the single most important factor to be associated 
with PTSD in this investigation, Study 2 also found that subjective trauma 
severity items accounted for unique variance in the onset of PTSD, i. e. extreme 
fear may on its own cause some post-traumatic stress symptornatology. Thus, it is 
important not to disregard the fear conditioning component of the adult models of 
PTSD. Indeed, fear conditioning offers a better explanation of certain re- 
experiencing symptoms, e. g. the DSM-IV symptom of "Physiological reactivity 
upon exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of 
the traumatic event", as well as various hyperarousal symptoms. The distinction 
between different forms of memory processes that elicit PTSD suggests that there 
are multiple pathways to the onset of PTSD that adult (and child) models of the 
disorder might need to account for. 
A second wider implication concerns the issue of whether PTSD in children and 
adolescents is fundamentally different to PTSD in adults. This investigation has 
replicated the similarities observed between adult and child PTSD that were 
presented in the Introduction (see particularly sub-sections 1.4 and 1.5): children 
and adolescents assessed in this investigation reported the full range of PTSD 
symptornatology, and experienced a decrease in PTSD symptomatology, as has 
been observed in studies of adult populations exposed to trauma such as assaults 
and RTAs. 
The one difference between children and adolescents in this study and adult 
populations was the failure of social support to help protect against PTSD 
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symptornatology (cf. Joseph et al., 1994). This does not suggest that there is a 
significant underlying difference in the nature of FýSD between these age groups; 
social support is a process involved in a wide range of psychopathology, and 
cannot be considered to be particularly pertinent to the aetiology of adult PTSD. 
Since the only differences between child and adult PTSD relate to the range of 
psychosocial factors that impact on individuals experiencing this disorder, it is 
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Appendix A: Materials used in Study I 
40 Letter for Parents - opt-in version 
0 Letter for Parents - opt-out version 
9 Information sheet given to children and adolescents 
0 Consent form for children and adolescents participating in Study 1 
0 Questionnaire Battery 
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Letterfor Parents - opt-in version 
Dear Parent, 
How children and young people feel after a frightening event and what their 
memories of the event are like 
We are a group of researchers from King's College London and would like your child to 
take part in our study. This study is looking at how children think and feel after they have 
been involved in a frightening event. In addition we are hoping to understand more about 
children's memories of frightening events. 
We are hoping to ask children at your child's school about the most frightening event that 
has happened to them in the last two months. This will involve your child telling us what 
was the most frightening event to have happened to him or her in the past two months, 
and filling in some questionnaires about memories of the event and how he or she has 
been feeling since it happened. Your child will also be asked to fill in some 
questionnaires about how he or she feels now. 
Your child does not have to take part. It is entirely up to you and your child whether he or 
she takes part. If you do not mind your child taking part in the study, then please 
complete the slip below and return it to your child's teacher. If you do not return the slip 
within the next two weeks, we will assume that you do not give your permission for your 
child to participate. 
If you do not allow your child to take part, or if you later change your mind and decide to 
withdraw your child from the study, then you are free to do so and we will not ask why. If 
you decide not to take part in the study, or if you later on withdraw your child from the 
study, this will not affect how you or your child are treated. 
Any information that your child tells us will be kept secret and only used by other 
researchers within our group, unless your child is thought to be in any danger. If you have 
any questions or would like some more information, please call Richard Meiser-Stedman 
on 020 7848 0766. 
Yours sincerely, 
Richard Meiser-Stedman 
Dr Patrick Smith 
Prof. William Yule 
I do/ do not [please delete as applicable] give pem-dssion for my child to take part in 
the "How children feel after upsetting events" study. 
Child's name: 
Parent or guardian's name: 
Parent's signature: Date: 
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Letterfor Parents - opt-out version 
Dear Parent, 
How children and young people feel after a frightening event and what their 
memories of the event are like 
We are a group of researchers from King's College London. We would like to invite your 
child to take part in our study looking at how children think and feel after they have been 
involved in a frightening event. The information we are gathering will help those working 
with children who have been particularly distressed following frightening events. 
We are hoping to ask pupils at your child's school about the most frightening event that 
has happened to them in the last two months. This will involve your child telling us what 
was the most frightening event to have happened to him or her in the past two months, 
and filling in some questionnaires about their memories of the event and how he or she 
has been feeling since it happened. [Head teacher's name] has given us permission to 
conduct this study at [School name]. 
This study is voluntary; it is up to you and your child whether he or she takes part. 
Your child will be given an information sheet about the study at school, telling 
them this. In order to make it easier for children to participate in the study, we are 
writing to each child's parent to inform them about this study. If you would not 
like your child to participate in the study, then please would you return the slip 
below indicating your wishes by the ....................................... If you are 
happy for your child to participate in this study, then you do not have to return the 
slip; if we do not hear from you we will assume that you are happy for your 
child to participate. 
If you do not allow your child to take part, or if you later change your mind and decide to 
withdraw your child from the study, then you are free to do so and we will not ask why. if 
you decide not to take part in the study, or if you later on withdraw your child from the 
study, this will not affect how you or your child are treated. Any information that your 
child tells us will be kept secret and only used by other researchers within our group, 
unless your child is thought to be in any danger. If you have any questions or would like 
some more information, please call Richard Meiser-Stedman on 020 7848 0580. Thank 
you for your time. 
Yours sincerely, 
Richard Meiser-Stedman 
Dr Patrick Smith 
prof William Yule 
I doldonot [please delete as applicable] give permission for my child to take part in 
the "How children feel after upsetting events" study. 
Child's name: Class: 
Parent or guardian's 
name: 
Parent's signature: Date: 
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Information Sheetfor Children and Young People 
How children and young people feel after a frightening event and what their 
memories of the event are like 
We would like you to take part in our study. Our study is looking at how children 
think and feel after they have been involved in an upsetting or frightening event, 
and what their memories of the event are like. 
We would like you to tell us what was the most upsetting or frightening event that 
has happened to you in the last two months, and fill in some questionnaires about 
yourmemories of the upsetting or frightening event, and how you have been 
feeling since it happened. We would also like you to fill in some questionnaires 
about how you feel now. 
You do not have to take part. It is entirely up to you whether you take part or not. 
If you do want to take part, you can change your mind later and we will not ask 
you why. If you do not want to take part, we will not ask you why. 
If you decide not to take part in the study, this will not affect how you are treated 
by your school or King's College London. If you decide to take part in the study 
at first, and then later on decide that you do not want to take part anymore, this 
also will not affect how you are treated. 
Any information that you tell us will be kept secret, unless you are in any danger. 
If you have any questions or would like some more information, please call 




How children and young peoplefeel after afrightening event and what their 
memories of the event are like 
I agree that the purpose of this study has been explained to me, that I have 
received an information sheet, and that I have had a chance to ask questions about 
the study. I understand what is involved for me if I agree to take part in the study. 
I understand that I am taking part in this study because I want to. I understand that 
I can withdraw from the project at any time, and that I don't have to give a reason 
why. I also understand that if I don't take part in the study or stop taking part at 
any time, I won't be treated any differently by my school or King's College 
London. 
I, understand that any information I tell will be kept secret, unless I am in any 
danger. 
Name of child or 
young person: 
Signature of child 
or young person: 
Name of 
investigator: 
(Present at giving 








Young people's memoties offrightening events 
Thank you for agrccing to takc part in this study. 
Please complete this page before filling in the rest of the booklet. If you have any 
questions about how to complete this booklet, then please ask your teacher. 
Remember: you can decide at any time not to take part in this study, and you don't 
have to give a reason why. If you decide not to take part, you will not be treated 
any differently. 
Also remember: All the information you give us will not told to anyone else, 









Section I- Mat was the most frightening event that has happened to you in the 
past two months? 
We would like to know what was the most frightening event that has happened to 
you in the past two months. Could you write below what happened? You don't 
have to write very much, a sentence is enough. 
Section 2- How youfelt when thefrightening event happened 
We would like to know how you felt when the frightening event happened. Listed 
below are some feelings that you might have had. We'd like you to tell us how 
much you felt each one by ringing a number next to the feeling; the bigger the 
number more you felt. 
There are no right or wrong answers; we are interested in what you think. 
SCARED: NOT EXTREMELY 
SCARED AT SCARED 
ALL 123456789 10 
ANGRY. NOT ANGRY EXTREMELY 
AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ANGRY 
SAD: NOT SAD AT EXTREMELY 
ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 SAD 
ASHAMED: NOT EXTREMELY 
ASHAMED ASHAMED 
AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
HELPLESS: NOT EXTREMELY 
HELPLESS HELPLESS 
AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Section 3- How often do you have memories of what happened 
When people have frightening events happen to them, they sometimes find that 
they have memories of what happened pop in to their minds. People might not 
want these memories to suddenly come back to mind. We would like to know 
HOW MEN you think memories about the frightening event pop into your 
mind. Please tick the box below that applies to you. 
Not at all or only Once a week or 2 to 4 times a 5 or more times a 
one time 
II 
less/once in a while 
II 




Section 4- What you feel like when these memories pop into your mind 
We would like to know how you feel whenever memories of the frightening event 
pop into your mind. Below are some feelings that you might have when memories 
of the frightening event pop into your mind. 
We'd like you to tell us how much you feel each one by ringing a number next to 
the feeling. 
SCARED: NOT 
SCARED AT EXTREMELY 
ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 SCARED 
ANGRE NOT ANGRY EXTREMELY 
AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ANGRY 
SAD: NOT SAD AT EXTREMELY 
ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 SAD 
CRAZY. NOTCRAZY EXTREMELY 
AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 CRAZY 
CONFUSED: NOT 
CONFUSED EXTREMEY 
AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 CONFUSED 
ASHAMED: NOT 
ASHAMED EXTREMELY 
AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ASHAMED 
HELPLESS: NOT 
HELPLESS EXTREMELY 
AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 HELPLESS 
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Section 5- Mat your memories of theffightening event are like 
This is a questionnaire all about your memories of the frightening event. We 
would like to know what your memories feel and seem like. Please read each 
sentence and tell us how much you agree with each one. Please tick the box that 
applies. 
Don't Don't Com- 
agree at agree a Agree a pletely 
all bit bit agree 
1. My memories of the frightening event are 
mostly pictures or images. 
2. When I think about the frightening event it is 
just like thinking about anything else that has 
happened to me. 
3.1 can't seem to put the frightening event into 
words. 
4. When I have memories of what happened I 
sometimes hear things in my head that I heard 
during the frightening event. 
5. When I remember the frightening event I feel 
like it is happening right now. 
6.1 can sometimes smell things that I smelt when 
the frightening event happened, even though 
the smell isn't actually around anymore. 
7.1 can talk about what happened very easily. 
8.1 remember the frightening event as a few 
moments, and each moment is a picture in my 
mind. 
9. My memories of the frightening event are like 
a film that plays over and over. 
10. My memories of the frightening event are very 
clear and detailed. 
11. Remembering what happened during the 
frightening event is just like looking at 
photographs of it. 
12. When I talk about the frightening event it is 
just like a reading out a story from a book. 
13. When memories come to mind of what 
happened, I feel my body is in the same 
position as when the frightening event 
occurred. 
14. My memories of the frightening event feel like 
memories of other things that have happened 
to me that aren't very scary. 
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Section 6- How hard is it to get rid of the memories 
We would like to know how easy or difficult it is for you to get rid of memories of 
the frightening event that pop into your mind. 
The harder it is for you get rid of these memories, then the higher the number you 
ring. If you don't have any memories pop into your mind, then you don't have to 
answer this question. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers. 
. EXTREMELY EXTREMELY 
ý -, EASY 123456789 10 HARD 
Section 7- Mat you do to get rid of the memories 
We would like to know what you do to get rid of the memories of the frightening 
event that pop into your mind. Sometimes people try to push these thoughts and 
memories out of their minds. Sometimes people will try to think about something 
else instead. We would like to know how much you try to do these things. 
Read the sentences below carefully and tick the box that says how much you agree 
or do not agree with it. 
I don't I don't 
agree agree aI agree I agree 
at all. bit. a bit. completely. 
L When I have thoughts or memories about 
what happened, I try hard to push them 
out of my mind. 
2. When I have thoughts or memories about 
what happened, I try hard to think about 
something else. 
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Section 8- Mat you do when you have any unpleasant thoughts and memories 
Most people have unpleasant and unwanted thoughts and memories, which can be 
difficult to control. These thoughts and memories can be like pictures or spoken 
words. We are interested in the things that you generally do to control these kinds 
of thoughts and memories. 
Below are a number of things that people do to control these unpleasant thoughts 
and memories. Please read each statement carefully, and tick the box that indicates 
how often you do each one. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend 
too much time thinking about each one. 
When I have an unpleasant or unwanted thought or memory: 
Some- Almost 
Never times Often always 
1.1 try to think clearly about the thought or 
memory. 
2.1 ask my friends if they have thoughts or 
memories like mine. 
3.1 concentrate on the thought or memory. 
4.1 do something that I enjoy. 
5.1 don't talk about the thought or memory to 
anyone. 
6.1 find out how my friends deal with these 
thoughts or memories. 
7.1 get angry with myself for having the thought 
or memory. 
8.1 keep myself busy. 
9.1 keep the memory to myself. 
10.1 punish myself for thinking the thought or 
memory. 
11.1 remember good times. 
12.1 replace the thought or memory with another 
bad thought or memory that isn't very important. 
13.1 shout at myself for having the thought or 
memory. 
14.1 slap or pinch myself to stop the thought or 
memory. 
Continued over the page... 
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Some- Almost 
Never times Often always 
15. ' 1 talk to a friend about the thought or memory. 
16: 1 tell myself not to be so stupid. 
17.1 tell myself that something bad will happen if 
I have the thought or memory. 
18'. 1 think about nice things. 
19.1 think about other things that are bothering 
me. 
20.1 think about problems that aren't so 
important. 
21.1 think about something else which upsets me. 
22.1 think about something else. 
'23.1 
think about things that used to bother me. 
24.1 try a different way of thinking about it. 
25.1 try and do something around the house. 
26.1 try not to talk about the thought or memory. 
27.1 try to come up with a better thought or 
memory. 
28.1 try to see if the thought or memory is really 
true. 
29.1 wonder why I am having the thought or 
memory. 
30.1 worry about more minor things instead. 
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Section 9- How I've beenfeeling about thefrightening event 
This is a questionnaire about how you've been feeling since the frightening event 
happened. Below are some comments other people have made about frightening 
events. Please read each one and tick the box that shows how often each comment 
is true for you DURING THE PAST SEVEN DAYS. If none of them are true, then 
tick the "not at all" box. 
During the last seven days... Not At Some- 
All Rarely times Often 
1 Do you think about it even when you don't 
mean to? 
2. Do you try to remove it from your memory? 
I Do you have difficulties paying attention or 
concentrating? 
4. Do you have waves of strong feeling about 
it? 
5. Do you startle more easily or feel more 
nervous than you did before it happened? 
6. Do you stay away from reminders of it (e. g. 
places or situations)? 
7. Do you try not to talk about it? 
8. Do pictures about it pop into your mind? 
9. Do other things keep making you think 
about it? 
10. Do you try not to think about it? 
11. Do you get easily irritable? 
12. Are you alert and watchful even when there 
is no obvious need to be? 
13. Do you have sleep problems? 
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Section 10 - How I have beenfeeling lately 
This questionnaire is all about how you've been feeling generally in the past 
week. There are no right answers but it is important to say how you have felt. 
Please answer as honestly as you can. Put a tick in the appropriate box. 
SOME- 
MOST THVIES NEVER 
1*I look forward to things as much as I used to. 
2.1 sleep very well. 
3.1 feel like crying. 
4.1 like to go out to play. 
5.1 feel like running away. 
6.1 get tummy aches. 
7.1 have lots of energy. 
8.1 enjoy my food. 
9.1 can stick up for myself. 
10.1 think life isn't worth living. 
11.1 am good at things I do. 
12.1 enjoy the things I do as much as I used to. 
13.1 like talking with my family. 
14.1 have horrible dreams. 
15.1 feel very lonely. 
16.1 am easily cheered up. 
17.1 feel so sad I can hardly stand it. 
18.1 feel very bored. 
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Section 11 - How I have been thinking lately 
This questionnaire is about the kinds of things that you have been thinking since 
the frightening event. Please read the sentences below and tick the box that says 
how much you agree or disagree with each one. Remember that there are no right 
or wrong answers. 
Don't Don't 
agree at agree a Agree a Agree a 
all bit bit lot 
1. Anger will make me lose control. 
2. Anyone could hurt me. 
3. Bad things always happen. 
4. Everyone lets me down. 
5.1 am a coward. 
6.1 am always going to cause frightening events. 
7.1 am different to other kids because of what 
happened to me. 
8.1 am no good. 
9.1 can't cope when things get tough. 
10.1 can't stop bad things from happening to me. 
11.1 don't have any feelings. 
12.1 don't think I'm coping as well as I should. 
13.1 don't trust people. 
14.1 feel like a robot sometimes. 
15.1 feel like I am a different person since the 
frightening event. 
16.1 had a feeling the frightening event was going 
to happen. 
17.1 have no future. 
18.1 have to be really careful because something 
bad could happen. 
19.1 have to watch out for danger all the time. 
20.1 helped make the frightening event happen. 
21.1 knew that the frightening event would happen. 
Continued on next page 
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Don't Don't 
agree at agree a Agree a Agree a 
all bit bit lot 
22.1 must control my thoughts and feelings about 
the frightening event or I will go crazy. 
23.1 used to be a happy person but now I am 
always sad. 
24.1 will always be angry with the people who 
caused the frightening event. 
25.1 will never be able to have normal feelings 
again. 
26. I'm scared that I'll get so angry that I'll break 
something or hurt someone. 
27. I'm the kind of person who always gets into 
trouble. 
28. If I avoid things after the frightening event it 
means I am a coward. 
29. If I let out my feelings bad things will happen. 
30. If I was a better person, I could have stopped 
the frightening event from happening. 
31. Life is not fair. 
32. My friends at school wouldn't have got 
involved in frightening events. 
33. My life has been destroyed by the frightening 
event. 
34. My reactions since the frightening event mean I 
have changed for the worse. 
35. My reactions since the frightening event mean I 
will never get over it. 
36. My reactions since the frightening event mean 
something is seriously wrong with me. 
37. My reactions since the frightening event show 
that I must be going crazy. 
38. No one understands me anymore. 
39. Not being able to get over all my fears means 
that I am a failure. 
40. Nothing good can happen to me anymore. 
41. Small things upset me. 
Continued over the page... 
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Don't Don't 
agree at agree a Agree a Agree a 
all bit bit lot 
42. Someone should be punished for what happened 
to me. 
43. Something terrible will happen if I do not try to 
control my thoughts about the frightening event. 
44. The frightening event happened as a 
punishment for me. 
45. The frightening event has changed me forever. 
46. The world is a dangerous place. 
47. What happened to me is really unfair. 
This is the end of the questionnaire - thanks 
for filling it in! 
Please now go through the booklet and check 
that you've answered all the questions on each 
page. 
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Appendix B- Materials used in Study 2 
Invitation letter 
0 Information sheet for children and adolescents 
0 Information sheet for parents 
0 Consent fonn 
0 Consent form for tape recording interview 
0 Child self-report questionnaires at initial (two to four week) assessment 
0 Parent self-report questionnaires at initial (two to four week) assessment 
0 Child self-report questionnaires at three month follow up assessment 




Accident and Emergency Department 
Tel: 020 7346 3938 (10am-IOpm) 
Dear [Parent's name], 
How children and young people feel after being in a frightening event 
We are carrying out a study with colleagues at the Institute of Psychiatry looking 
at the ways in which children and young people react when they have been 
involved in a frightening event, such as a road traffic accident, or being mugged. 
We would like to invite you and [Child's name] to participate in our study. My colleagues 
have included information sheets for you both that outline what participating in this study 
would involve. 
I would like to stress that your participation in this study would be entirely voluntary. If 
you decide not to take part, it would not affect your future treatment from the Accident 
and Emergency department or at the Institute of Psychiatry. Likewise, if you decide to 
participate in the study you can always withdraw from the study at any time, without 
giving a reason, and without affecting the treatment you receive from Accident and 
Emergency or the Institute of Psychiatry. 
The Institute of Psychiatry is a leading world centre for the study and treatment of 
children's reactions to frightening events. If your child is suffering badly as a result of 
what the frightening event they were involved in, the clinical psychologists there can 
ensure that they get the best possible treatment. They will discuss this with you in further 
depth, should the need arise. 
Richard Meiser-Stedman, a researcher at the Institute of Psychiatry, will be in touch with 
you within the next few days to see how you would feel about participating, and answer 
any questions you might have. If you are willing to take part in the study, Richard will be 
able arrange a time when you might come and meet us, or if it is not convenient for you to 
come back to King's College, when he might come and meet you at your home. 
Thank you for considering this request. 
Yours sincerely, 
Dr Ed Glucksman Richard Meiser-Stedman, 
Dr Patrick Smith, & Professor William 
Yule 
Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry 
Kings College London, De Crespigny Park 
London SE5 8AF, Tel. 020 7848 0766 
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Infortnation Sheetfor Children and Young People 
How children think andjeel after being in afrightening event 
We would like to invite you to take part in our study. Our study is looking at how 
children and young people think and feel after they have been involved in a 
frightening event. 
We would like to talk to you and one of your parents about the frightening event, 
and about how you have been thinking and feeling since it happened. We would 
also like you to fill in some questionnaires about how you feel. 
We would like to meet you 2 times, so that we can see how you are getting on. We 
would like to meet you for the first time in the next 2-4 weeks, and the second 
time in about 6 months time. Each time we meet you will take about 11/2 hours to 
have a talk and to do the questionnaires. We would also like to send you some 
questionnaires in about 3 months time which you can fill in and send back to us. 
Everyone between 10 and 16 years of age who comes to the King's College 
Hospital A&E department is going to be invited to take part in our study, and we 
hope to have around 140 children and young people taking part. 
You do not have to take part. It is entirely up to you whether you take part or not. 
If you do want to take part, you can change your mind later and we will not ask 
you why. If you do not want to take part, we will not ask you why. 
If you decide not to take part in the study, this will not affect your care at any 
hospitals. If you decide to take part in the study at first, and then later on decide 
that you do not want to take part anymore, this also will not affect your care here. 
Anything that you tell us will be completely confidential; only people who work 
in our group will be able to look at what you've said. 
Thank you for thinking about taking part in our study. 
If you have any questions or would like some more information, please call 
Richard Meiser-Stedman on 020 7848 0580, or Dr Patrick Smith on 020 7848 
0506. 
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Infonnation Sheetfor Parents 
How children think andjeel after being in afrightening event 
We would like to invite you and your child to participate in our study. Please read 
this carefully if you wish for you and your child to participate. Your participation 
is entirely voluntary. 
Purpose of the study 
We are conducting a research study looking at what causes children to develop 
long-term reactions to frightening events. Your child's participation in the study 
will help us to better identify which children are at risk of developing severe 
reactions to frightening events, and how we can help these children to get over 
what has happened to them. 
Mat will the study involve 
You and your child will be asked to meet with us for an interview and to fill in 
some questionnaires at two points; within a month after the frightening event, and 
about six months after the event. We would like to talk to you and your child 
about the frightening event, and any problems your child might have had since it 
happened. The questionnaires will require you and your child to respond with 
your impressions of the event itself, your thoughts and feelings since the event, 
how your family has been coping since the event, and how you cope with various 
aspects of the frightening event. Each meeting will take about 11/2 to 2 hours with 
you and your child. At about three months after the frightening event we would 
also like to send some questionnaires to you for your child and yourself to 
complete. 
We are inviting all children and young people aged between 10 and 16 who are 
admitted to King's College Hospital to take part in our study, and we hope to have 
140 children take part. The results we obtain may be published in order to help 
other people working with children who have been in frightening events, but you 
or your child would not be named. 
If at the end of the study we think that your child might be suffering from any 
serious problems, we can discuss with you and your GP getting appropriate help 
for your child. This professional help might come from the Institute of Psychiatry 
or Maudsley hospital. The Institute of Psychiatry and the Maudsley hospital are 
one of the leading centres internationally for the assessment and treatment of child 
who have been exposed to very frightening events, such as road traffic accidents 
and other man-made disasters. 
Participation and withdrawal 
All the information recorded will be strictly confidential, and used only by 
clinicians and researchers working within the child traumatic stress clinic at the 
Institute of Psychiatry. Information about you and your child will be stored 
anonymously. If you decide to take part, you can withdraw at any time and 
without giving a reason. 
If you decide not to take part or decide to withdraw from the study, this will not 
affect the care you receive at any hospitals. 
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You will receive a copy of this information sheet and the signed consent form if 
you decide to participate. 
Thank you for considering taking part in our study. 
For more information 
Please ask if there is anything you or your child does not understand or if you 
would like more information. You can contact Richard Meiser-Stedman on 020 
7848 0580, or Dr Patrick Smith on 020 7848 0506. 
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Consentform 
An investigation into psychological reactions in children involved in frightening 
events 
I confirm that the purpose of this study has been explained to me and that I have 
had a chance to ask questions about the study. I understand what is involved for 
my child and myself if we volunteer. I understand that I will receive a copy of this 
signed consent form and the information sheets, and that copies of these also will 
be kept by the investigator. 
I understand that participation is entirely voluntary and that I can withdraw from 
the project at any time, without giving a reason for doing so, and without affecting 
any future care. The data collected will be confidential. 
Name of child 
Signature of child 
















Consentfonnfor recording of interview 
One copy to be kept with Film One copy with Patient's Case Notes. 
INSTITUTE OF PSYCHIATRY/SOUTH LONDON AND MAUDSLEY NHS TRUST 
Consent Form - Recorded Interviews 
I consent to the recording of an interview with me/my relative being made and kept on 
videotapelaudiotape. 
I understand that this recording may be used for purposes of assessment, teaching or research. 
Strict confidentiality will always be observed, and it will be seen only within the Institute of 
Psychiatry and South London and Maudsley NHS Trust by professional staff or their trainees. 
I understand that I will be further consulted before this recording is shown to a wider 
audience. (Any permission for wider showing to be noted here and separately signed and 
dated). 
NAMES OF ALL THOSE APPEARING ON AGE SIGNATURES 
THE RECORDING (if under 18) 
NAME OF PARENT OR RELATIVE AGE 
SIGNING ON BEIIALF OF A CHILD OR 
PATIENT UNABLE TO GIVE CONSENT 
Name of Interviewer 
................................................ 
Name of Consultant (Hospital Patients only) 
................................................ 
Serial No. of tape 
..................................... 
SIGNATURE 
Signature of Interviewer 
............................................ 
Date 
This form must be signed at the conclusion of the recording by all those who appear on the recording. In 
the case of young children, the parent or guardian should sign, or in the case of patients unable to give 
consent, their nearest relative should sign on their behalf. 
The complete form should be filed in the patient's notes. 
PLEASE NOTE that it is stW necessary to inform the interviewees during the first part of the recording 
that a recording is being made, and that their written permission for its preservation will be requested at 
the end. 
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Child self-report questionnaire battery at two to four weeks post-trauma 
How children and young people think and feel after 
being in a frightening event 
Thank you for taking part in this study. Please read the following questionnaires 
and follow the instructions on each page. 
Remember that there are no right or wrong answers - we are interested in what 
YOU think and feel. Just try and be as honest as possible. 
If there is anything you do not understand then tell Richard who will help you. 
Before you start, please could you write your name, date of birth, and today's date 
below. 
Your name: 
Your date of birth: 
Today's date: 
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What Ifelt and thought duting theftightening event 
[PerCog-C] 
Below is a list of thoughts or feelings. You may have had some of these when you 
had your frightening event. 
Please read each one carefully and tell us how much you AGREE or DISAGREE 
with the sentence by circling one answer. 
People react to frightening events in many different ways. There are no right or 
wrong answers to these sentences. 
Disagree Disagree Agree a Agree a 
a lot a bit bit lot 
1.1 couldn't believe this was happening 
to me. 
2.1 didn't feel like I was really there. 
31 didn't have any feelings about what 
was happening. 
4.1 didn't understand what was 
happening. 
5.1 really thought that I was going to die. 
6.1 thought that I was going to be very 
badly hurt. 
7.1 was really scared. 
8.1 was scared that someone else might 
get badly hurt. 
9. It all felt like a dream. 
10. Just after the frightening event I was 
really angry with the people who 
caused the event. 
11. Just after the frightening event, I was 
really angry with myself. 
12. My mind went blank. 
If there were any adults with you when the frightening event happened, we would 
also like to know how frightened they were. Please tick the box below that shows 
how frightened they were. 
Not at all 
frightened A bit frightened Quite frightened Very frightened 
El 13 1: 1 
303 
[RIES-C] 
Below is a list of comments made by people after frightening events. Please check 
each item indicating how frequently these comments were true for you DURING 
THE PAST SEVEN DAYS. If they did not occur during that time, please mark 
the "not at all" column. 
Duting the last seven days... Not At Some- 
All Rarely times Often 
1. Do you think about it even when you don't 
mean to? 
2. Do you try to remove it from your memory? 
3. Do you have difficulties paying attention or 
concentrating? 
4. Do you have waves of strong feeling about 
it? 
5. Do you startle more easily or feel more 
nervous than you did before it happened? 
6. Do you stay away from reminders of it (e. g. 
places or situations)? 
7. Do you try not to talk about it? 
8. Do pictures about it pop into your mind? 
9. Do other things keep making you think 
about it? 
10. Do you try not to think about it? 
11. Do you get easily irritable? 
12. Are you alert and watchful even when there 
is no obvious need to be? 
13. Do you have sleep problems? 
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[BDSRS] 
The statements below refer to how you have felt over the past week. There are no 
right answers but it is important to say how you have felt. Please answer as 
honestly as you can. Put a tick in the appropriate box. Thank you. 
Never Sometimes Most 
1.1 look forward to things as much as I used 
to. 
2.1 sleep very well. 
3.1 feel like crying. 
4.1 like to go out to play. 
5.1 feel like running away. 
6.1 get tummy aches. 
7.1 have lots of energy. 
8.1 enjoy my food. 
9.1 can stick up for myself. 
10.1 think life isn't worth living. 
11.1 am good at things I do. 
12.1 enjoy the things I do as much as I used to. 
13.1 like talking with my family. 
14.1 have horrible dreams. 
15.1 feel very lonely. 
16.1 am easily cheered up. 
17.1 feel so sad I can hardly stand it. 




This is a questionnaire all about your memories of the frightening event. We 
would like to know what your memories feel and seem like. Please read each 
sentence and tell us how much you agree with each one, by ticking the appropriate 
box. 
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree 
a lot a bit a bit a lot 
1. My memories of the frightening event are 
mostly pictures or images. 
2. When I think about the frightening event it is 
just like thinking about anything else that has 
happened to me. 
3.1 can't seem to put the frightening event into 
words. 
4. When I have memories of what happened I 
sometimes hear things in my head that I 
heard during the frightening event. 
5. When I remember the frightening event I feel 
like it is happening right now. 
6. When I think about the frightening event I 
can sometimes smell things that I smelt when 
the frightening event happened. 
7.1 can talk about what happened very easily. 
8.1 remember the frightening event as a few 
moments, and each moment is a picture in 
my mind. 
9. My memories of the frightening event are 
like a film that plays over and over. 
10. My memories of the frightening event are 
very clear and detailed. 
11. Remembering what happened during the 
frightening event is just like looking at 
photographs of it in my mind. 
12.1 can remember the order in which things 
happened during the frightening event. 
13. When memories come to mind of what 
happened, I feel my body is in the same 
position as when the frightening event 
occurred. 11 
14. My memories of the frightening event feel 
like memories of other things that have 
happened to me that aren't very scary. 
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How I control unpleasant thoughts and memories 
[cTCQ] 
Most people have unpleasant and unwanted thoughts and memories, which can be 
difficult to control. These thoughts and memories can be like pictures or spoken words. 
We are interested in the techniques that you generally use to control these kinds of 
thoughts and memories. 
Below are a number of things that people do to control these thoughts and memories. 
Please read each statement carefully, and indicate how often you use each technique by 
circling the appropriate number. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time thinking about each 
one. 
When I have an unpleasant or unwanted thought or memory: 
Some- Almost 
Never times Often always 
1.1 try to think clearly about the thought or 
memory. 
2.1 ask my friends if they have thoughts or 
memories like mine. 
3.1 concentrate on the thought or memory. 
4.1 do something that I enjoy. 
5.1 don't talk about the thought or memory to 
anyone. 
6.1 find out how my friends deal with these 
thoughts or memories. 
7.1 get angry with myself for having the thought 
or memory. 
8.1 keep myself busy. 
9.1 keep the thought or memory to myself. 
10.1 punish myself for thinking the thought or 
memory. 
11.1 remember good times. 
12.1 replace the thought with another bad thought 
or memory that isn't very important 
13.1 shout at myself for having the thought or 
memory. 
14.1 slap or pinch myself to stop the thought or 
memory. 
15.1 talk to a friend about the thought or 
memory. 
16.1 tell myself not to be so stupid. 
Continued over page 
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Some- Almost 
Never times Often always 
17.1 tell myself that something bad will happen if 
I have the thought or memory. 
18.1 think about nice things. 
19.1 think about other things that are bothering 
me. 
20.1 think about problems that aren't so 
important. 
21.1 think about something else which upsets me. 
22.1 think about something else. 
23.1 think about things that used to bother me. 
24.1 try a different way of thinking about it. 
25.1 try and do something around the house. 
26.1 try not to talk about the thought or memory. 
27.1 try to come up with a better thought or 
memory. 
28.1 try to see if the thought or memory is really 
true. 
29.1 wonder why I am having the thought or 
memory. 
30.1 worry about more minor things instead. 
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RSQ 
What I do when Ifeel sad or afraid 
People think and do many different things when they feel sad or afraid. 
Below is a list of things that people might think and do when they feel sad or 
afraid. We would like to know if you think or do any of these things. After each of 
these things are some answers. 
Please tick the answer that you generally do. 
Some- 
Never times Often Always 
1.1 think about how lonely I feel. 
2.1 think that I won't be able do my work at 
school because I feel so bad. 
3.1 think about how tired and achy I feel. 
4.1 think about how hard it is concentrate. 
5.1 keep thinking about how fed-up I am. 
6.1 think hard about the things that have made 
me sad or afraid. 
7.1 think about how I don't care about anything 
anymore. 
8.1 ask myself why I am not interested in 
anything. 
9.1 wonder why I keep getting sad or afraid. 
10.1 go away on my own and wonder why I feel 
like this. 
11.1 write down what I am thinking. 
12.1 think about things that have happened 
recently and wish they could have gone better. 
13.1 wonder why I feel so different to other 
people. 
14.1 keep thinking about how about sad or afraid I 
feel. 
15.1 think about everything that is bad about me. 
16.1 think about how I don't want to do anything. 
17.1 wonder what is wrong with me for me to be 
afraid or sad. 
18.1 go somewhere on my own and think about 
how I feel. 
19.1 get angry with myselL 
20.1 stay on my own and think about what is 
making me sad or afraid. 
21.1 try and work out what part of me is making 
me sad or afraid. 
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[CASIJ 
Directions: A number of statements which boys and girls use to describe 
themselves are given below. Read each statement carefully and tick the box that is 
under the word that describes you. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Remember; find the words that best describe you. 
None Some A lot 
1.1 don't want other people to know when I feel afraid. 
2. When I cannot keep my mind on my schoolwork I 
worry that I might be going crazy. 
3. It scares me when I feel "shaky". 
4. It scares me when I feel like I am going to faint. 
5. It is important for me to stay in control of my 
feelings. 
6. It scares me when my heart beats fast. 
7. It embarrasses me when my stomach growls (makes 
noise). 
8. It scares me when I feel like I am going to throw up. 
9. When I notice that my heart is beating fast, I worry 
that there might be something wrong with me. 
10. It scares me when I have trouble getting my breath. 
11. When my stomach hurts, I worry that I might be 
really sick. 
12. It scares me when I can't keep my mind on my 
schoolwork. 
13. Other kids can tell when I feel shaky. 
14. Unusual feelings in my body scare me. 
15. When I am afraid, I worry that I might be crazy. 
16. It scares me when I feel nervous. 
17.1 don't like to my feelings show. 
18. Funny feelings in my body scare me. 
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Feelings Questionnaire 
Below are some sentences about feelings in general. 
AEE 
Please read each of the sentences carefully and tell us how much you AGREE or 
DISAGREE with the sentence by circling one answer. 
There are no right or wrong answers to these sentences. 
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree 
a lot a bit a bit a lot 
1.1 think you should always keep your 
feelings under control. 
2.1 think you ought not to burden other 
people with your problems. 
3.1 think getting emotional is a sign that 
you are a wimp. 
4.1 think that people don't understand 
what anyone else is feeling. 
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"at I think about worrying 
[MCQI 
Nearly everyone worries about things from time to time. This questionnaire is 
about what people think of their worrying. 
Listed below are a number of things people have said about worrying. Please read 
each item and indicate how much you generally agree with it by ticking the 
appropriate box. 
Please respond to all of the items. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Agree Agree 
Do not Agree moderat very 
agree slightly ely much 
II do my best thinking when I am worrying 
2.1 need to worry in order to get things done 
3.1 need to worry in order to stay organised 
4.1 need to worry in order to work well 
5.1 would be selfish if I never worried 
6. If I did not worry, I would make more mistakes 
7. If I do not worry my life will be less good 
8. If I stopped worrying, I would become rude and 
arrogant 
9. It would be stupid not to worry 
10. It's normal to worry 
11. My worrying thoughts are not helpful 
12. People who do not worry don't care about other 
people 
13. Worrying helps me cope 
14. Worrying helps me to avoid problems in the 
future 
15. Worrying helps me to avoid really bad things 
happening 
16. Worrying helps me to get things sorted out in my 
mind 
17. Worrying helps me to plan the future more better 
18. Worrying helps me to solve problems 
19. Worrying is a sign of a good person 
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Parent self-report questionnaire battery at two tofour weeks post-trauma 
How children and young people think and feel after 
being in a frightening event 
Thank you for taking part in this study. Please read the following questionnaires 
and follow the instructions on each page. 
There are no right or wrong answers, we are interested in what you think and feel. 
Please could you write your name, your child's name, and today's date below. 
Your name: 




Below is a list of sentences that may be thoughts or feelings that you had during or 
shortly after the event your child experienced. 
Please read each sentence carefully and tell us how much you AGREE or 
DISAGREE with the sentence by ticking one box. 
People react to frightening events in many different ways. There are no right or 
wrong answers to these sentences. 
Don't Don't 
agree at agree a Agree a Agree a 
all bit bit lot 
1.1 was really scared. 
2. Just after the event I was really angry with the 
people who caused the event. 
3. Just after the event, I was really angry with 
myself. 
We would also like to know how your child seemed to react when the frightening 
event occurred. Please indicate below how distressed your child seemed during 
the frightening event. 
Not at all frightened A bit frightened Quite frightened Very frightened 
If you were actually involved in the frightening event with your child, please read 
the sentences below also and tell us how much you AGREE or DISAGREE with 
the sentence by ticking one box. 
Don't Don't 
agree at agree a Agree a Agree a 
all bit bit lot 
1.1 didn't feel like I was really there. 
2.1 couldn't believe this was happening to me. 
3.1 really thought that I was going to die. 
4. It all felt like a dream. 
I was scared that someone else might get 
5. badly hurt. 
I didn't have any feelings about what was 
6. happening. 
7.1 didn't understand what was happening. 
I thought that I was going to be very badly 
8. hurt. 
9. My mind went blank. 
314 
JPDS1 
Below is a list of problems that people sometimes have after experiencing a 
frightening event. Read each one carefully and cast your mind back to the week 
that has just passed. First, choose the answer (0-3) that best describes HOW 
OFTEN that problem has bothered you IN THE PAST WEEK. 
-0 
123 
Not at all or only Once per week/ 24 times per week/ 5 times per week/ 
one time Once in a while once in a while almost always 
Next, rate how distressing each of the experiences has been in the past week using 
this 0-3 scale. 
0123 
Not at all Very distressing 
1. Having upsetting thoughts or images about the frightening event that came into 
your head when you didn't want them to 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
2. Having bad dreams or nightmares about the frightening event 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
3. Reliving the frightening event, acting or feeling as if it was happening again 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
4. Feeling emotionally upset when you were reminded of the frightening event (for 
example, feeling scared, angry, sad, guilty, etc. ) 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
5. Experiencing physical reactions when you were reminded of the frightening event 
(for example, breaking out in a sweat, heart beating fast) 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0 1--- 23 
6. Trying not to think about, talk about, or have feelings about the frightening 
event 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
7. Trying to avoid activities, people, or places that remind you of the 
frightening event 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
S. Not being able to remember an important part of the frightening event 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
9. Having much less interest or participating much less often in important 
activities 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
10. Feeling distant or cut off from people around you 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
11. Feeling emotionally numb (for example, being unable to cry or unable to have 
loving feelings) 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
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12. Feeling as if your future plans or hopes will not come true (for example, you will 
not have a career, marriage, children, or a long life) 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
13. Having trouble falling asleep 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
14. Feeling irritable 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
15. Having trouble concentrating (for example, drifting in and out of conversations, 
losing track of a story on television, forgetting what you read) 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
16. Being overtly alert (for example, checking to see who is around you, being 
uncomfortable with your back to a door, etc. ) 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
17. Being jumpy or easily startled 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
Please indicate how much the problems listed on the previous two pages have 
interrupted with your life. Circle the number that best describes your situation in 
the past week. 
Work 
Because of my problems my work is impaired: 
02456789 10 




Social Life/Leisure Activities 
(with other people at parties, socializing, visiting, dating, outings, clubs, 
entertaining) 
Because of my problems my social life is impaired: 
0123456789 10 







Family Life/Home Responsibilities 
(relating to family members, paying bills, managing home, shopping and 
cleaning) 
Because of my problems my family life/home responsibilities are impaired: 
0123456789 10 
Not at +-Mildly. -* +-Moderately--+ +-Markedly--+ Very 
all severely (I 
never do 
these) 
Next, please rate how you feel about the frightening event at this moment: 
When you think back about the frightening event and the things that followed it, 
how UPSET do you feel? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at Extremely 
all 
To what extent do you think you have COME TO TERMS with the frightening 
event? 
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 
Completely Not at all 
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[BDIJ 




This is a questionnaire all about your memories of the frightening event. We 
would like to know what your memories feel and seem like. Please read each 
sentence and tell us how much you agree with each one, by ticking the appropriate 
box. 
If you were not directly involved in the frightening event, please complete this 
questionnaire thinking about your memories of when you first found out what 
happened to your son or daughter. 
Don't Don't 
agree agreea Agree Completely 
at all bit a bit agree 
My memories of the frightening event are mostly 
pictures or images. 
When I think about the frightening event it is just 
like thinking about anything else that has 
happened to me. 
3.1 can't seem to put the frightening event into 
words. 
4. When I have memories of what happened I 
sometimes hear things in my head that I heard 
during the frightening event. 
5. When I remember the frightening event I feel like 
it is happening right now. 
6. When I think about the frightening event I can 
sometimes smell things that I smelt when the 
frightening event happened. 
7.1 can talk about what happened very easily. 
8.1 remember the frightening event as a few 
moments, and each moment is a picture in my 
mind. 
9. My memories of the frightening event are like a 
film that plays over and over. 
10. My memories of the frightening event are very 
clear and detailed. 
11. Remembering what happened during the 
frightening event is just like looking at 
photographs of it in my mind. 
12.1 can remember the order in which things 
happened during the frightening event. 
13. When memories come to mind of what happened, 
I feel my body is in the same position as when the 
frightening event occurred. 
14. My memories of the frightening event feel like 
memories of other things that have happened to 
me that aren't very scary. 
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ITCQI 
How I cope with unpleasant and unwanted thoughts 
Most people experience unpleasant, and/or unwanted thoughts (in verbal and/or 
picture form), which can be difficult to control. We are interested in the 
techniques that you generally use to control such thoughts. Below are a number of 
things that people do to control these thoughts. 
Please read each statement carefully, and indicate how often you use each 
technique by circling the appropriate number. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Do not spend too much time thinking about each one. 
When I experience and unpleasant/unwanted thought: 
Never Some- Often Almost 
times always 
1.1 analyse the thought rationally. 
2.1 ask my friends if they have similar 
thoughts. 11 
3.1 avoid discussing the thought. 
4.1 call to mind positive images instead. 
5.1 challenge the thought's validity. 
6.1 do something that I enjoy. 
7.1 don't talk about the thought to anyone. 
8.1 dwell on other worries. 
9.1 find out how my friends deal with these 
thoughts. 
10.1 focus on different negative thoughts. 
11.1 focus on the thought. 
12.1 get angry at myself for having the thought. 
13.1 keep myself busy. 
14.1 keep the thought to myself. 
15.1 occupy myself with work instead. 
16.1 punish myself for thinking the thought. 
17.1 question the reasons for having the thought. 
18.1 replace the thought with a more trivial bad 
thought. 
19.1 shout at myself for having the thought. 
20.1 slap or pinch myself to stop the thought. 
21.1 talk to a friend about the thought. 
Continued over page... 
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Never Some- Often Almost 
times always 
22.1 tell myself not to be so stupid. 
23.1 tell myself that something bad will happen 
if I think the thought. 
24.1 think about past worries instead. 
25.1 think about something else. 
26.1 think more about the more minor problems 
I have. 
27.1 think pleasant thoughts instead. 
28.1 try a different way of thinking about it. 
29.1 try to re-interpret the thought. 
30.1 worry about more minor things instead. 
321 
[RSQ] 
Responses to sadness and being afraid 
People think and do many different things when they feel sad or afraid. Please read each 
of the items below and indicate whether you never, sometimes, often, or always think or 
do each one when you feel sad or afraid. Please indicate what you generally do, not what 
you think you should do. 
Some- 
Never times Often Always 
1.1 think about how alone I feel. 
2.1 think I won't be able to do my job/work 
because I feel so badly". 
3.1 think about my feelings of fatigue and 
achiness. 
4.1 think about how hard it is to concentrate. 
5.1 think about how passive and unmotivated I 
feel. 
6.1 analyse recent events to try to understand 
why I am sad or afraid. 
7.1 think about how I don't seem to feel 
anything anymore. 
8.1 think "Why can't I get going? " 
9.1 think "Why do I always react this way? " 
10.1 go away by myself and think about why I 
feel this way. 
11.1 write down what I am thinking about and 
analyse it. 
12.1 think about a recent situation, wishing it 
would have gone better. 
13.1 think "Why do I have problems other people 
don't have? " 
14.1 think about how sad or afraid I feel. 
15.1 think about all my shortcomings, failings, 
faults, and n-dstakes. 
16.1 think about how I don't feel up to doing 
anything. 
17.1 analyse my personality to try to understand 
why I am sad or afraid. 
18.1 go some place alone to think about my 
feelings. 
19.1 think about how angry I am with myself. 
20.1 listen to sad music 
21.1 isolate myself and think about the reasons 
why I feel sad or afraid. 
22.1 try to understand myself by focusing on my 
sad or afraid feelings. 
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[ASIJ 
Circle the one phrase that best represents the extent to which you agree with the 
item. If any of the items concern something that is not part of your experience 
(e. g., "It scares me when I feel shaky" for someone who has never trembled or had 
the "shakes"), answer on the basis of how you think you might feel if you had 
such an experience. Otherwise answer all items on the basis of your experience. 
Very Very 
little A little Some Much much 
I It is important to me not to appear 
nervous. 
2. When I cannot keep my mind on a 
task, I worry that I might be going 
crazy 
3. It scares me when I feel 'shaky' 
(trembling) 
4. It scares me when I feel faint 
5. It is important to me to stay in 
control of my emotions 
6. It scares me when my heart beats 
rapidly 
7. It embarrasses me when my stomach 
growls 
8. It scares me when I am nauseous 11 H 
9. When I notice that my heart is 
beating rapidly, I worry that I might 
have a heart attack 
10. It scares me when I become short of 
breath 11 H 
11. When my stomach is upset, I worry 
that I might be seriously ill 
12. It scares me when I am unable to 
keep my mind on a task 
13. Other people notice when I feel 
shaky 11 H 11 11 
14. Unusual body sensations scare me 
15. When I am nervous, I worry that I 
might be mentally ill 




Below are some sentences about feelings in general. 
Please read each of the sentences carefully and tell us how much you AGREE or 
DISAGREE with the sentence by ticking one box. 
There are no right or wrong answers to these sentences. 
Don't 
Don't agree 
agree at very Agree a Agree a 
all much bit lot 
1.1 think you should always keep your 
feelings under control. 
2.1 think you ought not to burden other 
people with your problems. 
3.1 think getting emotional is a sign of 
weakness. 




Mat I think about worrying 
This questionnaire is concerned with beliefs people have about their worrying. 
Listed below are a number of beliefs people have expressed. 
Please read each item and indicate how much you generally agree with it by 
ticking the appropriate box. Please respond to all of the items. There are no right 
or wrong answers. 
Do not Agree Agree Agree very 
agree sfightly moderately much 
1.1 do my clearest thinking when I am 
worrying 11 H 
2.1 need to worry in order to get things done 
3.1 need to worry in order to remain organised 
4.1 need to worry in order to work well 
5.1 will lose out in life I do not worry 
6.1 would be selfish if I never worried 
7. If I did not worry, I would make more 
mistakes 
8. If I stopped worrying, I would become glib, 
arrogant, and offensive 
9. It would be stupid and complacent not to 
worry 
10. It would not be normal if I did not worry 
11. My worrying thoughts are not productive 
12. People who do not worry have no depth 
13. Worrying helps me cope 
14. Worrying helps me to avoid disastrous 
situations 
15. Worrying helps me to avoid problems in the 
future 
16. Worrying helps me to get things sorted out in 
my mind 
17. Worrying helps me to plan the future more 
effectively 
18. Worrying helps me to solve problems 
19. Worrying is a sign of a good person 
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[STAII 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and then tick the appropriate box to the right of the 
statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but 
give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
Very 
Not at Moderately much 
all Somewhat so so 
1.1 feel calm. 
2.1 feel secure. 
3.1 am tense. 
4.1 am strained. 
5.1 feel at ease. 
6.1 feel upset. 
7.1 am presently worrying over possible 
misfortunes. 
8.1 feel satisfied. 
9.1 feel frightened. 
10.1 feel comfortable. 
11.1 feel self-confident. 
12.1 feel nervous. 
13.1 am jittery. 
14.1 feel indecisive. 
15.1 am relaxed. 
16.1 feel content. 
17.1 am worried. 
18.1 feel confused. 
19.1 feel steady. 
20.1 feel pleasant. 
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Child self-report questionnaire battery at three months post-trauma 
Child or Young Person's Booklet 
How children and young people think and feel after 
being in a frightening event 
Thank you for taking part in this study. Please read the following questionnaires 
and follow the instructions on each page. 
Remember that there are no right or wrong answers - we are interested in what 
YOU think and feel. Just try and be as honest as possible. 
I Before you start, please could you write your name, date of birth, and today's date 
below. 
Your name: 




Below is a list of comments made by people after frightening events. Please check 
each item indicating how frequently these comments were true for you DURING 
TIHE PAST SEVEN DAYS. If they did not occur during that time, please mark 
the "not at all" column. 
During the last seven days... Not At Some- 
All Rarely times Often 
1. Do you think about it even when you don't 
mean to? 
2. Do you try to remove it from your memory? 
3. Do you have difficulties paying attention or 
concentrating? 
4. Do you have waves of strong feeling about it? 
5. Do you startle more easily or feel more 
nervous than you did before it happened? 
6. Do you stay away from reminders of it (e. g. 
places or situations)? 
7. Do you try not to talk about it? 
8. Do pictures about it pop into your mind? 
9. Do other things keep making you think about 
it? 
10. Do you try not to think about it? 
11. Do you get easily irritable? 
12. Are you alert and watchful even when there is 
no obvious need to be? 
13. Do you have sleep problems? 
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[CPSSI 
Below is a list of problems that children and young people sometimes have after 
experiencing a frightening event. Read each one carefully and circle the number 
(0-3) that best describes how often that problem has bothered you in the last 2 
weeks. 
0 1 2 3 
- Not at all or only Once a week or 2 to 4 times a 5 or more times a 
one time less/once in a week/half the time week/almost 
, wh_le I always 
0123 Having upsetting thoughts or images about the event that 
came into your head when you didn't want them to 
(2) 0123 Having bad dreams or nightmares 
(3) 0123 Acting or feeling as if the event was happening again (hearing 
something or seeing a picture about it and feeling as if I am 
there again) 
(4) 0123 Feeling upset when you think or hear about the event (for 
example, feeling scared, angry, sad, guilty etc) 
(5) 0123 Having feelings in your body when you think about or hear 
about the event (for example, breaking out in a sweat, heart 
beating fast) 
(6) 0123 Trying not to think about, talk about, or have feelings about 
the event 
(7) 0123 Trying to avoid activities, people, or places that remind you of 
the traumatic event 
(8) 0123 Not being able to remember an important part of the upsetting 
event 
(9) 0123 Having much less interest or not doing the things you used to 
do 
(10) 0123 Not feeling close to people around you 
0123 Not being able to have strong feelings (for example, being 
unable to cry or unable to feel very happy) 
(12) 0123 Feeling as if your future plans or hopes will not come true (for 
I example, you will not have a job or get married or have kids) 
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0 1 2 3 
- Not at all or only Once a week or 2 to 4 times a 5 or more times a 
one time less/once in a week/half the time week/almost 
while always 
(13) 0123 Having trouble falling or staying asleep 
(14) 0123 Feeling irritable or having fits of anger 
(15) 0123 Having trouble concentrating (for example, losing track of a 
story on television, forgetting what you read, not paying 
attention in class) 
(16) 0123 Being overly careful (for example, checking to see who is 
around you and what is around you) 
(17) 0123 Being jumpy or easily startled (for example, when someone 
walks up behind you) 
Please indicate below if the problems you rated above have got in the way of any 
of the following areas of your life during the past 2 weeks. Circle Y for Yes, N 
for No. 
(18) Y N Fun and hobby activities 
(19) Y N Relationships with your friends 
(20) Y N Schoolwork 
(21) Y N Relationship with your family 
(22) Y N Chores and duties at home 
(23) Y N General happiness with your life 
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[BDSRS1 
The statements below refer to how you have felt over the past week. There are no 
right answers but it is important to say how you have felt. Please answer as 
honestly as you can. Put a tick in the appropriate box. Thank you. 
Never Sometimes Most 
I look forward to things as much as I used to. 
2.1 sleep very well. 
3.1 feel like crying. 
4.1 like to go out to play. 
5.1 feel like running away. 
6.1 get tummy aches. 
7.1 have lots of energy. 
8.1 enjoy my food. 
9.1 can stick up for myself. 
10.1 think life isn't worth living. 
11.1 am good at things I do. 
12.1 enjoy the things I do as much as I used to. 
13.1 like talking with my family. 
14.1 have horrible dreams. 
15.1 feel very lonely. 
16.1 am easily cheered up. 
17.1 feel so sad I can hardly stand it. 
18.1 feel very bored. IIIIII 
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ICPTCII 
How I've been thinking andjeeling since thefrightening event 
We would like to know what kinds of thoughts and feelings you've been having after the 
frightening event. 
Below is a list of statements. Please read each statement carefully and tell us how 
much you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement by ticking one box. 
People react to frightening events in many different ways. There are no right or wrong 
answers to these statements. 
Disagree Disagree Agree a Agree a 
a lot a bit bit lot 
1. Anger will make me lose control. 
2. Anyone could hurt me. 
3. Bad things always happen. 
4. Everyone lets me down. 
5.1 am a coward. 
6.1 am always going to cause frightening events. 
7.1 am different to other kids because of what 
happened to me. 
8.1 am no good. 
9.1 can't cope when things get tough. 
10.1 can't stop bad things from happening to me. 
11.1 don't have any feelings. 
12.1 don't think I'm coping as well as I should. 
13.1 don't trust people. 
14.1 feel like a robot sometimes. 
15.1 feel like I am a different person since the 
frightening event. 
16.1 had a feeling the frightening event was going to 
happen. HH 11 11 
17.1 have no future. 
18.1 have to be really careful because something bad 
could happen. 
19.1 have to watch out for danger all the time. 
20.1 helped make the frightening event happen. 
21.1 knew that the frightening event would happen. 
Continued over page... 
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Disagree Disagree Agree a Agree a 
a lot a bit bit lot 
22.1 must control my thoughts and feelings about the 
frightening event or I will go crazy. 
23.1 used to be a happy person but now I am always 
sad. 
24.1 will always be angry with the people who caused 
the frightening event. 
25.1 will never be able to have normal feelings again. 
26. I'm scared that I'll get so angry that I'll break 
something or hurt someone. 
27. I'm the kind of person who always gets into 
trouble. 
28. If I avoid things after the frightening event it 
means I am a coward. 
29. If I let out my feelings bad things will happen. 
30. If I was a better person, I could have stopped the 
frightening event from happening. 
31. Life is not fair. 
32. My friends at school wouldn't have got involved in 
frightening events. 
33. My life has been destroyed by the frightening 
event. 
34. My reactions since the frightening event mean I 
have changed for the worse. 
35. My reactions since the frightening event mean I 
will never get over it. 
36. My reactions since the frightening event mean 
something is seriously wrong with me. 
37. My reactions since the frightening event show that 
I must be going crazy. 
38. No one understands me anymore. 
39. Not being able to get over all my fears means that I 
am a failure. 
40. Nothing good can happen to me anymore. 
41. Small things upset me. 
42. Someone should be punished for what happened to 
me. 
Continued over page... 
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Disagree Disagree Agree a Agree a 
a lot a bit bit lot 
43. Something terrible will happen if I do not try to 
control my thoughts about the frightening event. 
44. The frightening event happened as a punishment 
for me. 
45. The frightening event has changed me forever. 
46. The world is a dangerous place. 
47. What happened to me is really unfair. 
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[TDRI 
People who have been in frightening events or have had close friends and family 
involved in frightening events, sometimes may have painful and scary memories 
or distressing thoughts about what happened. Sometimes people try to push these 
thoughts and memories out of their minds. Sometimes people will try to think 
about something else instead. We would like to know how much you try to do 
these things. 
Read the sentences below carefully and tick the box that says how much you agree 
or do not agree with it. 
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree 
a lot a bit a bit a lot 
1. When I have thoughts or memories about 
what happened, I try hard to push them out 
of my mind. 
2. When I have thoughts or memories about 
what happened, I try hard to think about 
something else. 
After frightening events, people may think a lot about what has happened. Here 
are some thoughts that people have had about frightening things. 
We would like to know if you've had thoughts like these. Please read each of the 
sentences below, and tick the box that says how often you've had thoughts like 
these. 
Some- Almost 
Never times Often always 
I keep wishing that I could go back in time 
and prevent the event from happening. 
2. Whenever I think of the event I wonder why 
it happened to us. 
3.1 am always wondering if my family or I 
might get hurt again. 
335 
What I think andfeel 
[RCMAS] 
Read each question carefully. Put a circle around the word YES if you think it is 
true about you. Put a circle around the word NO if you think it is not true about 
you. 
1. 1 have trouble making up my mind. Yes No 
2. 1 get nervous when things do not go the right way for me. Yes No 
3. Others seem to do things easier than I can. Yes No 
4. 1 like everyone I know. Yes No 
5. Often I have trouble getting my breath. Yes No 
6. 1 worry a lot of the time. Yes No 
7. 1 am afraid of a lot of things. Yes No 
8. 1 am always kind. Yes No 
9. 1 get mad easily. Yes No 
10. 1 worry about what my parents will say to me. Yes No 
11. 1 feel that others do not like the way I do things. Yes No 
12. 1 always have good manners. Yes No 
13. It is hard for me to get to sleep at night. Yes No 
14. 1 worry about what other people think about me. Yes No 
15. 1 feel alone even when there are people with me. Yes No 
16. 1 am always good. Yes No 
17. Often I feel sick in my stomach. Yes No 
18. My feelings get hurt easily. Yes No 
19. My hands feel sweaty. Yes No 
20. 1 am always nice to everyone. Yes No 
21. 1 am tired a lot. Yes No 
22. 1 worry about what is going to happen. Yes No 
23. Other children are happier than L Yes No 
24. 1 tell the truth every single time. Yes No 
25. 1 have bad dreams Yes No 
26. My feelings get hurt easily when I am fussed at. Yes No 
27. 1 feel someone will tell me I do things the wrong way. Yes No 
28. 1 never get angry. Yes No 
29. 1 wake up scared some of the time. Yes No 
30. 1 worry when I go to bed at night. Yes No 
31. It is hard for me to keep my mind on my schoolwork. Yes No 
32. 1 never say things I shouldn't. Yes No 
33. 1 wiggle in my seat a lot. Yes No 
34. 1 am nervous. Yes No 
35. A lot of people are against me. Yes No 
36. 1 never lie. Yes No 
37. 1 often worry about something bad happening to me. Yes No 
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Parent self-report questionnaire battery at three months post-trauma 
Parent's Booklet 
How children and young people think and feel after 
being in a frightening event 
Thank you for taking part in this study. Please read the following questionnaires 
and follow the instructions on each page. 
There are no right or wrong answers, we are interested in what you think and feel. 
Please could you write your name, your child's name, and today's date below. 
Your name: 




Below is a list of problems that people sometimes have after experiencing a 
frightening event. Read each one carefully and cast your mind back to the week 
that has just passed. First, choose the answer (0-3) that best describes HOW 
OFIEN that problem has bothered you IN THE PAST WEEK. 
0123 
Not at all or only Once per week/ 2-4 times per week/ 5 times per week/ 
one time once in a while once in a while almost always 
Next, rate how distressing each of the experiences has been in the past week using 
this 0-3 scale. 
.0123 Not at all Very distressing 
1. Having upsetting thoughts or images about the frightening event that came into 
your head when you didn't want them to 
How often? 01 2- 3 How distressing has this been? 0123 
2. Having bad dreams or nightmares about the frightening event 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
I Reliving the frightening event, acting or feeling as if it was happening again 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
4. Feeling emotionally upset when you were ren-dnded of the frightening event (for 
example, feeling scared, angry, sad, guilty, etc. ) 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
5. Experiencing physical reactions when you were reminded of the frightening event 
(for example, breaking out in a sweat, heart beating fast) 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
6. Trying not to think about, talk about, or have feelings about the frightening 
event 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
7. Trying to avoid activities, people, or places that remind you of the 
frightening event 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
8. Not being able to remember an important part of the frightening event 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
9. Having much less interest or participating much less often in important 
activities 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
10. Feeling distant or cut off from people around you 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
11. Feeling emotionally numb (for example, being unable to cry or unable to have 
loving feelings) 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
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12. Feeling as if your future plans or hopes will not come true (for example, you will 
not have a career, marriage, children, or a long life) 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
13. Having trouble falling asleep 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
14. Feeling irritable 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
15. Having trouble concentrating (for example, drifting in and out of conversations, 
losing track of a story on television, forgetting what you read) 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
16. Being overtly alert (for example, checking to see who is around you, being 
uncomfortable with your back to a door, etc. ) 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
17. Being jumpy or easily startled 
How often? 0123 How distressing has this been? 0123 
Please indicate how much the problems listed on the previous two pages have 
interrupted with your life. Circle the number that best describes your situation in 
the past week. 
Work 
Because of my problems my work is impaired: 
02456789 10 




Social Life/Leisure Activities 
(with other people at parties, socializing, visiting, dating, outings, clubs, 
entertaining) 
Because of my problems my social life is impaired: 
02456789 10 
Not at +-Mildly--* +-Moderately-+ 4--Markedly-+ Very 




Family Life/Home Responsibilities 
(relating to family members, paying bills, managing home, shopping and 
cleaning) 
Because of my problems my family life/home responsibilities are impaired: 
02456789 10 
Not at *--Mildly--+ +-Moderately--+ +-Markedly-* Very 
all severely (I 
never do 
these) 
Next, please rate how you feel about the frightening event at this moment: 
When you think back about the frightening event and the things that 
followed it, how UPSET do you feel? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not Extremely 
at all 
To what extent do you think you have COME TO TERMS with the 
frightening event? 
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 




[Beck Depression Inventory entered here] 
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[TDRI 
People who have been in frightening events or have had close friends and family 
involved in frightening events, sometimes may have painful and scary memories 
or distressing thoughts about what happened. Sometimes people try to push such 
thoughts and memories out of their minds. Sometimes people will try to think 
about something else instead. We would like to know how much you try to do 
these things. 
Read the sentences below and tick the box that says how much you agree or do 
not agree with it. 
Don't 
agree at Disagree Agree Completely 
all slightly slightly agree 
1. When I have thoughts or memories 
about what happened, I try hard to 
push them out of my mind. 
2. When I have thoughts or memories 
about what happened, I try hard to 
think about something else. 
After frightening events, people may think a lot about what has happened. Here 
are some thoughts that people have had about such frightening things. 
We would like to know if you've had thoughts like these. Please read each of the 
sentences below, and tick the box that says how often you've had thoughts like 
these. 
Some- Almost 
Never times Often always 
1.1 keep wishing that I could go back in 
time and prevent the event from 
happening. 
2. Whenever I think of the event I 
wonder why it happened to us. 
II am always wondering if my family or 
I might get hurt again. 
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[FFQI 
Below are a series of statements about your family since the frightening event. For each 
statement please put a cross in the box that best fits your situation. 
Does not Applies Certainly 
apply somewhat applies 
1. We are closer than before 
2. We are more irritable 
3. We are more withdrawn. 
4. We argue more. 
5. We avoid upsetting issues. 
6. We find it harder to enjoy things. 
7. We have a better sense of goals. 
8. We have less contact with relatives. 
9. We spend less time together. 
10. We talk over problems. 
11. We worry about strain. 
Below are two questions about what you personally have been thinking since the 
frightening event. Please tick the appropriate box. 
Some- 
Not at all times Often 
1. Since the frightening event, do you 
worry more about your children 
coming to harm? 
2. Do you need to know where your 
children are more than before? 
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[STAIJ 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and then tick the appropriate box to the right of the 
statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but 
give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
Not at Moderately Very 
all Somewhat so much so 
1.1 feel calm. 
2.1 feel secure. 
3.1 am tense. 
4.1 am strained. 
5.1 feel at ease. 
6.1 feel upset. 
7.1 am presently worrying over 
possible misfortunes. 
8.1 feel satisfied. 
9.1 feel frightened. 
10.1 feel comfortable. 
11.1 feel self-confident. 
12.1 feel nervous. 
13.1 am jittery. 
14.1 feel indecisive. 
15.1 am relaxed. 
16.1 feel content. 
17.1 am worried. 
18.1 feel confused. 
19.1 feel steady. 
20.1 feel pleasant. 
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Appendix C -Article publishedfrom the body of the thesis 
Mciser-Stedman, R. (2002). Towards a Cognitive-Behavioral Model of PTSD in 
Children and Adolescents. Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review, 5,217- 
232. 
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Towards a Cognitive-Behavioral Model of PTSD 
in Children and Adolescents 
Richard Meiser-Stedmanl 
Posttraumatic stress disorder in children and adolescents has been studied only for the past 
15-20 years and is the subject of a burgeoning corpus of research. Much research has focused 
on examining whether children and adolescents have the same responses to trauma as those 
experienced by adults. Many of the research tools used to investigate children's responses 
are taken from measures designed for use with adults, and these measures have proven to 
be useful. However, it has not been established that children's responses to traumatic events 
are related to the same underlying processes as are adults' responses. The possible applica- 
tion of 2 recent cognitive models of PTSD in adults to understanding PTSD in children and 
adolescents is discussed in this paper, within the context of what is already known about chil- 
dren's reaction to trauma and existing theoretical accounts of childhood PTSD. Particular 
attention is paid toward the nature of children's memories of traumatic events and how these 
memories relate to the reexperiencing symptoms of PTSD, and cognitive processes that may 
play a role in the maintenance of PTSD. It is proposed that the adoption of a more specific 
cognitive-behavioral framework in the study of this disorder may be beneficial and lead to 
better treatment outcomes. 
KEYWORDS: posttraumatic stress disorder, children; cognitive-behavioral model; traumatic memories; 
maintenance. 
INTRODUCTION 
it has been acknowledged only during the past 
15 years or so that children and adolescents may suf- 
fer from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In one 
of the earliest considerations of children's responses 
to trauma, Garmezy and Rutter (1985) concluded that 
children's reactions to trauma were not as serious as 
those developed by adults, and that children's reac- 
tions did not warrant inclusion within a diagnostic 
category of PITSD. 71his was due particularly to there 
being no reports that children exposed to disasters 
displayed PTSD-specific symptoms such as amnesia, 
psychic numbing, or intrusive flashbacks. 
Particular barriers to the understanding of chil- 
dren's reactions to traumatic events were quickly 
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highlighted. Yule and Williams (1990) pointed out 
that studies of children exposed to trauma are dif- 
ficult to conduct because of the tendency of adults to 
be highly protective toward such children and deny 
that children can suffer psychiatric disturbance fol- 
lowing trauma. In addition, these authors noted that 
one of the earliest studies (Galante & Foa, 1986) had 
not used scales appropriate for detection of traumatic 
stress reactions in children. 
A more detailed understanding of PTSD in chil- 
dren and adolescents was derived from the use of 
assessment measures designed specifically for PTSD. 
The Impact of Event Scale (IES; Horowitz, Wilner, & 
Alvarez, 1979) was utilized in a study of children in- 
volved in the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry disaster 
(Yule & Williams, 1990). Children assessed using this 
self-report measure were found to score in a similar 
fashion to adults. The PTSD Reaction Index (PTSD- 
RI), a structured interview based on the DSM-HI di- 
agnostic criteria for PTSD, was used by Pynoos et al. 
217 
10964037/02tt 200-0217/0 0 2002 Plenum Publishing Corporation 
218 
(1987) to assess children who had witnessed a fatal 
sniper attack on their school playground. Children 
in the playground at the time of the shooting were 
very likely to develop PTSD, with 77% developing 
moderate-to-severe levels of PTSD. 
These key articles that helped to bring about an 
acceptance of the validity of the PTSD diagnosis in 
children utilized scales and interviews based on diag- 
nostic criteria initially designed for adults. The study 
of reactions to traumatic events has been conducted 
formally for several more years within the adult pop- 
ulation, and a number of theories concerning the eti- 
ology of PTSD have been suggested. Before theoret- 
ical insights can be gleaned from research on adult 
populations subjected to trauma however, the issue 
remains of whether it is appropriate to continue to 
assume that child PTSD is essentially the same disor- 
der as that found in adults. 
It is the purpose of this review to examine the the- 
oretical understanding of children's and adolescents' 
reactions to trauma and how such an understanding 
may benefit from models of PTSD in adults. First, a 
brief critical review of theoretical accounts of PTSD 
in children and adolescents will be provided. Second, 
two recent cognitive models of PTSD in adults that 
have been shown to account for many of the key fea- 
tures of PTSD and have generated testable hypothe- 
ses will be outlined. Third, evidence concerning the 
pattern of reexperiencing observed in children will be 
considered. Fourth, the applicability of cognitive pro- 
cesses proposed in adult models of I1rSD to PTSD 
in children and adolescents will be discussed. Fifth 
and finally, an examination will be provided of how 
the framework proposed within this paper may guide 
future research into children's and adolescents' reac- 
tions to trauma. 
CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF PTSD 
IN CMLDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 
In this section, a brief overview will be provided 
of the most significant conceptualizations of PTSD 
in children and adolescents that have been offered 
over the past 15 years. 1he models were selected so 
as to provide an idea of the breadth of theoretical 
perspectives adopted so far in trying to understand 
children's responses to trauma, and the selection is by 
no means exhaustive. 
Pynoos and colleagues (Pynoos, 1994; Pynoos, 
Steinberg, & Goenjian, 1996; Pynoos, Steinberg, & 
Piacentini, 1999; Pynoos, Steinberg, & Wraith, 1995) 
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have considered children and adolescents' reactions 
to trauma within a developmental life-trajectory 
model. A child's short-term reaction to a trauma is 
considered to be moderated by four groups of fac- 
tors: (i) proximal trauma reminders (e. g., external 
and internal cues, physiological reactivity); (ii) prox- 
imal secondary stresses (e. g., changes to family and 
community circumstances); (iii) the "ecology" of the 
child (e. g., parental, school, and peer factors); and 
(iv) factors intrinsic to the child (e. g., genetic pre- 
disposition, developmental competencies). In partic- 
ular, it is argued that "the etiology of posttraurnatic 
distress, [is derived from] the nature of the trau- 
matic experience(s) and from the subsequent trau- 
matic reminders and secondary stressors" (Pynoos, 
Steinberg, & Wraith, 1995, p. 72; the italics are the 
original authors). A child's long-term reaction and 
adjustment is likely to be related to ongoing reminders 
of the trauma and persistent secondary stressors (e. g., 
physical disability, judicial proceedings, etc. ). 
This conceptualization is important as it inte- 
grates existing psychodynamic, familial, cognitive- 
behavioral, and psychopharmacological approaches 
to children and adolescents' reactions to trauma, and 
leaves little doubt as to the dramatic impact of "the 
legacy of trauma. " With regards to future research, 
Pynoos and colleagues advocate the investigation of 
a number of areas, including the development of brain 
mechanisms and how PTSD intersects with other anx- 
iety disorders over the life span. 
In a review of the literature concerning PTSD 
in children and adolescents, Fletcher (1996) adopted 
a multifactorial model similar to that of Pynoos and 
colleagues. Fletcher concluded that children react to 
trauma in a way very similar to that of adults, and 
called for further research to examine why it is that 
some children develop PTSD while others do not. He 
also stressed that factors other than those relating to 
exposure to trauma must be investigated. 
Schwarz and Perry (1994) emphasized the neu- 
robiological impact of a traumatic event, noting that 
acute stress results in the increased activation of the 
noradrenergic system, which plays an important role 
in a number of behaviors that are readily identified as 
being related to PTSD; arousal regulation, vigilance, 
irritability, locomotion, attention, sleep, and the star- 
tle response. The neurobiological changes thought to 
result from traumatic stress also "create an adaptive 
record of survival-related information" (Schwarz & 
Perry, 1994, p. 312). Such records, termed "malignant 
memories" by Schwarz and colleagues (Schwarz & 
Kowalski, 1991; Schwarz, Kowalski, & Hanus, 1993), 
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are hypothesized to possess a neural network archi- 
tecture and incorporate information derived from the 
traumatic event that has a potential bearing on the in- 
dividual's survival. 
The activation of these memories by trauma- 
related cues results in the individual experiencing high 
levels of noxious arousal, and potentially, cognitive 
distortions, memory changes, dissociative states, and 
altered behavioral and affective activity. It is further 
noted from animal studies that the developing brain 
is particularly sensitive to stress, especially when such 
stress is unpredictable and uncontrollable. The au- 
thors proposed therefore that children exposed to 
trauma may develop brains with dysregulated neu- 
rophysiological systems and neuroanatomical struc- 
tures that may leave them more vulnerable to suffer- 
ing from exposure to psychosocial stressors when they 
reach maturity. The authors described how younger 
children exposed to trauma may experience a more 
pervasive and persistent increase in basal autonomic 
tone and develop a posttraumatic reaction where 
symptoms are elicited by more general stimuli that 
are unrelated to the trauma. 
An integrative conceptual model that incorpo- 
rated exposure to trauma, child characteristics (such 
as gender and age), access to social support, and cop- 
ing styles was tested in a sample of elementary school- 
aged children exposed to a hurricane (Vernberg, La 
Greca, Silverman, & Prinstein, 1996). Vernberg et al. 
found that the four factors identified in the model 
were together able to predict a considerable amount 
of the variance in PTSD symptomatology. 'Ibis study 
is of importance as it compares the relative impor- 
tance of exposure variables to nonexposure variables 
such as social support and coping, and identifies spe- 
cific targets for treatment (e. g., the use of blame and 
anger). Follow-up investigations of the same sam- 
ple of children (La Greca, Silverman, Vernberg, & 
prinstein, 1996) found that at 7 and 10 months af- 
ter the disaster the model accounted for less variance 
in pTSD symptomatology, Although a considerable 
number of children thought they might die during the 
hurricane (60%), far fewer were hurt or actually wit- 
nessed other people being hurt during the event. Ibe 
success of the model in predicting children's reactions 
may result partly from investigating a sample exposed 
to a comparatively moderate trauma where the pro- 
tective effects of social support and coping may be 
more pronounced. Nevertheless, this study presents 
a significant advance in the methodology and theory 
used in the investigation of children's responses to 
trauma. 
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A number of reviews, while not proposing a spe- 
cific model of PTSD in children and adolescents, have 
outlined etiological factors that have been shown 
to predict the occurrence of the disorder (Amaya- 
Jackson & March, 1995; American Association of 
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 1998; Foy, Madvig, 
Pynoos, & Camilleri, 1996; Gurwitch, Sullivan, & 
Long, 1998; Pfefferbaum, 1997; Vogel & Vernberg, 
1993; Yule, Perrin, & Smith, 1999). The most widely 
accepted predictor of PTSD is exposure severity, 
while gender, prior exposure to trauma, prior psychi- 
atric disorder, and family functioning also seem to 
be emerging as having predictive value. A less clear 
picture exists of the relationship between variables 
such as age and ethnicity and posttraumatic stress 
reactions. 
A recent review has examined how a cognitive 
theory of childhood PTSD needs to accommodate de- 
velopmental factors (Salmon & Bryant, 2002). The 
authors of this review highlight the need to consider 
developmental issues that have a bearing on how a 
child may encode and then resolve a traumatic expe- 
rience. The development of language is thought to be 
of particular importance, both when a trauma is ex- 
perienced and when a child attempts to deal with the 
traumatic event. The social world of the child is exam- 
ined, and the role of the family in assisting a child to 
form complete memories of a trauma is stressed. The 
authors conclude by providing a relatively clear de- 
scription of how developmental issues might be con- 
sidered in both the assessment and treatment of chil- 
dren suffering from PTSD. 'Ibe role of the family in 
both assessment and treatment is stressed, in partic- 
ular the potential negative effect that parents may 
have in reinforcing a child's avoidant coping. Methods 
for supporting young children to communicate their 
experiences and the empirical support for providing 
such assistance are described. 
71be reviews described above have demonstrated 
how the understanding of children and adolescents' 
reactions to traumatic experiences has advanced to 
incorporate theory from a variety of domains. Many 
studies have been directed at examining core assump- 
tions regarding the nature of PTSD in children, such as 
the pattern of symptomatology observed in children 
following trauma. The need for further research into 
a number of aspects of children's reactions is widely 
acknowledged. Yet, it remains the case that such re- 
search is rarely driven by a coherent model that ex- 
plains the processes that are involved in the formation 
of specific PTSD symptoms such as intrusive memo- 
ries, flashbacks, and hyperarousal. The adoption of 
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such a theoretical account may offer clearer guide- 
lines as to how research may be directed beyond ex- 
amining demographic and psychosocial variables. 
Clearly, a theoretical account of FITSD in chil- 
dren and adolescents will need to be able to en- 
compass the full range of aberrations of behavior, 
cognition, physiology, and consciousness that are as- 
sociated with PTSD within a developmental context. 
Existing models have demonstrated a degree of suc- 
cess in accounting for these aberrations, yet inade- 
quacies are also present. For example, Schwarz and 
Perry (1994) considered the role of developmental 
neurobiology with regard to specific PTSD symptoms. 
Similarly, Salmon and Bryant (2002) placed their dis- 
cussion of childhood PTSD in the context of "fear 
networks" (Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum, 1989). How- 
ever, the kinds of single-level representations of emo- 
tion proposed within these accounts are limited in 
their explanatory power (Power & Dalgleish, 1997), 
especially with regards to some of the more disturb- 
ing symptoms of PTSD, such as flashbacks and emo- 
tional numbing; such accounts cannot explain the dis- 
continuity between the reexperiencing of traumatic 
events, where adults and children may experience 
overwhelming sensations as experienced at the time 
of the trauma, and the normal, voluntary activation 
of autobiographical memories. In the next section two 
cognitive models of PTSD in adults that assume multi- 
level representations of traumatic events are outlined, 
which may also inform the development of a model 
of PTSD in younger people. 
COGNIIIVE MODELS OF PTSD IN ADULTS 
Two models of PTSD in adults have had a 
tremendous impact on the understanding of the dis- 
order in recent years. This more recent generation 
of models of PTSD, in addition to overcoming the 
problems associated with single-level theories of emo- 
tion as outlined above, provide more powerful expla- 
nations of the time course of reactions to traumatic 
events and individual differences in the nature of such 
reactions. 
In the first model to be considered here, that 
of Brewin, Dalgleish, and Joseph (1996), it is sug- 
gested that the complex pattern of symptomatology 
observed in individuals with PTSD could be explained 
by a dual representation model, where the memories 
of the traumatic event are stored in a manner different 
to that of normal memories. These memories remain 
in a sensory format and are hypothesized to be rep- 
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resented within different neural structures than are 
normal memories. 
Brewin (2001) has presented evidence from 
a cognitive neuroscience perspective that suggests 
"traumatic memories" are laid down in a way that 
bypasses the hippocampus, the neural structure con- 
sidered to be responsible for the encoding of mem- 
ories within a temporal and spatial context. As a re- 
sult of this difference in information processing, "the 
sensory (visual, auditory, olfactory, etc. ), physiolog- 
ical, and motor aspects of the traumatic experience 
are represented in situationally accessible knowledge 
in the form of analogical codes that enable the origi- 
nal experience to be recreated" (Brewin et al., 1996, 
pp. 676-677). Such representations, termed "situa- 
tionally accessible memories" (SAMs) by Brewin 
et al. (1996), are reexperienced as the result of elicita- 
tion through associative learning; trauma-related cues 
will be likely to trigger such reexperiencing. 'Ibis qual- 
itative difference in representation also means that 
traumatic memories are not easily accessible by con- 
scious means. 
Such an account gives a powerful explanation 
of the cardinal cluster of symptoms observed in in- 
dividuals with PTSD: the reexperiencing phenom- 
ena. The difference in representation may account for 
how flashbacks are experienced frequently as disso- 
ciative states. The conscious activation of SAMs is 
thought to allow changes in such representations of a 
traumatic event, whereby conditioned emotional re- 
sponses are extinguished through a process of "spon- 
taneous or programmed habituation" (p. 678). Such 
habituation, and the associated normalization of at- 
tentional and memory biases, is responsible for de- 
creasing the likelihood of intrusively reexperiencing 
the traumatic event. 
However, the full resolution of a traumatic event 
may also be contingent on an individual's verbally 
accessible memory (VAM) of the event. VAMs are 
theorized to consist of representations of a person's 
conscious experience of a traumatic event, such as 
sensory features, emotional and physiological re- 
actions, and the perceived meaning of the event. 
Significantly such a representation is likely to be sub- 
ject to deliberate retrieval from an individual's store 
of autobiographical memories. Brewin et al. (1996) 
stressed that "secondary emotional reactions arising 
from subsequent conscious appraisal" (p. 682) may in- 
terfere with the emotional processing of a traumatic 
experience. Attributions of responsibility made after 
a traumatic event, leading to emotions such as guilt 
or anger, in addition to being distressing, may prevent 
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the habituation of fear when SAMS are activated. 
Therefore, the authors suggest that prior to the use 
of exposure treatment, such secondary emotions be 
addressed using cognitive techniques. 
Brewin et al. (1996) go on to describe three end- 
points of emotional processing that arise from the dual 
representation theory proposed. Completion or inte- 
gration results when memories of the traumatic event 
have been fully "worked through, " and are integrated 
with the individual's other memories and sense of self 
in the world. In particular, the individual will have ha- 
bituated to their SAMS of the event. The presence of 
unremitting PTSD is termed "chronic emotional pro- 
cessing, 9' and is thought to be associated with inability 
to integrate memories of the trauma. This may be the 
result of aversive secondary emotions, as described 
above, the lack of social support to assist processing 
of SAMS or VAMs, and ongoing trauma, among other 
causes. In addition to the symptoms of PTSD, an indi- 
vidual caught in this stage will continue to have atten- 
tional and memory biases toward trauma-related in- 
forrnation, and develop more generalized secondary 
reactions. The final endpoint of processing, "prema- 
ture inhibition of processing, " results when the indi- 
vidual succeeds in avoiding the activation of unpleas- 
ant SAMS and VAMs. Although the triggering of neg- 
ative affect may be automatically avoided by the de- 
velopment of "avoidance schemas: 1 the individual will 
continue to have attentional biases, impaired memory 
for the trauma, avoidance for trauma-related stimuli, 
and possibly somatization. 
The second of this new generation of models of 
pTSD in adults is that of Ehlers and Clark (2000). 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) based their model on a dual 
representation format very similar to that of Brewin 
et al. (1996), but elaborate on both the pathologi- 
cal role of "trauma memory" (their term for Brewin 
et al-'s "SAMS"), and the cognitions, metacognitions, 
and thought control strategies considered responsible 
for the maintenance of PTSD. Ehlers and Clark ar- 
gued that the combination of trauma memory and the 
negative appraisal of trauma and its sequelae result in 
a perception of "current threat" that is accompanied 
by intrusive phenomena, hyperarousal, anxiety, and 
other emotional responses. 
Ehlers and colleagues have demonstrated the 
niaintaining effect of a sense of "current threat" in 
victims of physical and sexual assault (Dunmore, 
Clark, & Ehlers, 1999), political prisoners (Ehlers, 
Maercker, & Boos, 2000), and motor vehicle accident 
(NWA) survivors (Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; 
Steil & Ehlers, 2000). In addition to the presence 
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of poorly elaborated trauma memories (the recall of 
which is easily triggered by associated cues), a num- 
ber of cognitions and metacognitions are thought to 
give rise to this mental state. These include dysfunc- 
tional meaning attached to symptoms of the trauma 
(e. g., believing that having flashbacks is a sign that one 
is "going mad");. perceived negative responses from 
others (e. g., "people think I am too weak to cope on 
my own"); a sense of permanent change (e. g., "my 
life is ruined"); and change in global beliefs (e. g., "the 
world is a dangerous place"). 
The power of metacognition to impede recov- 
ery from the acute phase of the disorder was demon- 
strated by Steil and Ehlers (2000) in their finding that 
the distress caused by reexperiencing symptoms of 
MVAs was related to the idiosyncratic meaning as- 
signed to the symptoms (e. g., believing that intrusive 
thoughts are a sign that one is going "mad"). This re- 
lationship existed regardless of intrusion frequency, 
accident severity, and general anxiety-related catas- 
trophic cognitions. In addition, dysfunctional mean- 
ing attached to traumatic symptoms was found to be 
associated with maladaptive coping strategies such as 
avoidance, thought suppression (an active effort to rid 
one's mind of a cognition), rumination, and distrac- 
tion. These strategies are considered to discourage 
the full processing of traumatic memories, and in the 
case of thought suppression, paradoxically encourage 
the production of distressing intrusive cognitions. A 
considerable body of work has shown that thought 
suppression (see Purdon, 1999, for a review) is re- 
sponsible for an increase in the frequency of intrusive 
thoughts and memories. 
Thus, cognitions and metacognitions that are 
formed after a traumatic event may promote the 
maintenance of PTSD in two ways. First, dysfunc- 
tional cognitions and metacognitions produce a sense 
that the trauma continues to have damaging implica- 
tions, and consequently generate a feeling of appre- 
hension. Second, the thought control strategies that 
result from these appraisals can discourage emotional 
processing of memories of the traumatic event. These 
cognitions and coping strategies may explain how a 
substantial proportion of traumatized adults emotion- 
ally engage in exposure treatments and yet do not 
proceed to habituation of the memories (Jaycox, Foa, 
& Morral, 1998). Therefore, Steil and Ehlers (2000) 
suggest that "therapeutic strategies aimed at identify- 
ing, restructuring, and changing the negative idiosyn- 
cratic meaning of posttraumatic intrusions should be 
helpful in alleviating posttraumatic symptomatology" 
(p. 555). 
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Ehlers and Clark (2000), like Brewin et al. (1996), 
consider exposure to be an integral part of cognitive- 
behavioral interventions for PTSD, but argue that 
the adoption of cognitive restructuring during reliv- 
ing may be useful. In this way problematic appraisals 
associated with key moments of the trauma may be 
identified and discussed, and the full benefits of expo- 
sure can be attained. Although Ehlers and Clark ex- 
pound more the potential role of cognitive techniques 
in the treatment of PTSD in adults, there exist, how- 
ever, few significant conceptual differences between 
their model and that of Brewin et al. (1996). Each 
accounts for the extreme nature of the reexperienc- 
ing symptoms of PTSD, and the variation in outcome 
between survivors of trauma. In particular, the onset 
and maintenance of PTSD symptornatology are dis- 
tinguished. 71be early onset of intrusive phenomena 
is considered a normal reaction to an extreme event 
(especially after more severe trauma). 71be mainte- 
nance of such symptoms is considered to result from 
a variety of maladaptive responses. 
THE NATURE OF CHILDREN AND 
ADOLESCENTS'MEMORIES OF TRAUMA 
Although children and adolescents have been 
found to possess the same two-factor structure of 
reexperiencing and avoidance observed in adults 
(Dyregrov, Kuterovac, & Barath, 1996), particular 
consideration must be given to children's memories 
of traumatic events. Theorists positing a cognitive 
approach to PTSD in adults (Brewin et al., 1996; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000) regard the reexperiencing phe- 
nomenon of the disorder not only to be its primary 
distinguishing feature, but also to be indicative of the 
central underlying abnormality that is responsible for 
the disorder: the nature of the memories of a trau- 
matic event. These and other authors (e. g., van der 
Kolk, 1996) argue that traumatic events may be poorly 
encoded in memory, resulting in primitive representa- 
tions of events. In addition such representations may 
also play a considerable role in maintenance of the 
hyperarousal cluster of symptoms, as the physiologi- 
cal changes encoded during the traumatic event are 
reexperienced. 
It is essential therefore to consider whether the 
reexperiencing symptoms children experience are 
like those of adults; that is, such symptoms are the 
result of triggering involuntary recall of poorly elab- 
orated, sensory-based memories of the traumatic 
event. With regard to this, there is a growing body 
Meiser-Stedman 
of research regarding the elicitation, form, and treat- 
ment of traumatic memories in children. Three av- 
enues of research have addressed the issue of the exis- 
tence and role of traumatic memories in children and 
adolescence: clinical reports of children's memories 
of traumatic events, symptomatology profiles of sam- 
ples of children exposed to trauma, and studies that 
have examined specifically the nature of children's 
memories of traumatic events. 
Clinical Reports of Children's Memories 
of Traumatic Events 
The landmark case studies conducted into chil- 
dren's reactions to traumatic events examined 5- 
14-year-old children involved in the Chowchilla bus 
kidnapping (Terr, 1981). Terr reported the presence 
of some symptoms that would be considered to fit 
DSM-IV criteria for reexpericncing: Nightmares or 
bad dreams with some content pertaining to the kid- 
napping, "posttraumatic play, " and behavioral reen- 
actment. Flashbacks, however, were not observed 
in the children. Terr described how older children 
reported daytime visions of the kidnapping, but 
suggested that these reexperiencing episodes were 
voluntary. 
In a 4-year follow-up study of these children, Terr 
(1983) reported that their memories of the kidnap- 
ping were largely unchanged, and that such memories 
were still recalled with a "vivid immediacy. " A signif- 
icant number continued to engage in posttraurnatic 
play and behavioral reenactment, a variant of post- 
traumatic play that was considered to be less "fun, " 
and very often involved the reexperiencing of psy- 
chophysiological responses experienced during the 
kidnapping. Behavioral reenactment is a feature of 
children's reactions to trauma that may be readily con- 
ceptualized within the dual representation theory of 
Brewin et al. (1996) as the elicitation of motor re- 
sponses recorded during the trauma. 
Perrin, Smith, and Yule (2000) share the view 
that children and adolescents can suffer from in- 
trusive thoughts about a traumatic event, adding 
that such phenomena can occur either when falling 
asleep or when triggered by external or internal re- 
minders. Perrin et al. (2000) also briefly overview the 
debate regarding the reactions of very young chil- 
dren to trauma, noting that although evidence ex- 
ists to suggest that this group does not suffer from 
visual flashbacks, they can display signs of reexpe- 
riencing through vivid reenactment of the trauma 
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(Scheeringa & Zeanah, 1995; Scheeringa, Zeanah, 
Drell, & Larrieu, 1995). In short, many clinical reports 
note that children "re-see" or "re-feel" the trauma 
(Terr, 1991) and acknowledge the different sensory 
modalities that such experiences may take. 
Symptomatology Profiles of Samples of Children 
Exposed to Rauma 
Beyond clinical reports, a number of studies 
have shown that the full range of reexperiencing 
symptomatology is found in children and adoles- 
cents who have been exposed to traumatic events. A 
meta-analysis conducted byFletcher (1994) examined 
34 studies of children exposed to trauma (with a to- 
tal sample size of 2,697) and found similar rates of 
pTSD in child and adult samples. Fletcher (1996), in 
discussing these findings, concluded that the DSM-IV 
diagnosis of PTSD could be applied to all child age 
groups. Although the pattern of symptornatology in 
imetcher's meta-analysis for preschool children ap- 
pears to be different to that of school- and teen-aged 
children (with preschool children found to be more 
frequently distressed by reminders of the trauma, 
have bad dreams regarding the trauma, and engag- 
ing in posttraumatic play), this meta-analysis does 
underscore the general acceptance that children re- 
experience traumatic events. 
Quantitative Studies of Children's Memories 
of -praumatic Events 
The finding that children and adolescents expe- 
rience unwanted thoughts of traumatic events, have 
flashbacks" (albeit not young children), and expe- 
rience physiological arousal on exposure to trauma- 
related cues, supports the suggestion that children and 
adolescents can form SAMs of traumatic events. Fur- 
ther evidence suggesting that some children's mem- 
ories of traumatic events are comparable to the con- 
cept of SAMs comes from the few studies that have 
sought to assess the nature of these memories in chil- 
dren quantitatively. 
Burgess, Hartman, and Baker (1995) adopted a 
conceptual framework that incorporated neurobio- 
logical, information processing, and psychodynamic 
approaches in their study of the memories of 34 phys- 
ically and sexually abused children. The somatic, be- 
havioral, verbal, and visual qualities of the children's 
rnernories were examined. Somatic and behavioral 
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memories of trauma were very common and clearly 
related to the sexual nature of much of the abuse that 
was endured by the children in this sample. Most chil- 
dren's memories had a visual quality, though this find- 
ing was based on noting whether children were able 
to draw elements of the trauma they were exposed to. 
Such an indicator is likely to be highly insensitive due 
to children's lack of artistic ability or unwillingness to 
draw their experiences. Verbal memories were of a 
varying quality, though only three children expressed 
no memory at all of what happened to them. 
Further data concerning the quality of children's 
memories of trauma have been obtained from one 
study of pre-school-aged children exposed to an ex- 
treme natural disaster. Azarian, Lipsitt, Miller, and 
Skriptchenko-Gregorian (1999) assessed 90 children, 
aged 10-44 months, after the 1988 Armenian earth- 
quake. More than half of the sample had verbal mem- 
ories of the earthquake, and nearly all displayed what 
the authors termed "nonverbal" memories: repetitive 
earthquake-related play, nightmares, and physiologi- 
cal and somatic reactions that were produced in reac- 
tion to specific reminders of the earthquake. An im- 
portant finding of this study was that memory quality 
varied across the age range. The youngest age group, 
that of children aged 10-24 months, contained signif- 
icantly fewer children with verbal memories than did 
the two older groups, while the rates of nonverbal 
memory presentation remained approximately equal 
across the age span. 
The two studies discussed above lend weight to 
the possibility that children exposed to trauma can 
have nonverbal memories similar to the SAMs de- 
scribed by Brewin et al. (1996). It is noteworthy that 
Azarian et al. (1999) found that very young children 
had no verbal memories of the earthquake that they 
were exposed to, yet possessed nonverbal memories 
at the same rate as older children did. That such young 
children lack verbal memories is entirely in keep- 
ing with their linguistic development (see Salmon & 
Bryant, 2002, for further discussion of this). However, 
if the ability to form verbal memories is a protective 
one would have expected this group to demonstrate 
more nonverbal memories than did older children, 
who with their more developed linguistic and cog- 
nitive abilities may have been more able to process 
the traumatic event. Brewin and colleagues note that 
adults with PTSD following a trauma may have some 
verbal account of the event, but that such accounts 
are likely to be fragmentary and more biased to de- 
scribing sensory rather than semantic aspects of what 
occurred. 
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In conclusion, it is suggested from the existing 
evidence that Brewin et al. 's (1996) concept of SAMs 
may be of explanatory relevance to children's reac- 
tions to trauma. Like adults' reexperiencing of trau- 
matic events, children are likely to possess emotion- 
laden memories composed of sensory fragments, that 
are easily elicited by reminders of the event, and can 
be experienced in the present as intrusive memories 
and "flashbacks. " Further studies of the memories of 
a greater age range of children are necessary to inves- 
tigate this proposal. These should include prospective 
studies that examine the relationship between mem- 
ory quality and PTSD symptomatology. 
The finding of Azarian et al. (1999) that the 
presence of verbal memories in young children may 
be protective against the development of nonverbal 
memories is in particular need of replication. If this is 
the case, then other barriers to the formation of coher- 
ent and nonintrusive memories other than linguistic 
ability will need to be investigated, such as emotional 
regulation and willingness to confront fear-eliciting 
internal or external stimuli. Indeed, one of the ad- 
vances of the recent adult cognitive models of PTSD 
is the realization that although verbalizing a traumatic 
event is a necessary step in the processing of the event, 
other aspects of the traumatic memory also may need 
to be modified. Commentators on IPITSD in children 
have drawn attention to young children's limited abil- 
ity to encode an event in a verbal form (Fivush, 1998; 
Salmon & Bryant, 2002). Future studies may be ben- 
eficially directed toward other aspects of children's 
memories of trauma. Similarly, dissociation, which is 
considered to play a significant role in the onset of 
PTSD in adults by interfering with the process of 
forming a coherent memory of a traumatic event, has 
received little attention in studies of children and ado- 
lescents exposed to trauma. 
COGNITIVE AND METACOGNITIVE 
PROCESSES INVOLVED IN THE 
MAINTENANCE OF PTSD IN CHILDREN 
AND ADOLESCENTS 
Among the most significant advances brought 
about in the adult cognitive models of PTSD outlined 
above is their account of the time course of the disor- 
der. Accounting for the time course of PTSD is consid- 
ered a necessary component for any model (Dalgleish, 
1999). Such necessity seems to stem from the finding 
that at least for severe trauma such as rape, posttrau- 
matic symptornatology in the immediate aftermath 
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of such an event may be common (Rothbaum, Foa, 
Riggs, Murdoch, & Walsh, 1992). 
Dunmore, Clark, and Ehlers (1999,2001) argued 
that factors responsible for the onset and maintenance 
of PTSD in adults are rarely distinguished in the litera- 
ture, and that cognitive factors mayplay as significant 
a role in these aspects of the time course of PTSD as 
do pretraurnatic and peri-traumatic experiences. Both 
Brewin et al. (1996) and Ehlers and Clark (2000) ac- 
knowledge that the onset of posttraurnatic symptoma- 
tology may be strongly related to the quality of the 
memory laid down during the traumatic event, and 
argue that those individuals who suffer from more 
chronic PTSD are prevented in some way from pro- 
cessing such memories. This suggestion accounts for 
the finding that for many individuals the symptoms 
of PTSD are fleeting, whereas for others the disorder 
can last for many years. 
In the rest of this section, an examination of 
the kinds of cognitive processes that may be in- 
volved in the maintenance of PTSD in children 
and adolescents is examined. Appraisal, metacog- 
nitive, and information-processing aspects of cog- 
nition will be considered. First, however, a caveat 
must be highlighted regarding the adoption of 
an onset-maintenance approach to PTSD in chil- 
dren and adolescents. Although a growing body 
of research suggests that, as in adults, stress re- 
actions in the immediate aftermath of a traumatic 
event may be quite common but diminish rapidly 
for most individuals (American Academy of Child 
and Adolescent Psychiatry, 1998; Mirza, Bhadrinath, 
Goodyer, & Gilmour, 1998; Yule et al., 2000), 
such findings should still be considered as tenta- 
tive, especially in the case of young children who 
have been the subject of relatively few prospective 
studies, 
Secondary Emotions 
In the aftermath of a traumatic event, adults may 
develop what Brewin et al. (1996) term secondary 
emotions. According to these theorists, strong sec- 
ondary emotions such as guilt and anger may inter- 
fere with the processing of traumatic memories by 
preventing a reduction in affect when traumatic mem- 
ories are activated. Both anger and guilt (Goenjian, 
1993; Gurwitch et al., 1998; Pynoos & Nader, 1988; 
Schwarz & Kowalski, 1991) are common reactions 
to trauma observed in children. To date both guilt 
(Pynoos et al., 1987) and anger (Vernberg, La Greca, 
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Silverman, & Prinstein, 1996) have been shown to be 
associated with PTSD. 
"ought Control Strategies 
As discussed in detail above, the cardinal symp- 
toms of PTSD are distressing intrusive thoughts, feel. 
ings, and images, through which the individual "re- 
cxpcricnces" the traumatic event. 'Ibe way in which 
an individual responds to these reexperiencing phe. 
nomena can have significant repercussions; an impor- 
tant feature of Ehlers and Clark's model of PTSD is 
that maladaptivc thought control strategies, such as 
rumination and thought suppression, paradoxically 
increase the frequency of the intrusions (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000). Unlike other forms of avoidance that 
would appear to hinder the processing of traumatic 
memories, such as distraction, thought suppression 
would appear to actually exacerbate the reexpericnc- 
ing symptoms. 
Only two articles have evaluated the role of 
thought suppression in children with PTSD. In a study 
of 40 children exposed to MVAs, aged between 8 and 7 
years old (mean age 13-6), Aaron, Zaglul, and Emery 
(1999) found that nearly one quarter of the exposed 
children developed PTSD (according to DSM. lVcri. 
tcria). In a regression analysis of the assessed vari- 
ablcs, only fear at the time of the traumatic event and 
thought suppression were found to be significant prc- 
dictors of PTSD I month posttrauma, where greater 
fear and the greater endorsement of thought supprcs- 
sion were associated with worse symptom& 
Certain flaws arc apparent in this study, most no. 
tably the use of a scale that includes intrusion items 
in addition to thought suppression items (the White 
Bear Suppression Inventory-, Wegner & Zanakos, 
1994), a small sample size, and that the children were 
assessed only at I month posttrauma. Nevertheless 
the study used both the key posttraumatic stress self. 
report measures available for use with children (the 
IF, S and the PTSD-RI), and included a suitable con. 
trol group (non-MVA attendees at an accident and 
emergency department). Ehlers, Mayou, and Bryant 
(in press) also offer support for the role of thought 
suppression in their study of children involved in 
N4VAs, where a single item assessing this strategy was 
found to be a significant predictor of FTSD at both 3 
and 6 months posttrauma. 
Dissuading a child from the use of thought sup- 
priession is a simple target for treatment. However 
further research is necessary to discover if thought 
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suppression leads to an increase in the frequency 
of intrusive cognitions, as has been demonstrated 
in adults. Gaskell, Wells, and Calam (2001) demon- 
stratcd that the standard experimental thought sup- 
prcssion paradigm is workable with children aged 
7-11 years, while also finding that this thought con. 
trol strategy was not responsible for an increase in 
intrusive thoughts. 
Other thought control strategies, such as distrac. 
tion, which may not exacerbate the occurrence of 
intrusive thoughts and memories but may still dc- 
lay the processing of traumatic memories, arc worthy 
of investigation. Stallard, Vellcman, Langsford, and 
Baldwin (2001) found that in their sample of 97 chil. 
dren aged 7-18 years who had been involved In NIVAs, 
the use of distraction was associated with a diagno. 
sis of FTSD at 6 weeks after the accident, though 
was not predictive of PTSD at 8 months posttrauma. 
Very little is known about the developmental course 
of thought control strategies with regard to MD or 
any other anxiety or depressive disorder. Unfortu. 
natcly, the avoidance cluster of symptoms within the 
DSM-IV classification of PTSD includes one symp. 
tom for the avoidance of thoughts, fccling. and convcr. 
sations associated with a traumatic event; this crude 
grouping may mask important differences between 
adults and children in the use of what are quite distin. 
guishabic avoidant strategic& Tbc findings of Aaron 
ct al. (1999) and Ehlers ct al. (in press) suggest that 
more detailed research regarding the varieties of cog. 
nitive avoidance is warranted. 
Negative Interpretation of Intrusive Symptonts 
One factor only recently idcntiricd within the do. 
main of adult PTSD is the interpretation of posttrau. 
matic symptoms. in particular the intrusive symptoms 
(see Stcil & Ehlers, 2000). For cxample, the occur. 
rcncc of flashbacks may be seen by the individual as 
a sign that he or she is suffering from brain damage 
or "going mad. " Emotional numbness may be intcr. 
prctcd as indicating future unhappiness, as a result of 
being unable to form a close relationship with anyone 
(for further examples, see Ehlers & Clark. 2000). 
In addition to further cnhancing a sense of cur- 
rent threat, such cognitions also promote use of mal- 
adaptive thought control stratcgics, such as thought 
suppression (see earlier). At present few studies in 
children have formally acknowledged the potential 
role of such interpretations. Tcrr (1983) noted that 
one of the Chowchilla bus kidnapping childrcn had 
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developed a fear of being afraid, a process that is 
related to the interpretation of symptoms. Ibe only 
specific test of the role of these kinds of appraisals 
is that of Ehlers et al. (in press) where the appraisal 
of the self as going mad was associated with PTSD 
symptornatology at both 3 and 6 months posttrauma. 
A concept that has been more readily applied 
to child psychopathology is that of anxiety sensi- 
tivity. Anxiety sensitivity is the construct of tend- 
ing to catastrophise or overinterpret signals of anx- 
iety. Within adults, this construct has been identi- 
fied as being closely associated with certain anxiety 
disorders (Taylor, Koch, & McNally, 1992). Within 
children, the Childhood Anxiety Sensitivity Index 
(CASI; Silverman, Fleisig, Rabian, & Peterson, 1991) 
has been used to account for a significant propor- 
tion of variance on measures of children's fears and 
trait anxiety, which could not be explained by anx- 
iety frequency. Increasingly evidence has suggested 
that this construct is a unique predictor of trait anxi- 
ety, and has potential implications for the assessment 
and treatment of anxiety (Mattis & Ollendick, 1997; 
Silverman & Weems, 1999). 
With regard to the psychopathology of PTSD 
in children, no study has examined specifically 
the role of anxiety sensitivity, though two studies 
have examined the role of anxiety sensitivity in a 
group of children with a number of anxiety disor- 
ders (Chorpita, Albano, & Barlow, 1996; Weems, 
Hammond-Laurence, Silverman, & Ginsburg, 1998). 
Although there is some disagreement over the age at 
which anxiety sensitivity might influence general anxi- 
ety and fearfulness (where Silverman & Weems, 1999, 
argue persuasively in support of their finding that 
younger children are affected by their anxiety sensi- 
tivity), the emerging consensus is that by 11-12 years 
children possess the cognitive capacity to be con- 
cerned with abstract objects of fear, such as going 
crazy, losing control, or death. In each of these studies, 
however, the number of children with PTSD was very 
small. 'Ibis preliminary evidence that the construct of 
anxiety sensitivity is important in the development of 
anxiety disorders in children suggests that there is a 
pressing need to investigate metacognitive processes 
in pediatric PTSD. 
Rumination 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) describe how individuals 
involved in a traumatic event may ruminate over is- 
sues such as how the event could have been prevented, 
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and how justice or revenge might be achieved. They 
also propose four ways in which rumination may 
maintain PTSD: through strengthening maladaptive 
appraisals of the trauma, interfering with the process- 
ing of traumatic memories, increasing feelings of anx- 
iety and hopelessness, and providing more internal 
cues to intrusive traumatic memories. 
Within child and adolescent populations, very 
few studies have examined children and adolescents' 
use of rumination. Broderick (1998) assessed children 
aged between 9 and 12 years for their responses to aca- 
demic, family, and peer problem situations, and found 
that girls used rumination as a means of coping with 
stressors more than did boys. Studies examining the 
role of rumination in child psychopathology are even 
more scarce, in particular with regard to child's reac- 
tions to trauma. Some studies have demonstrated that 
the attributions children and adolescents form con- 
cerning the causes of a traumatic event can influence 
the development of posttraumatic symptomatology 
(Joseph, Brewin, Yule, & Williams, 1993), though very 
little research has examined the repetitive kind of pre- 
occupation identified by Ehlers and Clark (2000). One 
study has examined rumination and PTSD in children, 
that of Ehlers et al. (in press), who found that two 
items pertaining to ruminative styles (thinking about 
the trauma over and over, and wondering why the 
trauma happened to them) predicted the maintenance 
of PTSD symptoms. 
Broderick's study (Broderick, 1998) makes ap- 
parent individual differences in the use of rumina- 
tion among prepubescent children, and given the im- 
portance attached to rumination by recent studies of 
PTSD in adults (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Dunmore 
et al., 1999; Ehlers et al., 1998), further research in 
children exposed to traumatic events is warranted. 
In particular such research may need to examine 
whether specific cognitions such as those identified 
by Ehlers et al. (in press) result from an individual's 
more global "behavioral-attentional style" (Nolen- 
Hoeksema, 1991). 
"Current Threat, " Worry, and Attentional Biases 
Following a traumatic event children suffering 
from PTSD are likely to have elevated levels of anxi- 
ety (Ellis, Stores, & Mayou, 1998; Lonigan, Shannon, 
Taylor, Finch, & Sallee, 1994; Vogel & Vernberg, 
1993). Such anxiety is likely to be the result of a 
number of factors, but whatever the causes, ongoing 
anxiety is considered by most theorists to impair 
the successful processing of traumatic memories; 
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accessing emotion-laden memories of a traumatic 
event is unlikely to produce clinical improvement 
if no extinction of fear can occur (Foa, Steketee, & 
Rothbaum, 1989). 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) describe how adults with 
pTSD often possess a particular form of anxiety that 
theY term "current threat" (see above). 'Ibese authors 
consider this state to be strongly related to various be- 
liefs that an individual holds regarding their present 
condition and their more global worldview. A discus- 
sion of the possible role of children and adolescents' 
views of their own symptomatology has been given 
above. With regard to their more global assumptions, 
a recent study by Bishop (2001) found that a trau- 
rnatic event has little bearing on a child's "assumptive 
world" (Janoff-Bulman, 1989); indeed the absence of 
a relationship between the child's beliefs about the 
world and their levels of anxiety and depression is 
taken to suggest the fascinating possibility that "chil- 
dren may deal with traumatic events by subsequently 
rejecting assumptions about the world that threaten 
their sense of security" (p. 404). 
An early study into children's fears following a 
traumatic event (a lightning strike at a boy's foot- 
ball match) demonstrated that, not unsurprisingly, 
the children exposed to the tragedy were more likely 
than control groups to have fears and worries regard- 
ing, a number of phenomena. These phenomena in- 
cluded lightning and thunderstorms, disasters, death 
and dying, as well as other events and situations that 
were not so related to the event they were exposed 
to, such as animals and the supernatural (Dollinger, 
C), Donnell, & Staley, 1984). Although such fears may 
result from amendments to a child's self-schema and 
external threat schemata (Kendall & Ingram, 1987; 
Kendall & Ronan, 1990), the intensity of such fears 
alsO may be aggravated by worrying. Vasey (1993), following the work of Borkovec, 
Shadick, and Hopkins (1991), defined worry as "an 
anticipatory cognitive process involving repetitive 
thoughts and images that contain fear-producing con- 
tent related to possible traumatic events and their po- 
tentially catastrophic implications (p. 7). " Such a pro- 
cess is likely to play a significant role in enhancing 
specific fears following a traumatic event, in addition 
to Inaintaining a generally anxious mood. Vasey's con- 
sideration of childhood worry centers largely around 
the role of children's cognitive development, ac- 
knowledging that worry requires the ability both to 
anticipate future events as well as the related ability 
, to go beyond what is observable and consider what 
is nierely possible"(Vasey, 1993, p. 9). Before a child 
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is 7-8 years of age, he or she is unlikely to be able to 
consider the future (Piaget & Inhelder, 1966), though 
at the slightly earlier age of 5-6 years children have 
been found to produce anticipatory thoughts of threat 
(Vasey, 1991). 
For the child who already has experienced an 
extremely frightening event, it may be considerably 
easier to conceive of future threats, as demonstrated 
in the study of Dollinger et al. (1984). For children 
exposed to trauma, worry may be directed toward 
the prevention of the reoccurrence of an experienced 
event. In adult populations, it has been proposed that 
beliefs regarding the importance of worry, especially 
as a way of coping with future anticipated threats, play 
a key role in the maintenance of high levels of anxiety 
(GAD; Wells, 1995). The role of the metacognitive 
beliefs outlined by Wells (1995) have not yet received 
attention with regard to childhood anxiety disorders, 
yet Vasey (1993) has acknowledged that the role of 
children's beliefs concerning their own problem solv- 
ing skills and cognitive states are related to uncon- 
trollable worry. Future research directed at cxamin- 
ing children's beliefs regarding worry could highlight 
how children think about the future following trauma 
and whether an endorsement of worry may maintain 
elevated levels of anxiety and contribute to the main- 
tenance of PTSD. 
For some time it has been known that follow- 
ing a traumatic event adults suffering from PTSD 
demonstrate an attentional bias (as measured using 
the modified Stroop task) toward trauma-related cues 
than do adults not suffering from PT'SD (Cassiday, 
McNally, & Zeitlin, 1992; Foa, Feske, Murdock, 
Kozak, & McCarthy, 1991; Kaspi & McNally, 1991; 
McNally, Kaspi, Riemann, & Zeitlin, 1990; Thrasher, 
Dalgleish, & Yule, 1994). A variety of explanations 
has been proposed for why such a bias occurs (see 
Thrasher & Dalgleish, 1999, for a review), but no clear 
account exists as to why different methodologies for 
examining attentional biases (e. g. the dichotic listen- 
ing task; Trandel & McNally, 1987) do not demon- 
strate the same bias as conclusively. Brewin et al. 
(1996) view the presence of attentional bias as an 
indicator that SAMs of a traumatic event have not 
been processed and are accompanied by high levels 
of emotion. 
Three studies involving samples of children ex- 
posed to traumatic events have investigated the role of 
attentional biases in this age group. Moradi, Taghavi, 
Neshat-Doost, Yule, and Dalgleish (1999), in a study 
using the modified Stroop task, found that children 
aged 9-17 years who had been exposed to traumatic 
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events such as MVAs or assaults, demonstrated an 
attentional bias toward trauma-related words, rela- 
tive to neutral words and to children who had not 
been exposed to trauma. Unfortunately a sample of 
children who had been exposed to trauma but did 
not develop PTSD was not included in this study, and 
as the authors conclude, the children included in the 
study were old enough to have met all the significant 
cognitive developmental milestones. The same sam- 
ples of children also performed the dot probe task 
(Dalgleish, Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, & Yule, 
2001). Children with PTSD selectively allocated at- 
tention toward socially threatening stimuli, and away 
from depression-related stimuli (no trauma-related 
stimuli were used). 
Ribchester (2001) has overcome some of the fail- 
ings of these studies into children's selective atten- 
tion following trauma. Ribchester found that chil- 
dren suffering from PTSD who had been exposed to 
a MVA demonstrated greater response latencies to- 
ward trauma-related words on a modified Stroop task, 
relative to other word categories and a sample of chil- 
dren also exposed to MVAs but not suffering from 
PTSD. In addition to using an appropriate control 
group, this study also found that the threat-specific 
attentional bias was eliminated following treatment 
with eye movement desensitization and reprocessing 
(EMDR). 
Although the findings from these studies are 
broadly consistent with others that have examined at- 
tentional biases in anxious children (Vasey, Daleiden, 
Williams, & Brown, 1995; Vasey, Elhag, & Daleiden 
1996), it has not been demonstrated that such biases 
play a role in the maintenance of PTSD in either chil- 
dren or adults. It remains to be established whether at- 
tentional bias is a discrete cognitive process involved 
in the etiology and maintenance of PTSD, an exper- 
imental index of PTSD symptoms (e. g., hypervigi- 
lance), or, as Brewin et al. (1996) have suggested, an 
indicator of the presence of unprocessed SAMs. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It has not been the aim of this paper to out- 
line the effects that trauma has on a child's develop- 
ment and distal psychopathology (see Pynoos et al., 
1999, for such an account). This is not to say that 
trauma and PTSD do not have long-term develop- 
mental consequences for children, in terms of both 
psychopathology, and more general functioning such 
as school performance. The work of Bolton, O'Ryan, 
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Udwin, Boyle, and Yule (2000) in the follow-up of 
children involved in the Jupiter disaster demonstrated 
that children are at a greater risk in the aftermath 
of a traumatic event of developing a range of anx- 
iety and affective disorders, especially if they have 
PTSD. Rather, it has been the purpose of this paper 
to stress the need for a more detailed understanding 
of the precise mechanisms that govern the incidence 
and course of posttraurnatic stress reactions, as well 
as how other psychopathology can result following a 
traumatic event. 
The present paper has not been aimed at con- 
clusively advocating any specific cognitive-behavioral 
model for the understanding of children and adoles- 
cents' reactions to trauma, but has argued that adopt- 
ing a "dual representation" framework in attempting 
to understand PTSD in children and adolescents may 
be useful. It has been demonstrated that children with 
posttraurnatic stress disorder possess both represen- 
tations of traumatic events that fit within the notion 
of SAMs and verbally accessible memories and that 
incorporate maladaptive appraisals and "secondary 
emotions" that are associated with a worse outcome, 
the key aspects of the architecture described by both 
Brewin et al. (1996) and Ehlers and Clark (2000). 
Adopting such a framework to the understand- 
ing of IPTSD in children and adolescents offers spe- 
cific directions for future research. First, predictions 
can be made regarding how the time course of PTSD 
varies according to a child's developmental stage. 
Very young children, who are largely dependent on 
their caregivers to appraise danger and for the for- 
mation of a coherent narrative of a distressing event 
(Salmon & Bryant, 2002), would be likely to form 
PTSD symptornatology in the short-term following 
a traumatic event (largely as a function of their care- 
giver's levels of distress and communication with their 
child); lacking the verbal ability and emotional reg- 
ulatory capacities to process their SAM representa- 
tions of the trauma, PTSD symptoms, if present, may 
remain at a stable level for a long period of time. 
Elementary school-aged children would be able to 
lay down more coherent memories of a trauma than 
would very young children. Those that do lay down 
the kinds of memories that give rise to reexperienc- 
ing and hyperarousal may be less likely to engage in 
strategies of coping that impair the processing of such 
memories, for example, cognitive avoidance, rumina- 
tion, or worry, as they lack the more abstract cognitive 
abilities that motivate and enable the use of such cop- 
ing. Older children and adolescents, like elementary 
school-aged children, would be able to appraise an 
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event as traumatic on their own and be more able to 
form a coherent memory of it represented in a verbal 
format. However, they are also more able to engage 
in maladaptive ways of coping, and so a significant 
minority of this age group, much in the same way as 
adults, would be likely to form chronic reactions to 
trauma. 
Second, the role of the family, already demon- 
strated to be important in the development of PTSD 
in children and adolescents (Smith, Perrin, Yule, & 
Rabe-Hesketh, 2001), may be further investigated. In 
the context of a dual representation account of PTSD, 
a child's family may play a role in moderating PTSD 
at a number of points: by enabling a child to verbalize 
a traumatic event as it occurs, enabling the verbaliza- 
tion and emotional processing of a traumatic event in 
its aftermath, and influencing a child's appraisals and 
coping styles after a traumatic event. 
Third, the role of pretraumatic psychological dis- 
orders in increasing the risk of PTSD (Asarnow et al., 
1999; La Greca, Silverman, & Wasserstein, 1998) may 
be better understood. Preexisting elevated arousal 
may lead to a child laying down more emotion-laden 
memories and be related to the onset of PTSD, while 
the presence of maladaptive cognitive and metacog- 
nitive styles may play a role in the maintenance of 
posttraumatic symptomatology. 
Fourth, the increased prevalence of emotional 
disorders in children and adolescents exposed to 
trauma may be further investigated. As has already 
been demonstrated in adults exposed to trauma (Foa, 
Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999), a child's ap- 
praisals. following a trauma may be associated with 
depression and anxiety, as well as posttraumatic symp- 
tomatology. 
Fifth, our understanding of the role of verbal ac- 
counts of a trauma may be further informed. An ex- 
amination of the literature on child and adult reac- 
tions to trauma highlights the need to understand the 
degree to which the remission of PTSD is related to 
the formation of verbally based memories of a trau- 
matic event. Both the adult cognitive models outlined 
above and a number of theorists in the domain of 
child and adolescent PTSD (Fivush, 1998; Salmon & 
]3ryant, 2002) have highlighted the need for individ- 
uals exposed to trauma to form a coherent memory 
of a traumatic event that is represented in a verbal 
format. In one study of adults treated for PTSD, us- 
ing exposure it was found that the transformation of 
sensory and action-oriented descriptions of the trau- 
matic event to meaningful and reflective accounts was 
associated with clinical improvement (Amir, Stafford, 
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Freshman, & Foa, 1998). It is unclear whether it is the 
change in narrative structure that is associated with 
an improvement in posttraurnatic stress symptoma- 
tology, or other factors that are influenced by expo- 
sure techniques, such as the extinction of conditioned 
fear responses. 
Sixth, the importance attached to forms of cog- 
nitive avoidance by both Ehlers and Clark (2000) and 
Brewin et al. (1996) suggests that future research may 
be usefully directed toward understanding how chil- 
dren's use of thought control strategies varies across 
development. Research into children's use of other 
cognitive activities (such as worry and rumination) 
across development will further inform how maladap- 
tive coping maintains PTSD. 
The case for applying elements of adult ap- 
proaches to psychopathology to the understanding 
of childhood emotional disorder has already been 
made, for example, the information processing per- 
spective on anxiety (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997). How- 
ever, there exists in this application of adult the- 
ory the danger that "the more the research is about 
psychopathology, the less it is about development" 
(Steinberg, 2002, p. 127). Adopting a dual represen- 
tation framework does not preclude developmental 
considerations when understanding children's reac- 
tions to traumatic events. Rather, such a framework 
allows investigation into developmental influences on 
the specific processes that contribute to the onset and 
maintenance of PTSD. 
Although considered the "first-line" approach 
to treatment, the "active ingredients" of cognitive- 
behavior therapy (CBT) for PTSD in children and 
adolescents have yet to be established (Cohen, 
Berliner, & March, 2000). Exposure treatments have 
been shown to be effective in child as well as adult 
populations (Saigh, Yule, & Inamdar, 1996), but the 
success of this treatment could be attributable to dif- 
ferent therapeutic processes. As mentioned above, ex- 
posure treatment may allow a reduction in the neg- 
ative affect and arousal incorporated in traumatic 
memories, modify the structure and form of the trau- 
matic memory such that the memories are less likely 
to be triggered by external sensory stimuli, or both 
of these processes. The role of cognitive elements of 
CBT similarly needs clarification, and it is suggested 
that cognitive interventions will benefit from incor- 
porating an understanding of children's cognitive- 
avoidant and metacognitive processes in the after- 
math of trauma. The framework presented here for 
understanding elements of children's and adoles- 
cents' reactions to trauma may inform how cognitive 
230 
behavioral treatments might be improved and tai- 
lored to a child's development. 
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accessing emotion-laden memories of a traumatic 
event is unlikely to produce clinical improvement 
if no extinction of fear can occur (Foa, Steketee, & 
Rothbaum, 1989). 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) describe how adults with 
pTSD often possess a particular form of anxiety that 
theY term "current threat" (see above). These authors 
consider this state to be strongly related to various be- 
liefs that an individual holds regarding their present 
condition and their more global worldview. A discus- 
sion of the possible role of children and adolescents' 
views of their own symptornatology has been given 
above. With regard to their more global assumptions, 
a recent study by Bishop (2001) found that a trau- 
matic event has little bearing on a child's "assumptive 
world" (Janoff-Bulman, 1989); indeed the absence of 
a relationship between the child's beliefs about the 
world and their levels of anxiety and depression is 
taken to suggest the fascinating possibility that "chil- 
dren may deal with traumatic events by subsequently 
rejecting assumptions about the world that threaten 
their sense of security" (p. 404). 
An early study into children's fears following a 
traumatic event (a lightning strike at a boy's foot- 
ball match) demonstrated that, not unsurprisingly, 
the children exposed to the tragedy were more likely 
than control groups to have fears and worries regard- 
ing a number of phenomena. These phenomena in- 
cluded lightning and thunderstorms, disasters, death 
and dying, as well as other events and situations that 
were not so related to the event they were exposed 
to, such as animals and the supernatural (Dollinger, 
09ponnell, & Staley, 1984). Although such fears may 
restIlt from amendments to a child's self-schema and 
external threat schemata (Kendall & Ingram, 1987; 
y, endall & Ronan, 1990), the intensity of such fears 
also may be aggravated by worrying. Vasey (1993), following the work of Borkovec, 
Shadick, and Hopkins (1991), defined worry as "an 
anticipatory cognitive process involving repetitive 
t1loughts and images that contain fear-producing con- 
tent related to possible traumatic events and their po- 
tentially catastrophic implications (p. 7). " Such a pro- 
cess is likely to play a significant role in enhancing 
spe , cific 
fears following a traumatic event, in addition 
to maintaining a generally anxious mood. Vasey's con- 
sideration of childhood worry centers largely around 
the , role of children's cognitive 
development, ac- 
knowledging that worry requires the ability both to 
anticipate 
future events as well as the related ability 
6tto go beyond what is observable and consider what 
is merely possible"(Vasey, 1993, p. 9). Before a child 
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is 7-8 years of age, he or she is unlikely to be able to 
consider the future (Piaget & Inhelder, 1966), though 
at the slightly earlier age of 5-6 years children have 
been found to produce anticipatory thoughts of threat 
(Vasey, 1991). 
For the child who already has experienced an 
extremely frightening event, it may be considerably 
easier to conceive of future threats, as demonstrated 
in the study of Dollinger ct al. (1984). For children 
exposed to trauma, worry may be directed toward 
the prevention of the reoccurrence of an experienced 
event. In adult populations, it has been proposed that 
beliefs regarding the importance of worry, especially 
as a way of coping with future anticipated threats, play 
a key role in the maintenance of high levels of anxiety 
(GAD; Wells, 1995). The role of the metacognitive 
beliefs outlined by Wells (1995) have not yet received 
attention with regard to childhood anxiety disorders, 
yet Vasey (1993) has acknowledged that the role of 
children's beliefs concerning their own problem solv- 
ing skills and cognitive states are related to uncon- 
trollable worry. Future research directed at examin- 
ing children's beliefs regarding worry could highlight 
how children think about the future following trauma 
and whether an endorsement of worry may maintain 
elevated levels of anxiety and contribute to the main- 
tenance of PTSD. 
For some time it has been known that follow- 
ing a traumatic event adults suffering from PTSD 
demonstrate an attentional bias (as measured using 
the modified Stroop task) toward trauma-related cues 
than do adults not suffering from PTSD (Cassiday, 
McNally, & Zeitlin, 1992; Foa, Feske, Murdock, 
Kozak, & McCarthy, 1991; Kaspi & McNally, 1991; 
McNally, Kaspi, Riemann, & Zeitlin, 1990; Thrasher, 
Dalgleish, & Yule, 1994). A variety of explanations 
has been proposed for why such a bias occurs (see 
Thrasher & Dalgleish, 1999, for a review), but no clear 
account exists as to why different methodologies for 
examining attentional biases (e. g. the dichotic listen- 
ing task; Trandel & McNally, 1987) do not demon- 
strate the same bias as conclusively. Brewin et al. 
(1996) view the presence of attentional bias as an 
indicator that SAMs of a traumatic event have not 
been processed and are accompanied by high levels 
of emotion. 
Three studies involving samples of children ex- 
posed to traumatic events have investigated the role of 
attentional biases in this age group. Moradi, Taghavi, 
Neshat-Doost, Yule, and Dalgleish (1999), in a study 
using the modified Stroop task, found that children 
aged 9-17 years who had been exposed to traumatic 
